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Abstract 
The Representation of the People Act of 1918 and the Equal
Franchise Act of 1928 trebled the electorate and created a near
universal franchise. Politicians of the two principal inter-war
parties - Conservative and Labour - declared their commitment to
rational political education as the basis of effective democracy. Yet
belief in the continuing ignorance and irrationality of the
electorate, in the dishonest propaganda of their opponents and, for
the Conservatives, in the threat to democracy posed by socialism,
encouraged the use of less than rational propaganda in order to
achieve and maintain power. The size of the electorate gave a new
emphasis to large scale party propaganda while the party
organisations were adapting themselves to the new conditions. The
Conservative Party used its financial reserves and anti-socialist
support to develop new publicity techniques, particularly in its use
of film. The Labour ParLy attempted to do likewise, but was hindered
by financial difficulties and local party independence, as its
experience with film publicity demonstrated.
The new media of broadcasting and film were seen to have
considerable implications for democracy. At the BBC John Reith and
his senior staff believed broadcasting to be democracy's perfecting
element, and attempted to develop what they saw as an impartial and
rational means of universal political communication and education.
The political parties and the government of the day, however,
recognised the power and dangers of the medium, and party jealousy
and disagreement, together with government pressure, reinforced
internal factors acting against the successful prosecution of this
aim. In particular certain of the BBC's ideals and objectives were
mutually incompatible. Thus it proved less than easy to reconcile the
objective of impartial and comprehensive foreign affairs coverage
with a conscious promotion of international amity. Moreover the BBC's
very commitment to democracy could militate against effective
political education, especially at a time when the concept of
democracy was being questioned and totalitarian alternatives offered
ii
abroad.
In the film industry the cinema newsreels were the most important
contribution to political communication and the provision of news.
Their editors proclaimed both their impartiality and, in some cases,
a serious intent. Yet coverage of domestic politics was limited and
overwhelmingly concerned with government activities. The considerable
attention given to the newsreels by the Conservative ParLy and the
National Government complemented existing editorial predilections,
and the consequence was a less than independent or impartial stance.
Thus despite the valuable contribution which both radio and film made
to political information and education, their use as democratic
integrators in response to the totalitarian challenge was actually to
prove in some degree inimical to the rationalist and educative
element of the democratic ideal.
This thesis considers the aims and efforts of those responsible
for the new methods of political presentation. It touches on the
question of the actual impact of these methods, but does not attempt
a detailed evaluation. Using new material from the papers of the
Conservative and Labour parties, the BBC, Foreign Office News
Department and individual politicians, in addition to film viewing
and interviews with those involved, its intention is both to explore
new fields and to shed fresh light on old ones.
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Terminology and abbreviations 
The term 'political broadcasting' is sometimes used to denote
specifically 'party' political broadcasting. In order to avoid
ambiguity in the following chapters, however, I have not used it in
this sense at all. I have referred to general broadcasting about
politics as either 'political broadcasting' or 'political affairs
broadcasting', whilst for broadcasts by or with the close involvement
of the political parties I have used the terms 'party political
broadcpsting' or 'party broadcasting'. One phrase not used below is
current affairs broadcasting', as both the term and the concept are
comparatively modern. 'Current affairs' was rarely used inside the
BBC during the period under consideration; indeed current affairs
broadcasting as such - the day to day, up to the minute discussion of
events as they happened - was then virtually unknown, apart from
certain topical talks which followed or formed part of the news
bulletins. It would be hard to recognise most broadcasting about
politics in the 1920s and 1930s as 'current affairs' in the modern
sense.
While this research was in progress the archives of the British
Broadcasting Corporation were being completely reindexed. Where the
new index number was known during the course of writing it has been
used. Elsewhere a series of initials hAs been used to denote specific
BBC files. These initials, together with the new index numbers, are
listed in the bibliography.
Other abbreviations used, either in the text or in the footnotes,
are as follows:
AC(T)	 Assistant Controller (Talks)
BBC	 British Broadcasting Company
British Broadcasting Corporation
BBFC	 British Board of Film Censors
BMN	 British Movietone News
BPN	 British Paramount News
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BUF	 British Union of Fascists
CCO	 Conservative Central Office
CEA	 Cinematograph Exhibitors' Association
CFA	 Conservative and Unionist Films Association
CP	 Cabinet Papers
C(P)	 Controller (Programmes)
CPGB	 Communist Party of Great Britain
CRD	 Conservative Research Department
CWS	 Co-operative Wholesale Society
DOG	 Deputy Director General (BBC)
DG	 Director General (BBC)
FO	 Foreign Office
GBN	 Gaumont British News
GPO	 General Post Office
HO	 Home Office
ILP	 Independent Labour Party
IO	 India Office
ITA	 Independent Television Authority
IM	 Imperial War Museum
LCC	 London County Council
LNU	 League of Nations Union
LPAR
	 Labour Party Annual Report to Conference
MEPO
	 Papers of the Metropolitan Police
MOI	 Ministry of Information
NACEC
	 National Association of Co-operative Educational Committees
NCL	 National Council of Labour
NEC	 National Executive Committee of the Labour Party
NFA	 National Film Archive
NJC	 National Joint Council of the NEC, TUC and PLP
NjFC	 National Joint Film Council
NPB	 National Publicity Bureau
NSC	 National Savings Committee
NUCUA	 National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations
NUWM
	 National Unemployed Workers' Movement
PAC	 Parliamentary Advisory Committee (of BBC)
PEP	 Political and Economic Planning
PG	 Pathe Gazette
PLP	 Parliamentary Labour Party
PMG	 Postmaster General
PRO	 Public Record Office
Prem.	 Papers of the Prime Minister's Office
RPA	 Representation of the People Act
SDP	 German Social Democratic Party
SNE	 Senior News Editor (BBC)
TAC	 Talks Advisory Comittee (BBC)
T&GWU	 Transport and General Workers' Union
TUC	 Trades Union Congress
WFA	 Workers' Film Association
1Introduction.
The extension of the franchise in Britain in the first three
decades of the twentieth century was widely regarded as a necessary,
but nonetheless alarming, step. In 1910 some twenty-eight per cent.
of the adult population enjoyed the right to vote, numbering just
under 7,700,000 men out of a total population of nearly 45,000,000.
By 1919 the proportion of men and women eligible to vote had been
increased to seventy-eight per cent., and by the election of 1929 to
ninety per cent., of the adult population, in absolute terms nearly
29,000,000 of both sexes, including the so-called 'flappers'. These
years thus saw the electorate almost quadrupled, and the most
important and responsible democratic right given to working class men
and to women who had until now been considered too ignorant or
irresponsible to deserve it.
The granting of the vote, however, did not follow any radical
alteration of opinion on the part of those who granted it, as to the
knowledge or inherent wisdom of the newly enfranchised, and the
question remained
how the promiscuous crowd of old and young, of learned and
unlearned, of rich and poor, who are all declared collectively
arbiters of their political destinies, would be able to discharge
1
their new function of "sovereign".
Severe doubts remained, and it was not surprising that, despite
educational progress since the Education Act of 1870, the objective
of an educated and fully literate society still seemed remote. The
general level of education was perceived as still being low, with the
concerns of the majority too restricted for them to take a wider and
more responsible view of their democratic duties. The increasing
1.	 M. I. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organisation of Political 
Parties, London 1902, 3.
2complexity of society, moreover, made it ever more difficult for the
electorate to comprehend the political and social issues presented to
it.
Nor was education necessarily associated with greater
rationality. Increased literacy, combined with a still limited
education, was seen as exposing the people to a number of influences
and pressures which were not necessarily beneficial, whilst the
development of a minimum level of standard education was felt by some
to have dangers for individuality. The franchise extensions of the
second half of the nineteenth century had been followed by the
developement of 'caucus' politics and of political practices which
many deplored, developments which were nevertheless to prove
fundamental for party politics in the twentieth. Moreover, from the
1890s onwards, the growth of the popular press and changes in reading
habits amongst the working classes had created a new and significant
influence upon public opinion. These new factors were seen as being
of mixed value for democracy, and useful primarily to unscrupulous
politicians, and to newspaper proprietors such as the Earmsworth
brothers and later Lord Beaverbrook, who proved themselves very ready
to use or abuse the power of the platform which they had raised. As
William Lecky wrote in 1896,
To set the many against the few becomes the chief object of the
electioneering agent. As education advances newspapers arise
which are intended solely for this purpose, and they are often
2
almost the only reading of great numbers of voters.
Thus reason, political knowledge and understanding, which Lecky
believed to be the prerogatives of the educated and propertied
classes, would be subsumed within a general ignorance, which would be
manipulated by men of influence for their own ends. Writing a few
years earlier, Sir Henry Maine described the factors at work in this
manipulation of the gullible, an analysis of the operation of one
form of propaganda:
2.	 W.E.H. Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, London 1896, 18-19.
3a ready belief in generalities has shown itself to be a
characteristic of imperfectly educated minds. Meantime, men
ambitious of political authority have found out the secret of
manufacturing generalities in any number .... All generalisation
is the product of abstraction; all abstraction consists in
dropping out of sight a certain number of particular facts, and
constructing a formulae which will embrace the remainder; and the
comparative value of general propositions turns entirely on the
relative importance of the particular facts selected and of the
3
particular facts rejected.
The mid-Victorian rationalist individualist vision was therefore
believed by many to be still unattainable in present conditions; yet
the alternative democratic scenario, trusting in the instinctive
common sense of working men, a common sense based not on knowledge
but on daily experience, was also considered suspect in view of
increasingly prevalent theories as to the nature of man in the mass.
These were 'scientifically' formulated in the ideas of such social
psychologists as William McDougall and Wilfred Trotter, whose
writings on man's herd instinct struck a chord amongst the many, both
democratic and elitist, who were finding traditional liberal
4
assumptions about rationalist individualism inadequate. Thus in
the early years of the twentieth century a debate arose between those
who held that recent experience had shown traditional theories to be
fundamentally unsound and those who believed the recognised flaws to
be capable of remedy, the consequence of concrete factors such as the
nature of society, the level of education, and the political
consciousness of the electorate. Yet Britain was, by now, almost
irrevocably committed to the path of franchise extension. If the
3. Sir Henry Maine, Popular Government, London 1885, 107.
4. R.N. Soffer, 'New Elitism:Social Psychology in Prewar England',
Journal of British Studies, vol. 8 (1969), 111-140. The Labour
leader, James Ramsay MacDonald, read Trotter and cited him in
his own writings. A copy of Trotter's Instincts of the Herd In 
Peace and War was to be found at the library of the
Conservative Research Department when this was established in
1929.
4battles against the female and 'flapper' votes were bitter and
prolonged, they could be no more than holding actions. In such an
atmosphere the leaders of all the major political parties could only
express their confidence in a democratic future, rejecting the
pessimistic and elitist conclusions of the social psychologists,
whilst adopting some of their pseudo-scientific reasoning in order to
explain the apparent continuing irrationality of the electorate.
By 1914, therefore, there was a widespread and powerful, if most
crudely conceptualised, post-Freudian belief in the tremendous
psychological forces at work in man and society, and a growing
conviction that, once recognised, it was possible to manipulate them
in particular directions, for good or ill. The growth in commercial
advertising during this period was partly a reflection of such a
belief, and one whose significance was not lost upon politicians
anxious to sell their own 'product'. But it was the First World War
which confirmed in the minds of all concerned the truly awesome power
of propaganda. On both sides of the conflict a conviction arose,
shortly after the war had ended, as to the major role which
propaganda had played in the German collapse and the Allied
5
victory.	 The word 'propaganda' assumed most undesirable
connotations within a democratic system which aspired to and claimed
a rational basis. This distaste was only strengthened when it was
appreciated to what excesses of untruth both sides had sunk, and the
wartime Ministry of Information became an early victim of the peace.
During the 1920s and 1930s the democracies were to observe and
deplore the eagerness with which the communist and fascist regimes
adopted propaganda as a weapon with which to consolidate their power,
guide the knowledge and thoughts of their people, and ensure national
unity. Propaganda both repelled and fascinated. The inter-war years
••n • li.D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in The World War, London
1927; Sir Campbell Stuart, Secrets of Crewe House, London 1920;
J.D. Squires, British Propaganda at Home and in the United 
States from 1914 to 1917, Cambridge 1935; G. Bruntz, Allied 
Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918,
Stanford 1938; D.C. Watts (ed.), Hitler's Mein Kampf, London
1974, 161-169.
5saw a large number of writings on the subject and a debate as to the
exact nature of propaganda, a term with as many definitions as
6
analysts.
Not surprisingly, the concepts of 'citizenship' and 'education
for democracy' found great vogue during this period, a response
partly to the new electorate and partly to the totalitarian challenge
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to democratic ideas. The notion of citizenship proved especially
attractive, tying as it did the new practice of a universal franchise
to the more traditional values of duty and service. The adult
education movement received considerable support, and in their desire
to be seen as supporting this praiseworthy cause the political
parties themselves established colleges and held summer schools
where, so it was claimed, non-partisan courses on citizenship were
given and the cause of political education upheld. Politicians openly
espoused reason and education as the essence of democratic decision
taking, legitimating their own creed as truth, and denigrating
irrational propaganda.
Yet political parties still had to counter the arguments of their
opponents, communicate their own message to the voters and win
support, and behind the scenes the need for effective propaganda - an
activity only occa-sionally hidden behind the more euphemistic word
'publicity' - was fully recognised. Whilst the Conservative Party,
6. C.F. Higham, Looking Forward, London 1920; L. Doob, Propaganda: 
Its Psychology and Technique, New York 1935; M. Garnett,
'Propaganda', Contemporary Review, May 1935, 574-582; 0.
Stapledon, 'Education and Propaganda', Adult Education, April
1935, 193-199; A. Huxley, 'Notes on Propaganda', Harper's
Monthly Magazine, December 1936, 31-41; D.W. Harding, General
Conceptions in the Study of the Press and Public Opinion', The
Sociological Review, October 1937, 372-375; A.J. Mackenzie,
Propaganda Boom, London 1938; S. Rogerson, Propaganda in the
Next War, London 1938; F.C. Bartlett, Political Propaganda,
Cambridge 1940.
7. L.P. Jacks, Constructive Citizenship, London 1927; E.D. Simon,
'Education for Democracy', The Political Quarterly, vol. 5
(1934), 307-322; E.M. Hubback, 'Education in Citizenship',
Adult Education, vol. 7 (1934), 53-59; P. Doyle, 'Education in
Democracy', Adult Education, vol. 8 (1936), 226-233. An
Association for Education in Citizenship was formed in 1933-4.
6fearing the effects of 'socialist' and e conmunist' propaganda,
awaited an electoral disaster that never came, the Labour Party
explained away its lack of success at the polls as being, to a large
extent, the effect of deeply rooted propaganda of the Right. A large
section of the electorate was perceived as being both volatile and
uncommitted to any one party. Public opinion polls and psephological
studies did not yet exist to demonstrate to anxious politicians the
proportion of voters who had rapidly attached themselves to one or
another of the principal parties and so settled into established
voting patterns. Thus a widespread belief in the propaganda of the
opposition and in the volatility of the newly enfranchised, led, in
the 1920s and 1930s, to increased experiments in and attempts at mass
political persuasion. Propaganda was tacitly accepted as a necessary
evil.
It is, perhaps, necessary to provide a brief definition of
'propaganda', although the term certainly did not have a uniform
meaning amongst those who used it. In some instances, for example, it
was used to refer to certain forms and techniques of persuasion, as
well as to the aims which lay behind their use. In the present
context, however, 'propaganda' is taken to be an attempt by one
individual or group to instil in others such beliefs as the author
intends, using the selection of facts, the inventions of fiction or
the appeals of emotion, or a combination of the three, to this end.
The purpose of political propaganda is thus to narrow the recipient's
choice of options, in the taking of any decision, to one. By contrast
the objective of education in abstract terms is to broaden the
recipient's understanding of the available options, and to provide
all pertinent facts and arguments, yet without expressing a
preference or weighting the evidence. In practice it is clear that
little education and less 'political' education falls within these
terms. For whereas propaganda can be defined in reference to its aims
alone, education requires some consideration to be given to both aims
and implementation.
Accepting such definitions, the first point to be made is that
7certain forms of propaganda were not necessarily incompatible with a
rationalist democracy. Propaganda which consisted of the selection
and interpretation of facts could be reconciled to a system which
required them all to be available to the voter. Given a pluralist
society, and a means of communication which reflected that pluralism
fully and effectively, the different propaganda strands would merely
form part of the greater educational effort. This was an idea which
lay behind many of the early hopes for broadcasting as the perfecting
element in democracy. In a politically conscious and critical
democracy even appeals to emotion could be regarded as valuable
indications of a party's outlook, and hence not necessarily
unacceptable. The nature of the persuasion could be a useful guide to
the mind which originated it.
Yet at the same time it must be said that few indeed of those
involved in political propaganda in the inter-war years considered
the existing channels of communication to be either adequate or
effective, whilst even fewer welcomed the 'dishonest' propaganda of
the opposition as the acceptable counterpart, the equivalent, to
their own activities. In the development of their own publicity
organisations and methods the objective was not just to reach the
electorate, but also, if possible, to reach it either alone or in an
overwhelming preponderance. It need hardly be said that the absence,
failure or inferiority of an opponent's propaganda, when observed,
was a cause for celebration and not regret.
The second point to be made is that although 'propaganda' was not
by definition an activity conducted by the few towards the many, in
the circumstances of their aims and objectives the political parties
were primarily concerned with large scale propaganda efforts. Such
undertakings were considerably more complex and uncertain than
individual persuasion, because of the diverse character of the
target, and the lack of precise knowledge about it. As already
stated, the public opinion poll was quite unknown for most of the
period. For this reason there was, where it could be afforded,
considerable	 experimentation	 in	 technique,
	
experimentation
8exemplified by the various attempts to use the new mass medium of
film for 'mass' propaganda. It might also be tentatively suggested
that the complex nature of the audience for propaganda encouraged the
use of fairly simple, emotional appeals, appeals that would be
understood by a larger body of people than might be capable of
assimilating a factual argument.
Nevertheless, although propaganda in democratic Britain involved
a narrowing of thought for the recipient, it was intended by the
principal parties essentially as a short cut to the electoral
decision which rational thought would, more gradually, have reached.
As such the emphasis on 'rational' political education was perfectly
genuine. Power in democracy had, it was felt, to rest on popular
conviction if it was to be sustained. It was therefore very necessary
to back up propaganda with the political 'education' which each party
confidently believed would confirm the already implanted conclusion. r
This somewhat naive idea in large measure absolved the political
parties, at least in their own minds, from the opprobrium incurred by
utilising propaganda.
The inter-war years saw an increasing recognition that effective
democracy required effective communication. It was not surprising,
therefore, that whilst the popular press was largely rejected as the
medium for this communication, in view of its structure and
ownership, the new media of broadcasting and film were considered to
have great potential for the fulfilment of this role. The creators of
the BBC believed that broadcasting could indeed provide an essential
element in the democratic system, and worked to that end. A large
proportion of this study is devoted to an analysis of their efforts,
and of the tensions and theoretical contradictions which so
frequently frustrated them in their objectives. It would also have
been odd indeed if the political parties, so concerned to communicate
their messages to an enormous audience, and in some cases almost
equally concerned to prevent their opponents from so doing, had not
recognised in broadcasting a tremendous force for good or evil. The
story of the BBC and political presentation is therefore largely one
9with that of the parties and broadcasting.
In the world of film the documentary movement, founded by John
Grierson, professed similar aspirations. Its work, however, must on
the whole be considered to have been outside the mainstream of
political communication, and its audience strictly limited. In view
of this, and of the already extensive writings on the documentary
movement, no consideration of it has been made in the present
8
work. Within the commercial film industry, however, the cinema
newsreels both enjoyed a large audience and made some pretensions to
covering the political scene. At the same time they were fully
commercial operations, and this fact was, as with the press, to prove
a critical influence upon their approach to political presentation.
The 1920s and 1930s were a period during which, within the
dominant Right, fears as to the threat of civil disorder, political
upheaval and the overthrow of democratic institutions was rife. The
predominantly Conservative governments of the day were increasingly
concerned to defend the established order against possible
totalitarian alternatives. The wireless and film were considered to
be powerful weapons in this fight, both for and against. In any case
their unique and seemingly ethereal nature, infiltrating, as it
appeared, beyond the level of conscious perception, gave them a
particular mystique. Their peculiar potency as media for persuasion
and the moulding of public opinion was never doubted. The Government
consequently took an increasing interest in them, particularly in
relation to the presentation of foreign and defence policy, using the
excuse of 'national interest' to justify such intervention. The
question must therefore be considered as to whether government
actions could be described as censorship, the natural stablemate of
propaganda.
8. See F. Hardy, John Grierson, London 1979; J. Grierson, Grierson 
on Documentary, London 1966 (revised edition); R. Low, The
History of the British Film 1929-1939 - Documentary and 
Educational Films of the 1930s, London 1979; P. Swann, The
British Documentary Film Movement, 1929-1946, unpublished Ph.D.
Thesis, Leeds 1979.
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The presentation of politics was an activity as old as society
itself. In the inter-war years, however, the extension of the
electorate and the perceived threat, both internal and external, to
democracy itself, caused politicians, educationalists and those in
control of the channels of communication, to consider it in a more
serious and organised way than hitherto. The debate between
propaganda and education was to be a practical as well as a
theoretical one during this period, despite popular abhorrence of the
former. For as Macgillivray of Scotland Yard asked John Buchan's
hero, Richard Hannay,
Propaganda 	  Dick, have you ever considered what a diabolical
weapon that can be - using all the channels of modern publicity
to poison and warp men's minds? It is the most dangerous thing on
9
earth.
9. J. Buchan, The Three Hostages, London 1924, 53. John BuchRn was
particularly conscious of the power of propaganda, for he had
been director of Lloyd George's Department of Information
during the war, prior to the creation of a full Ministry of
Information.
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CHAPHR ONE
The Conservative Party and Party Publicity.
"Propaganda, now recognised as the world's most potent weapon ....
Our one great advantage: Wealth. Let us use it. Its expenditure
should be regarded as an insurance premium."
Notes for speech by Stanley Baldwin to Party
financial backers, March 1927.
"We are faced with the intensive propaganda of Socialism .... The
maintenance of an educated democracy depends on unceasing propaganda
pressed with vigour and enthusiasm, and at the same time directed
with a full and exact knowledge of the facts...."
Stanley Baldwin, in Politics in Review, 1934.
"The honourable gentleman knows that in present conditions,
unfortunately, political advertisement is necessary on the part of
every party. Some of us do it better than others [laughter and
cheers].
Stanley Baldwin, in the House of Commons, June
1935.
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The extensions of the franchise in 1918 and 1928 received a mixed
reaction from Conservative politicians, but left almost all deeply
worried as to the Party's continuing electoral prospects. A general
fear and suspicion of the rationality of the new electorate wag
widespread, and reports of voters' ignorance and gullibility
circulated freely. As one commentator wrote in 1920:
There should be no delusions about the political prospects of the
immediate future. All the recent by-elections have shown a
tremendous landslide towards Labour, which demonstrates the
1
extreme instability of the new electorate.
A comparative . newcomer to the ranks of the Unionist peers, Lord
Sydenham of Combe, believed that
The Government of all "advanced" States will ... pess into the
nominal control of electoral mobs, which can construct nothing
but may at any time destroy at the bidding of temporary passion,
2
or of artificially created misunderstanding.
Naturally the Conservative case was considered both rational and
honestly presented, so that the voters' emotionalism was considered
an electoral disadvantage. As Neville Chamberlain sadly told his
diary,
the new electorate contains an immense mass of ignorant voters,
1. J.B. Firth, 'The future of the Conservative Party', Fortnightly
Review, vol. 113 (1920), 220. See also The Nineteenth Century
and After, vol. 95 (1924), 12-13, and the Contemporary Review,
vol. 125 (1924), 2, 13.
2. The Nineteenth Century and After, vol. 103 (1928), 32 - 42.
13
of both sexes, whose intelligence is low and who have no power of
3
weighing evidence.
The Conservative MP Sir Henry Craik, speaking in 1912, saw nothing to
be pleased about in the prospect of an enlarged franchise:
The one thing that is certain about this addition to the
electorate is that its movements will be absolutely uncertain,
that it may turn in favour of one party just as much as of
another, that it will be moved by fitful and changeful impulses,
and that it will be largely under the control of dexterous
4
manipulation and careful Machiavellian electioneering dodges.
The extension of the franchise to the working classes was seen as
dangerous for the Party particularly because of the claim by Labour
to represent the working man's cause. Austen Chamberlain, for
example, believed that the name 'Labour' was 'an excellent
5
electioneering asset,' and other Conservatives agreed. The female
franchise was felt to be equally dangerous because of the supposed
flightiness and extra gullibility of women. Sydenham continued:
We are being brought face to face with mob-psychology - largely
feminine - as
6	
an ultimate determining force in national
politics.
That the women's vote was largely responsible for the 1923 election
3. K. Feiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, London 1946, 110.
4. House of Commons Debates, 5th Series (hereafter H.C. Debates),
vol. 39:col. 1414, 17 June 1912.
5. The Contemporary Review, vol. 121 (1922), 300. See, however,
Beatrice Webb's contrary view that "Labour" cannot be a long-
lived epithet, it smells too flagrantly of sectional
interest.' - M. I. Cole (ed.), Beatrice Webb's Diaries 1924- 
1932, London 1956, 162, 14 February 1928.
6. The Nineteenth Century and After, vol. 103 (1928), 32-42.
14
7
defeat was apparently 'well rubbed-in' in Conservative circles.
Even J.C.C. Davidson, who was sympathetic to the women's cause and
did much to improve the status of women within the party
organisation, felt that
It is always unwise to forecast the result of an election, more
especially nowadays when the women's vote is such an inconsistent
8
factor.
'Inconsistency' amongst the electorate was something that the
Party, with its pre-war emphasis on party loyalty through regular
registration campaigns, still at heart deplored, despite the fact
that it was itself about to exploit this very fault of the voter
through the party publicity developments of the inter-war decades.
Neville Chamberlain was not the only senior Conservative politician
to regret that
we may never get back to the old days when every little boy or
9
girl was either a little Liberal CT a little Conservative.
To this general belief in the electors' volatility, in the ebb and
flow of support between the parties, must be ascribed much of the
determination with which certain party leaders and managers were to
undertake the role of persuaders and educators to a mass audience.
Philip Cambray, deputy head of the Conservative Central Office
Publicity Department in 1927, stated the problem in his apologia for
party persuasion, The Game of Politics:
Members [of Parliament] now face an electorate of forty to fifty
7. K.W.D. Rolph, Tories, Tariffs and Elections, unpublished Ph.D.
Thesis, Cambridge 1974, 140.
8. J.C.C. Davidson papers, Davidson to R.T. Harper, 19 November
1923. These papers are as yet unindexed, and no more detailed
reference is therefore possible.
9. Neville Chamberlain papers, NC18/1/938, Neville to Hilda
Chamberlain, 9 November 1935.
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thousand. In some constituencies it is even more numerous, and
from one fifth to a quarter may change with every new register.
The definite party 'fors' and 'againsts' form but a small part of
the whole. Even in a well organised constituency, under present
day conditions, the number of declared Party adherents forms a
10
minority of the whole body of electors.
His conclusion was natural and logical, and represented the view of
others besides himself:
A commander in the field who, through unjustified scrupulousness,
neglected to avail himself of every opening to defeat the enemy,
would promptly and rightly be removed from his command. As the
politician has the duty of defeating his opponent, so he also has
the responsibility of preparing himself for the task which he has
11
to perform.
The extension Of the franchise thus necessarily affected the approach
of the Party to political communication and persuasion. As the Party
Chairman from 1926 to 1930, J.C.C. Davidson, told Baldwin in 1928,
Before the War it was possible with a limited and highly expert
electorate to put forward Party programmes of a restricted and
well defined character, but nowadays I am quite sure that while
10. P. Cambray, The Game of Politics, London 1932, 8. This book,
which was intended almost as a Clausewitz for politicians,
certainly shows a well developed and not unsophisticated theory
of the mechanics of political persuasion. Without over-
emphasising the power of particular techniques or weapons, and
recognising their limitations, Cambray makes considerable
claims for the effectiveness of well planned party tactics and
propaganda, in an attempt to arouse politicians to the need for
a considered electoral strategy. Chapters include 'Propaganda
Offensives', 'Futility of Defensives', 'The Value of Surprise',
'Concentration of Effort', and 'Weapons and Machinery in
relation to Political Strategy'.Cambray had been a senior
member of the Central Office Publicity Department since the
war.
U. Ibid.185.
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not departing from the principles of our Party we must endeavour
to gain the confidence not only of our own supporters but of the
12
mugwump vote ....
Such statements as to the uncommitted nature of the larger part
of the electorate were not based on any poll or psephological study,
but on ingrained beliefs as to the voting habits of the new
electorate, and on observation of the changing fortunes of the three
parties. Party managers' understanding of the electorate was not
improved by the fact that after the 1918 Representation of the People
Act the task of electoral registration 
13
was lifted from the parties
and accepted as a duty of the state. The rapid abandonment of
registration campaigns left the Conservative Party machinery
available to pursue other means of obtaining and holding votes, and
the relative importance of direct publicity campaigning within the
work of the Party was thereby naturally increased. Direct publicity
became More than ever necessary as a means of communicating with the
electorate now that registration no longer provided such a point of
contact between party and voter.
The 1918 and 1928 Acts had serious consequences for the
Conservative Party's attitude to mass propaganda. So did the post-war
rise of the Labour Party. Long before 1918 fears had been expressed
about the new party's natural identification with the working
classes, a
14
nd
 its use of trades union organisation for furthering its
support. But with the tremendous leap forward that Labour made in
the 1922 General Election, gaining 142 seats, it became for the first
time the true second party in parliament, and thereby the alternative
party of government. More worryingly Labour polled only 1.5 million
votes less than the Unionists, having put up more candidates than the
12. Davidson papers, Davidson to Baldwin, 14 February 1928.
13. D. Butler, The Electoral System in Britain since 1918, Oxford
1963, 8-9.
14. J. Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin 1902-1940, London
1978, 55.
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Liberal Party. Indeed no fewer than 103 M.P.s of all parties were
15
returned with majorities of less than 1,500. 	 In 1923 the figure
was to be 115. Never since then has the outcome of an election been
decided on so few votes. Indeed it has been shown that with 8,000
votes less, split evenly between 37 select constituencies, the
16
Unionists would not have had a parliamentary majority in 1922. In
such circumstances it was justifiable to claim that the campaign had a
very real likelihood of affecting the outcome. If it is now
recognised that the Representation of the People Act of 1918 left the
Unionists in a remarkably sound position as far as safe seats were
17
concerned, this was not seen at the time, and nor was it obvious
from the elections of 1922 and 1923.
Consequently there was a widespread fear and expectation of
electoral defeat by Labour amongst Conservatives throughout the
inter-war period, and notably in 1927-1929 and 1933-1935. As 'an
enquirer' stated before the 1922 election,
'The appearance of an organised Labour Party, bidding frankly for
the control of national Government remains .... the new factor of
18
the election.'
Following it the editorial of The Nation and Athenaeum declared that
'The Labour Party has at last achieved the promise of its second
19
birth'. Although the Conservative Party leadership did not go as
far as the Daily Mail in proclaiming that 'A vote for the Labour
Party is a vote for Bolshevism', there is every reason to suppose
that they were seriously worried by such an apparently inexorable
15. M.S.R. Kinnear, 'The British General Election of 1922',
unpublished D.Phil. thesis, Oxford 1965, 228.
16. Ibid., 430.
17. M.S.R. Kinnear, The British Voter, London 1968, 72, 122-4.
18. The Nation and Athenaeum, 32 (1922), 149.
19. Ibid., 306-7.
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rise. This was no short lived and passing fad. In Arthur Ponsonby's
satisfied words it was
not due to any swing of the pendulum; it represents the steady,
20
continuous growth of a new force.
Increasingly the party battle was seen in terms of a socialist/anti-
socialist axis, and as the Liberals slowly faded into insignificance
the Conservatives made a conscious bid to pick up the remnants and
their supporters. Thus Austen Chamberlain commented:
To those who feel that the Liberal party is without a future and
will never again be in a position to form a Government, the great
preoccupation mist be how, in its gradual dissolution, we shall
21
secure our shRre of its old supporters.
The *
 Labour and socialist movement was therefore seen to be
destroying the traditional two party political system and, by 1924,
one of the traditional parties themselves. It offered a threat both
22
by its impressive rise and through what it stood for. These facts
alone encouraged active counter-measures. But it also offered an
object lesson to the Conservative Party in the methods by which it
23
was seen to be reaching for power. Henderson's propaganda machine
was felt to be a new and effective force in political persuasion, and
the pride which Labour leaders took in declaring theirs to be the
most deliberately propagandist and educationalist party had its
effect on their opponents. In 1929, for example, Neville Chamberlain
explained the Party's defeat as the result of
20. Ibid., 347; Contemporary Review, 125 (1924), 11.
21. Evening News, 30 July 1924. Quoted by J. Ramsden (1978), Op.
Cit., 199.
22. See for example an article by Walford P. Green, The Nineteenth 
Century and After, vol. 96 (1924), 741, 746.
23. See pp.140-141,145-147 below.
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the ceaseless propaganda that has been going on among the working
classes, to the effect that things would never be right for them
24
till a 'Labour' government came in.
An editorial in The Times in 1924 stated that
no body of politicians in this country has ever had a shrewder
idea of the value of propaganda, written and spoken, than the
25
organisers of the Labour Party.
This point was not lost upon Conservatives, and they reacted
accordingly. The Party was to prove itself ready, throughout the
period of study and subsequently, both to accept responsibility for
its own electoral failure when necessary, and to adapt to the new
conditions. Having identified external factors, its leaders turned
inwards in order to analyse the inadequacies of its policies, methods
and organisation. Thus Matthew, McKibbin and Kay have argued that
although
the Liberals were wedded to the forms of the 1867-1914 political
community ... the ideologies of both the Labour and Conservative
parties made them better able to exploit a fully democratic
26
franchise.
24. K. Felling, Op. Cit., 168.
25. The Times 22 September 1924, 13c. The editorial concluded by
warning the Conservative and Liberal Parties that 'the Labour
Party is very much awake and is prepared to make as much
capital as it can out of its period of office. The Opposition
has a good case to present to the country; but the best case in
the world will go by default if it is not disseminated widely
enough. There may be no need to copy the Labour Party's methods
of propaganda; but from a national point of view it is surely
important that the argument for the Opposition should be as
accessible to the electorate as is the argument for the
Government.'
26. H.C.G. Matthew, R.I. McKibbin, J.A. Kay, 'The Franchise Factor
in the rise of the Labour Party', English Historical Review,
vol. 91 (1976), 723.
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They conclude that it was for this reason that 'the future lay
27
between two distinctly popular parties'.
	 John Ramsden likewise
makes the point that
The conscious rejection of ideology by British Conservatives hns
indeed been one of their most distinctive features, and arguably
one of the reasons for their long term success .... It was this
readiness to subordinate policy and ideology to the drive for
power that enabled the party leaders to draw their followers
steadily to the left, never quite losing touch with the currents
28
of popular opinion, for this was the means to power.
Thus paradoxically Conservatives made a virtue out of progressive
concession.
The progressiveness, however, came predominantly from the head,
and the' concession was to a large extent wrung from the body of the
Party. The reaction against organisational change, inevitable within
a conservative party but equally present within the Labour,
manifested itself, for example, in disagreements between the
completely independent local constituency associations and the
centre. Indeed this problem was to be a continuing source of
irritation and a hindrance to the development of party organisation
as envisaged by successive central party managers. By the mid 1920s
ways were being sought to circumvent parts of the organisation which
were behind in development. From 1931 onwards a group at the centre
of party affairs was attracted to the National Government idea, and
the attendant concept of a centralised 'national' organisation, in
the hope of achieving precisely that end, thereby calling down upon
themselves a confusing mixture of praise and alarmed objection.
Indeed, as early as 1923, following his own narrow personal election
defeat, J.C.C. Davidson had begun to entertain such ideas. His plans
for party reorganisation included
27. Ibid., 749-50.
28. J. Ramsden (1978), Op. Cit., x-xi.
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A) the Central Office carrying out its normal functions, only
with much more drive and enthusiasm, working through and with
local associations in the constituencies, and
B) an outside organisation carrying out national propaganda,
financed by a fighting fund to be raised by the same methods as
some of the great cities have raised funds to fight Socialists in
municipal and parlismPntary elections ... that fund should
provide paid organisers to carry out educational propaganda of a
29
non-party character.
Such proposals were to recur. Indeed the emphasis on 'non-party'
anti-socialist propaganda was a common one. If it was somewhat naive
to believe that such propaganda could be non-partisan, the desire
nevertheless carried a clear message for 1931. Under Baldwin, and
with support from Davidson, the Party was guided towards a more
centrist political image as a conscious attempt to appeal to the
middle and working classes. As Davidson told Baldwin in February
1928,
If our strength in the country is to be maintained and we are to
win over to our support the majority of the politically
uneducated electorate, we must combine intensive political
education with the appeal that the present Government pursues a
policy which is in the interests of every class of the community,
30
and in fact is national and imperial and not party.
This aim coincided excellently with Baldwin's own stance and with
his style as the man of reason, honesty, integrity and stability.
Baldwin was the Party's leader from 1923 to 1937, and his public
image of a straightforward Englishman has become legendary, and has
31
been frequently copied. It was ideally suited to the coming of
29. R.R. James, Memoirs of a Conservative, London 1969, 191-2.
30. Davidson papers, Davidson to Baldwin, 14 February 1928.
31. K. Middlemas and J. Barnes, Baldwin, London 1969, 501-4. The
last question which Robin Day asked Mr. Callaghan on 'Campaign
22
the mass media style of persuasion. Not only was the message an
electorally appealing and catholic one, well to the left in the
Party, but the medium of the man was also excellent. His quiet but
determined voice, his contrast with the oratorical excesses of Lloyd
George, his ability to paint brilliant word pictures of abstract
concepts such as tradition, duty and English character, stood him in
good stead in his personal appearances and his radio broadcasts. He
was photogenic - in a more immediate and obvious way, for example,
than Neville Chamberlain or Clement Attlee - and this again was an
invaluable electoral asset, both when reproduced on leaflets and
32
posters and when he appeared on film. 	 In his pipe he had an
instantly identifiable 'prop', only later equalled in value by
Churchill's cigar and Harold Wilson's pipe and Gannex, and cameramen
and cartoonists made full use of this imnge identifier. Both his
voice and his appearance mirrored his overall political image which
was instantly recognisable, beautifully simple, and one with which it
was all too easy to associate. His style was at the time described as
33
'piano'.	 This ability of Baldwin to be himself an immediate
symbol of all he represented was just what was needed in an age which
was increasingly coming to appreciate and use instant images as
34
attitude formers. 	 Baldwin was well aware of this and, more than
many party leaders, was concerned about the need for his party to
undertake the political education and persuaion of the people. Many
'79', the evening before the 1979 General Election poll, was
whether he believed himself to resemble Stanley Baldwin.
32. Baldwin himself disliked intensely the necessity of making film
appearances and avoided it whenever possible. 'More difficult
than trying to extract blood from a stone' was how the Party's
film adviser described persuading Baldwin to make a film
speech. His performances, however, were always impressive, no
doubt aided by his use of an early version of the 'rolling
autocue', which the Party's film crew devised for his benefit.
Thus he could appear to speak from the heart whilst actually
reading a prepared statement. But he found it a nerve-racking
process, and after each 'take' would bury his face in his hands
- S. Chesmore, Behind the Cinema Screen, London 1934, 58.
33. The Times, 21 May 1929, 15d.
34. D. Southgate, The Conservative Leadership, London 1974, 197-8.
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of his books of speeches, which were themselves used as party
propa
5
ganda and sold in considerable quantities, include reference to
- 3
this.	 After the 1923 defeat he personally involved himself in
preparing the Party for the next election, believing that the war had
left people particularly susceptible to the presentation of
ideologies such as socialism, and that appeals must therefore be made
36
both to the head and to the heart of the electorate. Indeed it is
clear that he and his closest supporters made use of his acknowledged
position as a valuable electoral asset in order to consolidate his
37
hold upon the leadership of the Party.
Baldwin recognised the inevitability, the necessity and the
justice of franchise extension, declaring that 'the franchise has
become a right'. Nevertheless he too feared the mass electorate. All
the justifiable qualms of liberal rationalism were summed up in 1928,
when he wrote:
Democracy "has arrived at a gallop in England and I feel all the
time that it is a race for life; can we educate them before the
38
crash comes?
He believed that 'the status of our electorate has got a little bit
ahead of its culture', and that 'the greatest work of all that lies
35. For example S. Baldwin, 'Our Inheritance', London 1928, 8, 13,
29-36.
36. Middlems and Barnes, Op. Cit., 264-6. At the party meeting at
the Hotel Cecil, 11 February 1924, Baldwin reminded his
audience of the extension of the electorate and declared; 'Old
cries, old methods, may be equally useless in new conditions
and against new enemies, and I do not think to an old
electioneer - and most of us are old electioneers - there is
any one phenomenon more striking than 
	  the impossibility
both in the election of 1922 and in the one which has just
taken place of any even approximately accurate forecast being
made of the result by the most experienced elect ioneerers
[sic] '- Gleanings and Memoranda, March 1924, 231.
37. J. Ramsden, The organisation of the Conservative and Unionist 
Party in Britain, 1910 - 1930, D.Phil.thesis, Oxford 1974, 96.
38. K. Middlemn and J. Barnes, Op. Cit., 503.
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before us is to make .... democracy fit for its task'.
	 He
justified 'political education' - the arousing of the political
conciousness of the people and their provision with 'knowledge' for
the taking of political decisions - for the reason that
there are large masses in this country who have not, from the
nature of things, yet had time to develop a keen political sense
themselves. And they are only too prone to be led away by really
skilful and clever propaganda designed by appealing to their
better qualities, to lead them to ends they would be the last to
40
desire if they realised that those ends were.
Yet it seems doubtful whether, in arousing the political
consciousness of the electorate, either he or his Conservative
colleagues ever considered that the recognised and valid distinction
between provision of knowledge and subjective interpretation of it
was either necessary or relevant as far as their own 'political
education' was concerned. That he could argue, in opening the Party's
political college in 1923, that the lecturers there had been chosen
not to give propaganda but to speak the truth, demonstrated not
hypocrisy or naivety regarding the nature of objectivity, but a firm
belief that the obvious conviction of those who supported the
Conservative cause made the subjective communication of evidence
41justifiable. The only questions that were relevant were ones of
degree and method, and it is to these that we must now turn, looking
first, briefly, at the pre-war situation.
The National Union of Conservative and Constitutional
Associations and Conservative Central Office had been established in
1867 and 1870 respectively, and under John Gorst began the adaptation
of the Party to modern conditions. Progress, however, was slow and
the considerable electoral success of the Party in the latter part of
39. S. Baldwin (1928), Op. Cit., 29.
40. Ibid., 30.
41. S. Baldwin, On England, London 1926, 156.
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the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries made any radical and
rapid reorganisation appear superfluous. In the first decade of the
new century certain old-fashioned individuals, such as Balfour and
his Chief Whip and Central Office controller, Sir Alexander Ac land-
Hood, hindered organisational progress. At the same time internal
party dissensions, arising from dissatisfaction with the direction of
42
the Party, led to factiousness and confusion in the organisation.
The disastrous and frustrating elections of 1906 and 1910,
however, demonstrated clearly the parlous condition of the Party and
the necessity for extreme measures to put it once again on the path
where lay electors' votes. The replacement of Balfour by Bonar Law,
of Ac land-Hood by Steel-Maitland, and the appointment and report of
the Unionist Organisation Ccuncittee in 1911 were the first signs of
the new broom that would sweep the Party and prepare it for the
organisational demands of the twentieth century. The 1911
reorganisation was of great significance for the structure, working,
and organisational efficiency of the Conservative Party from that
date until the Maxwell Fyfe reforms of 1948, and it provided the
organisational basis for a new approach to party propaganda.
Some developments had, of course, already been made in order to
take account of the increased electorate. An army of 160 speakers had
been employed to proclaim the party's message throughout the country.
To transport them Central Office had acquired a fleet of 42 motor
vans. Gramophone records with a propaganda message were being sold,
and large scale if ponderous leaf leteering utilised, 40 million
leaflets being distributed at each of the General Elections of 1910.
In 1910 there was appointed as press adviser to Central Office Sir
Malcolm Fraser, thereby placing party management of, and relations
with, the press on an immeasurably more professional basis than
43
previously.
42. R.B. Jones, The Conservative Party 1906-1911, unpublished
D.Phil.thesis, Oxford 1960, passim.
43. J. Ramsden, The organisation of the Conservative Party, al.
Cit., 215, 263.
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The 1911 reorganisation, however, was significant as a conscious
recognition of the new requirements for a mass party with a popular
base. It represented a step away from traditional dependence upon
registration campaigns and the party loyalty and constancy of
electors as the principal determinants of the outcome of an election.
It was a move towards a more positive form of political propaganda
aimed not only to bring out the known Conservative voters but also to
convert others from their previous allegiance, and to catch the newly
enfranchised. Perhaps above all it was the first of a series of
reorganisations which gradually increased the importance of central
control over electoral propaganda management, even when so much of
this propaganda was ultimately only carried out with the assent and
assistance of the local parties themselves. Amongst its
recommendations were the creation of the new post of Party Chairman
to take charge of the Party outside parliament, including Central
Office, a treasurer to raise funds, the reabsorption by Central
Office of certain functions of the National Union, including the
publication of literature and organisation of the Party's
professional speakers, and the rapid reform of the local parties,
putting them on a more permanent basis and with a more conscious
responsibility for active propaganda.
Firstly under Balfour and then under Bonar Law the newly
appointed Party Chairman, Arthur Steel-Maitland, began the
implementation of the 1911 recommendations. Ramsden describes the
extent of this pre-war reorganisation, and it is evident that,
although 1914 found the Party still in the process of reform) much
had already been achieved. The financial independence of the local
constituency parties, however, still made thorough reorganisation
44
from the centre difficult to carry throne-1.
Although the First World War did not seriously disorder the party
machinery in the way that the Second did, party publicity does seem
44. J. Ramsden (1978), Op. Cit., 70-72, 102-105. For details of the
pre-war developments I have relied heavily on this work.
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to have suffered, and it suffered even more during the succeeding
coalition years, when confusion over the direction the Party was
taking was reflected in a partial regression in its organisation. One
section affected was the Literature Department; it managed to produce
only five million leaflets for the 1918 election and only just over
5
one million in 1919.
	 Constituency parties lacked the finance to
purchase large quantities of literature, the journal Gleanings and 
Memoranda was _
6
poorly subscribed, and no posters were produced in the
4
latter year.
	 This failure to meet the requirements for the new
electorate was exacerbated by the short notice at which the 1922 and
1923 elections were held, thereby leaving little time for the
production of adequate and appropriate propaganda literature.
Relations with the press were also damaged whilst the Party was a
member of the coalition. Although Unionist papers predominated within
the press, they were virtually united in support of diehard
opposition to the continuation of the coalition, only the Daily 
Telegraph upholding the pro-coalition stance of the party
47
leaders. The Party had put considerable amounts of money into the
press before the war, most notably for Max Aitken's purchase of the
Daily Express, but it was now increasing ly
 felt that it was not
receiving the return it might have expected. Following the collapse
of the coalition in 1922 a large proportion of the press supported
the new Unionist government, but the uncertainty of its allegiance
was demonstrated by its coolnessand even hostility to the Tariff
election of barely a year later. Central Office was well aware of
this fragile relationship, most particularly with the press barons:
'REothermere] is going to advise all Conservatives not to vote',
45. National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations
(hereafter NUCUA), Report of Executive Committee to Central
Council, 11 March 1919; Report of Publications Sub-Comnittee to
Executive Committee, 18 November 1919.
46. NUCUA, Report of Publications Sub-Committee to Executive
Committee, 18 November 1919; Report of Executive Committee to
Central Council, 18 November 1919.
47. J. Ramsden (1978), Op. Cit., 148.
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J.C.C. Davidson informed the Party Chairman, Lt. Col. Stanley
48
Jackson, in November 1923.
	 The disloyalty of the Daily Express 
was the cause of many angry words about it and its owner at Central
Office in the early 1920s. Difficulties were such that, despite the
general support of the Rothermere and Beaverbrook press in the 1924
election, Central Office broke off relations with the Daily Express 
49
the following year, and this situation continued for two years.
As the decade progressed party managers became increasingly
concerned at the Party's apparently reduced influence over the press.
Such a term was, of course, relative. In 1927, despite the decline of
50
the provincial press, Conservative Central Office still 1provided
5
articles and editorials for, or managed, 230 newspapers.
	 Of the
newspaper magnates the Conservatives could rely upon the support of
the Berry brothers, and especially Sir William Berry, created Lord
52
Camrose in 1929 for services to the Party. But it was Rothermere
and Beaverbrook, ever extending their press domains and ever
increasing the proportion of the press audience reading their
newspapers, who continued to be a source of worry to J.C.C. Davidson
as Party Chairman in the later 1920s, even before the almost
irreconcilable differences created by the Empire Free Trade issue of
the early 1930s. Thomas Marlowe, recently editor of Rothermere's
Daily Mail, told Davidson in September 1927 that Rothermere and
Beaverbrook intended to stab Baldwin in the back and support Lloyd53
George. Rothermere's 'defection' to Lloyd George was confirmed
48. Davidson papers, Davidson to S. Jackson, 24 November 1923.
49. J. Ramsden (1978), Op. Cit., 233.
50. C. Seymour Ure, 'The Press and the Party System between the
Wars', in G. Peele and C. Cook (ed.), The Politics of 
Reappraisal, London 1975, 233-5.
51. Baldwin papers, Bal. 53/ff108-113, Report on Conservative
Organisation at Central Office and in the Constituencies during
1927.
52. R.R. James, Op. Cit., 292-297.
53. Davidson papers, note by J.C.C.D., 24 September 1927.
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for Davidson by Sir William Berry the following year. Only three
months later Davidson had reliable information that Rothermere was
55
threatening to support the Labour Party at the coming election.
As late as March 1929 relations between the Conservative Party and
this potentially politically valuable or dangerous individual, whom
Davidson had done much to pacify, were still sufficiently uncertain
for a rumour, that Rothermere had given a quarter of a million pounds
to the Labour Party's election fund, to be seriously discussed by
56
Baldwin. In the event Beaverbrook proved more generally friendly,
and Rothermere less positively hostile to the Party until after the
1929 election than party leaders feared. Nevertheless the fact
remains that there existed considerable concern for the allegiance of
the most important sections of the national press and for the
potential damage to the Party's fortunes that might result from a
serious rift, and this fear did much to determine the actions of
party managers throughout the inter-war period.
The Party's professional speakers were also not providing an
57
adequate service, or so it was felt.	 Following the rise of
Labour, a party which emphasised the value of its propagandists as
educators, the emotional tub-thumping of the full-time Conservative
speakers and adssioners was seen to be quite inappropriate to net
this new challenge. Increasingly during the 1920s these paid speakers
gained the reputation of being something of a liability to the
58
Party. A hold-over from the days when politicians employed others
to speak for them, they were felt, in the 'new Conservatism' of the
54. Davidson papers, J.C.C.D to Lord Irwin, 7 June 1928. Davidson's
conclusion from this was that Beaverbrook would be forced to
support the Conservative Party.
55. Davidson papers, J.C.C.D. to Baldwin, 13 September 1928.
56. T. Jones, A Whitehall Diary, London 1969, 174.
57. See for example Conservative Agents' Journal, October 1922.
58. Davidson noted in 1928 for Baldwin: 'hat is being done to
improve our speakers? Numerous complaints of quality.'
Davidson papers, undated memorandum entitled "M's attitude".
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Baldwin age, to present an old and damaging image of the Party to the
world, and constituency associations proved increasingly reluctant to
59
use them.
Organisationally, therefore, the Conservative Party in the early
1920s was strong but not without its weaknesses. Although there was
remarkably little criticism of the party machinery by disappointed
politicians and party workers following the 1923 defeat, the
replacement of Admiral Sir Reginald Hall as Principal Agent by an
organisational expert, Herbert Blain, indicated a recognition that
considerable improvement was possible. Publicity developments had
followed the pre-war initiative but had as yet to prove wholly
satisfactory. Press relations were far from satisfa, ctory, and
already party managers were noting with some alarm the decline of the
independent provincial press and its absorption within the cartels of
those two most unreliable of party supporters, Lords Rothermere and
Beaverbook.
Two individuals, J.C.C. Davidson and Joseph Ball, must receive
special attention in any account of the Party's development of
publicity. It was their attitudes and activities which, more than
those of any other person, governed the future techniques of
persuasion that the Party would employ. If Baldwin provided the
unique political style and message, it was Davidson and Ball who
decided how that style would be used, how presented to the public,
how stage managed. Under Davidson the task of party publicity
acquired a new importance in the business of Central Office. Under
Ball the efficiency and drive of the party publicity machine reached
new heights.
Davidson was Chairman of the Party from November 1926 to May
1930. A close friend and protege of Baldwin, he had been Private
Secretary to Lord Crewe, Lewis Harcourt, Baldwin and Bonar Law, and
sat in parliament for Hemel Hempstead from 1920 to 1923 and 1924 to
59. J. Ramsden, The Organisation of the Conservative Party, Op.
Cit., 245.
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1937. He was Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty immediately
prior to his appointment as Party Chairman. A fervent party man and
even more devoted to Baldwin, young, eager and determined, he was
convinced of the need to pull the organisation into line with modern
conditions. With a harshness typical of the Conservative Party in
defeat he was made a scapegoat for the failure of 1929 and for the
succeeding tensions in the Party, and was more or less forced from
office. This was not fully deserved, for whilst chairman he initiated
radical alterations and improvements in organisation and publicity
which not only helped to minimise that defeat, but also to put the
party organisation on a more stable footing for the future. When he
left Central Office there was still much to be done, and it must be
said that his over sensitive personality, which led him to react too
strongly to criticism, created many problems in the efficient working
of the party machine. Nevertheless his achievements were many andr in
the area of publicity, of extreme importance. By 1928 Baldwin could
declare that
I believe our organisation today is better than it has ever been
60
at Headqmrters and in the country.
Davidson took an active interest in party publicity as early as
1923, after the electoral defeat of that year and three years before
becoming Chairman. Indeed it is interesting to note that both he and
his successor as Chairman, Neville Chamberlain, who also took a close
interest in organisation and publicity, suffered personal defeat or
near defeat in elections during the 1920s. Davidson lost his seat in
1923 by an infuriating 17 votes, whilst Chamberlain just rnnaged to
retain Birmingham Ladywood in 1924 against the formidable opposition
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of Oswald Mosley, holding on by a narrow 77 majority. Whether or
not these close personal shaves influenced their views on the need
for publicity and organisation, they were not alone in the
Conservative hierarchy in urging such necessities. Robert Topping,
60. The Times, 28 September, 7d.
61. R.R. James, Op. Cit., 188-9; K. Feiling, Op. Cit., 117.
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for example, soon to be Principal Agent and then General Director at
Central Office, felt equally strongly about the importance of
62
continuous 'Organisation and Propaganda'. 	 Pembroke Wicks, a
senior official in the Chairman's Office at Central Office, likewise
gave this advice to Davidson four months before he became Chairman:
Whilst it is true that the superficial character of the modern
electorate renders them particularly liable to be swayed by
election cries and eleventh-hour proposals, it is equally true
that it is far less easy, with an electorate of modern
dimensions, to make up for lost time in propounding a real policy
at a General Election unless ample time has been given for the
principle upon which that policy is based to be assimilated by
63
the public.
The point all stressed was that preparation should begin immediately
and be dontinuous.
Davidson acted rapidly, dismissing Herbert Blain as Chief Agent
and appointing Sir Leigh Mac lachan in his place. He later recorded
that
This was in order that I could do what I thought was necessary in
the party organisation - divide information and publicit
4
y from
B
the duties of the Chief Agent whose job was organisational.
This division automatically raised the work of publicity in
comparison with the other work of the Chief Agent, who had until now
been the undisputed head of the party machine. Now Davidson on his
own initiative split the work of Central Office into 'Organisation'
and 'Operations', with Joseph Ball in charge of the latter as the new
62. J. Ramsden (1978), Op. Cit., 229.
63. Davidson papers, Wicks to J.C.C.D., 6 July 1926.
64. R.R. James, Op. Cit., 266.
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Director of Publicity. Moreover Davidson himself showed a greater
interest in Operations. He appointed a Deputy Chairman, Lord
Strathcona, to take responsibility for the organisation side so that,
in Ball's words,
The Chairman ... would devote himself mainly to the supervision
of operational matters, eg. plans generally, publicity,
propaganda, research, information, education and training;.
matters with regard to which I should be still, as I am now,
65
directly responsible to him.
In November 1927 Davidson decided to undertake a thorough
investigation of party organisation, and the committee he appointed
to do this reported in December. Its main recommendations reinforced
the new importance of publicity by suggesting a tripartite system in
which the Principal Agent, the Director of Publicity and the Office
Controller should have equal status under the Chairman and Deputy
66
Chairman.	 It also advised the removal of certain undesirable
elements from Central Office, individuals whose views on propaganda
did not suit the Party's desired image of truth and
straighforwardness in its political education. Davidson was later to
stress that the propaganda he nude use of was honest:
I did not agree with untrue propaganda, nor white lies or
overstatement of the truth .... I took the Information and
Propaganda machinery out of the hands of the Principal Agent, and
put the task into the hands of people whose sole job was to put
67
forward the policy of the Party truthfully and factually.
The man Davidson chose for this crucial post was Major (George)
65. Davidson papers, Ball to Strathcona, 17 May 1927.
66. Davidson papers, Report of Conservative Central Office
Reorganisation Committee, 20 December 1927.
67. R.R. James, Op. Cit., 270. The particular undesirable was
Philip Cambray, whose internal intriguing and underhand
electoral tactics exceeded what Davidson was prepared to
tolerate.
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Joseph Ball, by subsequent reputation a curious choice if truth and
straight dealing were the prime requirements. For a man about whom so
little is known Ball has become notorious, infamous even, as 'a
highly experienced 
8
behind-the-scenes-operator .... the classic Tory
6
"Eminence grise" , an 'enigmatic' and 'slightly sinister' man
69
whose 'strong suits were conspiracy and unscrupulousness'.
Davidson himself knew that
Ball has had as much experience as anyone I know in the seamy
70
side of life and the handling of crooks.
Ball's background was in military intelligence, having joined MI5 in
1913 and after the war become Civil Assistant to the Director of
Military Operations at the War Office immediately prior to being
recruited for the Conservative Party. Davidson and he had met during
the war in the course of Davidson's duties as a link between Bonar
Law and the Secret Service. Indeed Ball maintained contacts with
71
military intelligence while at Central Office.
	 It seems possible
that Ball first made proposals for the reorganisation of the Party's
publicity in 1924 and that Davidson recommended him to the then
72
Chairman, Jackson, as 'a first class man'. 	 Although opinion
73
differs as to precisely when he joined Central Office, by
68. L. Chester, H. Young., S. Fay, The Zinoviev Letter, London
1967, 162.
69. B. Page, D. Leitch, P. Knightley, Philby, London 1977, 88-9.
70. R.R. James, Op. Cit., 272.
71. In March 1938, for example, Ball obtained an intriguing dossier
on communist activities and labour incitement in Trinidad. This
he sent to a friend in military intelligence, and received the
reply that this inforuution had already been obtained from
other sources. - Conservative Research Department papers,
Trinidad Labour Troubles file, March - July 1938.
72. Davidson papers, J.C.C.D. to Jackson, 2 January 1924.
73. J. Ramsden (1978), Op. Cit., 197, suggests that he came to
Central Office in 1924. Percy Cohen, who worked for the Party
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February 1927 he had been appointed to the newly created post of
Director of Publicity, a position in which he exceeded all
expectations.
The new status of publicity and the success of Ball was
illustrated early in 1928 when Davidson decided to get rid of
Maclachlan as Principal Agent. 'Mac', one of the old school of agents
and close to retiring age, had shown himself to be:
1. Jealous of
generally; 2.
propaganda; 3.
their vote; ..
74
or form.
D[irector] of P[ublicity] and Miss Maxse and women
Ignorant of possibilities of new forms of
Blind to the increasing importance of women and
.. 6. Opposed to education altogether in any shape
Accordingly both Neville Chamberlain and Lord Younger, the Party
Treasurer, strongly recommended Ball for a suitable replacement, as
75
being 'head and shoulders' above anyone else.
	 Davidson, however,
was unwilling to lose such an ideal Director of Publicity:
I regard the progressive improvement of propaganda, which has
undoubtedly enormously improved during the last year, as a vital
factor in the winning of the next election. That improvement and
76
development is due in detail entirely to Ball.
The Deputy Chairman, Lord Stanley, agreed that
from 1911 to 1959, denies this categorically and states that he
was appointed in 1927 over Philip Cambray, to whom he was at no
stage subordinate. Other evidence found tends to support this
view.
74. Davidson papers, undated memorandum entitled "M's' attitude".
Miss Marjorie Maxse was Women's Officer at Central Office and,
from 1928, Deputy Principal Agent.
75. Davidson papers, J.C.C.D. to Lord Stanley, 25 January 1928.
76. Ibid.
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the publicity side of the office is just as important as the
77
agent's side, if not more so.
Accordingly Robert Topping was appointed instead of Ball.
Ball's intelligence experience was put to good use, as Davidson
recorded:
With Joseph Ball I ran a little intelligence service of our own,
quite separate from the Party organisation. We had agents in
certain key centres and we also had agents actually in the Labour
Party Headquarters, with the result that we got their reports on
political feeling in the country as well as our own. We also got
advance "pulls" of their literature .... This was of enormous
value to us because we were able to study the Labour Party policy
in advance and in the case of leaflets we could produce a reply
78
to appear simultaneously with their production.
Another valuable quality of Ball's was that 'He was a man who was
79
always intriguing and who knew how to make contacts'.
	 As one
colleague put it, 'Ball knew how to make a friendship at the top
80
quick'. This was useful both in gaining the support and trust of
his political masters - he was intimate both with Baldwin and above
all with Neville Chamberlain, whose right-hand man he was to become
77. Davidson papers, Stanley to J.C.C.D., 27 January 1928.
78. R.R. James, Op. Cit., 272. A possible example of this spy
system, which existed during the 1930s also, occurred in
November 1935. From a letter in the Conservative Research
Department files it would appear that Ball knew the text of
Arthur Greenwood's election broadcast in advance, for he asked
the Ministry of Health to provide a reply for Sir Kingsley Wood
to a specific point made by Greenwood, several hours before
Greenwood spoke. - Conservative Research Department papers,
1935 General Election - Press Publicity file, A.N. Rucker
Ministry of Health) to Ball, 4 November 1935.
79. A. Beichmann, 'Hugger-Mugger in Old Queen Street', Journal of
Contemporary History, vol. 13 (1978), 681.
80. Percy Cohen in interview with author, 20 April 1979.
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in the 1930s - and in gaining support and trust from those in
influence outside the Party, a Skill in which Ball prided
81
himself.
Thus Davidson and Ball complemented each other in their
determination to make the best possible use of party propaganda. It
was at this time that advertising agencies were first employed on a
professional basis. Once again Davidson had already suggested using
82
an advertising man to design the party's manifesto in 1923 , and
when he became Chairman first the Holford-Bottomley Advertising
Service, and then S.H. Benson, the large advertising agency best
.hknown for its Guiness contract, were employed on poster and leaflet
83
work, most notably for the 1929 election. The Party additionally
had informal contacts with other advertising agencies, and when Sir
Patrick Gower joined Central Office as Deputy Chief Publicity Officer
in 1928 his friendship with Sir Charles Higham reinforced these
. 84
contacts. The Party was to use Benson's again for poster work in
the 1931 and 1935 elections. It also employed a smaller agency,
'Press Secretaries Ltd.', who actually installed one of their
directors and one or two of their staff in Central Office on a full-
85
time basis, to produce certain regular party journals.
Professionalism was the order of the day, but central to any
expansion of propaganda activities was the question of finance. Since
1918 the Party had suffered considerable difficulties, firstly under
81. He was particularly confident of his infiltration of the
commercial cinema industry. See pp.663-664 below. For further
details of Joseph Ball see note A at the end of chapter,p.109.
82. Davidson papers, J.C.C.D. to Admiral Hall, 13 November 1923.
83. Conservative Central Office papers (hereafter CCO), C004/1/20,
Bottomley Advertising Service file. Bottomley's had been used
occasionally before, but not on a regular basis; Percy Cohen to
author, 20 April 1979.
84. When Gower left Central Office in 1939 he became Chairman of
Bighaes.
85. Percy Cohen to author, 20 April 1979.
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the later treasurership of Lord Farquhar (Party Treasurer 1911-22),
and then during the chairmanship of Sir Stanley Jackson (1923-
86
26).	 Although the Conservatives never suffered the same
difficulties as Labour, or the Liberal Party when the Lloyd George
fund was witheld from it, it was often a slow and complex task to
extract money from the Party's various sources, particularly as the
sale of honours was increasingly frowned upon by Davidson and
Baldwin. Davidson, however, proved to be an excellent fund-raiser,.
and later claimed that he had raised over a million pounds in three
87
years. His particular Skill was in 'milking' the City, and it was
in preparation for what was probably the first of such fund raising
campaigns, in March 1927, that either he or Ball set out in note form
the attitudes that were to guide them and the party in publicity
matters over the succeeding years. Davidson was just beginning his
tenure as Chairman and clearly felt the importance of his proposals.
Accordingly he arranged a dinner to be held at the home of Lord
Tredegar to which various eminent and wealthy businessmen would be
invited, subsequently to be addressed by Ball, himself and Baldwin,
with a view to establishing a fund with which to fight socialism.
Ball was to set the scene with a description of the dangers of the
existing situation and the activities of their socialist opponents:
1. 1924 Election Results; seats, votes, labour increases, graphs.
2. Revolutionary tail wags Labour dog, e.g. General Strike, Coal
Strike, China.
3. Efforts of opponents:
a) Elaborate S.S. (FBA, VDA, and thirty other ramifications).
b) Labour Educational Activities.
c) Intensive propaganda by outside committees, Communists,
National Minority Movement, I.L.P., Daily Herald,
Lansbury's Labour Weekly, Arcos Information Department,
Sunday Worker, Young Communists' League, Labour Monthly,
United Press Association of USA, and many others.
86. J. Ramsden (1978), Op. Cit., 170, 219.
87. R.R. James Op. Cit., 289-90.
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4. Funds at disposal of enemy:
a) Trade Union levies. b) Co-operative subscriptions
c) Moscow propaganda fund d) Special education funds
88
5. Dice at present loaded against us   
The conclusion to be drawn and emphasised from this analysis was
that:
Our only hope at the next Election lies in an intensive
propaganda campaign, carefully planned and co-ordinated on the
most modern lines.
Davidson's speech was to follow, outlining the details of the
proposed counter-campaign, and the notes for it deserve to be quoted
at length in order to illustrate the comprehensive and ambitious
nature of his thinking:
1. Necessity of reaching the uncoEerted and the opponent.
2. Methods of reaching the unciierted:
a) At home: by the morning paper, leaflets, broadsheets.
b) On the way to work: Advertisements and posters on vehicles,
station platforms, etc.
c) At Work: Our own propagandists among the workmen, armed
with information and with free leaflets and broadsheets.
d) During the dinner hour: Out-door speakers and distribution
of leaflets.
e) After working hours: Cinema vans, out-door meetings and
such Empire and patriotic propaganda as can be arranged at
cinemas and places of amusement generally.
f) Saturday afternoons: At football matches 	 leaflets,
advertisements, sky signs, community singing.
g) On Sundays: Extensive use of the Sunday Press and Saturday
distribution of leaflets.
88. Davidson papers, undated, unsigned notes for speech contained
in correspondence, February-March 1927.1 have been unable to
interpret the initials S.S. ( Secret Service?),F.B.A. and
V.D.A.
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3. For agricultural constituencies: Cinema vans, missionaries,
posters and leaflets. Local press advertisements,
correspondence and possible subsidies.
4. General education: a) Stott College as a Staff College. b)
Summer Schools. c) Study circles d) Local training centres for
speakers, canvassers and other party workers. e)
89
Correspondence classes for workers. f) Travel Bureau.
Finally Baldwin was to sum up with one of his 'inimitable little
90
speeches so free from party bias'. He was to point out
The effect of propaganda, now recognised as the world's most
potent weapon.
Once again there was the suggestion of an additional anti-socialist
'educational campaign' to be run independently of the Conservative
Party. But the most important point for Baldwin to emphasise was
Our one great advantage : WEALTH. Let us use it. Its expenditure
should be regarded as an insurance premium.
This method of raising funds from the City proved extremely
successful, and similar dinners were held 
1
in 1928 and 1929, as a
9
result of which some £306,000 was raised.
	 In addition to this in
1927 or 1928 a provisional agreement was made with certain major
banking firms to put up large sums for a secret anti-socialist
fighting fund, a scheme which fell through only because Reginald
92
McKenna of the Midland Bank refused to give his support.
89.	 Ibid.
90. R.R. James, Op Cit., 289.
91. Ibid.; MIdlemas and Barnes, Op. Cit., 517; T. Jones (1969),
Op. Cit., 176.
92. Neville Chamberlain papers, NC8/21/9, Ball to Chamberlain, 14
April 1934.
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The effect on Conservative publicity was innediately apparent.
These were the years when mass leafleteering reached its peak, as the
following table demonstrates:
Table 1.1: Production of  leaflets and pamphlets 1919-39 (excluding 
93
elections). 
Year	 Millions 
1919
	
	
c. 1.3
c. 10.31920
1921	 c. 2.2
1922	 unknown
1923	 1.5
1924	 8.1
1925	 5.3
1926	 6.8
1927	 19.4
a
1928	 9.7
1929	 c. 16.5	 plus
1930	 unknown
1931
	 unknown
1932	 'almost	 negligble'
1933	 0.9
1934	 unknown
1935	 unknown
1936	 minimal
1937	 minimal
1938
	 minimal
1939	 slight increase
93. NUCUA, Executive Committee Minutes, Reports of Executive
Committee to Central Council, Reports of Central Council to
Conference, 1919 - 1939.
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a. Of which 4 million were distributed in the last 3 months of
the year.
b. No figure known for post-election period. This figure covers
only from 1 January 1929 to Dissolution of Parliament, c.
April - May.
3. No Conference this year. Therefore no figure reported.
4. No figure given.
5. Minutes of Executive Committee of National Union, publications
Sub-Committee, 30 May 1934.
The high point of 1927 was the result of intensive activity to
counter Labour campaigning against the Trade Disputes Act. In fact
this Conservative counter-campaign became something of a by-word as a
successful confirmation of the new methods of propaganda. Percy
Cohen, active in Central Office at the time, described it as a
94
'jumping off ground for a new type of propaganda' , and both
Davidson and Ball referred with some pride to this early vindication
of their beliefs, for opposition to the Act in the country proved
95
minimal. Unfortunately the precise figures for leafleteering were
not regularly stated after 1928, and so it is only by general
indications that it can be concluded that after 1929 the Party's
literature production was greatly reduced, partly because of the
economic crisis, which hit the Party along with the rest of the
country. It should be added that both these figures and those for
leafleteering in General Election campaigns refer only to leaflets
produced by Conservative Central Office and sold or distributed to
local associations. At election time the addresses which all
candidates produced were additional to the centrally produced
94. P. Cohen, Disraeli's Child, unpublished typescript at
Conservative Research Department Library, vol 2, 315.
95. R.R. James, Op. Cit., 297; Chamberlain papers NC8/21/9, Ball to
Chamberlain, 14 April 1934.
43
literature listed below:
96
Table 1.2: Literature produced for General Elections, 1922-1935 
Year Millions
1922 18.5
1923 26
1924 36
1929 93.5
1931 23.5
a
1935 9+
a. Only 1.5 million had been distributed JanuAry - 1 August 1935.
No doubt much was done before the election in November, but
this was a drastic reduction from 1929, particularly when it
was known that an election would be called within the next
year. 9 million were distributed in the penultimate week of
the campaign, suggesting a rather larger overall total.
This tremendous output in the first five months alone of 1929 of
over 110 million leaflets and pamphlets, excluding individual
candidates' addresses and subsequent campaigning between June and
December, represented nearly four leaflets per elector. 8.3 million
were of the party manifesto, which had itself become a major mass
propaganda vehicle. There is evidence that this was
97 
an early case of
overkill', and it was certainly never repeated. Indeed no party
96. NUCUA, Executive Committee minutes, Central Council minutes and
annual reports, 1922-1936.
97. According to Davidson, in a speech to the Party's annual
conference, certain constituencies to whom literature was
issued failed to distribute it all - The Times, 23 November
1929, 7d. - This was, however, a regular problem at General
Elections.
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before or since has come close to this figure. To write and lay
out these leaflets the Party used professional journalists. C.H.
Butler, for example, who joined the DeparLwent in 1927, had formerly
been literary editor of the D
9
aily Express, and most recently the
9
Editor of Pearson's Magazine. With the employment of advertising
consultants the style of presentation also became more popular. In an
attempt to capitalise on the cigarette card craze the Party produced
a series of eight cards with a derogatory or 
00
inspirational cartoon on
1
one side and a brief message on the other.
	
	
It has been suggested
101
that leaflets were distributed free at Central Office expense.
Although this happened only on rare occasions it is true that leaflet
production was heavily subsidised from Central Office102funds, which
consistently made a financial loss on this operation. The Party
also experimented with a degree of direct mailing of leaflets to
specific interest groups - for example to nurses. That it could
afford such expenses shows its very different financial position from
that of the Labour Party, and the effect this had upon the relative
extent of their propaganda.
The production of posters does not show the same absolute
increase, although even here a rise for the elections of 1924 and
1929, before a cut-back in 1931, can be observed;
98. In the February 1974 election Central Office produced and sold
only 6 million leaflets, less than half Labour's figure - D.
Butler and D. Kavanagh, The British General Election of 
February 1974, London 1974, 236.
99. R.D. Casey, 'British Politics - some lessons in campaign
propaganda', Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 8 (1944), 78.
100. Typical ones showed MacDonald blowing soap bubbles of
'Socialist Promises', with the caption 'He's for ever blowing
bubbles'; also MacDonald and Lloyd George as shifty burglars
breaking into a safe containing 'The People's savings'. A set
of these cards is at the British Library.
101. R.D. Casey, 'The National Publicity Bureau and British Party
Propaganda', Public Opinion Quarterly, 1939, 630.
102. Davidson Papers, Central Office annual balance sheets, 1925 -
1929.
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Table 1.3:Poster production for General Elections, 1922-1931 
Year Million
1922 0.3
1923 0.3
a
1924 0.5
1929 0.45
1931 0.2
a.The Times,29/9/27, 12g, reports this as 477,000 posters and
cartoons, not much higher than in 1929.
In 1924 part of the increase may have been due to a last minute
poster campaign which Philip Cambray, in charge of Central Office
104
publicity, initiated in response to the Zinoviev letter. 	 Ramsden
suggests that the reduction in poster use in 1929 reflects a move
105
towards new forms of visual aid in the increasing use of films,
and indeed this was the first election in which film played a
prominent part. However the absolute reduction in poster numbers, if
there was much of one, was more likely due to the fact that the
number of large size posters used was greatly increased. Previously
the standard poster size used by parties haad been 'double crown' -
103. NUCUA, Executive Committee minutes, Central Council minutes and
annual reports, 1922-1932. No figure is available for 1935.
104. L.Chester et al., Op. Cit., 90-1. There is a picture of one
such poster opposite page 93.
105. J. Ramsden (1978), Op. Cit., 232.
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that is the smallest sheet size of 20" x 30" although occasionally
some larger formats had been used. Such posters were adequate for
announcing meetings and for close viewing, but because of their small
size they inevitably lacked impact. In commercial parlance,
the function of outdoor advertising is to create the decisive
impact, at the last possible moment, so that a sale will result,
not at some distant time, but within a minute or so ... [Also] by.
repetition the poster and sign assist in creating a familiarity
106
with the name of a product.
It was with these ends in mind that the Conservative Party also
produced 16, 32 and 64 sheet posters (that 
07
number of times the size
1
of double crown) for the 1929 election. 	 These were very large
indeed, the 16-sheet being the size most commonly used for commercial
advertising, and the 8-sheet the smallest generally recommended for
108
billboard use.	 It is noticeable that the Party was beginning to
follow commercial practice, no doubt partly because of their
employment of Benson's for poster production and billboard hire.
The cost of this poster campaign was by contemporary standards
extraordinary. The publishing costs alone were £11,000, a proportion
of this being recovered by sales to constituencies. The campaign
itself cost the Party an additional £27,000. Thus posters took nearly
a quarter of a total publicity budget for the election of
106. A-Parrister-At-Law, Outdoor Advertising, London 1957, 1-2.
107. R.D. Casey, 'The National Publicity Bureau', Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 1939, 630. Casey states that this was the first time
such very large posters were used for political advertising.
The Conservative Research Department collection of party
posters unfortunately contains double-crown and crown posters
only, so that it is difficult to check this claim.
108. Modern Advertising, London 1926, - a compendium of articles on
advertising technique.
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£155,500.	 Although Philip Cambray with hindsight doubted the
value of this poster campaign, believing it to be too short to be
110
effective,	 this was very far from the general view. One of the
smaller posters sold to constituencies, and extremely popular with
them as well as being used in the national campaign financed by
Central Office, was subsequently to become notorious amongst
Conservatives as contributing substantially to the Party's defeat.
This was the famous 'Safety First' poster which it was felt had, by
emphasising a singularly unexciting slogan suggested by B111enson's,
discouraged the new electorate of millions of young voters.
The use of large billboard posters demonstrated an increasing
awareness of the power of visual impact. In the 1929 election it also
ran close to the wind in evading the spirit, if not the letter, of
the laws regarding election expenditure. Between the announcement of
the election and the dissolution of parliament the billboards
contracted to an anonymous national manufacturing firm were made
available for ' Conservative use, expenditure declaration technically
only beginning from the dissolution. After the Second World War the
spirit of the law was to be observed more closely, and in 1950
Conservative posters on display when the election was announced were
covered until the dissolution, after which all poster displays were
112
costed.
109. Davidson papers, Accounts for the 1929 election. The purchasing
power of the 1900 £ in 1929 was 10/7d. In 1978 it was 5p -
Butler and A. Sloman, British Political Facts, 5th edition,
London 1980. 348-9. By 1978 standards, therefore, this campaign
cost in excess of £1.6 million.
110. P. Cambray, Op. Cit., 178.
111. T. Jones (1969), Op. Cit., 186, 1 June 1929; R.R. James, Op. 
Cit., 299. See Note B at end of chapter for Sir Patrick Gower's
account of this incident,p.111.
112. P. Cambray, Op. Cit., 157, E.A. Rowe, The British General 
Election of 1929, unpublished D. Phil. thesis, Oxford 1960,
lists and describes the posters used by the Conservative Party
in 1929, showing them to be of three types. 1) Scare posters
against Socialism 2) Posters of ridicule against the Liberal
Party 3) Posters of moderation in support of Baldwin. He does
not, however, mention the question of poster size, probably
because the large posters have not survived.
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The Liberal Party also used large posters in 1929. Unlike the
Liberals, however, the Conservative Party made little use of press
advertising. Publicly it was declared that such advertising would
contravene the Representation of the People Act and make necessary a
declaration of press advertising expenditure by each candidate in
whose constituency the newspapers concerned had been put on
113	 114
sale.	 Only E200 was spent on this form of advertising, 	 and
perhaps it was felt that the readers of those papers that would
accept such Conservative Party advertisements did not need
persuading. But if the Party did not undertake overt party publicity
in the press between 1927 and 1929, it was very far from dormant in
its attempts to make the best possible use of the medium. As we have
seen, relations with the press were generally good, except where
Rothermere and Beaverbrook were concerned. Davidson did everything he
could, while Chairman, to appease these powerful individuals. When an
opportunity came in September 1928 to gain Rothermere's support
115
Davidson urged that it be pursued. 	 He also did all he could to
prevent the complaints of the party rank and file about the attitude
of the press being voiced more openly, for this could only have
116
inflamed the situation. 	 At the same time, however, he worked to
halt the expansion of the Rothermere and Beaverbrodk empires into the
provinces, co-operating with Sir William Berry to prevent the Derby
Evening Express, and subsequently an Aberdonian evening newspaper,
117
from being bought by Rothermere.	 Playing a double game as he
was, Davidson was extremely anxious that Conservative Central
Office's part in thwarting Rothermere's ambitions should not be
113. The Times, 17 May 1929, 10d.
114. Davidson papers, 1929 General Election Accounts.
115. R.R. James, Op. Cit., 296.
116. NUCUA, Minutes of the Executive Committee, Motion by Sir
Charles Marston, 12 February 1929. Neville Chamberlain, the
succeeding chairman, likewise worked hard to avoid deliberate
antagonism - see for example Minutes of the Executive Committee
of the National Union, 17 June 1930.
117. R.R. James, 014 Cit., 294-5, and other correspondence about
sale of Derby Evening Express in Davidson papers.
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revealed. He also took pains to ensure that Berry remained
sympathetic, meeting him on several occasions, asking his advice, and
118
granting his request for a peerage. 	 For daily contact with the
press there was, as there had long been, a small Press Section in the
Publicity Department, and a special party press correspondent was
appointed to interview ministers who were not prepared to see the
press itself. Ball reported that
by the adoption of this method publicity can be secured, not only
in Conservative Press organs, but in most of those of the
Opposition, and even in that section of the Press which, while
calling itself Conservative, is constantly attacking the
119
Government.
In such matters as press relations diplomacy could reap large
rewards, but direct propaganda to the people was equally essential.
Leafleteering and posters were considered to be of vital importance
for this, but direct contact between party and people was still felt
to be necessary. The decreasing use of professional speakers did not
as yet represent a reduced belief in the worth of the public meeting,
although this was shortly to follow, nor in the importance of face to
face canvassing. It was merely a reflection of dissatisfaction as to
their competence, and as to the image they presented to the public.
In their place the Conservatism of Baldwin and Davidson emphasised
greater involvement by rank and file party members in voluntary
speaking. The Party's Philip Stott College ran weekend courses in
public speaking, and the Bonar Law College at Ashridge, opened in
mid-1929, had regular lectures on 'Public Speaking', 'How to Obtain
Political Information' and 'Organisation', and a weekend course on
120
'Public Speaking and the Formation of Public Opinion'.
	 Evening
118. Davidson papers, note of conversation between Davidson and
Berry, 13 December 1928.
119. Baldwin papers, Bal. 53/f111, Report on the Publicity
Department during 1927, 30 December 1927.
120. Gleanings and Memoranda, 1930-1934.
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classes on public speaking were also held at Central Office and
elsewhere. Clearly the Party still felt the public meeting to be
essential, for between November 1928 and April 1929 the Speakers'
Section of Central Office arranged 13,849 days of engagements for its
122
'staff' speakers.
	 By this time, however, the Party's employed
speakers had been so cut back that it had only 14 permanent and 18
123
retained propagandists, too few to undertake these engagements.
Even using in addition its 21 permanent organisers a further 30 to 40
full-time speakers would have been required. It seems probable,
therefore, that for the 1929 election Conservative Central Office, in
addition to its 53 permanent and retained staff, either employed
temporary speakers or paid an honorarium to volunteers who spoke.
Whichever was the case the Party was adapting its traditional methods
of publicity to meet the new demands, and thereby attempting to
present a new and attractive face to the electorate. It was also, in
its use of volunteers rather than paid speakers, following the
practice of the Labour Party, which employed only two paid speakers
but laid great emphasis on the value of the spoken word, both by
volunteers and by leading party politicians. The Conservative Party
too made increasing use of eminent political figures for normal
campaigning and, with Labour fielding up to forty volunteer speakers
at by-elections, followed suit by having, for example, 55 M.P.s lend
124
their support at Smethwick in 1927 and 36 at Chelmsford.
The 'modernisation' of public speaking, however, reached a peak
in the 1929 election, when the new loudspeaker and telephone systems
121. The Times 27 June 1929, 9c; 17 October 1929, 11g.
122. NUCUA, Report of the Central Council, 1929.
123. Davidson papers, List of staff employed by Central afice,1928.
124. Conservative Agents' Journal, April 1927; during 1927 the size
of Central Office's voluntary speakers list was increased, and
MPs and peers spoke at meetings arranged through Central Office
on 652 occasions - Baldwin papers, Ba1.53/f104, Report on
Conservative Organisation at Central Office and in the
constituencies during 1927.
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enabled the Party to indulge a love of technical experimentation and
gadgetry which has ever since put it in the forefront of developments
in party propagandist technique. This election saw the first use of
mobile loudspeaker vans, in which candidates could travel round their
constituencies declaiming to a much larger audience than could be
reached by the unaided voice. Hecklers could be ignored, and opposing
candidates drowned out of hearing. Central Office itself is not known
to have had more than one such van in 1929 - 'Mr Baldwin's Number 1'.
- equipped with loudspeakers, two microphones, apparatus for
receiving and amplifying music or political speeches from the BBC,
15
and a gramophone. 	 It would seem, from complaints in the
Conservative Agents Journal at the disturbance of the peace and the
public nuisance caused by loudspeakers, that the Liberal Party got
off the mark first in the use of this new 'engine of propaganda'.
Tory defence of the public quiet, however, soon vanished in direct
confrontation between rival party megaphones, as candidates obtained
126-
loudspeaker vans for their own use. 	 By 1931 Central Office had a
small fleet of these vans and nearly 100 portable public address
systems.
It was at major public meetings and rallies, however, that the
party used loudspeaker systems to best effect in 1929, using Baldwin
himself to reach the largest possible immediate audiences. Baldwin
could probably be said to have spoken live to more people, without
the aid of radio or television, than any other British politician
127
during an election campaign. 	 Not only were the political
meetings he attended in 1929 of traditional electioneering
proportions, but his speeches were also regularly relayed by
telephone lines from the hall in which he was speaking to overflow
halls and gatherings. Nor were these necessarily in the same town as
125. The Times, 6 June 1928, 14d.
126. Conservative Agents' Journal, 1926-9.
127. Lloyd George may have exceeded his score for the size of
audience for one speech. See the Manchester Guardian, 16 May
1929, editorial entitled 'A mechanical election'.
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the one in which he spoke; frequently in addressing a meeting in one
town of an area, he would simultaneously address up to eight separate
meetings in different towns in the district. Thus when speaking at
the Free Trade Hall in Manchester, in February, he addressed an
audience of over 30,000, situated at nine meetings, telling his
hearers that:
Democracy is on trial ... It is the first election of a fully'
enfranchised democracy of nunhood suffrage. I trust 
8
the fight may
12
be a fight on the basis of fact and not of fable.
Already his speech at Newcastle on 24 January had been relayed to
Berwick, South Shields, Stockton, West Hartlepool and Whitley
129
Bay,
	
	
and subsequently in speaking at Blackpool his words were
130
heard by a crowd of 60,000 on the beach. 	 Speaking at 
131
Bristol he
was relayed to all the more important towns of Somerset, 	 and the
rallies he addressed at Tredegar Park and Cardiff, already large,
132
were heard by many other meetings in Wales. 	 Amplifiers and
telephone relays for the 1929 General Election cost Central Office
133
the considerable sum of £8,138.
As with previous elections the Party tried to utilise the
gramophone for its propaganda. Neville Chamberlain was one of the
128. The Times, 28 Februqry 1929, 9e.
129. The Times, 25 January 1929, 11b.
130. The Times, 21 May 1929, 10b.
131. The Times 10 April 1929, 16e.
132. The Times, 8 May 1929, 16e. It is interesting to compare
Baldwin's mass rallies, held towards the close of the period
when such methods of electioneering were felt to be of value,
with the largest gathering Mrs Margaret Thatcher addressed
during the 1979 election campaign. This wasat Wembley, 29 April
1979, the audience numbering no more than 2,000, except during
the 30 seconds which were televised by courtesy of the
broadcasting organisations in their news bulletins.
133. Davidson papers, 1929 General Election accounts.
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134
ministers who recorded a speech. 	 These records were then sold to
local constituency associations, who could either sell them or play
them over their loudspeakers as they wished. As a means of persuading
the uncommitted such records would seem to have had their
limitations, although there are no reports as to their effectiveness
or popularity. An even more optimistic method of propaganda was used
by the agent of one county candidate, who distributed leaflets by
135
aeroplane.
	
	
There were reports of other candidates touring widely
136
spread constituencies by aeroplane. 	 A far more generally
acclaimed propaganda device was the lantern slide lecture, which the
a
Party had been using with considerple success since 
37
the 1890s, but
1
which had been developed considerably in the 1920s. 	 But the most
important developments of the 1920s for political propaganda were the
establishment of radio broadcasting for public consumption, the
confirmation of film entertainment as one of the most important and
powerful pastimes for the mass of the people, and the invention of
synchronised sound film. The Conservative Party's reaction to radio
broadcasting will be discussed elsewhere. The use that it made of
film, however, is of especial interest not least because it was
almost alone amongst the parties in such use throughout the inter-war
period.
The Conservative Party's earliest known contact with film was
premature. In about 1911 Bonar Law and F.E. Smith were filmed by
Cecil Hepworth, using his new vivaphone bynchronised sound system, a
technique which evidently proved unsatisfactory since little more was
134. Chamberlain papers, NC18/1/651, Neville to Hilda Chamberlain,
27 April 1929.
135. The Times, 14 May 1929, 8e.
136. The Times, 28 May 1929, 9d.
137. M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organisation of Political 
Parties, London 1902, 398; Interview with Percy Cohen, who
compiled these slide lectures.
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heard of it.	 There was an awareness even at this stage that the
political potential of film could be raised irrmasurably by the
addition of sound. The chief difficulty with film use, however, was
not in its lack of adequate sound - Baldwin was usefully to appear on
various occasions in the silent cinema newsreels, smbking his pipe,
demonstrating the good relationship he enjoyed with his industrial
workers, and proving the size of his following by being seen
addressing crowds said by the newsreels to be over 60,000 at party
139
rallies.	 The principal problem was that of exhibition. Film
coverage of party activities could be obtained in two ways - through
the commercial newsreels or by the Party's own production of
propaganda films. Hidden propaganda through feature films was only
later, and then very tentatively, contemplated. Although
advertisement of the Party through the newsreels would have ensured
the largest possible audience, there were serious obstacles to such
overt display of politics in the commercial cinema. The cinema news-
reels were felt by those who produced them to be almost entirely
visual media, an opinion which was most evidently justifiable before
the introduction of sound. Politics and political campaigning, on the
other hand, before film had encouraged even a limited visual sense in
politicians, were seen by the newsreel-makers as almost wholly verbal
activities, unsuitable for regular film coverage and placed outside
the newsreels' parameters of visual and entertaining news. The silent
newsreel, therefore, rarely provided an opportunity for party
publicity, and consequently the Party was encouraged to consider its
138. British Film Institute, Personalities Index, Unpublished note
on Cecil Hepworth. In 1914 the Party's attention was again
drawn to the political possibilities of film when the Ideal
Film Company made a film of the Sutherland forests, in order to
disprove Lloyd George's statement that thousands of people had
been evicted from their homes to provide a deer forest - Our
Flag, vol. 10 No.2, February 1914, 25.
139. The British Inter-University History Film Consortium's archive
series film on Stanley Baldwin, by John Ramsden, provides an
excellent opportunity to study his screen persona, and
illustrates how in what were remarkably infrequent and brief
screen appearances Baldwin effectively demonstrated and
confirmed for the mass audience his reputation as a bluff and
honest Englishman.
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own film production. Moreover, as Joseph Ball discovered, politics
was a taboo subject not only for conmercial film producers but also
for cinema exhibitors. As he reported in 1927,
the managers of cinematograph theatres [are] unanimous in their
opposition to the exhibition of any film of a political
140
character.
Not surprisingly the prospect of angering half their patrons by
projecting a politically unwelcome message, and another section of
the audience by introducing a serious and propagandistic note into an
entertainment show, did not appeal to cinema managers, and the Party
was therefore forced to find alternative means of exhibition:
The problem of exhibiting political propaganda films [declared
Ball] is one of such difficulty that at the present time it is
only by the production and use of our own cinema vans that they
141
can be placed before the public.
The method of exhibition mentioned, which brilliantly solved the
problem of how to obtain an audience for such films, and made a
virtue of a necessity, was the day_lightsinema van. This was a seven
ton pantechnicon with a hooded viewing screen at th
142
e back and a
projector, back-projecting film onto the screen. Such a van
enabled films to be shown in the street at any time of day, wherever
the van's speaker/operator cared to stop. The draw of a free film
show, particularly in rural areas where films were still a novelty,
was sufficient to attract large audiences of mixed political
140. Baldwin papers, Bal. 53/ff113-5, Report on the Work of the
Publicity Department during 1927. See pages 635-640 below on
opposition of exhibitors to politics in the cinema.
141. Baldwin papers, Bal. 53/ff113-115, Report on work of Publicity
Department during 1927.
142. 'Politics and the Film', Sight and Sound, 1 (1932), 49-50. A
picture of the first van is in Home and Politics, September
1925, and is reproduced in J. Ramsden (1978), Op. Cit., 395.
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persuasions - precisely the people that the Party desired to reach.
Here was the first great advantage of film as a propaganda medium.
Unlike other available techniques such as posters and pamphlets, film
was automatically associated not with persuasion or serious politics
but with entertainment. The cinema vans proved an effective
psychological draw by using the audience's pre-conditioned reaction
to film as a pleasurable experience in order to gain an attentive
viewing for a political message. Indeed reports indicated how
appreciative the audiences for these film shows were although this
143
was no guarantee of the films' effectiveness. 	 The Party's
message could only benefit from such an association with
entertainment, and this association was encouraged by making the
144
films themselves as entertaining as possible.	 A film of a
parliamentary candidate could even be a better crowd-puller than the
real thing, particularly when shown with non-political entertainment
films, and for this reason candidates were always urged to be present
when the cinema van was in action, in order that they might take over
the audience already captured. Davidson believed that the vans would
be of particular value after working hours when people would be
returning home. In the evening also, with more people on the street
than today, a large number of them on their way to or from the
regular cinema, the opportunity to attract a large audience was good.
In trying to reach the new voters - working class, women and the
young 'flapper' - who would not normally attend evening political
meetings, the Party was also incidentally aiming at precisely those
sections of society who visited the cinema most frequently, and this
fact evidently had a hand in interesting Joseph Ball in film
propaganda, as he explained in 1927:
The enormous increase in the popularity of cinemas particularly
143. Interview with Kenneth Lockstone, formerly Organising Secretary
of the Conservative and Unionist Films Association, and General
Manager of British Films Ltd., 31 January 1978. It was, of
course, difficult to heckle an amplified film which carried on
regardless of interruption.
144. Ibid.
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among the working classes, pointed the way, early in 1927 to the
cinema film as a method of placing our propaganda before the
145
electorate.
In fact the precise origins of the Party's interest in film and
outdoor cinema vans is obscure. It first experimented with one van in
August 1925, before either Ball or Davidson had become officially
146
involved with Conservative Central Office.	 Davidson, however,
later claimed that the idea of such a van was that of Sir Frank
Smith, his director of scientific research at the Admiralty, and that
147
Thorneycrofts, the shipbuilders, had constructea the first one.
Elsewhere it was stated that Conservative film publicity began
148
immediately after the 1914-18 war
	 and that Sir Albert Clavering,
a name of importance for party film after 1930, may be regarded as
149
the inventor of sound cinema vans.
	 It seems likely that the idea
of the self-contained, silent-film, daylight cinema van originated
commercially, shortly after the war. Vans designed to carry
projection equipment for erection in halls existed before this - the
War Aims Committee, for example, had a fleet of 22 'cinemotors' by
150
1918.
	 But the Conservatives do seem to have been the first to
have developed the idea of daylight cinema vans to any extent. The
first van was built not by Thorneycrofts, who only became involved in
1927, but by the firm of Blunt and McCormick, who also made some of
151
the Party's earliest films , and the Party became involved with
145. Baldwin papers, Ba1.53/ff113-115, Report on the Publicity
Department during 1927.
146. NUCUA, Report of the Central Council, 1925.
147. R.R. James, Op. Cit., 303.
148. Political and Economic Planning (Dartington Hall Enquiry), The
Factual Film, London 1947, 161.
149. A. Beattie, D.Dilks, N. Pronay, Neville Chamberlain, Leeds
1975, 5.
150. Public Record Office, National Savings Committee papers, NSC
29/15, correspondence relating to vans, 1918.
151. Information provided by Mrs. Margaret Grierson in letter to
author, 23 March 1979.
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film propaganda only when it acquired the prototype van in 1925, and
not before. Smith was probably responsible for developing the
earliest sound vans with Thorneycrofts in 1927. Clavering also became
involved in 1927 as a director of the British Talking Picture Co.,
who provided sound equipment and films.
The scheme was at first experimental, the van touring the
152
Midlands for three months in 1925.
	 Audiences of up to 2,000
could be obtained in large towns and cities, and two or three
meetings held each day. A show in a small town of 600 adults would
attract two thirds of the population. In such cases the operator
would show films for half an hour, give a speech and then answer
questions. He discovered that
the mere presence of this huge van stimulated interest in the
Party and in the work of the Government. Its presence answered
queries from the apathetic or the cynics who wondered "What the
153
Conservative Party was doing in the constituencies."
Clearly the cinema van's original function was not just to
propagandise through the films, but also to act as a crowd-puller for
what then became an ordinary, if unusually large, political meeting.
The speaker who accompanied the van in the General Strike year of
1926 stressed its value in gaining a hearing in the politically
unsympathetic mining districts, when he reported that
We toured many colliery areas and were everywhere given a really
good hearing. Without the van and the films this would not have
154
been the case.
With running costs of £30-40 a week he argued that the van did far
152. NUCUA, Report of the Central Council, 1925, 1926.
153. Baldwin papers, Bal. 48/f f73-79, Report on Tour of Daylight
Cinema Van, April-November 1926, by the speaker, W. Courtenay.
154. Ibid.
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more effective work than any two or three ordinary speakers,
attracting much larger audiences, and that it was both a better and a
cheaper form of propaganda. A practical demonstration of the
superiority of the vans over ordinary political meetings was to be
recorded by Neville Chamberlain in 1931:
It is very remarkable how they can get publicity when meetings
fail. During the L.C.C. elections on two nights when large halls
had been booked and good speakers brought down only about 50
people turned up. On the same two nights speakers going round
with the van reckoned that they addressed audiences amounting in
155
the aggregate to over 3,000 each night.
The value of the first van as a means of reaching a wide audience
was rapidly brought to Baldwin's attention, and shortly after
becoming Party Chairman Davidson confirmed the Party's interest in
film by acquiring the patent for one of the earliest practicable
cinema sound systems, the 'phonofilm'
	
two years before the
commercial 'talkie' appeared in Britain.	 Taking advantage of the
gift of a party sympathiser, Dav
1
idson ordered ten phonofilm outdoor
57
cinema vans from Thorneycrofts.
	 A fleet of twelve smaller vans
carrying portable projection equipment for showing films at indoor
meetings was also ordered, following successful experimentation with
158
a prototype paid for by the Junior Carlton Club. 	 By the time of
the General Election in 1929 the Party had 23 indoor and outdoor
cinema vans available and continously touring throughout the
155. Chamberlain papers, NC18/1/728, Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 1
March 1931. See also 'The Value of Cinema Vans in Borough
Divisions', in Conservative Agents' Journal, August 1931.
156. Minutes of the 1922 Committee, May 1927; In the early 1930s the
Party also acquired the patent of a 16 mm film sound system.
This proved a failure, however, and was not used.
157. Davidson papers, Party Accounts 1928. Three were paid for by
the party supporter, seven by the Party.
158. Ibid. ; The Man in the Street, August 1926.
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159
country.	 The p
160
honofilm vans were recognised immediately as of
'infinite value' , and it was reported in 1928 that they
prove to be an exceptionally effective means of drawing many
thousands of people and ip6riov1ding a new and telling engine of
education and propaganda.
Davidson told Churchill and Neville Chamberlain that
for rural districts the phonofilm cinema van is by common consent
162
the most powerful agency at the disposal of the Party.
An improved sound system introduced after 1930 was found to be quite
163
audible up to 250 yards distant.
The first films used were largely empire and colonial films
borrowed from various dominion offices, and the shows were always to
use non-party films, including some from the Empire Marketing Board,
164
to fill up the programme.	 In early 1926, however, Central Office
began to commission its own films. The films produced, as with the
system employed for displaying them, demonstrated ingenuity andan
appreciation of the most effective method of reaching the intended
audience. Ball wrote:
it was decided to endeavour to produce cartoon films (similar to
159. NUCUA, Report of the Central Council, 1928, 1929.
160. Davidson papers, undated memorandum (1930) by Davidson, on his
period as Chairman.
161. NUCUA, Report of the Central Council, 1928.
162. Davidson papers, J.C.C.D. to Churchill, 5 April 1928.
163. National Savings Committee papers, NSC 29/15, B.C. Robertson to
NSC Regional Commissioners, 29 February 1940.
164. Information provided by Mr. W. Mattock, a staff member of the
Publicity Department during the 1920s and 1930s, in a letter to
the author, 7 March 1978.
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the well known "Felix the Cat" films) ridiculing the policy and
165
tactics of our political opponents.
William Ward, one of only three known active film cartoonists in the
countr
6
y t was engaged to make films exclusively for the Conservative16
Party. Typically these cartoons lampooned the Opposition
leaders, showing MacDonald and Snowden as incompetent plumbers, or
Lloyd George as a garage mechanic whose hamfisted attentions ruined
the 'Car of State' driven by John Bull. Another (non-cartoon) film,
showing Cabinet Ministers at work in their offices, was intended to
give the public intimate peeps of prominent political
167
personalities, known to the majority only by name.
Other films showed pictorially the beneficial effects of Government
policy - the increases made, for examplel in housing.
The Conservative Party had found a highly effective new medium of
publicity, particularly for reaching the politicall&adverse or
apathetic, and one which was as yet unique to itself.
	 By 1929 it
165. Baldwin papers, Bal. 53/ff 113-115, Report on the work of the
Publicity Department during 1927.
166. Ibid.; Letter from Mr. Mattock, 7 March 1978. The cartoons
themselves were neither politically subtle nor technically
advanced, using knockabout humour to ridicule Labour and
Liberal politicians and policies, and well used artistic
cliches such as expanding and contracting eyes to denote rage
and dotted lines from the eyes to the object being looked at.
Films started with the cartoonist's hand drawing on a blank
sheet of paper. All these stylistic details had been in use
during the war. But these were the techniques generally still
used in Britain, and the audience would not have been
accustomed as yet to anything better.
167. Man in the Street, August 1926; Chamberlain papers,
NC7/11/19/15, Lord Halifax to Neville Chamberlain, 15 September
1926, 14 December 1926.
168. The only other known user of outdoor cinema vans, until the Co-
operative Wholesale Society acquired one in the late 1930s, was
the National Milk Publicity Council who, having hired the
Conservative vans briefly, bought two outdoor vans between 1936
and 1939. Several other organisations, including the G.P.O. and
Shell, used vans carrying indoor projection equipment.
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was spending considerable sums on film propaganda, and even managed
in that election to have its films widely shown in commercial
cinemas, thereby presenting its propaganda to a large, captive and
169
non-political audience.	 Indeed the Party was well pleased with
all its new propaganda efforts, and it was a shock to find itself out
of office despite all publicity and political achievements. Davidson,
who had expected defeat given the Party's lack of a positive
programme for the propaganda machine to publicise, argued
nevertheless that by organisation and propaganda, concentrated in
170
eighty marginal seats, the defeat had been minimised.
	 Although
ultimately he was made something of a scapegoat, and Chamberlain
called in to undertake further administrative reorganisation, it is
evident that following the 1929 election the Party at large was in no
doubt as to the vital need for mass propaganda. The defeat only
encouraged this conviction. Baldwin declared his own feelings a month
after the election:
the whole . organisation, the political organisation of a party,
has to adapt itself to the modern conditions of electioneering,
and to the enormous electorate that has come into existence after
the war; and I doubt if any party has yet adapted itself fully to
171
meet the new conditions.
The Central Council of the National Union of Conservative and
Unionist Associations immediately resolved that
no time should be lost by Party experts in making a close local
172
study of the mass psychology of the electors.
It felt that 'an intensified educational programme of propaganda'
169. Davidson papers, Accounts for 1929 General Election.
170. R.R. James, Op. Cit., 299.
171. Gleanings and Memoranda, August 1929, 178.
172. Ibid., 91.
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should be immediately carried out. Davidson himself began to review
173
his organisation before he resigned.
One department reorganised early in 1930 was the film section of
the Publicity Department. Successful as film propaganda had been, the
small section which ran it was very much an amateur organisation. The
Party was being exploited by commercial companies with which it had
dealings, and was not obtaining the most effective service for what
174
was becoming one of its more costly publicity devices.
	 The new
Chief Publicity Officer, Sir Patrick Gower, who replaced Ball when
the latter became Director of the Conservative Research Department in
mid-1929, recognised this problem. Desiring to further film
propaganda by establishing firm contacts in the commercial cinema, he
disbanded the film section and formed the independent, though largely
party financed, Conservative and Unionist Films Association (CFA),
under a new Honorary Organising Director, Albert Clavering. Clavering
brought the stamp of professionalism and a practical knowledge of the
cinema industry to Conservative film propaganda, and, with Joseph
Ball, was largely responsible for the good relationship that existed
between the Party and the commercial cinema industry throughout the
1930s. He was deeply involved in the cinema trade, being himself a
minor magnate. An entrepreneur of film production and distribution,
he was one of the founders of the Kinematograph Renters' Association
and a leading member of the powerful Cinematograph Exhibitors'
Association. During the First World War he had controlled the
distribution of the Topical Budget News Film, working closely with
No. 10, Downing Street, to further war propaganda. He owned a cinema
175
and newsreel theatre chain.
	 Widely respected in the commercial
173. Davidson papers, J.C.C.D. to Neville Chamberlain, 5 July 1930,
proposals for the further reorganisation of Central Office and
the Party.
174. Baldwin papers, Bal. 170/f f83-4, Patrick Gower to Geoffrey
Lloyd, 5 April 1935.
175. Baldwin papers, Bal. 170/ff85-6, Report on career of Sir Albert
Clavering, c. April 1935. Clavering was knighted for his
services to the Party in 1935.
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cinema industry, he was a close friend of Isodore Ostrer, President
of Gaumont British, whilst his brother Arthur was a director of
Pathe. Michael Balcon and Alexander Korda advised and assisted him on
176
propaganda film production. 	 By 1935 Sir Patrick Gower could tell
Baldwin that Clavering's service was an important reason
why we, as a party, are so far ahead of the other parties in the
development of film propaganda, which is likely to become
177
increasingly important as time goes on.
One useful innovation was the insistence that all constituencies
visited by a van fill in a report on each meeting held, detailing the
audience size, its reaction, the Agent's opinion as to the quality
and value of the film programme and the speaker, and, interestingly,
the predominant topics and questions raised by the audience and the
178
subjects of greatest concern to them. Such feedback was useful
not only to the CFA in gauging its effectiveness, but to Gower, to
whom the reports were sent
9
in assessing those subjects on which
17
propaganda was most needed.
But Clavering not only improved the cinema van system; he also
went over to the offensive in attacking the public exhibition of
Russian films, which were now beginning to arrive in this country.
According to Gower he had successfully prevented the commercial
180
exhibition of Russian films throughout Britain in 1929.
176. Interview with Kenneth Lockstone, 31 Janu2ry 1978.
177. Baldwin papers, Bal. 170/ff83-4, Patrick Gower to Geoffrey
Lloyd, 5 April 1935.
178. National Savings Committee papers, NSC 29/15, W.R.C. Howard
(Organising Secretary, Conservative Films Association) to Mr.
Francis, 14 February 1940 - contains a sample copy of this
form.
179. Baldwin papers, Bal. 47/ff103-8, Gower to Baldwin, 1 August
1935.
180. Baldwin papers, Bal. 170/ff85-6. Report on career of Sir Albert
Clavering, c. April 1935.
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Certainly in 1930 he organised a strong protest by Central Office
against the exhibition of films such as 'Potemkin' and 'Turksib' by
the Film Society and the London Workers' Film Society. No doubt he
firmly supported the L.C.C. (of which he was a member from 1931 to
1934) in its decision to refuse a licence for the showing of 'Mother'
181
by the Masses Stage and Film Guild in the same year. 	 He believed
passionately that the exhibit ion of left-wing and Russian films must
be stopped at all costs, and it might, perhaps, be allowable to
suggest that the already ultra-cautious British Board of Film Censors
took serious note of these views of the Conservative Party, and
particularly of Clavering and Gower, who were not infrequently taken
by members of the film trade to be unofficial government channels
182
when the Conservatives were in power.
Clavering was equally appalled by the left-wing nature of the
183
	
G.P.O. Film Unit led by John Grierson.	 He complained repeatedly
about its activities to his superiors, though with little apparent
success. Paul Rotha believes that the strongly critical Select
Committee Report on the G.P.O. Film Unit in 1934, which recommended
severe restrictions on its productions, was prompted in part by
184
Conservative Party interests, and this seems quite possible.
Rotha's further allegations, however, of a 'skein of intrigue and
manoeuvre' by the 'Film Trade' and Conservative politicians, are
185
	
insubstantial and must be open to doubt.
	 The G.P.O. Film Unit
181. R. Bond 'Dirty Work', Close-Up, August 1930, 98-100; The Times,
16 June 1930, llf; British Board of Film Censors papers, Notes
of deputation received by the Home Secretary from the
Parliamentary Film Committee and various film societies, 15
July 1930, to protest against the banning of Russian films.
These unindexed papers are held at the British Film Institute.
182. See pp. 654-664 below.
183. Kenneth Lockstone, Clavering's deputy, described Grierson as a
'Communist', and admitted that he had himself protested
vehemently about the 'Socialist propaganda' put out by the
G.P.O. film unit, which prior to 1933 was the Empire Marketing
Board film unit.
184. P. Rotha, Documentary Diary, London 1973, 117; Report from the 
Select Committee on Estimates, H.M.S.O., July 1934, ix-xiii,
185. P. Rotha, Op. Cit.,115, 122. See also note C at end of chapter
,p.111.
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was fortunate in having as its patron the Postmaster General, Sir
Kingsley Wood, who showed himself to be one of the Conservative
politicinns most interested in propaganda and the value of film.
Above all Clavering was to prove invaluable for his knowledge of
and contacts with the commercial cinema industry. He was able not
only to take the advice of such men as Korda, Balcon and Ian
Dalrymple (Chief Editor of London Films Ltd.), but also to maintain
close contact with the various cinema newsreel companies, advising
them of particular issues which the Party or Government was anxious
to publicise, and frequently taking film of political items that they
had shot, for use on the cinema vans. Two leading figures of British
Movietone News actually joined the CFA's central editorial committee,
responsible for devising and approving propaganda film scripts. These
were Sir Gordon Craig, who was initially Chairman of New Era Films
and subsequently General Manager and Director of Movietone, and
Movietone's Editor, Gerald Sanger, who was one of the most important
figures in the newsreel industry. After Clavering left the CFA Sanger
became its Honorary Films Adviser, from 1948 to 1959, and wrote
several of the film scripts. In particular the 'very presence of
Clavering as an official contact for film matters in party and
government circles prompted the newsreels to get in touch whenever
they were contemplating a political item or desired to interview a
186
minister.	 Clavering could then either give assistance or advise
against the coverage of an unsuitable issue, thereby ensuring that
the reels were aware of the Party or Government attitude in advance.
It would be wrong to read too much into this relationship, for
Clavering was essentially fulfilling the role of Film Press Officer.
But such a position was a novel one and undoubtedly benefited the
Party in the coverage which it received from the newsreels. The
Labour Party did not have an equivalent officer to look after its
newsreel presentation. The precise nature of the relationship between
the Conservative Party and the newsreels, and particularly British
Movietone News and Gaumont British News, was a complicated one, and
186. See note D at end of chapter,p.112.
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has been the subject of much speculation. This question will be
considered more fully in a later chapter dealing specifically with
newsreels and politics.
By 1930, therefore, the Conservative Party, although it had lost
the election, seemed well prepared to fight back, so far as mass
propaganda was concerned. It had experience of running large scale
leafleteering campaigns and had pioneered important developments ia
political poster work, employing commercial techniques with the
advice of publicity experts. Throughout the Party there was a strong
belief in the need for positive and large scale propaganda
campaigning, and in the cinema van system and its films it had a
unique and powerful new propaganda medium, now enhanced by the Skills
of a professional who was well equipped to infiltrate the comercial
industry in the Party's cause.
The election, however, had depleted the Party's financial
resources, and a cut-back in expenditure was found to be necessary in
the immediate future. The budget of the Publicity Department was
187
reduced from its peaks of 1928 and 1929.	 By 1931 the national
economic crisis was having severe effects upon party organisation as
railway shares, in which the Party had invested heavily,
188
plummeted.	 Accordingly the new Party Chairman, Neville
Chamberlain, demanded that all departments of Central Office reduce
their expiliture drastically. The Publicity Department was required
to cut its budget by half, a decision taken many months before the
187. Davidson papers, Party accounts, 1928, 1929; CCO, Director of
Organisation's file series, summary of party expenditure 1930 -
1936, contained in file entitled 'Report on Party Organisation,
April 1937'. At the time of writing the papers of Conservative
Central Office are only partly sorted and no more detailed
reference is possible.
188. Percy Cohen to author 20 April 1979; R.D. Casey, 'The National
Publicity Bureau', Public Opinion Quarterly, 1939, 624.
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formation of the National Government and the landslide election made
189
mass propaganda temporarily superfluous.
	 Party publicity was
also seriously hampered by the internal crises which the Party
suffered from 1929 to 1931. The long unresolved question as to
Baldwin's leadership made positive propaganda difficult, whilst the
attacks on Davidson further complicated his organisational tasks. The
replacement of Joseph Ball by Sir Patrick Gower in the central
position of Chief Publicity Officer was certainly significant for
party publicity. Ball, secretive and devious, was well suited to the
aggressive propagandising favoured by Davidson. Gower, by contrast,
came to Central Office after a highly respectable and successful
career in the Civil Service, having been Private Secretary to Bonar
Law, Ramsay MacDonald and Stanley Baldwin at No. 10, Downing Street.
His was a training in administration,diplomacy, and public relations.
Acting as intermediary between the Premier and the press was his
forte, an interpreter, for public announcement, of the Prime
Minister's decisions, and frequently the writer of Baldwin's
190 •
speeches.
	 Although he had been deputy Publicity Officer for a
year under Ball, it was to a large extent his previous experience of
public relations that he brought to the Publicity Department in 1929,
191
although he also was particularly keen on film propaganda.
	 Gower
was very much Baldwin's man, like Davidson who was responsible for
his appoinLment, and continued whilst Chief Publicity Officer from
1929 to 1939 to act also as an unofficial public relations officer
for the Party's leader. Such close ties between the leader and the
Chief Publicity Officer certainly benefited Baldwin; but given his
difficult personal position in 1930 they probably did little to
further party publicity.
189. CCO, Director of Organisation's file series, Topping to
Stonehaven, 'Interim Report on Office Reconstruction and
Reduction of Expenditure', 30 July 1931; Report prepared by
Chief Publicity Officer to the General Director, undated (early
1931). These reductions were successfully carried out.
190. Percy Cohen to author, 20 April 1979.
191. Kenneth Lockstone to author, 31 January 1978.
69
These various factors, together with the highly unusual
circumRtances of the 1931 General Election and the National
Government which followed it, meant that there would be a significant
pause in the organisational strides made in the 1920s, and that the
style and extent of Conservative propaganda between 1931 and 1934
would be rather different from what had gone before. The Chamberlain
Committee on Office Reorganisation recommended in 1931 that the
Party's speakers be reduced still further, and the previously highly
successful glass slide lecture lending service was also run down, due
to reduced demand and the constituencies' preference for cinema
192
vans.	 For the election of 1931 the Party produced only 23.5
million leaflets and 222,000 posters, although once again Benson's
was used for poster preparation and exhibition. Despite the
bitterness with which the campaign was fought the mechanics of
Conservative propaganda work were much reduced compared with 1929.
Lock of preparation, the diminished resources of the local
constituency associations, the change in organisational personnel and
the difficulties of having to adapt propaganda from an exposition of
Conservative to 'National' policy, all had a deleterious effect on
party publicity. Although Baldwin was later to congratulate the Party
on the ease with which it swung behind the National Government,
considerable re-adjustment pr1B3oved to be necessary in propaganda,
organisation and attitudes. In consequence the Films Association
acquired a certain importance in the election campaign. It too was
hit by the creation of the National Government - films and cartoons
produced in 1930 satirising MacDonald and Snowden were iramediately
194
made redundant , and the election found it with free capital of
192. CCO, Director of Organisation's file series. Report on Office
Reconstruction and Reduction of Expenditure, 30 July 1931;
NUCUA, Report of the Central Council, 1929.
193. 'To switch over, as in a night, from party warfare, party
programme, party propaganda, to the support of the National
Government was a great achievement, and an achievement no less
of the organising Skill of those who accomplished it than it
was of the patriotism of the rank and file.' - NUCUA, National
Union Annual Conference report, 1932.
194. Kinematograph Weekly, 24 May 1934.
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only £3. However it iranediately launched a fund-raising drive amongst
the London Conservative clubs, filmed speeches by the National party
195
leaders , and took its vans to 79 marginal towns where 543
meetings were held. In addition it obtained the use of nine
loudspeaker vans and two other sets of loudspeaker apparatus
f96
 which
it sent out to 48 towns where 404 meetings were given. The
Association also arranged the three films made of the party leaders
which were shown in the newsreels to audiences estimated at 25.
million. It should be added that although the newsreels also showed
films of the Opposition leaders they proved generally more co-
operative and sympathetic to the National Government parties and
197
undoubtedly gave them greater coverage.
	 In MacDonald's own
constituency of Seaham Clavering arranged for the Prime Minister's
film speech to be displayed in every cinema at each performance for
the week preceding the poll, a policy of blanket propaganda which no
- 198
doubt contributed to the 6,000 majority achieved there.
The Party had made great use of the cinema vans both before and
195. The British Inter-University History Film Consortium's archive
series film on Baldwin shows two speeches filmed at Paramount
in 1931, on the same day, one which was issued on the newsreel,
and one which was aimed particularly at Conservatives. John
Ramsden suggests that the latter was made for the C.F.A. and
was intended for showing on the cinema vans. The outdoor vans,
however, were intended to capture a general, non-political
audience. This film may therefore have been intended for indoor
projection only, to audiences which, showing sufficient
interest to attend indoor meetings, were predominantly
Conservatives. The fact that such a film was considered
necessary illustrates some concern for the support of the rank
and file of the Party.
196. NUCUA, Executive Committee minutes, 8 December 1931.
197. See pp.664-668 below.
198. Baldwin papers, Ba1.48/ff238-9, unsigned, undated memorandum
(probably by Albert Clavering, mid 1934); for such a strong
Labour mining seat MacDonald's success was a considerable
achievement which many believed impossible - R. Bassett,
Nineteen Thirty-one, London 1958, 319. How this cinema speech
was exhibited within the R.P.A. laws regarding election
expenditure is not known.
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199
during the election.	 But the financial crisis had undoutedly
struck it severely. Despite a realization that propaganda must be
continuous to be effective, the overwhelming electoral victory made
200
party publicity an obvious area for major economies.
	 In the
months following the election, demand for literature, and
201
consequently production of it, virtually ceased.
	 Early in the
New Year Gower told Clavering to put the cinema vans and the CFA
202
itself into mothballs , for despite the fact that the vans had
been hired out to the constituencies the operation had still been an
expensive one for Central Office. In order to bring the cost of van
hire for the local parties within the stringent laws regarding
electoral expenditure the weekly charge had merely covered hire and
maintenance for that week. Consequently the cost both of film
production and of maintenance of the vans and staff when not in use
had had to be financed from Central Office, and from private
donations raised by the CFA. But the Association was not closed down;
Clavering and his Organising Secretary, Kenneth Lockstone, objected
strongly to the idea of having dead capital tied up in the vans. At
Lockstone's suggestion they created an independent company, British
Film  Ltd., to hire the vans from the Party, maintain and run them on
its behalf, and, when it was not using them, to hire them out to
commercial firms wishing to use this new propaganda technique.The
Company would also produce short commercial advertising and
documentary films. The venture was highly successful, and British
Films was able to keep the vans running for the Party and to plough
money back into the CFA as a result of its commercial contracts,
which ranged from advertising cigarettes to health resorts. This was
to prove particularly profitable during the Second World War when the
vans were hired to the National Savings Committee for five years and
199. See Also Conservative Agents' Journal, March 1931, April 1931.
200. New Year's message to party workers from Lord Stonehaven, Conse-
rvative Agents' Journal, January 1932; The Times, 18 February
1932, 14c.
201. NUCUA, Executive Committee minutes, 15 June 1932.
202. Interview with Kenneth Lockstone, 31 January 1978.
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203
made a profit of some £36,000.
During the next three years mass propaganda, the CFA excepted,
was minimal. The Publicity and Speakers Departments had their budgets
still further cut, and in 1932-3 the amount of literature distributed
204
in the constituencies was 'almost negligible'. 	 There was an
unwillingness on the part of Conservative sympathisers to give money
for National publicity and of National Government supporters to
provide funds for the Conservative machine, although in the absence
of large National Labour and Liberal National organisations the
Conservatives still had to bear the brunt of National organisation.
Considerable resentment of this fact was felt by many constituencies
and back-bench MPs, who accused the Party Chairman, Lord Stonehaven,
of giving undue regard to the claims of MacDonald's and Simon's
205
parties.
	 It was even suggested that Baldwin and he actually
refused money from Conservative sympathisers because of the National
206
nature of the Government.	 These accusations were quite unjust
given Stonehaven's behind-the-scenes hostility to National Labour and
defence of Conservative Party rights. But it was understandable that
many local parties should feel aggrieved; nearly 60 had sacrificed
their own man for Liberal or National Labour candidates in 1931. A
further 90 had been opposed at that election by a candidate of the
other National Government parties, and so still felt themselves to be
very much concerned with the advocacy of Conservatisn rather than
207
with political unity.
	 Those constituencies who had returned a
Conservative candidate were also confused as to whether they should
203. This was achieved despite the profit tax, although at the
expense of wear and tear on the vans.
204. NUCUA, Executive Committee minutes, 30 May 1934.
205. Meeting of Agents in Western England, Conservative Agents' 
Journal, March 1934; Meeting of Agents in South Eastern
England, Ibid., June 1934.
206. Baldwin papers, Bal. 48/f245, unsigned memorandum to Baldwin,
c. February 1935.
207. T. Stannage, Baldwin Thwarts the Opposition, London 1980, 24.
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carry on Conservative or National propaganda. Although they were
urged by Baldwin and others to propagate a spirit of national unity,
they were at the same time told by party organisers to retain their
Conservative identity and to actively attract new members to the
208
Party.	 It was perhaps not surprising that in this confused
situation, yet with a solid national mandate, local party propaganda
should virtually disappear, particularly since many constituency
associations also found themselves in serious financial
209
difficulties.	 Stonehaven had an unhappy time defending the
continuation of the National Government against an increasingly
hostile minority of the rank and file, and not unnaturally this led
to some deterioration of party organisation. Symbolic of the Party's
condition was the demise in January 1934 of its most informative and
useful publication for party workers, Gleanings and Memoranda, and
its replacement by the less frequently issued Politics in Review.
In 1929 Davidson had used his modern central propaganda machine
both to stimulate national organisation, and as a means of
circumventing those parts of the Party which had proved backward in
adapting to the new mass electorate. He had complained of the 'dead
hand of obstruction on the part of the Agents', and was proud that he
had freed the 'powerful exercise of every engine of propaganda' from
their control. The cinema vans in particular, he had believed,
will prove increasingly of infinite value to the Party, provided
that some method of running them independently of the Party
210
Agents can be devised.
Now in 1934 Joseph Ball, who had been keeping a close eye on his
former department, informed Neville Chamberlain of the dire situation
208. Speech by Robert Topping at Western Agents' meeting,
Conservative Agents' Journal, April 1932.
209. Conservative Agents' Journal, March, July, 1933, February 1934.
210. Davidson papers, undated memorandum (early 1930) by J.C.C.D.,
on his achievements as Party Chairman.
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as far as propaganda was concerned. He reported that
.... since the National Government came into office there ha 
been a complete lack of adequate propaganda ... throughout the
211
country.
He was convinced that what little literature there was had been
distributed to firm Conservatives in secure Conservative
constituencies:
As the distribution figures show, this system, as a national
system of propaganda, has broken down. Many constituencies refuse
to take Central Office publications at all; others say they
cannot afford to do so; others disregard all communication about
them.
His conclusion was a damning one:
Me can surely no longer afford to allow the question whether or
not effective publicity shall be given in any particular
constituency to the Government's record or policy to be
dependent, as it often is today, upon the whim of the agent or
the state of the constituency's finances, or the effectiveness of
its distribution system.
Similarly in May Gower admitted to Stonehaven and Baldwin his own
worries about the Government's inadequate liaison with the
212
press.
The one relieving feature in this picture was provided by the
Films Association. Throughout the period and throughout the Party it
211. Chamberlain papers NC8/21/9, Ball to Chamberlain, 'Some notes
and suggestions about propaganda', 14 March 1934.
212. Baldwin papers, Bal.47/ff229-30 Gower to Stonehaven, 8 May
1934.
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was hailed as being invaluable. The Northern Counties declared that
This form of propaganda, most easily understood by the untrained
213
mind, has been successful in attracting large audiences.
The Eastern Area felt that 'it enables the voter who never attends
214
ordinary political meetings to be reached',
	 whilst from the East
Midlands it was reported that
There is an increasing demand for this service which is generally
recognised as the best form of propaganda the Party Organisation
215
has at its disposal.
The verdict from the West Country summed up general opinion:
Opinion seems to be unanimous that 16of
 all forms of propaganda the
2
cinema van is the most effective.
Despite its initial thriftiness Central Office obviously concurred
with this view, for the CFA's annual budget always equalled, and in
217
1934 was triple that of the Publicity Department itself.
	 The CFA
was also made responsible for organising the Party's loudspeaker vans
and equipment, for it possessed 96 public address systems to hire to
local parties, and its work with both methods of propaganda was of
great value at by-elections. At North Hammersmith, for example, a
cinema van toured with a film of the candidate and enabled him to be
213. NUCUA, Report of the Central Council, 1937, Northern Counties
Area Report.
214. NUCUA, Central Council report, 1931, Eastern Area Report.
215. NUCUA, Central Council report, 1935, East Midlands Area Report.
216. NUCUA, Central Council report, 1935, Western Cornwall, Devon
and Somerset Provincial Divisions Report.
217. COO, Director of Organisation's file series, Summary of Party
expenditure, 1930-36, in file entitled 'Report on Party
Organisation, April 1937'.
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218
seen at 78 meetings, itself addressing 18,000 voters.
By 1933-34 there was a growing recognition that positive National
Government propaganda could not be delayed if the deficiencies in
organisation during the previous three years were to be adequately
countered. By-election reverses were becoming worrying, whilst the
Publications Sub-Committee of the Party complained at the attacks
made upon the Government by the popular press, and warned of the
219
Labour Party's 'Victory for Socialism' crusade. 	 Local parties
were urged to improve their organisation by introducing the 'block'
system of canvassing and leaflet distribution. The Conservative 
Agents' Journal in 1933 referred repeatedly to the agents' anxiety
for Central Office direction regarding publicity, and in June 1934
the Central Council of the National Union passed the resolution
That this Council is of opinion that more definite and active
measures should be taken by Constituency Associations to combat
the menace of Socialism and urges better organisation of
220
propaganda during the coming months.
At the same meeting the Central Office Publicity Department was urged
to make its literature more avowedly Conservative rather than
National, a demand Stonehaven not surprisingly stamped on, arguing
that Central Office propaganda had to be designed to appeal to non-
Conservatives as well as to Party supporters.
The reasons for the Central Council's differentiation of
218. Conservative Agents' Journal, February 1933, May 1934.
219. NUCUA, Executive Committee minutes, 30 May 1934; The Times, 30
November 1933, 15b (leading article), discusses the anti-
National Government bias of the popular press - the Daily 
Herald, the News Chronicle, Daily Express, Daily Mail and
Evening News; Baldwin was told by Stonehaven that 'practically
the whole of the so-called popular press is closed to us' -
Baldwin papers, Bal. 48/f228, Stonehaven to Baldwin, 10 May
1934. See also Note E at end of chapter, p.112.
220. Politics in Review, vol. 1 (1934), 88.
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Conservative and National propaganda were to be found in the
activities of the National Government Co-ordinating Committee, and it
was with these activities that political propaganda took a new turn.
This body had been created in April 1933 by the three National
Government party organisations, in order to secure
the closest possible co-operation between them for the purposes
of National Government propaganda and other forms of political
221
activity.
In fact it was initially more concerned with such matters as by-
election candidate selection than with propaganda. Consisting of a
committee of senior representatives of the party organisations, it
had little power at first to improve publicity. However the Co-
ordinating Committee did represent the first step in a. move to give
the three party machines a more united appearance, a move which was
to have important financial benefits, at the same time as arousing
local Conservative constituency association fears of party
amalgamation.
If the Conservative Party organisation was in the doldrums
between 1931 and 1934, those of the Liberal Nationals and National
Labour were struggling even to survive. Apart from a sporadically
issued newsletter, which was in no way intended as propaganda, the
Liberal Nationals carried out virtually no propaganda on their own
behalf. National Labour, despite its poor parliamentary
representation, was initially in a slightly stronger position. Above
all it could rely upon the goodwill attracted by MacDonald himself,
and by what many saw as his self-sacrifice in the nation's interest
in 1931. This fact was to be of considerable conseqpence for the
support that certain leading cinema newsreels and film producers such
as Michael Ealcon gave the National Government. MacDonald had also
attracted to the National Labour ranks two eminent men who were to
give particular attention to its publicity, though with little
221. Gleanings and Memoranda, May 1933, 417.
78
success. Clifford Allen, lifelong socialist and pacifist, urged the
production of a regular National Labour News-Letter, to act as an
arena for educative and controversial debate. Although MacDonald
disparaged the value of such a publication, a fortnightly journal, of
remarkable quality given the circumstances under which it was
produced, was started in April 1932 in the optimistic hope that
The Labour electors must get the facts and must do some stiff
thinking upon them. This newsletter is issued to help him
222
[sic].
Within four months Allen had resigned his editorship, ill and
severely disillusioned by MacDonald's lack of interest and desire for
more Mular propaganda - fewer 'essays' and more 'shot and
shell'	 - and disgusted by the Government's apparent total
224
neglect of self advertisement and explanation of policy. 	 The
News-Letter, however, continued to function until 1947, but certainly
not as a method of propaganda of any importance.
Although MacDonald had been uninterested in Allen's efforts he
was an ardent propagandist, and in late 1931 had invited Robert
Donald, former editor of the Daily Chronicle and one of the most
respected men of Fleet Street, to take charge of National Labour
225
publicity.
	
Donald undertook this work with determination,
supporting the News-Letter, but also looking for a larger outlet for
222. The National Labour News-Letter, Foreword by J.R. MacDonald, 1
April 1932.
223. Quoted by Arthur Marwick, Clifford Allen, London 1964, 122.
224. 'I have never known any Government pursuing such a successful
policy, so entirely neglecting the public platform and the
press. This is not only stupid politically, but it is most
unfair to the patient rank and file enthusiasts, who want to
understand and support the Government's policy and instead find
themselves absolutely neglected.', Allen wrote to Malcolm
MacDonald, 11 June 1932. M. Gilbert (ed.), Plough My own 
Furrow, London 1965, 262.
225. H.A. Taylor, Robert Donald, London 1934, 257-9.
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National Labour views. This he found in Everyman, an intellectual and
literary magazine which, once acquired in mid-1932, he turned into a
valuable and widely respected journal of current affairs. Together
with Donald's other work for National Labour Everyman, although still
hardly large-scale propaganda, could have provided the Party with
reasonable independent publicity. But Donald's death in February 1933
deprived the organisation of a servant it could ill afford to lose.
National Labour propaganda remained minimal. It was hardly
surprising, therefore, that despite MacDonald's suspicions of his
Conservative allies, and his fear of being absorbed by the larger
party, he welcomed the creation of the National Government Co-
226
ordinating Committee and saw its role as a propagandistic one.
The organisations of all three National Government parties needed
rousing, and roused they were by the results of the by-elections in
the autumn. At East Fulham the Government candidate was defeated,
whilst at four other by-elections within the month the average swing
227
against the Government was over twenty per cent. 	 The Co-
ordinating Committee recognised at last that some kind of defence of
Government policy was necessary, and began to organise a campaign for
the New Year, although this was only made possible by the special
228
donation of funds by a wealthy sympathiser.	 Baldwin, in that
high moral tone which he always employed when talking about
propaganda hone of his favourite phrases was 'I hate
22
propaganda' ), showed his understanding of the necessity for it
when he wrote to party workers that
The maintenance of an educated democracy depends on unceasing
226. There is a brief correspondence on the formation of the
Committee in the MacDonald papers at the Public Record Office -
PRO 30/69/1/396, April 1933.
227. C.T. Stannage, 'The East Fulham By-Election, 25 October 1933',
Historical Journal, vol. XIV (1971), 165-200.
228. The Times 2 Decetber 1933, 12e; National Union Executive
Committee minutes, 30 May 1934.
229. P. Cohen, Op. Cit., 582 - Interview with Sir Patrick Gower.
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propaganda, pressed with vigour and enthusiasm, and at the same
time directed with a full and exact knowledge of the facts,
towards clearly defined ends. A confusion of aim or a lack of
230
enthusiasm renders propaganda weak and ineffectual.
Three weeks later a campaign was launched consisting of four
elements: a large number of mass meetings addressed solely by the
231
heads of the Government , a national poster campaign in 250
constituencies, the distribution of popularly designed pictorial
broadsheets in more marginal areas, and later in the year a national
232
cinema van campaign.	 For the first time a national campaign was
organised, run and wholly financed by Central Office without apparent
support from the constituency associations.
In connection with the cinema van campaign Clavering organised an
extremely sucessful publicity stunt with the newsreel companies. It
was arranged that the newsreels would film and exhibit the three
National Government party leaders inspecting and 'sending-off' the
fleet of outdoor cinema vans from New Palace Yard at the beginning of
the campaign, thereby increasing public awareness of and interest in
It. It also allowed MacDonald to say a few words on the achievements
of the National Government and to declare to a national audience of
many millions the campaign motto 'Pull together and pull the country
233
through'.	 The PM was warned, however, by Sir Patrick Gower to
Avoid using the word "political", because that might prejudice
the distribution of the film, as some exhibitors might think that
230. Politics in Review, vol. 1 (1934), 3.
231. National Labour News-Letter, 20 January 1934, 3 February 1934.
232. NUCUA, Executive Committee minutes, 30 May 1934. A typical film
show of this campaign, lasting between 1 and 2.5 hours, is
described in the papers of the Metropolitan Police at the
Public Record Office, MEPO 2/3075. Not all of the 8 films
described would have been shown at each 'pitch'.
233. British Movietone News, Issue no. 263, 18 June 1934, 'Picture
paragraph - London - Government Talkie Vans'.
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used were those Ball had first experimented with as Director of
Publicity - a national campaign of large letterpress posters by
Benson's, a cinema van campaign, a planned attempt to influence
personally those press proprietors and editors who actually
controlled the policy of their papers, similarly to bring influence
to bear on the controllers of the cinema newsreels and, going
further, to secure the adoption, by sympathetic feature film
producers, of
scenarios dealing with e .g. historial Imperial subjects in such a
way as to enlist the sIMPathies of the audience on the side ofzat
the present Government.
In addition he advocated mass leaf leteering, but by post to ensure
effective distribution, direct mail pamphleteering to specific
sections of the electorate, and a greater attention to be given to
broadcasting. Ball contended that Central Office was not a suitable
instrument for such propaganda, tied as it was to the existing party
organisation, whilst the latter needed considerable stimulation and
development before it could be considered sufficiently accommodated
to the enlarged condition of the electorate. He did not dare go so
far, however, as to suggest that the existing publicity services of
the Party be closed down.
Such proposals would, of course, have been useless without
financial support. By making the new bureau 'non-party', but
entrusted with the task of conducting the propaganda of all anti-
socialist organisations, Ball was convinced that he could obtain
considerable financial support from banks, joint-stock companies and
big business, and in this he was to be proved correct. Significantly
the committee he proposed to work out the details of the venture
included Chamberlain and Sir Kingsley Wood, 'who has a
238
real flair for
publicity as well as an ear constantly to the ground'.
237. Ibid.
238. Ibid.
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Chamberlain was immediately struck by the idea , and
recognised the greatest advantage in such a bureau as being its
ability to circumvent the local associations, and to conduct a
campaign in which government leaders could control the content,
extent and timing of propaganda irrespective of the whims of local
240-
party workers.
	 With Kingsley Wood and Ball he began immediately
to plan what was to become the National Publicity Bureau. Like Ball
he believed that if it were established as a non-political
organisation, professing to work in the national interest and without
apparent party affiliations, then substantial financial backing could
be gained.
Chamberlain's support for the idea virtually guaranteed that it
would go ahead. Throughout 1934 he was to become increasingly anxious
about the Government's electoral tactics, and with Ball's assistance
drew up a detailed programme of intended policy with which the
Government might go to the country, a programme which was accepted by
241
his cabinet colleagues largely intact.	 For Chamberlain was
steadily becoming the backbone of the Party and Government, and had
for long taken a consideale interest in both party organisation and4
publicity. Knowing well the vital need for good public relations he
had since 1929 held regular press conferences, both general and with
representatives of selected newspapers, a rare attention for a senior
242
politician and minister to give the press. 	 Early in 1931 he had
239. Indeed he nay even have suggested to Ball that he investigate
the feasibility of such a plan. Ball stated that Chamberlain's
mind was already working along similar lines.
240. Chamberlain papers, NC18/1/867, Neville to Hilda Chamberlain,
21 April 1934.
241. Chamberlain papers, NC2/23A, Political Diary for 1934.
242. Both his diaries and his letters to his sisters show a
continual attention to press relations. See for example
NC18/1/713, Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 18 October 1930;
NC18/1/756, Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 26 September 1931;
NC18/1/767, Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 17 January 1932. For
an inside view of Chamberlain's use and abuse of the press see
James Margach's The Abuse of Power, London 1978, Chapter 4.
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worked hard to finance, and persuade Lord Camrose (William Berry) to
publish, a Conservative national evening newspaper to counter the
Rothermere and Beaverbrook press, although this scheme came to
243
nothing.	 His protracted negotiations with Beaverbrook and
Rothermere helped temporarily to keep these lords sweet when they
took umbrage at Baldwin's leadership. Chamberlain ' had also shown
particular interest in film as a method of publicity, and
demonstrated an exceptional awareness of the nature of the medium and
244
of the techniques required to master it. 	 In 1932 he introduced
the procedure, followed annually thereafter, whereby the Chancellor
of the Exchequer made a brief film speech on the newsreels in
explanation of his budget. Later in the 1930s several of his public
speeches were made with the newsreel audiences in mind and, quite
evidently from surviving film, with an eye for the camera. This is
noticeable, for example, during his famous statements at Heston
Airport . during the Munich crisis. He frequently referred in his
diaries and letters to film interviews he had given, and to the work
of the cinema vans and was clearly most impressed by the films that
the CFA produced. In this interest he was encouraged by his
close working and personal relationship with Joseph Ball, for
Chamberlain was Ball's immediate superior as Chairman of the
Conservative Research Department and a friend with whom he went
246
fishing on the Test.
Ball was not the only person to devise ambitious propaganda
schemes. At the same time as he was submitting his proposals to
Chamberlain Sir Albert Clavering ventured an idea to Baldwin and
others which topped all previous conceptions. Recognising the respect
243. Chamberlain papers, NC18/1/727, Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 21
February 1931; R.R. James, Op. Cit., 359.
244. This is well shown in the British Inter-University History Film
Consortium's Archive Series film on Neville Chamberlain, by A.
Beattie, D. Dilks and N. Pronay.
245. Chamberlain papers, NC18/1/717, Neville to Hilda Chamberlain,
15 November 1930.
246. Interview with Percy Cohen, 20 April 1979.
85
in which film propaganda was held throughout the Conservative Party,
Clavering's suggestions encompassed nothing less than a large scale
247
take-over of the commercial cinema industry in this country. 	 He
reminded Baldwin of the
psychological fact that a story told by the talking film is more
easily understood and makes a more lasting impression upon the
memory than the same story told either by the written or spoken
word.
Citing Russia and America as nations which had fully appreciated the
power of film, he argued that, properly conducted, film propaganda
could become the most powerful weapon in the armoury of a political
party. More films should be rade for the cinema vans, the fleet of
which should be enlarged. The newsreels should be given greater
opportunities to film military subjects; this would be valuable both
for national feeling and for international prestige. But in addition
to such overt Publicity Clavering suggested that hidden propagandi-01
a subtly anti-revolutionary, patriotic and imperialistic character
could be produced either by procuring a financial interest in
individual commercial feature films, or preferably by taking a
controlling interest in a major British film company and cinema
chain. For £10,000 sufficient interest could be bought in a film to
be able to control the scenario, and to inject into it a suitable
anti-revolutionary message. For £1,000,000 an interest in the largest
cinema chain in the country, controlling 360 picture-houses, might be
obtained. Best of all,
A substantial interest in a large British film company such as
Gaumont British would enable us to influence the production of
patriotic and national films, and would also place us in a
position to secure the exhibition of suitable films by the films
news agency which is under their control 	  It would enable us
247. Baldwin papers, Bal. 48/ff231-239, undated and unsigned
memorandum. Internal evidence suggests author and date, and
Kenneth Lockstone confirmed that Clavering held such ambitions.
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England - a musical super of English life' and 'Rhodes'.
	 This
latter subject was filmed by Gaumont British in 1936 as 'Rhodes in
Africa', a film which hid the dirty linen beneath a spotless
deification of the central character, the film itself being a thinly
250
veiled apologia for British empire-building. 	 Indeed when one
considers both the genre of British films which Jeffrey Richards has
aptly named 'The Cinema of Empire', and the strict rulings of the
British Board of Film Censors with regard to films on such subjects,
it is impossible not to wonder with hindsight why Clavering felt that
direct party inv
5
olvement in the industry was necessary to produce the
21
desired images.
The most important known result of these proposals was that the
Party undertook secretly to finance and produce a 'feature
252
documentary' for commercial release. 	 This was an hour long film
called 'The Soul of a Nation' which used newsreel stock and specially
shot footage to relate the history of Britain in the twentieth
century, but from what was very much an establishment viewpoint. No
mention was made in it of its political origins, which it concealed
extremely cleverly in a pictorial chronicle, narrated by Felix Aylmer
and directed by J. B. Williams, that was warmly praised by the critics
253
when it was released, and which would hardly be dated today.
Rolling titles at the beginning of the film emphasised to the
audience that the film was
a true statement of fact, picturing events not as we should like
them to have been, BUT AS THEY WERE.
249. Kinematograph Weekly, 10 January 1935.
250. J. Richards, Visions of Yesterday, London 1973, 140-142.
251. Ibid.; British Board of Film Censors, Annual Report, 1931, 6-7.
252. Interview with Kenneth Lockstone, 31 January 1978.
253. J.B. Williams also directed the English version of the
controversial film 'Whither Germany' in 1934, a film which was
refused a certificate by the B.B.F.C. becausecffitspolitically
overt (anti-Nazi) stance.
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Most obviously stressed were the monarchy and parliamentary
democracy, but it was what they represented that was important. Of
Edward VII the commentary stated:
the free democracy and the constitutional monarchy express the
very spirit of the nation. When Edward VII opened his first
parliament in 1901 .... it had never been felt more strongly that
this ceremony, combining a changeless tradition with a
constantly changing parliament, was the perfect symbol of that
progress without violence which Britain enjoys beyond all others.
Of his successor George V:
The paradox of constitutional monarchy remained the perfect
expression of the national spirit and the inspiration of
Britain's traditional stability.
Britain's constitutional solution to the crisis of 1931 was
contrasted sharply with the violence, rioting and suppression that
the rest of Europe was shown as suffering:
All this distress, all this extreme nationalism, all this
rattling of sabres, perhaps they are no more than a nightmare
through which struggling humanity will come ... Perhaps the sun
will soon rise again upon the rest of civilisation ... In the
meantime we still have the English Channel and the cliffs of
Dover. They are not the barrier they were, but the tradition of
peace and security associated with them appears to have left a
permanent mark. And behind them is a country quietly tackling its
difficulties.
The achievements since 1931 were listed without mention of the
National Government, but ascribing Britain's greatness to the British
character - 'doggedness, good humour and common sense' and the film
ended with a repetition of the statement that Britain's greatest
advantage over all other nations was its tradition of 'progress
89
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without violence'.
'The Soul of a Nation' was a well crafted piece of work, novel in
conception, nicely executed, and far more expensive than any British
political party had previously attempted. The reviews it received
indicated that it was successful both in putting across its message
and in hiding its political origins, even though Michael Balcon,
Alexander Korda and the Chairman of the Cinematograph Fochibitars'
255
Association all knew who its sponsors were. 	 The serious drawback
of the film, however, was its length. Never before had anyone tried
to hold the attention of an audience for over an hour with a factual
film, and exhibitors proved unwilling to put it to the test. It had a
256
limited release in its full length , and was then divided into
six parts and exhibited as a series of shorts. As such it had a fair
circulation and was able not only to reach a larger audience than
would otherwise have been the case, but also to hit them repeatedly
for several weeks - a valuable bonus which helped to make up for its
loss of cumulative impact. But commercially it fell far short of
recouping its costs, and the Party never again attempted such an
ambitious project.
Joseph Ball's brain-child, however, had progressed steadily. In
November 1934 MacDonald himself began to express concern about the
Government's lack of propaganda, and following an offer by Sir
Charles Higham, the advertising consultant, to organise a press
campaign for the Government, the Prime Minister was goaded by H. B.
Usher, his Principal Private Secretary, into writing to the National
254. A 35 mm. copy of 'The Soul of a Nation' is held at the Imperial
War Museum. Picture quality is excellent, the soundtrack
variable.
255. Interview with Kenneth Lockstone, 31 January 1978. For reviews
of the film see Kinematograph Weekly, 20 December 1934;
Picturegoer, 4 May 1935; Monthly Film Bulletin, February 1935.
256. Interview with Kenneth Lockstone, 31 January 1978;
Kinematograph Weekly 10 January 1935.
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Government Co-ordinating Committee. 	 After congratulating it for
its film propaganda MacDonald stated his worries:
I feel that methods of political propaganda are about a
generation out of date and that now we are appealing to a vast
mass of electors we may find we have a good deal to learn from
258
the publicity expert.
The same day he told Lord Elton that
The advertisement scheme really must be pushed on. Roosevelt
sweeps the country just on account of advertisement! So far as
our press and our advocates are conc5erned
9	
, we might be living on
2
top of a mountain above the clouds.
Within a month rumours were beginning to circulate in the press
about the creation of a new propaganda department, and fears were
expressed that Sir Kingsley Wood, who was expected to take charge of
260-
it, would emulate propaganda developments in Nazi Germany. 	 The
new bureau had begun to raise funds earlier in the year, and had
actually been financing National Government propaganda since
261
October.	 However it was not until March 1935 that the
establishment of the National Publicity Bureau was officially
announced, to a mixed press reception and to some anxiety within
Conservative ranks who desired propaganda that was wholly
257. MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1/397, H.B. Usher (P.P.S. to PM) to
MacDonald, 6 November 1934.
258. MacDonald papers, FRO 30/69/1/397, MacDonald to David Margesson
(aLairman of Co-ordinating Committee), 8 November 1934.
259. MacDonald papers, PRO 30/69/5/46, MacDonald to Lord Elton
(Editor, National Labour News-Letter), 8 November 1934.
260. Manchester Guardian 20 December 1934, 8e; News Chronicle 28
December 1934, 10c.
261. CCO, Director of Organisation's file series, memorandum by J.
Ball entitled 'The Next General Election', c. late 1945 - early
1946.
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Conservative rather than National.
	 Indeed the Party was always
to remain extremely suspicious of the National Publicity Bureau (NPB)
because of the implied subsuming in its activities of the interests
of the Conservative Party among those of its minor allies, and hence
of its potentially leftward bias. A demand at the Central Council of
the National Union for Conservative films, literature and propaganda
was effectively answered by Lord Stonehaven, the Party Chairman. He
assured the meeting that the NPB was a purely temorsry tcku Va-Sen
would cease to operate after the election, that Sir Patrick Gower was
to act as liaison officer between the new bureau and the existing
party organisation, and that it would be a completely separate body
with no authority over Central Office, which would remain free to
issue its own broadsheet, pamphlet, leaflet and poster
263
propaganda.	 This was to be something of an empty promise, for
although Central Office continued to produce its educative pamphlets
and literature for party workers and members, much of its mass
propaganda role was taken over by theIiPB, including use of the CFA's
cinema vans. •
The National Publicity Bureau immediately commissioned eight new
- and most impressive - documentary short films which explained in a
serious manner the achievements of the National Government in such
fields as agriculture, market gardening, industry and Scotland, as
well as a series of humorous films in which the well known vaudeville
artists Stanley Holloway, the ventriloquist Arthur Prince and
Florence Day the singer, gave comedy sketches into which were
Injected a National Government propaganda message. Neville
Chamberlain saw these films, was 'immensely impressed' and found it
difficult to see how anyone not completely hard-boiled could
resist the conclusion that the Mationall G[overnment] had worked
262. The Times, 28 March 1935, 15c; Morning Post, 4 March 1935, 11g,
21 March 1935, 12c, 13g; News Chronicle 14 March 1935, 10b.
263. The Times 28 March, 8d. Following the General Election Sir
Kingsley Wood asked the Central Council not to insist on the
closure of the NPB, and it agreed to its continuation.
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instead,
 although they remained at Central Office and did the same
26
work.	 The NPB also developed and took over the distribution of
Central Office's latest venture in written propaganda, a monthly
pictorial broadsheet printed in tabloid newspaper form and with much
content of general interest, known as 'Popular Illustrated', 'New
London Pictorial', or 'Scottish Illustrated', according to where it
was distributed. By producing an attractive pictorial sheet,
identifying it in the readers' minds with the popular press and
distributing it in large quantities in strictly selected marginal
constituencies, the NPB hoped that the principal difficulty of all
printed propaganda could be overcome - to get it read, and by the
people who mattered. With a circulation rising from 3 to 5 million at
its peak, regularly produced and with an assured distribution
through full-time canvassers employed by the NPB, the 'Popular
Illustrated' no doubt did reach a wide and important audience, and
its human interest pictures and women's features probably ensured
268
that the politically significant messages were also seen.
Considerable direct mail pamphleteering also ensured that specific
groups of the electorate were reached, and the NPB's full-time
canvassers toured all the marginal constituencies, in effect taking
over the role of the local party workers where this was needed, and
encouraging them to greater propaganda activity. But following this
campaign Ball was to express total disillusionment with the local
parties, and with ordinary mass leafleteering:
We have definitely decided against using the ordinary political
leaflet, and we have abandoned all hope of securing effective
distribution of any propaganda through existing constituency
organisations. Until these latter have been thoroughly overhauled
and brought up to date we must face the fact that for the
distribution of such propaganda publications as 'The Popular
Illustrated' we must depend solely upon a paid and properly
267. CCO, Director of Organisation's file series, unsigned report on
Publicity Department, 14 October 1937.
268. These propaganda papers are deposited at the British Library
Newspaper library, Colindale.
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269
supervised professional distribution.
Certainly traditional Central Office leaf leteering was much
reduced, and Gower had to admit to Baldwin in August 1935, less than
four months before the eventual election date, that his own Publicity
Department had issued only 1.5 million leaflets that year. Following
this Central Office's publicity work was stepped up, for 57 different
types of leaflet were eventually p
7
roduced and over nine million
20
distributed to the constituencies. 	 But the Party as a whole was
271
ill prepared for the election.
	 Gower therefore urged Baldwin to
delay it until the New Year, believing that an extended cinema van
campaign would do much to compensate for the lack of other
propaganda,
because I am firmly convinced that visual propaganda of this kind
272
is very telling in its effect.
In contrast to the parlous condition of Central Office and the
273
constituencies, who came to rely heavily on NPB propaganda aid
the Bureau ran a full scale campaign for nearly ten months before the
election, and was evidently geared to continuing into the New Year
had Baldwin taken Gower's advice. Political opponents were seriously
worried by the NPB's campaign, which far exceeded anything that
274
Labour or Lloyd George could attempt , whilst the size of the
269. Baldwin papers, Bal. 48/f259, Ball to Baldwin, 6 December 1935.
270. Conservative Research Department Library, party leaflets, bound
in volumes; Morning Post, 5 November 1935, 14a.
271. See also J.C. Robertson, The General Election of 1935, Journal
of Contemporary History, vol. 9 (1974), 115-6.
272. Baldwin Papers, Bal. 47/f f103-8, Gower to Baldwin, 1 August
1935.
273. NUCUA, Report of the Central Council, 1935, 1936.
274. T. Jones, A Diary with Letters, London 1954, 147, note of
conversation with Lloyd George, 16 May 1935. L.G. expressed
concern that 'Kingsley Wood was covering the country with
poster-propaganda while he (L.G.) was silent'.
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poster campaign made it necessary for Central Office to prime
Conservative workers on how to answer questions from the public as to
275
whether the posters were paid for out of taxpayer's money.
Certain questions about the National Publicity Bureau need
clarification - who controlled it, who financed it, and how its
propaganda differed in practice from that which Central Office might
otherwise have produced? For while Conservative MPs were worrying at
its lack of a strictly Conservative viewpoint, and fearing that
Kingsley Wood, who was an acknowledged careerist, would turn it into
a rival organisation to the existing party machine, there were strong
grounds for belief that it was in reality no more than a front for a
Conservative body. Its Executive Committee was, of course, composed
of representatives of all the Government parties, as were its
publicity sub-committees. However its Chairman was Sir Kingsley Wood,
who admitted that in practice it was run by Conservative
- 276
officials.	 Patrick Gower spent much of his time there. Above all
its Deputy Chairman and Director was Joseph Ball who had devised the
Bureau, brought it into being and to a large extent ran it from his
office in the Conservative Research Department, although it did have
separate offices under the management of its Organising Secretary,
Col. E.H. Davidson, who had been a member of Lord Northcliffe's
propaganda committee in the First World War. Malcolm MacDonald, the
National Labour representative, remembers that
we left a lot of work to be done by Joseph Ball, who was a very
efficient professional operator at publicity propaganda through
277
the media.
Yet at the same time the Conservative controllers of the NPB seem
275. Notes for Conservative Workers, August 1935.
276. COD, Director of Organisation's file series, memorandum by Sir
Kingsley Wood, 8 March 1938, in file 'Lord Monsell's
Comaittee', 1937-8.
277. M. MacDonald to the author, 25 February 1979.
96
to have taken no more advantage of their position than the Party as a
278
whole did as the principal partner in the Government.
	 There was
little official contact between the NPB and Central Office, and the
representatives of the minor parties did play an active role in
279
approving or vetoing the propaganda produced by the Bureau.
Moreover it is clear that the NPB owed its existence predominantly to
Liberal and National Labour sympathisers who would not put up with
any Conservative duplicity. Kingsley Wood ascribed its creation to
the activities of a small group of big industrialists and other
City men of varying political views, but consisting very largely
of Liberals, who were not satisfied with the propaganda which was
carried out in 1933 and 1934 on behalf of the National
280
Government.
Ball confirmed that the NPB's funds came largely from
Joint Stock Companies, the executives of which regard themselves
as precluded from subscribing to any party organisation, and
that, in so far as they came from individuals, the subscribers
are largely Liberals who desire to see the National Government
kept in office, andare2, almost to a m	 ryan, ve suspicious of all81
the Party Headquarters.
278. Percy Cohen stated that to his knowledge certain NPB money was
used to finance the Conservative Research Department and even
found its way to Central Office. In that the NPB employed
Central Office staff and facilities and took over the financing
of Press Secretaries Ltd. this may well have been so. But the
content of NPB propaganda does not seem to have been any less
'National' or more Conservative thereby.
Malcolm MacDonald to author, 25 February, 1979. According to
Kinematograph Weekly, 4 April 1935, certain films made by the
CFA for the NPB had to be altered at the request of the minor
National Government parties.
280. COD, Director of Organisation's file series, Memorandum by Sir
Kingsley Wood, 8 March 1937, in file 'Lord Monsell's
Committee'.
281. Chamberlain papers, NC8/21/8, Ball to Chamberlain, 1 June 1938.
279.
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For National Labour J.H. Thomas was apparently successful in gaining
282
financial support for the NPB from city friends.
	 It would be
sheer speculation to suggest specific individuals, but three names
have appeared of men who may have been involved, namely Sir Julian
283
Cahn and Israel Sieff , and Lord Luke of Bovril, who had provided
money to establish the Conservative Research Department and who had
284
been invited by Ball to advise in the creation of the NPB.
	 At
least two backers gave assistance in kind, amounting to 'tens of
285
thousands of pounds' of press and film propaganda.
	 Whoever were
the principal backers of the NPB, they did rather more than provide
the finance. Not only did the Finance Committee of the Bureau, which
considered all proposals for expenditure, consist of representatives
of theNPB's sponsors, but even the Executive Committee which guided
policy contained two such representatives in addition to Sir Kingsley
Wood, Malcolm MacDonald, Lord Hutcheson (Liberal National), Joseph
286
Ball and Sir Patrick Gower.
The National Publicity Bureau was the natural culmination of ten
years of development in mass party propaganda. It was created to
utilise the finances of non-Conservative businessmen for anti-
socialist propaganda. Freely using the services of conmercial
advertising firms its work represented a thorough belief in the
powers of persuasion by modern mass publicity techniques. By the
rejection of mass leafleteering in preference for selected
282. R.D. Casey, 'The National Publicity Bureau', Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 1939, 625.
283. Baldwin papers, Ba1.47/ff245 and 249, unsigned memorandum, C.
February-March 1935, mentions a rumour that Cahn and Sieff had
supplied funds for non-party national propaganda.
284. Chamberlain papers, NC8/21/9, Ball to Chamberlain, 14 April
1934. The Research Department had some £50,000 of shares in
Ashanti Gold Fields, a company of which Lord Luke was Chairman
- CCO, Chairman's Office series, correspondence with R.A.
Butler file, R. Assheton to R.A. Butler, 18 April 1946.
265.
 Chamberlain papers, NC8/21/8, Ball to Chamberlain, 1 June 1938.
286. CC), Director of Organisation's file series, Report of Lord
Monsell's Committee on Film Propaganda, December 1937.
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distribution of broarisheets in marginal constituencies it showed
itself to be fully aware of the significance of the quality of
propaganda and of attention to distribution. Films, posters,
broadsheets and direct mail methods were all designed first and
foremost to gain attention, to place the National Government message
in the way of people during the normal course of their everyday
lives, demanding no personal effort from them, interspersing serious
political argument simply stated with pure entertainment, and using
popular association - vaudeville entertainers, soccer, the tabloid
press - in order to identify the National Government in the
electorate's mind with all things pleasurable in life. A noticeable
feature of NPB propaganda was the increasing particularisation of the
target. Many of the films produced were aimed at specific sections of
the electorate, and direct mail pamphleteering was directed to
teachers, parsons and lay readers amongst others. The Bureau was also
a response to the believed tardiness of the existing party
organisation in adapting to the modern conditions of electoral
politics, and to the confusion created by the new situation after
287
1931.	 In organising a mass campaign of nearly a year's length,
by financing it almost entirely from centrally directed funds rather
than remaining dependent upon local enthusiasm, by making itself
wholly independent of the local party associations for the selection
and distribution of propaganda and by boldly rejecting traditional
287. This is in no way to suggest that nothing was being done to the
existing machinery - far from it - but merely that the
expansion and adaptation of an organisation the size of a
national political party, comprising both voluntary and
professional sections, could only be achieved gradually, for
example in the creation of a larger and fully trained cadre of
party agents, of an effective national system of party
political education, and of an adequate army of voluntary
canvassers. Thus Philip Cambray identified the development of
mass propaganda methods as being the result of the failure of
the local canvass. After describing voluntary canvassers as the
'front-line' 'storm troops' of a Party he noted the inadequacy
of numbers to cope with the new electorate and concluded that
'Hence political strategists have to conduct their trench
warfare with wholly inadequate forces. For this reason their
election strategy is gradually changing over from the personal
appeal to the use of forces which are calculated to affect
opinion in the mass.' P. Cambray, Op. Cit., 180-182.
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propaganda techniques and organisation which it believed to be
outdated, the National Publicity Bureau was the progenitor of much
subsequent Conservative Party propaganda method, as well as an
impressive forebear to private industry's anti-nationalisation
publicity, which was to become an important feature of post-war
political propaganda.
Joseph Ball made large claims for the significant effect of the
campaign. A comparison of the voting figures in 1935 in 330 key
constituencies in which the Bureau functioned with those of the
divisions where it did no propaganda convinced him that the NPB had88
a 'decisive effect' on the result.
	 Chamberlain agreed that it
did 'prepare the way and must have won many votes'. But he also gave
due credit to Baldwin's personal charisma, to his own policy work
and to the programme of the Labour Party, which he considered
absolutely suicidal. It took no account of the fact that
•elections today are won or lost by the unattached voter,
particularly the women, who will never be attracted by a purely
class party, and who will always be frightened by proposals for
289
revolutionary change.
Thomas Jones also believed Baldwin's personality and Labour's
internal difficulties to have been responsible for the election
290
result.	 But the question of the actual impact of party
propaganda is not here at issue. The present concern is with the
attitudes and actions of party leaders and servants with regard to
propaganda, and it is clear that as far as this was concerned they
were most impressed by and even jealous of the NPB's work.
288. Chamberlain papers, NC8/21/8, Ball to Chamberlain, 1 June 1938.
289. Chamberlain papers, NC2/23A, undated diary entry (mid-November
1935; NC18/1/938, Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 9 November
1935; NC2/23A, undated diary entry (mid-November 1935).
290. T. Jones (1954), Op. Cit., 155-6, T.Jones to A. Flexner, 17
November 1935.
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The 1935 campaign cost the NPB £300,000.
	 For a centrally
funded publicity campaign this figure was nearly double the previous
record expenditure of 1929. Nor were the coffers of its business
backers exhausted, and Ball was confident that the Bureau's work
could be continued without pause for the next five years. His hope,
as he told Baldwin, was that the Labour Party's support would thereby
be so weakened as to force it to abandon its extreme socialist
policies of nationalisation of banking, coal, transport, iron and
steel, and so render it safe as an alternative party of
292
government.	 Such a double-edged argument would not have pleased
Conservative critics of the maintenance of the National Government.
Between 1936 and 1939 the National Publicity Bureau continued to
operate, though on a much reduced scale. Its principal activities
were those it had found most effective, if costly, in 1935. 'Popular
Illustrated' was published irregularly and the press service was
continued through Press Secretaries, providing regular news items,
articles and editorials to 140 provincial newspapers and
293journals.	 This was in addition to Central Office's regular
liaison with the national Press through A.P. Rowe, the Press Officer,
and Gower himself. Ball continued to stress the need for
... a daily or evening newspaper with a wide circulation among
the masses, and giving the Government regular and Whole-hearted
294
support.
291. CCO, Director of Organisation's file series, undated memorandum
entitled 'The Next General Election', by J. Ball, c. late 1945-
early 1946. The purchasing power of the 1900 £ in 1935 was
12/2d - D. Butler and A. Sloman, Op. Cit., 348-9. At 1978
prices, therefore, this campaign cost over £3.6 million.
292. Baldwin papers, Bal. 48/ff251-2, Ball to Baldwin, 6 December
1935.
293. Chamberlain papers, NC8/21/8, Ball to Chamberlain, 1 June 1938;
COD, Director of Organisation's file series, unsigned
memorandum on Publicity Department, 14 October 1937.
294. Baldwin papers, Bal. 48/f257, Ball to Baldwin, 6 December 1935.
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Such a newspaper was needed in order to counter the Daily Herald, and
the Daily Mail and Daily Express which, he felt, attacked the
Government more than they supported it.
But once again a large part of the inter-election propaganda load
was taken by the cinema vans of the CFA and the NPB, for which the
295
NPB provided funds every year.
	 This was in no sense cheap
propaganda, and to have continued it the Bureau must have valued it
296
highly.
	 It is worth pausing briefly to try to assess just how
significant the Party's use of film was, for although it was
evidently highly regarded by both the central organisation and the
local parties, it mist be said that the contemporary comments cited
as to the medium's effectiveness were made in a period of naively
uncritical belief in the persuasive power of film. Although the
phrases 'mob psychology' and 'mass propaganda' were in great vogue
there was still little scientific basis for much of what was
believed. It should be borne in mind that Davidson, Ball, Gower,
Kingsley Wood, Chamberlain and others involved were essentially
enthusiastic practising amateurs. They were learning their way,
relying for their attitudes to propaganda upon past experience, upon
evidence which was only gradually becoming more quantifiable, upon
intuition, commercial practice which was more distinctive from than
similar to the political case, upon unreliable testimony as to the
significance of propaganda during the First World War, in Russia and
Nazi Germany, and, it must be admitted, upon statements made valid by
repetition. This is not to belittle their beliefs - political
persuasion remains at heart an intuitive business. In their
experimentation and use of professional journalists, film-makers and
295. NUCUA, Report of the Central Council, 1936, 1937; Conservative 
Agents' Journal, February 1938; Chamberlain papers, NC8/21/8,
Ball to Chamberlain, 1 June 1938.
296. A six month campaign by 15 outdoor cinema vans cost £20,728 at
the beginning of the War. This did not cover either the cost of
running the NPB's 17 indoor vans, which would not have been
much less, or the considerable cost of film production -
National Savings Committee papers, NSC 29/15, Statement of
costs of cinema van campaign based on CFA experience, by Sir
Albert Clavering, 15 February 1940.
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advertising consultants they did all they could to reduce the
variables and, by so doing, gradually introduced new techniques and
new attitudes to the art of political persuasion. Thus they placed a
new emphasis in the 1930s on immediate mass propaganda in the absence
of long term national and local organisation and education, which
only more gradually recovered their former degree of importance in
the extended party machine.
As for the Party's use of film, if the audience reached was a
wider one than previously it was also likely to contain a larger
proportion of hostile viewers. Moreover, with the reduction of other
forms of propaganda, the total number of people reached by party
publicity probably did not increase through film use, except when it
was infiltrated into the commercial cinema. Results from the cinema
vans, however, were not inconsiderable. They undoubtedly attracted
large audiences, and the journal World Film News estimataithat in the
months immediately prior to the 1935 General Election 1.5 million
297
people saw films from them.	 Even in a brief non-election
campaign in the winter and spring of 1936-7 the indoor vans held
2,048 meetings in over 300 constituencies, whilst in the summer of
1937 the outdoor vans visited 230 constituencies and held 2,430
meetings in thirteen weeks, the two fleets having a total audience of
298
over 900,000.	 These were figures ordinary political meetings
could not have approached. Nor for the latter would the audience have
been the one desired. When it is considered that the vans were
concentrated in particular on marginals and by-elections, and, in the
summer months, at packed seaside resorts, undoubtedly attracting both
a good audience and one which would not have attended ordinary
political meetings, than it becomes clear that the Party had one of
the most effective disseminators of political views then available. A
study of the surviving films also furnishes proof of their quality,
for it was realised that to hold an audience accustomed to commercial
297. World Film News, December 1936, 29.
298. National Savings Committee papers, NSC 29/15, Memorandum by
W.R.C. Howard on 'the use of Daylight Cinema Vans for
Propaganda and Advertising purposes', 13 February 1940.
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films the highest professional standards would be necessary.
	 As
for the superior persuasive power of film, the point was well made by
the commentator who stated that although a public meeting on tariffs
would be unlikely to attract one in a hundred electors, and an
article on the subject in the press to be read by one in a thousand,
show that same group of people a film illustrating, for instance,
the development of the home market garden industry and the vast
number of men unemployed as the result of foreign dumping, and
there will be scarcely one who will not carry away some vivid
picture that they will associate with the idea of tariffs and the
advisability of voting for Mr. X, who stands for protection. With
300
their own eyes they have seen the tomatoes growing.
The committee which in 1937 was established to review
Conservative Central Office organisation was certainly well pleased
with the Party's use of film during the previous twelve years. Its
members emphasised
the importance which they attach to the production and display of
films. They are satisfied that wireless and the cinema have
altered the attitude of the general public towards political
meetings, and that large audiences can only be obtained today by
a speaker of the first rank, or in very exceptional
circumstances. The exhibition of political films, however, is
more and more attracting the attention of the electorate, and is
today providing a most effective means of propaganda. The
Committee think, the
1
refore, these operations should be extended
30
when funds permit.
299. See Note F at end of chapter,p.113, for filmography of all
films known to have been made by or for the Conservative Party,
1926-39. This list is far from complete. Only a small
proportion of the films described exceeded ten minutes in
length. Few have survived.
300. 'Politics and the Film', Sight and Sound, vol. 1 (1932), 49.
This article also contains a photograph of a van at work.
301. CCO, Director of Organisation's file series, Report of Lord
Monsell's Committee on Film Propaganda, December 1937.
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This committee provided an opportunity for a certain long
unspoken hostility between Central Office and the NPB to be aired. It
would have been hardly surprising if Sir Robert Topping, the General
Director at Central Office, had not felt a certain resentment at the
usurpation of his organisation's mass propaganda work by the NPB. Sir
302
Joseph Ball	 certainly gave the appearance in the Conservative
Research Department and the National Publicity Bureau of removing
authority from Palace Chambers and establishing an alternative centre
under his own direction, and this was emphasised by the very close
involvement of Chamberlain in the CRD's work, and Gower at the NPB. A
certain personal antipathy developed between Topping and Ball, both
303
strong and determined men.	 David Clarke, a member of the
Research Department and later its director, described relations
304
between the two bodies as 'frankly bad'.	 When Sir Patrick Gower,
who was by now owing greater allegiance to Ball at the NPB than to
Central Office, suggested in evidence to the Monsell Committee that
the Conservative Films Association be almost wholly taken over by the
NPB film unit, Topping objected. With the assistance of Douglas
Hacking, the new Party Chairman, and Col. Ropner, the Treasurer of
the CFA, he blocked the proposal, and the Committee, of which he was
a moocher, even went beyond its brief by making suggestions for the
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better organisation of the NTIL
302. Ball was knighted in 1936.
303. Interview with Percy Cohen, 20 April 1979. Gower described
Topping as 'tough as an individual .... but without much
interest in propaganda and sometimes a little jealous of that
side' - P. Cohen, Op. Cit., 581.
304. CCO, Chairman's Office series, correspondence with R.A. Butler
file, memorandum on Research Department by David Clarke, 2 July
1946.
305. CCO, Director of Organisation's file series, Lord Monsell's
Committee file, memorandum by P. Gower, 27 October 1937;
memorandum by Col. Ropner, 10 November 1937; memorandum by R.
Topping, May 1938; Topping actually drafted the Monsell
Committee's Report on Film Propaganda. Interestingly Topping
himself was not wholly convinced of the value for money of the
cinema vans. Whilst acknowledging the propaganda advantages and
extreme popularity of the vans, he pointed out in September
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Following this tussle for control of film publicity, relations
between the NPB and Central Office eased. The NPB, despite Ball's
optimism, was slowly being run down and he was himself drawn into
other spheres of activity, having been appointed Director (designate)
of the Films Division of the embryo Ministry of Information, a
position he owed almost entirely to the reputation for expertise in
306
film propaganda which he had acquired in the Party's service. 	 At
the same time Topping could not ignore the great benefit which the
Party had derived from the NPB, and was only concerned that the Party
organisation should retain its own distinct identity. Central Office
propaganda was still struggling - from December 1935 to March 1938
less than 3 million leaflets were sold and distributed by the
307
Party , and the Executive Committee of the National Union
complained both in 1937 and 1938 at the serious lack of any
308
propaganda work other than that provided by the NPB. 	 In
preparation for the abortive 1939 election Joseph Ball reviewed Party
organisation once again, and yet again concluded that
in my view, neither is the Conservative Central Office equipped
for planning and organising, nor are the constituency
associations fit to be entrusted with the responsibility of
carrying out, the long and intensive propaganda campaign which
1935 that each one cost about £40 a week to run. In terms of
audience reached this worked out at 3d. per individual who saw
the Party's films. By contrast constituency agents were
permitted by election law to spend no more than 5d per elector
during a three week election campaign. These tentative doubts,
however, were overridden by the Chairman of the Party - COO,
CC04/1/37, Topping to Stonehaven, 17 September 1935. Topping's
jealousy of Ball and the NPB is therefore lent credence by his
defence of the CFA in 1937 despite these doubts.
306. For details of Ball's subsequent career at the MDI see F.
Thorpe and N. Pronay, British Official Films in the Second 
World War, London 1980, 25-34.
307. Chamberlain papers, NC8/21/8, Ball to Chamberlain, 1 June 1938.
308. NUCUA, Executive Committee minutes, 24 June 1937, 24 March
1938.
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will be necessary if we are to win the next Election.
He did, however, recognise the considerable efforts that were being
made to improve party organisation and to develop long term political
education, for with Neville Chamberlain's ascension to the leadership
a halt had been called to the slide in party organisation. Indeed in
1935 Ball had himself told Baldwin that for a strong and permanent
party the chief requirement was an overhauled organisation and a
nucleus of really competent party canvassers and workers in each
constituengio able to argue the Conservative creed, individual to
individual.
For this was one of the roots of the problem, of the situation
which gave such apparent importance to organisations like the
Conservative Films Association and the National Publicity Bureau, and
emphasised the role of mass propaganda techniques - that the
Conservative Party within the National Government was still in too
strong a position, despite its fear of the socialist challenge, for
there to be necessary anything more than a gradual if steady
quickening of the organisational pace, a pace not helped by the
financial troubles of the 1930s. Both the Party as a whole and the
exponents of mass propaganda were well aware of the vital need to
reinvigorate the party organisation, both local and national, and to
provide for a scheme of much longer and more thorough political
education. In the 1920s the encouragement of the Women's organisations
and the Junior Imperial League, the establishment of a Political
Education Department, Ashridge College and the Conservative Research
Department, the increased professionalisation of the party agents,
the slow weaning of the local parties from excessive dependence upon
wealthy candidates and the positive moves towards a more democratic
party - all this was testimony to the tremendous strides forward that
309. Chamberlain papers, NC8/21/8, Ball to Chamberlain, 1 June 1938.
310. Baldwin papers, Bal. 48/ff255-8, Ball to Baldwin, 6 December
1935.

108
democratic electorates can be influenced. Such propaganda can
33
best be directed centrally ....
It was equally for these various reasons, and because of the widely
prevalent views as to the power of mass propaganda, that the party
made such use of film, the newest and one of the most effective media
for propaganda then available. In the tentative recording of audience
reaction to its films, and in attempts to assess propaganda impact in
selected constituencies, the Party was even just beginning to move
towards a more soundly based approach to political persuasion.
Yet despite this latter development it must be concluded that the
greater part of the Party's propaganda was essentially intuitive in
its conception and implementation, and emotional in its character and
aim. Although techniques changed in order to cope with the increased
audience the objective remained much the same. Statements as to the
need for continuous and rational political education did not alter
the fact that the Party's primary concern remained short term
electoral victory, and the inconsistency of its propaganda output
reflected this fact. Even Baldwin, that curious mixture of idealist
and astute politician, recognised this to be so and derived a wry
satisfaction from his own party's propaganda strengths. As he
commented on the newly created NPB, in the House of Commons:
The honourable gentleman knows that in present conditions,
unfortunately, political advertisement is necessary on the part
of every314party. Some of us do it better than others [laughter and
cheers].
'Present conditions', by implication, were an uneducated and not
313. COO, Director of Organisation's file series, report of
Committee on Party Finance 1943.
314. The Times, 26 June 1935, 8c.
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wholly rational electorate, a socialist challenge and an
international threat to democracy. The question Baldwin left
unanswered, however, was when such conditions were likely to change.
Note A.
Ball, born in 1885, had been trained in the law and had taken
First Class Honours at London University. Following the 1929 General
Election he was appointed as the first director of the newly created
Conservative Research Department, which he developed into a small but
extremely valuable policy research unit. With Neville Chamberlain as
its Chairman Ball soon became one of his principal aides, and their
acquaintanceship was improved by their shared love of fly fishing.
Ball was to be a trusted adviser in matters of both policy and
strategy - see J. Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party Policy,
London 1980, 33-92. Ball also proved himself useful as a behind-the-
scenes agent for Chamberlain once the latter had become Prime
Minister. In 1937 he held unofficial meetings with Senor Batista y
Roca, representative of the Catalonian Government, and put him in
touch with Lord Halifax at the Foreign Office. In 1938-9 he met and
held discussions with Staatstrat Wohltat, GOring's Commissioner for
the German Four Year Plan, presumably on Chamberlain's behalf. Also
in 1938 he acted as unofficial go-between between Chamberlain and
Count Grandi, in negotiations which Chamberlain was carrying out
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behind the backs of the Foreign Office. Further evidence of his
continued contact with the intelligence services was provided in
1938. Following Eden's resignation as Foreign Secretary a group of
Eden supporters began to meet regularly at the home of MP Ronald
Tree. Joseph Ball, according to Tree, admitted to him during the war
that he had arranged to have Tree's telephone tapped in 1938-9.
On the outbreak of war Ball became Director of the Film Division
of the Ministry of Information. The outcry which greeted this
appointment demonstrated how much he was disliked and distrusted
amongst the intelligentsia of the documentary film movement.
Consequently he was an early victim of the large scale reorganisation
of the MOI which took place in 1939-40, and left to become Deputy
Chairman of the Security Executive, the committee responsible for
home intelligence and security, and in overall control of MI5. From
the late 1930s Ball began to involve himself in business,
particularly in South Africa, and became Chairman of Henderson's
Transvaal Estates Ltd. and Lake View and Star Ltd., and a director
of Consolidated Goldfields of South Africa. It is said that, shortly
before his death in July 1961, he destroyed all his papers.
For a man so closely involved in intelligence work, and intent on
remaining in the background, Ball acquired a conspicuously public
reputation in political circles for secrecy, manipulation and so
forth. This was a reputation he encouraged at Central Office by
rarely giving reasons for his orders to his staff. Perhaps this was a
characteristic of intelligence men, for it was one in which Sir
Reginald Hall, Conservative Principal Agent 1923-24 and former
Director of Naval Intelligence, also indulged. A former colleague,
Mr. Percy Cohen, admitted to the author that Ball positively enjoyed
his rather unsavoury reputation and acted up to it. Both Chester et
al. and Page et al. use misleading evidence in order to add to his
notoriety. His behind the scenes importance throughout the 1930s, and
in a large number of diverse fields and incidents of national and
international significance, is undoubted, but his present enigmatic
reputation is a combination of fact and facade - K. Middlemas, The
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Diplomacy of Illusions, London 1972, 108; M. Gilbert and R. Gott,
The Appeasers, London 1963, 216, 224, 227; R. Tree, When the Moon was 
High, London 1975, 76; F. Thorpe and N. Pronay, British Official Film
in the Second World War, London 1980, 25-34; N.West, MI5, British 
Security Service Operations 1909-1945, London 1981,42,154.
Note B.
In an interview with Percy Cohen in the early 1960s Sir Patrick
Gower recalled the important part Benson's played in devising this
poster. He and Ball
came to the conclusion that with Baldwin at the height of his
popularity the P.M. must be the foremost figure in publicity for
the Election. Ball and he produced a rough draft of a poster
containing the P.M. 's photograph and the slogan, "The man you can
trust". They then approached advertising agents who had great
experience of poster work in the political field. They looked at
the rough, and said "There are too many words: it must be
shortened. We would like to take it back and give you firm advice
later". They came back and submitted the new design with the
slogan, "Safety First". Both Ball and he were rather hesitant, so
they consulted J.C.C. Davidson, the Party Chairman, and the three
together were persuaded to adopt it.
	
(P. Cohen, Op.Cit., 581)
Note C.
Paul Rotha, Op. Cit., 115, 122, suggests that Bruce Woolfe,
Managing Director of Gaumont British Instructional, and Sir Gordon
Craig, Chairman of New Era Films, were politically motivated in
certain of their actions in opposition to John Grierson's movement.
Certainly both had strong Conservative sympathies - Joseph Ball was a
close friend of Woolfe and a director of one of his companies, whilst
Craig was active in the C.F.A.. But equally Woolfe was one of the
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deputation to the Home Secretary in 1930 in protest against the
censorship of Russian films. Rotha relates that Craig had advised the
abandonment of Grierson's first film, Drifters, in mid-production,
and uses this proposal, which no evidence suggests was other than
commercially motivated (Craig's firm was involved in its
distribution), to implicate Craig in the underhand political and
trade conspiracy which Rotha states existed in opposition to the
documentary movement. Opposition there certainly was; evidence of a
strong 'intrigue' is lacking.
Note D.
Clavering's secretary, now Mrs. Marjorie Lockstone, remembers
that the newsreels rang very frequently, and that Clavering's chief
problem was not to persuade the reels but to get ministerial co-
operation. Busy ministers could not as yet be prevailed upon to
attend to self-projection, and much valuable publicity was lost as a
result. It was still the business of a minister's Private Secretary
between the liars rather to keep the press away from his minister than
to encourage direct contact at convenient times, and Clavering's
efforts to publicize the National Government's work suffered
repeatedly in the face of ministerial disdain and refusal to co-
operate.
Note E.
Both Stonehaven and Gower continually urged on Baldwin and other
ministers the vital necessity, for effective press coverage, of
advance press notices and copies of speeches. The practice of
providing the press with advance copies of statements was
comparatively recent and far from universally accepted. Gower
recognised that one of the principal reasons why the press failed to
give ministers the attention they felt their actions warranted was
not political prejudice, but simply that busy ministers were not
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prepared to give sufficient attention to the daily needs of the
press, nor to make themselves available to the working journalist -
Baldwin papers, Bal. 48/f229-30, Stonehaven to Baldwin, 10 May 1934.
This was a continual problem; Winston Churchill's total failure
whilst Prime Minister to understand the day to day operation of a
newspaper, and his firm belief that 'Press relations' meant dining
with Beaverbrook and Berry, is related by J.Margach, The Abuse of 
Power, London 1978, Chapter 5.
Note F.
List of films produced by or for the Conservative Films Association, 
1926-1939.
Below are listed all the films to which reference has been found.
Often the reference is vague, and where it is not certain that a film
was actually produced, or where the date of production is uncertain,
this is indicated by a question mark respectively before or following
the stated date. The order of production within any one year is
unknown.
Date	 Title if known, and brief details
	 Surviving
copy.
1926	 film of cabinet members at work. Silent
1926-7 Red Tape Farm. Cartoon by W.Ward. Silent
	 NFA
1926-7 three further cartoons by W.Ward, one possibly
entitled Pets. All silent
1926-7 John Bull's Hearth. Skit on free trade. Silent
	 NFA
1927	 speech by Sir W.Joynson Hicks on the General
Strike
1927
	 speech by Sir Douglas Hogg on the Trade Disputes
Bill
1927	 film on housing progress
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? 1928	 speech by S. Baldwin
	
1928	 speech by Earl Beatty on disarmament
	
? 1928	 speech by N.Chamberlain on housing and pensions
	
1929	 speech by J.C.C.Davidson
	
1929	 election speech by S.Baldwin in garden of No.10,
Downing Street
	
1930	 Socialist Car of State. Cartoon
	 NFA
	
1930	 Impressions of Disraeli. Disraeli's speeches
recited by George Arliss, and introduced by
S.Baldwin	 NFA
	
1931	 ? The Right Spirit. Cartoon
	 NFA
	
1931	 film on agriculture
1931 ? three further films on the fishing industry,
steel, and unknown
	
1931	 speech by S.Baldwin
	
1931	 cartoon showing Macdonald and P.Snowden as
incompetent plumbers
	
1931	 Dinner Hour Dialogue (?). Two Lancashire cotton
workers discuss safeguarding. Acted sketch
	 NFA
	
1931	 Dinner Hour Dialogue (?). Two Yorkshire woollen
workers discuss safeguarding. Acted sketch
	 NFA
. 1931 crisis
	
1931
	 speech by S.Baldwin on crisis
	 Visnews
	
1931
	 speech by J.H.Thomas
	
? 1931	 speech by N.Chamberlain
	
1931	 election speech by J.R.MacDonald
	 NFA
	
1931	 election speech by S.Baldwin	 NFA
	
1931
	 election speech by J.Simon	 NFA
1932 ? The Price of Free Trade. On the need for
protection of the steel industry
	 NFA
	1934	 The Great Recovery. On economic recovery under
the National Government
	 NFA
	
1934
	 Empire Trade. On imperial trade policy
	 NFA
1934 ? Tariffs. On the benefits to industry and
agriculture from tariffs
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1934	 A Brighter Countryside. The growth of agriculture
due to the National Government 	 NFA
1934	 Nursery Gardening (?). How tariffs saved the
glasshouse industry
1934	 Housing and Slum Clearance (?). Including speech
by Sir Edward Hilton Young
1934 ? an acted sketch, including a soapbox orator in
Hyde Park
1934	 The Soul of a Nation. 7 reel feature documentary IWU
1935	 speech by J.R.MacDonald
1935	 speech by J.R.MacDonald
1935	 budget speech by N.Chamberlain. (taken from
newsreels ?)
1935	 film on agriculture, including speech by W.Elliot NFA
1935	 speech on foreign policy by Sir John Simon 	 NFA
1935	 Britain Under The National Government. Narrated
by S.Baldwin	 NFA
1935	 Scottish Industries (?). For Scotland only
1935	 Scottish Agriculture (?). For Scotland only
1935	 Signs of the Times. Prosperity and holidays
under the National Government	 NFA
1935	 Without Prejudice. 'a story film with a moral'
1935	 Arthur Prince and Jim. Ventriloquist's sketch 	 NFA
1935	 Sam Small at Westminster. Sketch by Stanley
Holloway
	 NFA
1935	 Florence Day. Vaudeville singer
1935	 election speech by Sir John Simon	 NFA
1935	 election speech by S.Baldwin	 NFA
1936	 speech by S.Baldwin (taken from newsreels?)
1937	 Our Heritage The Sea. Documentary short which
had commercial showing, and was also shown abroad
by the British Council 	 NFA
1937-8 speech by N.Chamberlain at Albert Hall. Possibly
filmed as part of:-	 NTA
? 1937-8 The House of Chamberlain. On the Chamberlain
family
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1938	 speech by N.Chanterlain (c.May)
1939	 speech by Sir John Simon. This would seem to have
been a somewhat premature General Election Speech NFA
In addition to the above films, it was common practice for a film to
be made of by-election candidates, whilst some 150 MPs had Christmas
message films made by the CFA for screening in their local cinemas. ,
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CHAPTER TViO
The Labour Party and Party Publicity.
"To have passed from the small beginnings of the Labour
Representation Committee to the formation of a Labour Ministry in so
short a time is a remarkable testimony to the political education of
the people and to the effective character of the Party's propaganda."
Labour Party Annual Report, 1924.
"a Party is a nation-wide organisation dependent for success upon the
regular, year-in, year-out, professional work of a number of
publicity trades. And these cannot continually live on Party
enthusiasm. Their pay is honourably earned and paid."
H. Finer, - Encyclopaedia of the Labour Movement,
1928.
"Labour must shout or be lost, advertise or be damned."
Unsigned article - The Labour Organiser, April
1936.
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Both the Liberal and the Labour parties made considerable play of
their claims to be parties of reason, appealing to the electorate
rationally with rational policies, laying an emphasis born of
ideological conviction upon political education and enlightenment.
The Conservative Party of course made similar claims; yet because
rationalism was a central feature of their ideological make-up it
became the principal property of the two more markedly doctrinal
parties. Through universal education they believed would come the
rule of reason and hence, in the hope of the early socialists,
the acceptance of pr
1
ogrammes by reason of their justice,
rationality and wisdom.
As James Ramsay MacDonald wrote,
The sole way leading to Socialism is the way of education, which
supplies the human qualities that demand the Socialist State for
their satisfaction and support, and protect those working it
2
out.
Given the relative positions of the Liberal and Labour parties,
both electorally and ideologically, it might have been thought that
the latter would have upheld this wholehearted belief in the raison 
d'etre of a complete democracy even more fervently than its
progenitor. Yet certain recent historians of the relative fortunes of
the two parties have argued that although the new Liberals after the
First World War 'believed that calculation and good sense would move
men', and therefore developed 'a style of politics that demanded
1. J.R. MacDonald, Parliament and Revolution, Manchester 1919, 103
- quoted by S. Macintyre, 'British Labour, Marxism and Working
Class Apathy in the Nineteen Twenties', Historical Journal, 20
(1977), 479.
2. J.R. MacDonald, Socialism: Critical and Constructive, London
1924, (2nd. ed.) 218. For a critical analysis of Labour's
attitude to education, both at school and political, see R.
Barker, 'The Labour Party and Education for Socialism',
International Review of Social History, 14 (1969), 22-53.
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an informed and intelligent electorate', the Labour Party by contrast
adopted a thorough conviction in the 'Party Government' view of the
British constitution, which saw it in terms of direct competition
between opposing parties for the votes of the mass electorate.
Consequently,
In practice .... the Labour Party never believed that the
electorate could be moved by democratic rationalism .... its
publicly stated policy was not much more than a collection of
shrewdly contrived slogans attached to deeper and more subtle
calls upon class loyalty. Despite the traditions and aspirations
of its leadership, Labour's politics were conducted in a pretty
3
vulgar way.
Such an attitude was reflected both in the style and content of the
Party's . proselytisation and in its rapid development of an
organisation designed primarily to win votes. This chapter will
detail how Labour Party publicity organisation actually evolved, and
the factors which influenced that development. It will again consider
the extent to which the Labour Party believed film to be of value
politically, and how its experience with film typified and clarifies
its attitude towards and experience with propaganda generally. First,
however, consideration must be given to the question of whether in
fact the Labour Party did abandon its belief in 'democratic
rationalism', and if so why.
The concept of education for democracy, so widely held in the
early years of the century, was the natural result of compounding the
over-optimistic idealism of nineteenth century rationalist
individualism with a positivist view of human progress derived from
the evolutionary theories of Darwin, Spencer and others. Education
and the democratisation of the state were seen as vital requisites
3.	 H.C.G. Matthew, R. I. McKibbin, J.A. Kay, 'The Franchise Factor
in the rise of the Labour Party', English Historical Review, 91
(1976), 747-8. See Note A at the end of chapter,p. 213, on the
question of the Liberal Party and propaganda.
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for evolution and clear evidence of it. With its growing
consciousness the Labour Movement conceived its role as being to lead
the working classes to a full awareness and understanding both of the
nature of the state and of their party within it. For the political
wing this meant perhaps even leading them to some comprehension of
the ideals and implications of socialism, albeit a diluted version as
expounded by Ramsay MacDonald. Thus it was argued that the aim of
political education of the working classes should be
to raise politics from being a mere affair of voting for a man
for any reason that it may suit parties to offer, and show it to
be the workings of man's most sacred aspirations through the
medium of the communal life of which he is a part .... Good
citizenship must, in short, be cultivated by an education in
4
social ethics rather than by a course in political history.
The notion of the evolution of man and society from an emotional and
irrational state to a rational and socialist one was well illustrated
by the comment that
A Socialist is a person who, reading the signs of the times,
undertakes the task of preparing Man for civilisation. An anti-
Socialist is a person whose mind, still in the semi-natural
5
state, is unable to understand the message of the Socialist.
This thesis bore strong religious and moral overtones; if rationalism
was the acknowledged aspiration of political education, it was
largely derived from and paralleled by the continuing tradition,
within socialist and Labour circles, of man's redemption from his
state of original sin.
4. J.R. MacDonald, 'The People in Power', in S. Colt (ed.),
'Ethical Democracy: Essays in Social Dynamics', London 1900,74-
75.
5. R. Neft in D. Griffiths (ed.) What is Socialism ? , London 1924,
57, quoted by S. Macintyre, Op. Cit., 485.
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'Education', meaning specifically education towards a political
end, was therefore felt to be of vital importance and, as was the
case in all political parties of the period, the words 'education'
6
and 'propaganda' became virtually synonymous in this context.
Socialists considered it particularly important that the socialist
message should be fully comprehended and accepted by the masses and
not merely supported irrationally, for political understanding was
half of that message:
If the people cannot construct Socialism in their minds they
cannot build it into their institutions. A mere class
consciousness will not guard the nation against this shortcoming,
because, however useful it may be to imbue the workers with a
sense of their class importance and their present class
subordination, the political value of this is slight. The
shortcoming is intellectual and moral .... Too much Socialist
7
propaganda has been upon these insubstantial lines.
And again:
The task of the Socialist is to make enlightenment come quick -
but it must be enlightenment .... If this is said to be slow, I
reply that it need not be so, but that, if it is, it is so by the
6. See B. Barker (ed.), Ramsay MacDonald's Political Writings,
London 1972, 44.
7. J.R. MacDonald (1919),Op.Cit.,59. See also B.C. Barker, 'The
Politics of Propaganda: a study in the theory of educational 
socialism and its roles in the development of a national Labour 
Party', unpublished M. Phil. thesis, York 1972, iii, in which
he states that, as MacDonald saw it, 'Politicianswere educators
and propagandists devoted to the moral reform of individuals
and thence society .... Propaganda, elevated as the principal
task of politics, provided the foundation of the balance
MacDonald sought to create between the political
responsibilities of a great party and the Labour Movement. If
the problem in industrial society was individual failure, it
followed that socialist politics would be primarily concerned
with the restoration of moral sensibility rather than with the
redistribution of wealth or even public ownership'.
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8
nature of society.
Yet emphasis on the need for working class support which was
politically aware, and comprehending of socialist ideology rather
than rote, led the early Party leaders, as it later led successive
groups on the left of the Party, into a dilemma. For although they
were expounding the cause of rational politicking, they had, in their
desire to become politically involved and to further political
education and political involvement among the working classes,
already entered the political arena against whose persunsional
9
methods they claimed to be fighting. In so doing, and in accepting
the potentially all powerful partnership of the Trade Union Movement,
Labour leaders became eligible to hold political office and to wield
the highest power, an eligibility which became a real possibility
with the passing of the Representation of the People Act of 1918.
This was a carrot which no politically ambitious group could have
refused, and nor did Labour. Although it might be over-nice to
suggest that the first two Labour ministries were not perfect
examples of gradualism, of MacDonaldism, as they have subsequently
been portrayed, the Labour Party's taking of office within five years
and three elections of its becoming a serious candidate represented a
significant departure from the educative justifications of
10
gradualism as only recently stated by its leaders. 	 In 1919, for
example, MacDonald had argued that Labour should only take power when
its electoral support was a comprehending and wholehearted one:
Nothing will be more damaging to Labour than to take office in
8. J.R. MacDonald (1919), Op. Cit., 99.
9. Indeed MacDonald recognised that integration into the
established political system before the war had the result that
every one of us in Parliament had incurred the suspicion of
opportunism'. He accepted this as a valid criticism of many of
those Labour leaders who had decided to support the war -
Ibid., 60.
10. For arguments as to the excessively gradualist nature of the
MacDonald Government see R. Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism,
London 1961, 59-121.
123
the midst of shifting sands or to be presented with political
power by the masses who vote for it because other parties are for
11
the time being unpopular.
Bernard Parker argues from this that MacDonald 'was genuinely afraid
that office migh
1.2t 
distract the Labour Party from its primary
educative role'. Certainly education appeared to be of paramount
importance to MacDonald, and electoral success secondary, in 1900
when he wrote:
Until we can put on the political arena a body of men who
recognise that their first duty is to educate the heart and the
head of the people, and who are not afraid of being defeated
while the educating process is going on, the politics of the
13
English people will sink to lower and lower depths.
Philip Snowden was articulating a belief as applicable to a Labour
Government as a Conservative, in 1921 when he declared that
the nominal government of an ignorant democracy may be a greater
14
danger to the State than even the despotism of an autocracy.
The failure of the first Labour Government and the Labour Party's
belief in the effect of the Zinoviev letter, were therefore as much
vindicat ions of the gradualism expounded by Labour leaders prior to
1923 as was the failure of the General Strike, and George Lansbury
reflected this view at the 1928 annual conference:
Gradualness is .... inevitable because our people have not yet
11. Quoted by B. Barker, Op. Cit., 45-6.
12. Ibid., 46.
13. Ethical World, 13 October 1900. Quoted by B. Sacks, J. Ramsay
MacDonald in Thought and Action, University of New Mexico 1952,
14.
14. P. Snowden, Labour and the New World, London 1921, 224.
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developed sufficient wisdom, knowledge and understandin g
 to
15
enable us to advance more speedily to our goal.
Although such views as to the unavoidably gradual nature of
political education - but not necessarily as to the gradual
implementation of socialist policy - continued to be stated
throughout the inter-war years, and particularly after the disastrous
defeats of 1931 and 1935, they were electorally anachronistic and
16
had been since 1918. 	 In recognising the 'wild emotion' and
continuing gullibility of the electorate in such matters as Zinoviev,
Labour leaders were by implication accepting the fact that so far
they had failed to educate it to a degree that would make a socialist
state the inevitable consequence. Yet to withdraw from political
activity was by now impossible, and they were urged on by natural
political ambition, by a desire to test the political temper of the
new mass electorate and by their concern to prevent the development
in the new voters of sustained Liberal or Conservative voting habits.
Desirous of proving the worth of the political wing of the Labour
Movement to its other sections, particularly following the short-
lived threat of direct action through the use of industrial force in
the years immediately after the war, the Labour Party thus entered
the national party arena perhaps before its educative doctrine deemed
15. Labour Party Annual Conference Report (hereafter LPAR), 1928,
150.
16. Thus Herbert Morrison wrote in October 1936:- 'We must in our
propaganda and our thoughts revive Socialist first principles
and feature in our work to a greater extent than has been the
case in recent years positive Socialist education.' - Glasgow
Forward, 17 October 1936. He would rather fight an election 'on
a clear contructive policy of Socialism and fail to win fifty
seats that I could have won by playing with superficial
politics.' - Warrington Examiner, 23 March 1935. Quoted by B.
Donoughue and G.W. Jones, Herbert Morrison, London 1973, 211.
Similarly W.Wedgwood Benn declared that '.... the Labour Party
did not merely want a victory that came from the swing of the
pendulum; it wanted to construct a sound position for many
years of Labour rule by a constructive policy understood by the
people and accepted by them.' - Manchester Guardian, 5 July
1937. For Arthur Henderson's view after 1931 see page 212-213
below.
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it either right or advisable to do so. Indeed it might be argued that
the mass franchise came into existence too soon after the
introduction of universal education and the beginnings of the growth
of social consciousness within the working classes, for the
successful prosecution of gradual, rationalist, political education
as proclaimed by Labour. In accepting the ultimate political
challenge by contesting for government the Labour Party was forced to
fight on its opponent's terms, to fight to win, to use appeals to
class loyalty, traditional religious morality and to trade unionist
consciousness, to organise, publicise and propagandise on a national
scale. For repeated failure could well have been fatal to a nascent
party continually needing to prove its value to the classes and the
industrial movement through which so much of its power and influence
might come.
There is every reason to suppose, however, that it accepted this
fact willingly, and that, indeed, it had never been the wholly
rational educator it proclaimed itself to be. The Labour Party was
after all a 'compromise', its policy a result of the uneasy
17
relationship between its socialist and trade union components.
Its propaganda was likewise largely the product of this relationship.
Thus the potential objective of that propaganda was seen by the
Party's different elements as being to educate the electorate in the
principles of socialism and to arouse the political consciousness
present but dormant in the working classes, in order to stimulate
them to consider the particular question of class or labour
representation. Despite the statement of socialist aims in the 1918
constitution, the inter-war Labour Party was in most respects
dominated by its trade union element. It became increasingly a party
with a socialist objective but a programme far from wholly socialist,
and not even uniquely progressive. Partly as a response to this fact
it also rapidly became a party which propagandised itself largely on
its claim to be the true representative of the working classes,
particularly through its unification of class and union interests.
17. H. Tracey, The Book of the Labour Party, London 1925, 165.
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Such a selling point lent itself to emotive advertisement, and the
Labour Party in consequence showed itself to be not so morally
superior in its propaganda techniques as might have been inferred
from its indignation at those of _others. Moreover the politically
active trade unionists in the Party, Arthur Henderson included, did
not have the inhibitions about premature assumption of power that
many of their socialist colleagues professed, although doubts
remained within the union movement as a whole as to whether
governmental power was the proper aspiration of its representation in
parli2ment.
It was also generally accepted that the creation of a national
party organisation in its own right, outside the confines of the
trade union movement, would immeasurably enhance the educational
power of Labour. The decline of the Liberal Party and the
enfranchisement of women did after all present a vast non-union
market to the Party, and the demand was made increasingly for the
recognition and encouragement of individual party membership through
local parties.
Finally, although MacDonald and others averred an ideological
commitment to 'education' before political power, and to political
power only through political education, their writings on the subject
were often vague and ambiguous. It is evident that they were well
aware of the impracticability of adhering strictly to the spirit of
this ideal, given both existing political practice as they saw it,
and the current state of mass society. Indeed MacDonald admitted that
mass education and the universal franchise were not necessarily the
liberating forces hoped for:
Conservatism no longer resists but welcomes a democratic
franchise, because experience has shown it that it can manipulate
that franchise, and owing to its control of the press and the
influences that make opinion, it can get from a wide electorate -
especially from the broad margin of electors who take no rational
or abiding interest in politics or in their national affairs -
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mandates which suit itself. The democracy has become its tool,
and it finds renewed strength in masses of newly enfranchised
people. In unawakened subordi
8
nate minds it finds both its
1
strength and its justification.
Thus MacDonald realized that popular education and the mass franchise
could be turned to advantage by the governing classes, who
found that these majorities were moved by no definite idea and
sought no definite goal. They lived from hand to mouth. They
could be stirred into passion by things which were trivial, they
could be easily deceived, they were fond of dramatic
representations and were very credulous ... The "governing
classes" have striven to keep things so. They have discovered
that the effect of popular education was not to make people
intellectually vigorous, but to make them slaves of what they
read, and that the effect of having the vote was not to make
them consider what they would do with it, but to make them enjoy
19
an election.
Norman Angell echoed this disillusionment with popular education in
1925:
The errors [of democratic decision] have not been due to the
intellectually baffling nature of the problems, but to the flat
refpRal on the part of whole nations to face self-evident facts,
because to face them would have meant abandoning the indulgence
of a temper, or appetite, or emotion. .... If the people can
disregard in their collective decisions the facts of which they
are already perfectly well aware, they can just as easily
disregard that further knowledge with which a wider education in
20
this sense of "knowing things" might endow them.
18. J.R. MacDonald, A Policy for the Labour Party, London 1920, 53.
19. J.R. MacDonald (1919), Op. Cit., 57.
20. N. Angell, The Public Mind, London 1926. 21.
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Likewise he argued that Conservatives had recognised that 'democratic
devices	 ...
21 are
	 now actually	 factors	 of fundamental
Conservatism'.	 As MacDonald sadly concluded, 'surrounded by
democratic reforms, the "governing classes" have maintained their
22
authority and have used democracy to maintain it'.
Inevitably the press was seen as an arch enemy:
The power of the press as a moulder of working class opinion
cannot be over-emphasised. The ideas and thoughts of most workers
23
come from the capitalist controlled press.
Conspiracy theory was a common theme, even of former Liberals:
the mass of workers are distracted and beguiled by the "organs of
public opinion", which play upon their credulity and their
lighter tastes and interests so as to keep them from any form of
24
organisation that is really dangerous to the powers above.
Only a few, Kingsley Martin and Norman Angell among them, identified
the fundamental motivation behind the popular press as being as much
economic as political. Yet having financial incentives did not make
the attitude of the press any less deplorable:
5
One Immediate effect of the increasing financial competition
amongst newspapers is a tendency to reduce politics, like all
25
other subjects, to the level of a stunt.
21.
	 Ibid., 143.
22. J.R. MacDonald (1919), Op. Cit., 58. See also Note B at the end
of chapter,p.214.
23. W. Paul, The State: its origins anefunctions, Glasgow 1917,
187. Quoted by S. Macintyre, Op. Cit., 481.
24. J.A. Hobson, Democracy after the War, London 1917, 149.
25. K. Martin, 'Public Opinion: Rationalisation of the Press and
Democracy', Political Quarterly, 1 (1930) 429.
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And again:
giving the public what it wants in this case means offering it
that which it will buy most readily in an unthinking mood, that
which flatters its class and national prejudices and keeps alive
each treasured myth. Broadly its influence is to stimulate
exactly those mental habits which an educated person hs learnt
26
to avoid. It is an antidote to education.
Despite their insistence on gradualism, therefore, a feature of
the writings of MacDonald and others was frustration and impatience,
particularly at the apparent stupidity of the masses who had so far
failed to recognise where their best interests lay, but who instead
constituted for the Labour Party 'the marshalled opposition of mass
27
habit'.	 Although MacDonald continued to emphasise political
education as the only solution, he confessed that the people 'took
infinitely more interest in getting the vote than they have taken in
28
using it',	 and plaintively protested that the 1918 election had
not shown that the people yet possessed
that vigilant watchfulness and that consistency in thought and
29
interest which James Mill had assumed.
Earlier he had written:
the ordinary man, not of the street but of the suburb ... does
not understand what Socialism means - and probably does not want
to understand .... It is nothing but a waste of time to explain
new ideas to such people. They are the despair of everyone who
tries to bring commonsense into politics, and the victims of
26. K. Martin, 'The Influence of the Press', Politicalquarterly, 1
(1930), 176.
27. J.R. MacDonald (1924) Op. Cit., 270.
28. J.R. MacDonald, in S. Coit (ed.) Op. Cit., 60.
29. Quoted by B. Sacks, Op. Cit., 17.
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those who appeal to popular ignorance and fear.
The problem was not simply one of capitalist repression or of lack of
education, although further socialist education and propaganda
remained the only solutions identified by Labour leaders. The problem
was in the continuing irrational character of human nature. Indeed
MacDonald at times even seemed to be admitting the ineluctability of
the irrationality of man and society. Impressed by the arguments of
Wilfred Trotter, whose Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War 
provided a scientific, or pseudo-scientific, explanation of the
inevitability of irrationality in the mass, MacDonald accepted that
Adaptive reason cannot be exercised by the crowd ... because the
crowd cannot employ the processes of balanced judgement to
81
control its will.
Philip Snowden equally felt that
It is not the institution of Parliament, nor the system of
democracy which is at fault, but the state of mind and the lack
32
of intelligence on the part of the electorate.
30. J.R. MacDonald, Socialism, London 1907, 1.
31. J.R. MacDonald (1924), Op. Cit., 219. For MacDonald on Trotter
see 'A Policy for the Labour Party', London 1920, 67. See also
R.N. Soffer, 'New Elitism: Social Psychology in Pre-war
England', Journal of British Studies, 8 (1969), 111-140, for
details of Trotter and his contemporary social psychologist,
William McDougall. Interestingly Ross McKibbin supports the
picture of MacDonald given here when he comments that despite
the latter's belief in the inevitability of society's evolution
to collective forms of life, 'he never believed the working
class would necessarily hasten this evolution. On the contrary
he had long before concluded that the ignorance and
parochialism of the working class could actually obstruct it.
It was this that made his departure from the Labour Party in
1931 so easy.' - 'Arthur Henderson as Labour leader',
International Review of Social History, 23 (1978), 79-101.
32. P. Snowden, Op. Cit., 50. In an almost identical statement
MacDonald wrote that, 'in expressing disappointment with the
results of parliamentary government, we must begin by admitting
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The fact that the working classes had not as yet established their
own non-capitalist press was, for Snowden, writing in 1921, further
evidence that they were not yet ready for the 'conclusive contest'
and the assumption of power:
A democracy which is not educated up to the point of organising
all its resources for the class struggle is far from being
prepared to bring that struggle to a conclusive contest, and it
is certainly far from being educated to administer a new economic
and social order. If the working classes would spend one-
twentieth part of the money they now waste in drink and gambling
on political and publicity organisation, the capitalist monopoly
of the means of influencing public opinion would be quickly
33
destroyed.
The arguments of MacDonald and others evidently contained many
inconsistencies. They believed in the powers of political education
yet apparently admitted man's irrationality and lack of intelligence,
particularly in the mass. They stated that power should only be
accepted if founded on conscious, 'educated' support, yet also
justified their own political involvement as necessary for effective
political education. Yet despite these contradictions it is clear
that they retained, as it was necessary for their constitutional
evolutionism that they should retain, a firm belief in the ultimate
victory of rationalism through political education and propaganda.
The conclusions as to the continuing irrationality of the electorate,
for example, were made within general arguments on the need for still
more of the type of rational political education which it was claimed
Labour propagandists had been attempting since the later 19th
century. Anxious as they were to assert the validity of evolutionary
over revolutionary socialism, MacDonald, Snowden and others
proclaimed the success of their propaganda so far; they declared the
that the first point to be made against it belongs not to
itself, but to the masses. They have not been intelligent
enough to use it.', Parliament and Revolution, 58.
33. P. Snowden, Op. Cit., 50-51.
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confirmation, in the rise of the Labour Party, of educational
evolutionism and its superiority ov
34
er industrial action or coerced
revolution on the Russian model. Snowden's statements quoted
above were made during a long argument refuting the case of the
revolutionaries against those of the 'evolutionists'. Thus he
rejected their arguments both of capitalist dominance of all channels
of public opinion and of the failure of educational methods to
replace the irrational with the rational mind. He was forced to
admit, as he would not have done in another context, that
Working class leaders find little difficulty in securing a
platform for their views in the capitalist Press ... the alleged
subservience of democracy to capitalist influence and control is
35
greatly exaggerated.
He also affirmed, as indeed he had to, that the Labour Party's
electoral success was a response to its educational work, rather than
to factors such as class loyalty and dissatisfaction with alternative
parties:
The progress which has been made in the last generation in the
education of the masses on political and social questions h2s
been very great. The wonderful growth of the Labour Party in
Great Britain in the short space of twenty years is encouraging
evidence that educational work among them has been effective ....
The progress, it is true, has been irritatingly slow to the
impatient, but it is, on the whole, moving as rapidly as the
evolution of those forces which are preparing for the new social
36
order.
Political education and propaganda was therefore pronounced a
34. For one instance of the case against evolutionary theory see
Note C, at the end of chapter,p.215.
35. P. Snowden, Op. Cit., 52.
36. Ibid., 52-3.
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success. What was needed was still more. But despite Snowden's
emphasis on patience and on the need for electoral understanding to
parallel Labour's rise, theparty was as a whole anxious for
electoral victory. It had now become, both by choice and of
necessity, a national political force and had thereby entered the
electoral race. It was therefore more than ever essential that,
notwithstanding the continuing stupidity and gullibility of much of
the electorate, its belief in the possibility of a constitutional
victory should be seen to bear rapid results. Although a belief in
the rationality of man remained a central and conscious tenet of the
Labour Party's faith, and rational political education and propaganda
one of its principal declared duties, electoral necessity induced a
compromise in practice. Labour politicians utilised their own
emotional catchwords and phraseology just as did Conservatives, none
37
more successfully than MacDonald himself.	 The Labour Party's
attitude to organisation and publicity was therefore a response to
the combination of its rooted ideological commitment to political
education and propaganda, the rather different viewpoint brought to
this tfiRk by its trade union element, the apparent capitalist control
of the 'organs of public opinion', the continuing apathy and dull-
wittedness of sections of Labour's potential vote and the acceptance
and indeed emphasis of constitutionalism and the existing system of
'party government', with its natural accent on electoral politics.
Whilst continuing to proclaim itself as a pure and uncompromising
party of principle, Labour became also, both through its desire to
integrate itself into the existing political fabric, and through its
impatience to achieve the 'new social order', a party in the more
traditional mould, with its own organisational structure, ambitions,
and existence as a valid entity in its own right. Such a development
was an umnvoidable and obvious step both for party benefit and for
the greater and more effective prosecution of political education and
propaganda. Yet it led to a publicity organisation which was as much
electorally as educationally orientated, as was indeed the entire
party machine. It is to the details of that publicity organisation
37. See, for example, R. I. McKibbin, 'The evolution of the Labour 
Party, Oxford 1974, 130.
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that we must now turn.
Prior to 1918 few in the Labour Party would seriously have
considered describing it as a united, national party. As Arthur
Henderson wrote, the 42 M.P.s returned to parliament in December 1910
were not a par
	 y in the accepted sense of the word, and some of
them had not shaken off their allegiance to the historic parties.
In the country, though we maintained our own electoral machinery
and our own staff of organisers, the organisation was essentially
38
a federation of local and national societies.
Propaganda - chiefly public meetings and some literature - was
predominantly locally initiated, except at General Elections, when
the unity of the Party was enhanced by a more thorough, common
distribution of material produced by Head Office. The central
organisation, small and run on a very tight budget, was concerned
primarily with the stimulation of new Labour organisations in areas
where none existed and with improving them where they did. Head
Office's principal function between elections was not mass but
organisational propaganda: the holding of conferences concerned with
the organisation of the supporters of an expanding party,
organisational tours by the National Agent and later by national
'Organisers', and the arrangement of by-election contests where there
was adequate constituency support. These functions were to remain of
primary importance and to take the largest single part of Head
Office's budget throughout the period under consideration. Although
local Labour parties appeared to grow quite remarkably rapidly during
39
and after the First War , and although the Conservative and
38. A. Henderson, The Aims of Labour, London 1918, 15-16.
39. R.I. McKibbin, (1974), Op. Cit., 137-9. Note also his
qualification as to the nature and strength of these bodies. As
he concludes, 'The growth of constituency organisation ... was
always variable, frequently makeshift, and not usually founded
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Table 2.1 Comparison 	 of	 average	 electoral	 expenditure of
43
Conservative, Liberal and Labour Candidates, 1923-1945. 
Election	 Conservative	 Liberal	 Labour
£ £ £
1923 845 789 464
1929 905 782 452
1935 777 495 365
1945 780 532 595
Central funds were similarly in stark contrast to Conservative.
In 1928 expenditure from the Labour Party's General Account totalled
44
£48,600.	 In the same year Conservative Central Office spent
45
£106,000, whilst its total central party outlay was £248,000. The
annual income of Labour's General Account, from which all
organisational, publicity and administrative expenses were paid,
only exceeded £50,000 in 1925 and 1926, declined steadily thereafter
to a low of under £40,000 and was only approaching its previous
46
level in the two years before the war.
The administrative staff of the Party was likewise much smaller
than that of its chief rival. In 1919 Head Office staff totalled 30,
and its other national staff (excluding agents, who were paid for by
47
the local parties), 17.	 The Press and Publicity Department did
not exceed ten in number, five being clerical, until after the Second
43. D. Butler and A. Sloman, British Political Facts 1900-79,
London 1980, 229.
44. LPAR, October 1928. The general account excluded annual income
and expenditure on literature, which was dealt with in a
separate Literature Account. The Literature Account generally
balanced when calculated over a period of years, Head Office
printing slightly more than the local parties bought.
45. J.C.C. Davidson papers, party accounts.
46. Party Accounts contained in LPAR, 1918-39.
47. Labour Party National Executive Committee (NEC) Minutes series,
Memorandum on Party staff, April 1919.
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World War. Even when, as part of Arthur Henderson's great scheme
for the unification of the Labour Movement, the Press and Publicity
Departments of the Labour Party and the TUC were combined between
49
1922 and 1926, the joint department's staff totalled only seven.
Of course the Party derived considerable advantages from its
connection with the trade union movement, and co-operation over
propaganda was close wherever it was possible. Several of the Party's
campaigns were organised in conjunction with the TUC, particularly
when union interests were directly concerned, as in the 'Mines for
the Nation', 'Trade Union Defence' and 'Unemployment Assistance Board
Regulations' campaigns. During General Elections TUC staff were made
available to Labour Head Office, and the unions could be generous
with their not inconsiderable funds in both election and inter-
election campaigns. A considerable proportion of local parties
remained dependent upon the assistance of union branches for
organisation and propaganda work. Such co-operation was invaluable,
but it was not always as much as the NEC would have liked. Despite
the increased activity and influence of the National Council for
Labour (the joint committee of NEC, TUC General Council, and PLP
representatives) after 1931, co-operation and co-ordination remained
on the whole informal and dependent upon the goodwill of the unions,
who needed the Party far less than the Party needed them. Thus it was
the TUC, unhappy with the unification of the Press and Publicity
Departments, who withdrew from the experiment in 1926, although
certain journals continued to be produced as a joint effort. Although
the unions generally lent support to the Party's campaigns, co-
operation was sometimes less than might have been hoped for, as in
the 'Victory for Socialism' campaign of 1934-5 and the 'call to
50
Action' campaign of early 1933. The Party could certainly not
48. NEC, List of Party staff, January 1936, shows Press and
Publicity Department staff as eight, and a Literature
Circulation Officer and one other had been added by 1939.
49. NEC, List of salaries of staff of Joint Press Department, c. 20
August 1923.
50. There had been no apparent active co-operation in the former by
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afford to depend, for its continuing propaganda effort, upon union
financial support which might not be forthcoming, or which could be
withdrawn at any time. Even the annual affiliation fees were not
51
always assured , whilst the Party's financial weakness in the late
1920s and 1930s was an inevitable consequence of the unions' own
difficulties arising from the Trade Disputes Act.
With all these obstacles Labour found propaganda of the capital
intensive type used by the Conservative Party extremely difficult.
Suffering repeated financial setbacks through the depression of the
1920s, following the Trade Disputes Act of 1927, after the 1929
election and in the wake of the 1931 crisis, frequently with a
52
deficit in its General Account , Labour learnt to harbour its
resources, to use its money cautiously and to make full use of its
other assets - its enthusiasm and voluntary workers. Thus in the 1929
election, in which the Conservative Party spent £297,000 from its
central funds,. Labour managed to raise £49,600 through its 'Bid For
Power' fund (£100,000 had been the target figure), spent £15,400 in
grants to candidates, £8,800 on subsidising manifestoes and
literature sales, £4,400 on other administrative expenses, and still
had a balance of £20,900 to transfer to its General Account in order
the unions by the time of the Party Annual Conference in
October 1934, although the campaign had been running for six
months - Annual Report 1934, Report on the Victory for
Socialism Campaign. Similarly, although the TUC urged union
branches to organise trade union propaganda weeks to coincide
with the Party's membership drives in 1933, only in four areas
were T.U. meetings actually combined with the 'Call to Action'
campaign. - National Joint Council (NJC) Minutes series,
Report of activities of TUC General Council, Labour Party
Executive Committee and Parliamentary Labour Party, to National
Joint Council, 21 March 1933 and 23 May 1933.
51. See note 106 below.
52. See, for example, NEC, Auditors' Report on 1926 Accounts, 19
July 1927: Memorandum on financial estimates for party in 1928,
7 March 1928; Final Report of the Economy Committee, 17 January
1933; Minutes of the Finance and General Purposes Committee, 21
February 1934.
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to offset the effects on normal income of the Trade Disputes Act.
With funds so restricted, with its annual estimated income almost
invariably wholly accounted for in advance by standing expenses such
as organisers, propagandists and administration, the NEC was most
unwilling to accept new financial undertakings. Indeed it was often
unable to do so, unless it could be absolutely certain of full
financial support from the local parties. As the Party's auditorg
commented in 1935,
The present position of yearly deficits and consequent
limitations on all new efforts seems to us to be intolerable and
54
unworthy of the movement.
But the majority of constituency parties, themselves operating on a
minimal budget, rarely found it possible to lift their own annual
incomes to any appreciable extent, even when called upon by the
National Executive for extra effort. The financial patronage of the
unions, beyond annual affiliation fees, likewise remained an
uncertain and only occasional source of additional funds, invariably
allocated in advance for specific campaigns.
What was remarkable about Labour's propaganda effort, given
resources which to either of the other major parties would have
appeared quite inadequate, was not that it managed to make any show
at all, but that for size and complexity it bore extremely creditable
comparison with the Conservative propaganda machine. Indeed the
particular emphasis of Labour campaigning - its constant public
meetings and demonstrations - led to much admiration and fear amongst
opponents. Lloyd George described Labour as 'a great propagandist
party', and told Asquith that 'The Labour Party alone has a machine
53. NEC, Statement of Accounts, 31 December 1929. This balance was
subsequently somewhat depleted by post-election appeals from
local parties for assistance for financial difficulties arising
from the election.
54. LPAR 1935, 48.
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fitted for the times'.	 Arthur Henderson felt justified in
boasting that
No party has carried on such continuous or extensive propaganda
56
during recent years as the Labour Party.
Yet all too often the history of Labour propaganda work before the
Second War, like that of the Labour Party itself, was, despite
considerable achievement, one of unfulfilled hopes. Labour organisers
and publicists planned on a hardly less ambitious scale than their
Conservative counterparts, but almost invariably without the same
results.
Publicity organisation before the 1914-18 war was minimal. There
was no Press and Publicity Department at Head Office and propaganda
production was irregular and unco-ordinated. Unlike the Conservative
Party Labour employed no staff speakers, or 'propagandists' as they
were always called. Only at election time was a special Literature
Sub-Committee of the NEC set up to consider literature production,
and it was only then that any really organised, large scale
57
propaganda was undertaken.
	 By subsidising some candidates,
encouraging others and supplying free copies of the party manifesto,
however, the Labour Party was able to acquit itself very respectably,
considering the limited number of seats it was contesting. In the
first General Election of 1910 Head Office sent out over 5 million
leaflets, 800,000 manifestoes, 44,000 double crown and 7,000 crown
58
pictorial posters.	 Bearing in mind that the total electorate
within Labour contested constituencies numbered only just over 1.5
million, Labour propaganda in these 78 seats was therefore
55. Daily News, 2 March 1929; Lloyd George to Asquith, 20 August
1924. Quoted by P.R. Shorter, Op. Cit., 109%
56. A. Henderson, 'Labour's Army is Unconquered', Labour Magazine,
November 1931, 292.
57. NEC, Minutes, 13 April 1910.
58. LPAR 1909-10, 6.
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potentially very comprehensive. The Party's annua l report was
justified in declaring that
This department of the Party's activity is becomin g more and more
59
important.
Before the December 1910 election Head Office arranged for each
contested constituency to be visited by a sitting M.P., although
there was still as yet no serious attempt to establish the organised
provision of voluntary and M.P. speakers to local bodies who
requested them.
Only in May 1913 did a standing 'Labour Propaganda Committee'
appear,
u
 with reference to propaganda against the Trade Union Act of
6
1913.	 A plethora of committees was then created - a Joint
Committee of the NEC and the parliamentary committee of the TUC, to
consider Labour propaganda, a sub-committee of the NEC to liaise with
the Parliarrentary Labour Party about propaganda against the Act, and
another sub-committee of the NEC actually to prepare that
61
propaganda.	 The movement was anxious to make a real impact in
this, its largest and most important non-election campaign to date.
Certainly the campaign set the style for virtually every one until
1939, employing a series of large scale organisation conferences for
party workers in order to stimulate them to local propaganda, an
accompanying series of mass demonstrations and the sale and
distribution of leaflets and pamphlets. The central feature of all
would be the exhortatory organisation conference, followed by local
propagandising through public meetings. The spoken word was held to
be the best form of propaganda, not least because it was also the
cheapest when undertaken by local volunteers, and 'star' speakers
were much sought after from Head Office by local parties. Indeed the
•
paramount position of the public meeting and other forms of verbal
59. Ibid.
60. NEC, Minutes, 6-7 May 1913.
61. Ibid.
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publicity in Labour propaganda was made particularly evident by the
use of the word 'propaganda', throughout the movement, not only to
describe the general activity of publicity, but also to apply to the
quite specific activity of speech making. In the National Agent's
monthly reports to the NEC and in the Party's annual reports the
section on 'Propaganda' referred exclusively to spoken word
propaganda, whilst 'Publicity' denoted written, poster, and other
forms. There was therefore a greater distinction between 'propaganda'
and 'publicity' in the Labour Party than in the Conservative,
although it was a differentiation of type and not of style or degree.
Both words were also used in their generic sense.
Having learnt from this early campaign, and seeing the next
election at most two years away in 1915, the NEC decided that
the necessity for propaganda as an accompaniment to that of
organisation .... becomes particularly urgent ... this phase of
Party activity should be dealt with more methodically than
hitherto .... Provided the Chairman and members of the
Parliamentary Party would undertake to place a number of their
dates at the disposal of the Head Office a series of most useful
conferences with all the local workers could be held in our
present and prospective constituencies for the purpose of
stimulating local interest in party organisation ... In the past
Head Office has been inundated with requests for speakers which
it has been unable to fulfil, and the haphq7Ard way in which
engagements have been made has led to serious overlapping in some
centres and neglect elsewhere ... Another feature of the proposal
would be the more systematic distribution of Party literature by
62
our local organisations.
The extremely modest nature of these reforms indicated just how
poorly organised had been party publicity and propaganda before. They
62. NEC, Report on Party Organisation in 1914 and 1915, 11 December
1913. This memorandum helps to point the distinction made above
between spoken and written propaganda and publicity. The
proposals were endorsed by the Annual Conference - NEC,
Organisation Sub-Committee minutes, 24 March 1914.
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also demonstrated once again how the party leadership's primary
concern was with propaganda for the promotion of local organisation,
through which then the electorate could be reached.
This priority was evident equally in the editorial policy of the
Party's first newspaper, the Daily Citizen, as it was evident also in
the pre-Whams Daily Herald. Established in October 1912 the Citizen
was very much the paper of the Labour Movement rather than a popular
daily which happened to be owned by it and to support its politics.
As such it reported the most turgid of Labour Party organisational
news, but was allowed little opportunity to turn itself into a going
concern, attractive to other than the dedicated party supporter.
Although there was considerable argument as to the precise purpose of
63
the paper - either as popular propagandist and vote-catcher, or
as a cohesive and binding force in the active Labour Movement - and
although some concessions were made to popularity, the paper failed
in both possible functions, for it folded early in 1915 and would
64
have done so had war not come.
A deeper dilemma for the Board of Management of the Citizen lay
in the question of to what extent putting a popular dressing, in the
shape of sports and other features, around the Labour news was a
tendency towards manipulation in the Northcliffe mould, even if the
news itself was honest. With a strong belief in the existence of
press manipulation spread throughout the Labour Movement, there was
an understandable desire to be seen to be rejecting the popular style
and methods of Fleet Street and to produce a distinctive paper in
which, divorced both from tinsel and from ideological twisting, the
truth would shine through. A belief in capitalist manipulation not
infrequently led to the apparent discernment and declared rejection
of the more obvious features of manipulatory technique in many areas
of Labour propaganda. Yet at the same time an absolute conviction in
63. Labour Party annual Conference Report 1912, 78-80.
64. R.I. McKibbin, 'The Evolution of a National Party: Labour's 
political organisation 1910-24', D.Phil. thesis,Oxford 1970,
112-118.
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the righteousness of the Labour cause equally frequently led to their
65
retention, unconscious or otherwise.
Although the war put a temporary stop on all press, publicity and
propaganda developments, it was to prove a stimulant to party
organisation through its direct effect upon Arthur Henderson, the
architect of the Party reorganisation and constitution of 1917-18.
Following his forced resignation from the Government in 1917
Henderson turned with a remarkable thoroughness, as R.I. McKibbin has
66
shown, to the reorganisation of the Party.
	 Knowledge of the
coming Representation of the People Act, and experience of the
violence of the Russian Revolution, combined in Henderson to produce
67
a new sense of urgency and increased electoral determination. He
recognised in the war the growth of a new 'democratic consciousness'
and argued that
[The War] .
 has shown the need for drastic change in the
composition and organisation of political parties ... The old
party system has irretrievably broken down .... Political power
is about to be re-distributed, not only amongst the electors
under the Franchise Bill, but amongst the political parties in
Parliament which will claim to represent the new democratic
68
consciousness.
	 if Labour is to take its part in creating the new order of
65. It would be difficult, for example, to distinguish any
significant differences in persuasional techniques between
Labour and Conservative spoken rhetoric, or between Labour and
Conservative posters, although Labour, following the success of
its pre-vorticist poster 'Forward! The Day is Breaking' by
Gerald Spencer Pryse, developed a penchant for inspirational
posters of considerable artistic merit and emotional power,
posters of a kind which neither of the other parties really
used. For Labour posters see pages 163-167 below.
66. R.I. McKibbin (1974), Op. Cit., 91-106.
67. J.M. Winter, 'Arthur Henderson and the Russian Revolution',
Historical Journal 15 (1972), 770-771.
68. A. Henderson, Op. Cit., 20-21.
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society it must address itself to the task of transforming its
political organisation from a federation of societies into a
national popular party, rooted in the life of the democracy, and
deriving its principles and its policy from the new political
69
consciousness.
As Frank Purdy declared at the annual conference in January 1918:
The Representation of the People Bill will effect a revolution in
70
the methods of all political parties.
One necessary step towards the creation of a national party and
the unification of organisation was inevitably a greater attention
to, and centralisation of, control of party propaganda. The matter
was quickly taken up when, in October 1917, for the first time a
proposal was made to formally institute a Press and Publicity
Department, primarily in anticipation of the next General Election,
but also to affirm the position of the central organisation in the
expanded national party. At first the new department was to be
concerned chiefly with press relations, serving both the national and
the local Labour press; it would
.... act as the medium through which Labour news could be
circulated to the General Press of the country, and it might
become the Organ through which accurate information regarding
Labour Policy and criticism of public affairs by Party Leaders
could be conveyed through the Local Labour Weeklies to the
71
Organised Working Class Movement.
Henderson admitted that so far the distribution of labour press news
had been
69.	 Ibid., 15-16.
70. Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1918, 96.
71. NEC, Memorandum by A. Henderson, 16 October 1917.
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.... anything but satisfactory: such news items are often picked
up at random from various people who are supposed to be in close
touch with the Movement, and the information so obtained is often
inaccurate, sometimes biassed, and not infrequently wilfully
72
misleading.
It was hoped that the department might in time also become a
'literary section' for the production of party literature, although
the NEC was assured that additional expenses for this new development
73
would be minimal.
	 Indeed, as established the Press and Publicity
Department had a staff of only three - the Director, Herbert Tracey,
who was recruited by Henderson from the Christian Commonwealth, a
74
secretary and a messenger. In 1919 the staff was supplemented by
the appointment of W. W. Henderson, Arthur's son and former lobby
correspondent of the Daily Citizen, as parliamentary correspondent
75
for the Party.
It was hardly surprising that the problem of press relations was
felt to be of such importance. Although the press was the greatest
political communications medium available Labour had had no official
paper since the demise of the Citizen, whilst relations with the
Daily Herald during the war were far from cordial. As Ross McKibbin
remarks, 'For a party almost obsessed by the needs of propaganda' the
76
lack of a newspaper 'was an obvious deficiency'. Yet at the same
72.
	 Ibid.
73. The Press and Publicity Department rapidly did assume a
general publicity role, and it was envisaged that it should
become the sole channel for all party press releases and
literature publications, even those emanating from other
departments such as the International and Advisory Committees -
see NEC, Memorandum by Henderson on Co-ordination, Section III
- The Press and Publicity Department, 19 October 1920.
74. NEC, Re-organisation Sub-Committee, 25 October 1917; NEC,
Minutes 14 November 1917.
75. NEC, Meeting of the Executive Section of the Joint Committee
between the ParliqmPntary Labour Party and the Executive, 26
March 1919. For details of Herbert Tracey and William Henderson
see Note D at end of chapter,p.215.
76. R.I. McKibbin (1974) Op. Cit., 222.
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time the Party was unwilling to suffer again the considerable
financial losses incurred with its first paper. Only slowly and
reluctantly was it later to assume responsibility for the Herald. In
the establishment of the Press Department it therefore hoped to
infiltrate the existing press.
Early experience was most encouraging; by April 1918 it had
become regular practice for news agencies - Reuter, Central News;
and Press Association - to keep in daily contact with the Department
of their own volition. Accordingly Tracey and Arthur Henderson
proposed the establishment of a regular weekly Labour News Service,
to be provided to the news agencies for general distribution and to
the Labour press, the politically independent journals and the
Liberal and Unionist provincial and weekly press. It was hoped,
somewhat optimistically, that shortage of news in the latter would
encourage the printing of Labour news, and that
those circulating in industrial districts and rural areas might
be easily seduced from their present allegiances before they
77
became aware of what is happening.
The main aim, however, was
securing publicity for the party aims and plans without showing
the cloven hoof of propaganda too clearly. News is the chief
thing; Labour opinion can be insidiously propagated in journals
which have formed the habit of printing the news supplied by the
78
department's postal service.
It was hoped later to circulate news daily, direct to the national
press, and even eventually to provide articles, interviews,
manifestoes and letters to the editor. Henderson and Tracey believed
with some justification that
77. NEC, Memorandum on Press Department, 17 April 1918.
78. Ibid.
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the press generally will have a friendlier feeling for Labour
propaganda if they get accustomed to expect a regular and
79
plentiful supply of Labour news Which costs them nothing.
The details of the Labour Press Service were finalised in September
1918 and it was fully operational by the following spring, servicing
80
180 Labour newspapers, journals and the press agencies.
	 During
General Elections it became standard practice also to provide daily
bulletins direct to the London and provincial press, and the annual
reports of the Party showed considerable satisfaction with what was
81
being achieved.
Lacking the national newspaper support it believed its opponents
to possess, Labour took particular care to cosset the press in so far
as it was able. In all campaigns organised through the constituency
parties the importance of liaising with the local papers was
emphasised, whilst the value of organisation conferences and
campaigns was Seen to lie as much in the press coverage they received
as in their impact upon the immediate audience. Thus when a series of
sixteen regional conferences, mainly for party workers, was held
during five months of 1921, it was recognised that
Quite apart from the immediate effect of the conferences upon our
own movement, the publicity value of these conferences hRs been
remarkable ... Each weekend we have had a pronouncement from one
of the leading members of the Party upon current problems, and we
have had an excellent show in the Sunday press each week. The
value of this as an influence upon the public mind cannot be
estimated, and the series of conferences has increased the
standing and improved the prospects of the Party throughout the
82
country.
79. Ibid.
80. NEC, Minutes of meeting with Fabian Research Department, 4
September 1918; memorandum on staff of Labour Party, April
1919.
81. LPAR 1924, 71-2; LPAR 1929, 51-2.
82. NEC, Report on Regional Conferences, 1 December 1921.
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The value of providing advance copies of speeches was appreciated
83
also by the late 1930s. If Labour continued to object strongly to
the lack of political balance in the press, it had to admit by 1939
that as regards straight reportage the situation had greatly
improved:
There has been a steady development in the amount of press
publicity obtained by the Party. Policy declarations, platform
speeches, Executive communiques and statements, new publications,
new candidatures, By-election information, Campaign activities,
and general Party work are receiving notable attention in the
84
national and provincial press.
But of course the Party remained generally far from satisfied
with the coverage it received, particularly after experiencing the
85
onslaughts of 1924 and 1931. A press of its own was seen, both
nationally and locally, as the only real solution. The Leeds Weekly 
Citizen, a local Labour paper, declared in 1919:
We remain in a state of lethargy and impotence from the press
point of view ... What is wanted is a series of Labour evening
86
newspapers, produced in the various large centres.
In the absence of a Labour national press the demand grew for a local
one, and W.W. Henderson wrote that
the local journal is the greatest force we have, or can handle,
or can build up to combat our newspaper opponents in the
87
home.
•
83. LPAR 1937, 24.
84. LPAR 1939, 87.
85. See, for example, R.B. Suthers, 'Three Blind Mice - and
Ananias', Labour Magazine, November 1931, 298-301.
86. Leeds Weekly Citizen, 10 January 1919, 2c-d.
87. Labour Organiser, January 1921.
151
In order to encourage the creation of local papers the format of the
Labour Press Service was altered in 1921 to become a four-page copy,
of which two pages were left blank for the printing of local news by
local parties, the sheet then being distributed as a local
88
newspaper. Much effort was put into stimulating local enthusiasm
for the project, which had to be locally financed, and initial
results were most encouraging. By early 1922 local Labour Party
papers, both established through the Press Service and wholly
89
independent, numbered about 55.
Yet, as with so much that the Party attempted, early hopes soon
met hard reality. The demand for such purely political, propagandist
sheets was minimal and confined solely to existing Labour supporters.
This attempt to create a new local press was also being made at the
very time that the provincial press as a whole was in sharp decline.
Even those papers that managed to survive generally only did so as
monthly editions with small circulations; the South Leeds Citizen was
issued monthly to 6,000, the Sheffield Forward to 5,000. A year after
the new Press Service had been started, it was admitted that
The Labour press development schemes formulated by the Department
have been seriously affected by the financial stringency imposed
upon the majority of local organisations in consequence of the
world-wide industrial depression ....[rendering] it much more
difficult, if not actually impracticable for local Labour Parties
90
to undertake the production of local Labour newspapers.
The scheme, which at best reached a monthly circulation of under
200,000, slowly declined, as table 2.2 indicates:
88. The Conservative Party used an identical system, as did the Co-
operative Citizen to which, after the demise of the Labour
Press Servia-6- ake, several local parties subscribed.
89. The Labour Organiser listed 55 local Labour papers between July
1921 and February 1922. It is unclear whether this was
comprehensive.
90. LPAR 1923,39.
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Table 2.2 Local Labour newspapers using the Labour Press Service as 
91
local paper, 1922 - 1925.
Year	 Weekly local Labour	 Monthlies	 Independent Papers
Papers using service
	 taking Stereo Service*
1922 4 8 8
1923 5 13 6
1924 6 4 2
1925 5 5 2
* The Stereo Service allowed independent papers to take items from
the Labour Press Service without taking block orders of the service
itself.
Indeed, by January 1924 the total number of local Labour papers was
lower then When the scheme had been started, as many of the
92
previously well established papers had also collapsed.
	 In 1926
the project was abandoned as a costly failure, and the press service
93
reverted purely to its original role.
Thereafter the Daily Herald received the Party's full attention,
with continual campaigns to boost Herald sales. Yet these campaigns
still had limited success due to the political nature of the paper,
which left it woefully unattractive by comparison with the popular
press. Labour only gained a truly national newspaper after 1930, when
Odhams, the publishers, took a major financial interest in the
Herald and turned it into the largest circulation paper in Britain,
through popularisation and the introduction of all the regular
accessories of the popular press of the period, such as gifts,
91. LPAR 1922, 46-47; 1923, 40; 1924, 71; 1925, 71.
92. Editorial, Labour Organiser, January 1924.
93. NEC, Memorandum on Labour Party Press and Publicity Department,
24 February 1926.
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competitions and insurance schemes. But by then, despite its constant
support for the Party, it had become a paper which many party
activists, who resented what was so obviously a compromise with
capitalism, believed did not always act in the Party's best
interests. Demands for greater loyalty and more political news by the
94
Herald became not uncommon.
	 Having failed to create a truly
committed press of any significance, Labour was therefore forced by
electoral necessity to adopt commercial methods, a decision which the
Labour leadership, more mindful of practical requirements than many
95
of the rank and file, accepted with some equanimity.
Like the Conservative Party Labour was determined to develop its
own direct channels of mass communication, and leafleteering and
pamphleteering were held to be vitally important, particularly
96
bearing in mind the lack of press support. In the first flush of
reorganisation in August 1918 Arthur Henderson envisaged that some 50
million leaflets for sale to the constituencies and 9 million
manifestoes for free distribution, would be necessary for the coming
97
General Election, assuming Labour contested 300 seats. 	 These
figures were out of all proportion to anything previously considered,
98
although no record survives of the numbers actually produced.
Subsequent election leaflet and manifesto statistics show that Labour
was determined to utilize mass leafleteering to the fullest possible
extent:
94. It should be added, however, that in general the Party
leadership and the majority of supporters remained happy with
the Herald's support.
95. W.W. Henderson had written in 1922: 'The chief fault of
attempts to establish Labour papers ... lies in the belief that
a paper to be a Labour paper, must necessarily contain column
after column of solid propaganda matter. What are really wanted
are successful newspapers 	 ' - Labour Organiser, April
1922.
96. See W.W. Henderson's speech to Lancashire Labour Agents,
reported in Labour Organiser, February 1926.
97. NEC, Report to Organisation Sub-Committee, 27 August 1918.
98. LPAR 1919, 29, States only that 'millions' were sold.
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Table 2.3 Labour Party General  Election leaflet and manifesto 
99
production, 1922 - 1935. 
Year Leaflets
(millions)
a
Manifestoes
(millions)
c
1922 13-15 10.0
d
1923 20.5 3.0
e
1924 21.4 6.0
f
1929 43.0 8.9b d
1931 21 5.5
1935 13.1 5.4
a. Large quantities of old leaflets were also distributed.
b. 6.6 million of these were provided free by the Federation
of Building Trades Operatives.
c. Distributed free at the expense of the General Election
Fund.
d. Sold to local parties for distribution.
e. 2 million provided free, the remainder sold. In addition
the TUC provided 2 million copies of a special appeal to
trade unionists.
f. Sold, but very heavily subsidised, with a loss to the
General election fund of £4,000.
These figures compared extremely favourably with those for the
Conservative Party, particularly if some allowance was made for the
lower total of constituencies contested by Labour. The free issue of
the manifesto in large quantities rade it a major piece of propaganda
literature in its own right, as indeed it was becoming for the
99. LPAR 1919 - 36; Reports on General Election Literature, in NEC,
1918-35.
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100
Conservatives.	 Again this centrally produced literature was
generally in addition to the candidates' own election addresses. With
up to forty different leaflets and thirty different posters there was
considerable specialisation of literature. Thus in 1923 six leaflets
were aimed at women and mothers, two at ex-service men, two to
agricultural workers, 'An appeal to teachers' was made, and two to
101
'brainworkers', in addition to many others.
Head Office also became increasingly concerned to improve both
the presentation and the distribution of its literature. Neither had
been particularly satisfactory, and during 1921 Egerton Wake, the
National Agent, had been compelled to report that, owing to the lack
of organisation of literature sales by local authorities, there was
difficulty in getting party literature into the hands of the
102
people.	 Considerable emphasis was still placed on the importance
of the more solid 'pamphlet' type of literature, which was sold
rather than distributed free, and the vain hope was to be expressed
in 1925 that it should be possible to sell a minimum of 100,000
copies of each pamphlet produced, and 500,000 of each leaflet.
Accordingly at Area organisation conferences during 1922 the local
parties were informed that it was vitally important that they appoint
literature secretaries and committees to deal with all literature
purchases and sales. Yet three years later, despite 'the great
importance of written propaganda to the Labour Movement as a means to
some extent of counteracting the hostility of a vast hostile press',
in practice 'our local dist
1
ributive machinery is neither sufficiently
03
adequate nor efficient'. 	 Head Office circulars about its
publications frequently got no further than the local agent who
100. The Report of the Central Council of the National Union of
Conservative and Unionist Associations, 1929, stated that over
8 million manifestoes were distributed for the election.
101. NEC, Circular on General Election Literature, 15 November 1923.
102 NEC, Literature, Publicity and Research Sub-Committee, 8
February 1921.
103. NEC, Memorandum on Literature Distribution, 15 January 1925.
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received them, even where a literature secretary did exist.
But although another attempt was made to urge upon local parties
the necessity of formal machinery for organising literature sales and
distribution, the situation remained much as before. Head Office was
faced with the problem of being able only to work through the
voluntary, and often obstinately and politically independent,
constituency parties, which were still in many cases merely the old
trade councils under a new name. Henderson's dream of a united, model
party organisation would take considerably longer to achieve than the
extension of the franchise for which it was intended to cater. In the
meanwhile, unlike Conservative Central Office, Labour did not have
the option of circumventing such difficulties with alternative,
capital intensive, publicity devices.
These problems, as well as the central party organisation's
ultimate ambitions, were well illustrated by the Party's 'Victory for
Socialism' campaign in 1934 and 1935. It had been reported in late
1933 that the number of local literature secretaries was still quite
inadequate, and that a proposal to provide literature on a regular
monthly basis had met with a very poor response. Nevertheless the NEC
decided that if Labour was to make an impression in the next election
it would have to undertake a long term national campaign, both to104
revive its local organisations and to publicise its policies.
This was certainly necessary, for although in by-elections the
position of the Party wns showing a considerable improvement, its
organisation and financial situation were still precarious. In 1932
104. Head Office tentatively adopted the opinion that the election
would be held in autumn 1935 or spring 1936, and by October
1934 was sufficiently confident of this estimate to warn all
local parties to prepare for an election the following autumn.
The funds of the Victory for Socialism campaign were budgeted
to be fully expended by October 1935. Far from being unprepared
for the 1935 election, as it later claimed, Labour had been
preparing for it for at least a year, although its leadership
problems, and the sharp timing of the election only two weeks
after the Municipal elections, to which the Party also attached
great importance, led to immediate pre-election difficulties
for it.
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it had had to draw on special reserve funds in order to remain
solvent, and had reduced staff salaries by five per cent.Throughout
the country the Party was seriously affected by the economic crisis.
The By-Election Insurance Fund, set up in January 1933 in order to
subsidise by-elections from regular contributions by all local
parties, failed once to achieve solvency before 1935, an indication
of the inability of large numbers of local parties even to raise
their incomes by the few pounds (7/6d per by-election) necessary for
105
this new expense.	 By February 1934 the Party had not yet reached
the stage where income balanced liabilities, and the Finance and
General Purposes Sub-Committee of the NEC forecast a deficit of
106
nearly £3,000 that year.
With a much reduced force of Agents - 136 in October 1935
107
compared with 169 in April 1929 	 - the Party had to reinvigorate
and organise its local associations more than ever. Accordingly in
October 1933 the NEC announced its 'Victory for Socialism' campaign,
the stated aim of which was to double the Labour electorate and to
increase its parliamentary representation from 51 to 400 M.P.s. At
least £50,000 would be required for the campaign, which was not to be
proceeded with unless £5,000 had been already obtained or assured.
105. NEC, Final Report of the Economy Committee, 17 January 1933;
Report on the first year of the By-Election Insurance Fund, 24
January 1934, in which it was declared: 'Parties are in the
main anxious to meet their dues under the fund and realise
their obligations; only their own financial difficulties
prevent prompter payment'; Financial report for 1934, 23
January 1935.
106. NEC, Finance and General Purposes Sub-Committee, 21 February
1934. The power of the trade unions over the Party was made
particularly evident in this context. The projected deficit was
in large measure due to the T.G.W.U.'s decision to withold
£2,000 in affiliation fees in order to express its loss of
confidence in the NEC's promotion of the Unions' political
interests. This decision was in turn mainly the result of the
NEC's imposition of Arthur Henderson as a parliamentary
candidate upon the Clay Cross Labour Party, thereby violating
traditional local party independence, and overriding the prior
claims of the nominee of an affiliated body.
107. National Council of Labour (NCL) Minutes series, Report of
monthly activities of the TUC, NEC, and PLP, 25 February 1936.
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£20,000 was to come from the constituency parties by means of a
monthly payment of 35/-, in return for which Head Office would
provide a supply of leaflets 'in a style to attract attention and
108
influence opinion'	 , sufficient for 'carrying a monthly Socialist
109
Message into every home in the land'.	 It was believed that
A systematic distribution of literature month by month leading up
to the next General Election will have a profound effect on
110
public opinion.
Such a scheme would indeed have constituted a unique and
impressive method of mass political communication had it been fully
implemented. But of this the local parties were quite incapable. For
the campaign as a whole the first £5,000 still had not been raised by
March 1934, despite the offer from Odhams Press of free provision of
one million leaflets a month for six months, a gift to the value of
111
£1,000.	 Moreover, of the 581 constituency parties sent details
of the literature scheme in October, 366 had not replied by March, 56
had found themselves financially unable to take part, 36 had declared
that they could only participate a 1a lower monthly contribution, and
1
only 85 had accepted in full. 	 Although it was decided to
introduce a graduated scale of contributions, only 48 more parties
had entered the scheme by this means by the time it started in May
1934. Instead of the £10-12,000 annual income hoped for, allowing a
monthly message to be issued to every one of the eight million
working mens' dwellings in the country, only £2,200 per annum could
be expected, permitting the publication of just over one million
leaflets each month. By September the number of co-operating parties
108. NEC, Circular on Victory for Socialism Campaign, 3 October
1933.
109. LPAR 1934, 49.
110. NEC, Circular on Victory for Socialism Campaign, 3 October
1933.
111. NEC, Minutes, 1 March 1934.
112. Ibid.
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had doubled, yet the monthly issue rose only to 1.7 million leaflets,
the majority of these inevitably being taken by the financially
sounder parties for use in areas which were already Labour
113
strongholds.	 Indeed by November 44 parties had had to leave the
scheme, mainly because of financial difficulties, and the total
114
number of bodies taking part was beginning to decline.
Recognising this the NEC appealed to stronger parties to
subsidise backward constituencies who could not otherwise take part,
but only two parties and three individual party members
115
responded.	 Through the assistance of the former, Head Office was
able to supply 2000 leaflets a month to ten backward constituencies
and, with Odhams' gift as well, some 402 constituencies received some
literature during the seventeen months of the campaign. But few had
been able to undertake the regular, blanket distribution originally
envisaged, and the total of 26 million leaflets issued in this period
represented only 1.5 million a month, mostly to the same
constituencies. When W.W. Henderson came to analyse the results of
the 1935 General Election with reference to those constituencies
which had taken part in the 'Victory for Socialism' literature scheme
(and it is interesting that he contemplated such an analysis), he had
116
to admit that the results were 'inconclusive'.
	 Harry Drinkwater,
editor of the Labour Organiser, was more damning. He declared that
large numbers of leaflets had remained undistributed and that the
'Victory for Socialism' campaign had been an almost unmitigated
failure. The Party's local organisational strength, membership and
113. LPAR 1934, 54. In May 1934 1,088,750 leaflets were isued to 151
parties, an average of 7,210 per party. In September 1,707,500
were issued to 308 parties, an average to the new co-operating
parties of only 3,941, assuming numbers issued to the original
parties remained constant. Clearly the rise in co-operating
parties was only possible because they made use of lower scales
of contribution.
114. NEC, Report on Victory for Socialism Campaign, 13 November
1934.
115. LPAR 1935, 46.
116. NEC, Research and Publicity Committee, 19 December 1935.
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finances were still quite inadequate for such leaflet distribution,
the propaganda value of which, in any case, he considered to be
small. Such a direct approach to the elector would not work:
few persons are convinced by frontal attacks, but millions more
by other means more subtle and more comforting to the
117
convert.
Unlike the Conservative Party Labour retained its faith in
leafleteering.It did so because it recognised it as the only way of
reaching the large section of the electorate who did not read a
Labour paper or attend political meetings, and because it still saw
its problem as financial rather than as a lack of local voluntary co-
operation and enthusiasm. Given improved finances it was confident
that it could create an effective method of mass propaganda through
mass literature distribution, and W. W. Henderson wrote in 1936 that
such schemes should no longer be of short duration, in 'campaigns'.
Instead,
Phases of effort which hitherto have generally been regarded as
"special efforts" must now be regarded as part of the normal
118
activities of the party.
Certainly it had greatly improved its literature system by 1939 - a
Literature Circulation Officer had been appointed, over 800 local
literature secretaries existed and leaflet distribution had risen to
6.3 million in 1937 and 6.6 million in 1938, not least because of the
119
Party's Spain Campaign.
	 But this still represented a regular
monthly issue of no more than 550,000 leaflets to only 170
constituency parties, again largely those which were already
organisationally strong. Dislike for and doubt as to the worth of
117. Editorial article, 'The Victory for Socialism Campaign - Did it
Fail?', Labour Organiser, November 1935. Internal evidence
indicates author.
118. NEC, Memorandum on the Literature Campaign, 21 May 1936.
119. LPAR 1937, 59; 1938, 85.
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Summerbell also gave considerable help to local parties by preparing
125
suitable layouts for election addresses, leaflets and posters.
Much thought went into the presentation of the 'Victory for
Socialism' monthly message:
In view of the fact that the central aim of the scheme is to make
a special approach to the millions of people who are not
Socialists, it was decided that in the first part of the Campaign
we should concentrate on a particular method of approach rather
than rely upon variety of appeal ... the first monthly message
... is simple, direct, and capable of arousing sympathy, as the
first step towards creating conviction and enlisting active
12B
support.
For the 1935 General Election the NEC, possibly with the National
Publicity Bureau's 'Popular Illustrated' in mind, sanctioned the
production of a sixteen page illustrated broadsheet entitled 'What
Socialism Will Really Mean to You', in a popular style for general
127
distribution.
	
Although it had a limited issue of 237,000, Head
Office was excited by the possibilities revealed. When, therefore,
Labour's new 'National Campaign' in 1937 provided another
opportunity, it produced 'Your Britain', a sixteen page 'pictorial
presentation' of "Labour's Immediate Programme" in colour and
photogravure. As the Party's annual report remarked:
The wording, type, and lay-out of leaflets and posters have been
considered with the greatest care, pictures have been extensively
included, whilst in "Your Britain" we have introduced a new
technique in national political publicity of which every member
innumerable occasions, usually with a Herald advertisement on
the reverse, particularly for the annual agricultural
campaigns.
125. Summerbell's advertised regularly in the Labour Organiser 
during the 1920s.
126. NEC, Report on Victory for Socialism. Campaign, 25 April 1934.
127. LPAR 1936, 80.
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of the Party can be proud 
28
.... "YourrBritain" marks a turning
1
point in Party literature.
In format it resembled Picture Post and was indeed a most attractive
and popularly styled magazine. Once again, however, party hopes
suffered a set-back because of economic reality. Such a production
was only possible if it was sold rather than distributed free.
Although one million copies of 'Your Britain' No. I were printed,
only 750,000 were sold in eighteen months. Subsequent issues in 1938
and 1939 on 'Your Peace', 'Farming and Food' and the Municipal
Elections, had sales of 580,000, 240,000, and 590,000 respectively,
figures which in other respects were good for political literature
129
which had to be sold.
Labour publicists were evidently as anxious as Conservative to
attract people's attention and to use every possible means to put
across their message. Posters were seen as particularly potent.
Desiring to follow up the great success of the famous pre-war
inspirational poster 'Forward! The Day is Breaking', by Gerald
Spencer Pryse, the Party commissioned the same artist in 1921 to
130
produce new posters.	 The well-known cartoonists Will Dyson of
the Daily Herald and Low of the Star, were also asked to advise and
produce designs, and apparently remained closely concerned with the
131
pictorial work of the Party for many years.	 Sizes were mainly
double crown, although when a new poster scheme was introduced in
132
1920, 8-sheets were also employed on a limited scale. 	 Thus in
preparation for the 1922 and 1923 elections, in addition to eight
.28. LPAR 1937, 21, 23.
129. LPAR 1939, 84-85.
130. NEC,	 Literature,
November 1921.
Publicity and Research Sub-Committee, 24
131. NEC,	 Literature,
October 1920.
Publicity and Research Sub-Committee, 13
132. NEC,	 Literature,
December 1920.
Publicity and Research Sub-Committee, 28
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letterpress posters (including one with the slogan 'Safety First:
Vote Labour and we shall have Safety all the time'), there were
eleven coloured pictorial posters ranging from double-crown to 3-
panel posters - three complementary pictures, probably double or quad
crown, which produced one large poster, as in 'Yesterday', 'Today',
133
and 'Tomorrow'.	 Both in 1923 and 1924 the football analogy was
used in posters depicting Labour footballers winning through, to the
captions 'Use Your Head! Support your own team and vote Labour', and
'Labour versus the Rest'. By 1935 the value of children on posters
had long been appreciated, and a photographed poster appeared that
year of two young children appealing 'Vote Labour and Give us a
134
Chance'.	 The two most notorious political posters of the 1930s
were both produced by Labour; one, depicting a baby wearing a gas
mask, raised such a protest from National Government candidates in
1935 that it was boycotted by several billposting firms, who refused
135
to display it despite financial loss.	 The second, entitled 'War
- Sower and Reaper', and in use from 1933 onwards, was equally
powerful, as an advertisement for it in Labour Organiser indicated:
Death, white-skulled and shrouded in black, sows with one claw-
like hand the seeds of war - tanks, machine-guns, aeroplanes,
poison gas - and with a scythe in the other, rapaciously reaps
the harvest of mangled young bodies, and of poisoned old ones in
devastated cities. The whole of the background is flaming colour
136
lighted by the fires of war.
All of these posters, however, were double-crown.
The particular emotional value of poster advertisement was used
to the full, and consciously so. In the pages of the Party's
133. NEC, Circular for General Election literaiure, 15 November
1923.
134. These posters are all kept at the Labour Party Archives.
135. NEC, Research and Publicity Committee, 16 April 1936.
136. Labour Organiser, October 1933.
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organisational journal, Labour Organiser, protestations as to
Labour's purely rational methods of political education were less
apparent than in more public papers, and Harry Drinkwater, the
Editor, admitted in July 1937 that
Few posters put across a reasoned case, or make an appeal to
reason. They are mostly an appeal to impulse, sometimes to
passion, occasionally to hate .... A strict moralist would, we
137
think, rule out the poster from political propaganda.
He nevertheless recommended that the Party do all it could to develop
its poster work further. He was only reasserting what had been
advocated even more openly in an article by a party agent in 1921:
A vast number of the electorate have little inclination to reason
out political questions for themselves. They are swayed by
impulses, prejudices, and catchwords. It is therefore necessary
to put our point of view in as simple and striking a manner as
possible, so that the man in the street may receive impressions
that will influence his thoughts and induce him to support our
13
cause at the polling booth.
Election figures for poster issue were as shown in Table 2.4:
137. Ibid., July 1937.
138. Ibid., March 1921.
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Table 2.4 Labour Party General Election poster issue, 1922-1935.
Posters
a
1922 204,695
1923 86,000
1924 244,000
1929 311,000
1931 80,000
1935 205,110
a. Posters issued between 30 June 1922 and 30 April 1923,
mostly at election.
b. In addition large numbers of old posters were issued.
139. LPAR 1922-1936; Reports on General Election. literature 1922-
1935, contained in NEC papers.
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Once again these figures bear comparison with those of the
Conservative Party, the lower figures being partly explicable by the
lower number of constituencies contested. By 1934 the Party was also
beginning to use 16-sheet pictorial posters, although billboard hire
charges prevented wides
14
pread use, and poster sizes did not approach
those used by the NPB.
It is evident that had it had sufficient funds the National
Executive would have considered undertaking large scale advertising
on commercial lines, just as did the National Publicity Bureau. In
1929 estimates were received, presumably from advertising firms, for
141
a poster and advertising scheme on a large scale'.
	 Although the
cost of £105,000 put it well beyond the Party's capabilities, the NEC
did authorise the Elections Sub-Committee
to proceed with a Publicity Scheme on a large scale, if the
142
financial situation permits.
Again in 1935 it was reported that a scheme for large scale newspaper
advertising during the General Election period was being prepared by
140. NJC, Report on Campaign for Peace and Freedom, 23 March 1934.
141. NEC, Minutes, 26 April 1929.
•
142. Ibid.. This was in response to Arthur Henderson's request for
authorisation to spend up to £15,000 on a last minute appeal to
electors.
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an advertising firm, but that costs would be prohibitive.
Attempts in 1932 and 1933 to develop a scheme for the regular
provision of 'wayside posters' to constituencyerties also met with
1
little success through lack of local response.
In consequence the Party's inter-election use of posters remained
erratic. In some years none were produced or sold by Head Office,
although in a few constituencies locally organised posters were
displayed. Thus at Bermondsey and Romford in 1936-37 the local
parties erected 200 and 300 double-crown poster boards respectively,
outside branch and union headquarters and the homes of party workers,
thereby avoiding the commercial renting of sites. Head Office adopted
the idea and estimated that it should be feasible for a constituency
to have a regular display of 100 posters for an initia1 outlay of £18
45
for boards, and a monthly cost of 15/- for posters.
	 These were
expenses which many local parties could have afforded, yet few
pursued the idea until 1938-39, when Head Office's sales of posters
rose greatly as a result of renewed Head Office encouragement and
increased campaign activity. This dilatory approach indicated not a
lack of interest in poster use, but rather an unthinking belief that
143. NEC, Research and Publicity Committee, 21 March 1935. Not
surprisingly, when in 1936 a scheme was proposed by a Labour
candidate for publicity estimated at £250,000 per annum, it was
also rejected, but not before the Party Secretary, J.S.
Middleton, had discussed the proposal with his - Research and
Publicity Committee, 16 April 1936; A conference resolution in
1936 recommending the establishment of an advisory committee of
'experts' on press, publicity, research and public speaking,
was similarly withdrawn after the NEC agreed to discuss the
proposal with its sponsor - Annual Conference minutes, 216.
Herbert Morrison, however, did make use of the voluntary
services of such advertising and public relations professions
for the 1937 L.C.C. elections and thereafter - see footnote 267
below.
144. NEC, Research and Publicity Committee, 19 January 1932. Of
6,000 organisations circulated with details of this scheme only
159 replied, with the sale of 879 double-crown posters;
Research and Publicity Committee, 20 April 1932, 16 March 1934.
145. M. Hackett, 'Points on Poster publicity', Labour Organiser,
November 1937.
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such forms of publicity were unfortunately too expensive, as indeed
they would have been if commercial billboards and large-size posters
had been used. As we shall see with regard to the use of
propagandists, and as was to some extent the case with leafleteering,
disillusionment at the lack of party resources sometimes led local
parties to do far less than they might have in these areas of
publicity. Instead they concentrated on the frequent organisation of
local meetings, a cheap, locally initiated and traditional method of
propaganda.
Lack of money and of local support were the problems with which
centrally organised Labour mass propaganda had continually to
contend. Even where constituency support was sufficient to provide
some financial assistance for a particular method of publicity it was
rarely enough to allow Head Office to develop the system to a level
adequate for comprehensive national coverage. This was the case with
regard to the Party's use of full-time professional propagandists. In
September 1921 a proposal had been made for the appointment of nine
full-time propagandists, one for each organisational area. Head
Office had also improved its list of available voluntary speakers
and made arrangements with selected M.P.s for assistance in filling
146
speaking engagements.
	 The national organisation had not
previously been particularly efficient in this respect, for in 1919 a
group of local Labour parties had suggested the creation of a Head
147
Office bureau for the booking of party speakers.
	 Financial
difficulties, however, again prevented the full implementation of
these plans. Only three propagandists were appointed, the reduction
being the result, as the National Agent stated,
of the necessity of safeguarding the financial position of the
148
Party arising through the present economic depression.
146. NEC, Minutes, 6 September 1921, 18 October 1921.
147. NEC, Minutes, 2-3 April 1919.
148. NEC, Report on propaganda, 1 December 1921.
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He reported the valuable work that the three were doing, each one
generally spending a week in one constituency, addressing up to two
meetings a day:
by this means the remote part of the divisions have been opened
up and public interest created, and organisation stimulated, in a
149
way that would have been impossible without this assistance.
It should be added that Labour propagandists were not infrequently
also prospective candidates, and probably of a rather higher calibre
in general than those of the opposing Conservative army. Yet despite
the excellent reports which Head Office continually received, and
150
despite the high regard in which propagandising was held , the
number of propagandists employed in the 1920s never exceeded four
151
and had been reduced by natural wastage to two in June 1929. 	 The
scheme to arrange M.P.'s speaking tours had also been seriously
152
curtailed.	 .Indeed, except for specific campaigns and for by-
elections, when Head Office used every available speaker, the
national organisation of speakers throughout the 1920s remained
surprisingly haphazard for a party so concerned with the spoken word.
Not until 1929 was a Propaganda Officer appointed to co-ordinate the
-153
Party's spoken propaganda.
Yet the spoken word was undoubtedly the most popular of the
Party's methods of proselytisat ion. We have already seen that to a
considerable extent the character of the Party organisation was
determined from its local and industrial elements, and there can be
no doubt that at this level a strong belief remained in the value of
149. Ibid.
150. See, for example, NEC, Report on Propagandists, 16 July 1924.
151. Two temporary propagandists were also appointed for the
duration of the 1922 election campaign.
152. NEC, Report on propaganda, c. 2 May 1922 (contained in NEC,5
April 1922).
153. NEC, Office Arrangements Committee, 16 July 1929.
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the campaign, the public meeting and the mass demonstration. Such
frequent and vociferous display of the unity and solidarity of the
Labour Movement made an impressive show for participants and
opponents alike, and certainly acted as a catalyst to the Movement's
constituent parts. It stimulated organisation and encouraged
voluntary participation.
The conclusions of recent studies of local party organisation
during this period, for example in the East Midlands and Yorkshire,
are significant in that they indicate far greater Labour than
154
Conservative propaganda activity on a local voluntary basis.
P.R. Shorter's finding that 'the bulk of the work [of campaigning and
propagandising] was done by the D.L.P.s themselves' shows clearly
where the real strength of the Labour Party lay, in its voluntary
155
workers.	 The NEC recognised this fact and geared its main
efforts to meeting the propaganda requirements of local party workers
through a whole range of national campaigns and demonstrations in
which organisational conferences and mass demonstrations addressed by
national figures would be used to stimulate local parties to ever
more local meetings, demonstrations and canvassing. Many campaigns
promoted specific policies, such as the Mines for the Nation campaign
of 1919, the Trade Union Defence campaign of 1927, the campaign
against Unemployment Assistance Board Regulations (1935), for
Holidays with Pay (1937), Anti-Hitler and anti-Fascist campaigns
(1934) and the Spain Campaign (1937-39). Others took the form of
regular Individual Membership campaigns, and campaigns designed to
raise interest in the Party generally, such as the Call to Action,
Victory for Socialism, and Labour's National campaigns of 1932 to
1939. At their best they could be most impressive. During the six
weeks of the Mines for the Nation campaign 86 centrally organised
demonstrations were held, with participants varying from only 120 to
7,500, as a result of which considerable press publicity was
obtained. Following these, large numbers of local meetings were held
154. P.R. Shorter, Op. Cit., 123-128; B.C. Barker, Op. Cit., 237-8.
155. P.R. Shorter, Op. Cit., 125.
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and no less than 15 million leaflets systematically distributed by
local workers, at the expense of 
t115
e 6Labour Party Central Fund, the
TUC and the Miners' Federation. Although such large scale
leafleteering was never again achieved outside an election, the
campaign itself was typical. Concentrated nation-wide effort was felt
to be more effective and was certainly more impressive than
continuous but isolated propagandising. As a circular for the 1934
Victory for Socialism campaign remarked, a campaign should be one
not of isolated and unconnected efforts, but of organised and co-
ordinated activities in which every unit will feel and know
itself an essential and related part of a great co-operative
157
undertaking.
With such an emphasis on propaganda through the meetings of local
parties, the success or otherwise of which went mostly unrecorded, it
is difficult to assess the impact of these campaigns. The statistics
for numbers of meetings organised were certainly impressive. In the
autumn and winter campaign of 1932 it was hoped that the total number
158
of meetings would approach 2,000 , whilst for the six-month Call
to Action campaign the following year 1,200 meetings were addressed
by 500 volunteer and MP speakers booked through Head Office, and a
further 800 meetings by speakers from the local speakers panels which
159
Head Office was encouraging County Federations to organise.
Meetings in the Campaign against the Unemployment Board Assistance
160
Regulations in 1935 numbered 'some thousands' , and during
Labour's National Campaign a Socialist Crusade Week, in September
1937, and a Peace and Security Week, the following March, contained
156. NEC, Report on Mines for the Nation Campaign, undated (c. 25
February 1920).
157. NEC, Circular on Victory for Socialism, 3 October 1933.
158. NJC, Report of activities of TUC, NEC, and PLP, 22 November
1922.
159. LPAR 1933, 25.
160. LPAR 1935, 26.
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2,000 and 1,000 meetings respectively.
	 It is perhaps
significant, however, that the campaign against the Trade Disputes
Bill in 1927, Which Egerton Wake described as 'probably wider than
any previous effort made by the movement', was judged by J.C.C.
Davidson, the Conservative Party Chairman, to be a
62
complete fiasco',
1
and that it indeed met with little success.
	 The Peace and
Freedom campaign of 1934 was an admitted failure, and the Victory for
Socialism campaign was in almost every respect disappointing. Not
2,000 but 5,000 meetings had been hoped for in the 1937 Socialist
163
Crusade Week.
Moreover, although campaigning was in general deemed to be
effective, local response inevitably varied greatly throughout the
country according to the pre-existing strength of the local
organisation. In the Peace and Freedom campaign, whose vital tssk it
was to refute Conservative accusations of Labour's 'totalitarian'
tendencies, 21 public meetings arranged to stimulate local propaganda
had mixed success. In some areas such as Newport, Swansea,
Huddersfield, Lincoln, Burnley and Reading, attendances were
considered to be good (although even at these numbers rarely exceeded
1,000, the maximum being 1,200). Elsewhere, despite considerable
advance publicity through advertisements in the local press,
circulars to local union branches and double crown and 16-sheet
posters, attendances were 'very unsatisfactory' (Birmingham),
'disappointing' (Leeds), 'small' (Bristol), 'no marked enthusiasm'
(Southampton), a 'complete fiasco' (Newcastle-on-Tyne), and two
164
meetings had to be cancelled from lack of support.
In all such campaigns activity was weakest where it was most
161. Labour Organiser, February 1938; NJC, Report of activities of
TUC, NEC and PLP, 22 March 1938.
162. NEC, National Agent's Report, 20 June 1927; R.R. James,
Op.Cit., 297.
163. Politics in Review, 4 (1937), 123.
164. NJC, Report on campaign for Peace and Freedom, 23 April 1934.
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needed, precisely because they depended so heavily on local support.
Local organisational enthusiasm was widely seen as the only possible
key to the problem, and in consequence those rural areas where it was
almost wholly absent received much attention from the NEC. In early
1925 Head Office had identified 'The Real Problem' for electoral
success as being the 192 County Divisions in which Labour did not
hold a single seat, and at the Annual Conference three resolutions
had demanded increased rural propaganda,
as we consider that there will never be a Labour majority in
165
Parliament until this is done.
Egerton Wake agreed:
a Labour majority in the House of Commons cannot be secured until
166
Labour wins a proportion of the county divisions ...
Already the Party's propagandists had been concentrating on the rural
areas, and from 1927 onwards the Party carried on a regular annual
agricultural campaign, intended primarily to encourage the
development of local organisation. Financed from a special
agricultural fund the campaign consisted of propaganda weeks in
twenty to thirty constituencies each year, with leaflet distribution,
an organisation conference and a public demonstration. Yet these
efforts met with little obvious success. In 1934, for example,
audiences at the 15 conferences ranged from 25 to 120, the latter
being London. Several divisions actually rejected offers to
167
participate in the campaign as being of no practical value. 	 Only
in 1937-38 did the Agricultural Campaign Committee raise sufficient
165. NEC, Head Office report to Organisation .
 Sub-Committee, 21
Janmry 1925; Organisation Sub-Committee 21 May 1925.
166. NEC, Memorandum on Agricultural Campaign, 22 November 1926.
167. NEC, Agricultural Campaign Committee, 16 April 1934; Report on
Agricultural Campaign, 20 December 1934.
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funds to expand its effort to a reasonable extent, covering 78 areas
with loudspeaker vans, holding over 2,000 meetings and distributing
nearly 500,000 leaflets in the 1938 season. As with so much that had
been achieved in the two years before the war, the fruits of the
Party's labours would only be reaped in 1945.
The emphasis upon the spoken word, by which the Labour rank and
file traditionally placed great store, and which possessed the
advantages of cheapness, maximum group involvement and show, was
reflected in the NEC's continuing efforts to co-ordinate general
spoken work propaganda nationally. During the 1920s as we have seen,
the central party organisation had been unable to contribute as much
as it desired to this fundamental aspect of Labour propaganda.
Nevertheless the staff propagandists visited up to 50 constituencies
each for a week in any one year, whilst for by-elections large
numbers of MPs and party leaders were sent by Head Office, though
usually only to address one evening meeting each. Thus 22 MPs,
including MacDonald, spoke at Stowbridge in 1927, whilst in 1930 36
attended West Fulham, together with eight party agents drafted in
from other constituencies. Cabinet ministers were not exempt from
this duty, and J.R. Clynes, the Home Secretary 168
together with 19
fellow MPs, spoke at Shipley in the same year. These were, of
course, all indoor meetings, and it must be noted that even here, in
a form of propaganda in which Labour prided itself, it was frequently
169
outgunned by its Conservative opponents.	 Similarly the National
Agent was forced to admit later in 1930 that
It had been noticeable in recent By-elections that opposing
parties have surpassed our efforts in the open air meetings. This
is due to the very large number of professional speakers in the
170
employment of the Conservative and Liberal organisations.
168. NEC, By-Election Reports, 23 February 1927, 20 May 1930, 27
October 1930.
169. See page 50 above.
170. NEC, Paddington By-Election, 26 November 1930.
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This fact, however, only emphasised for him the lesson that 'the day
of street meetings is by no means over'.
Labour responded as well as it could with 47 MPs and other
speakers for indoor meetings at East Islington in February 1931, in
171
addition to 'a large number ' for open air work.
	
The newly
appointed propaganda officer, Morgan Phillips, was also at last
bringing order to the organisation of centrally co-ordinated spoken
propaganda, and in 1930 arranged 839 enNements for MPs, expenses
being paid by the engaging body. Even here financial
difficulties were encountered, however, for although Head Office was
particularly anxious to encourage rural and marginal constituencies
to take speakers, local parties frequently rejected them on the
grounds that they could not even pay expenses. There was often more
to such rejections than lack of money. Many local parties saw little
value in taking an outside speaker, and little hope of attracting the
unconverted elector to such meetings unless it was a cabinet minister
173
or party leader, and so turned down offers of anyone else.
With the decimation of Labour's parliamentary ranks in the 1931
General Election, however, the Party found itself with large numbers
of ex-MPs available for use as propagandists at comparatively cheap
rates. Although the two full-time propagandists had to be dismissed
in 1932 because of the Party's financial difficulties, Head Office
arranged part-time employment in the same year for eighteen ex-MPs,
and nearly 1,000 meetings were thereby given at little expense to the
174
constituencies.
	
For the Victory for Socialism Campaign the Party
employed eleven temporary propagandists, several of whom were
171. NEC, Report on East Islington By-Election, 24 February 1931.
172. LPAR 1930, 6.
173. This was a continuing problem - NEC, Report on Propaganda
activities, 22 January 1936, and J. Cutter, 'Those
Propagandists', Labour Organiser, March 1936.
174. NEC, Report on propaganda and speakers' engagements, 27 April
1932; LPAR 1932, 29.
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prospective parliamentary candidates, for six months, later extended
to the General Election. Of these the five who were not returned to
Parliament in 1935 were retained. By the mid-1930s, moreover, Head
Office co-ordination of voluntary speakers was at last proving its
potential. From 1931 onwards local party requests for speakers, both
via Head Office and from the regional speakers' panels, increased each
year, and by 1938 the Propaganda Department was supplying over 8,000
175
speakers annually.
In practice, therefore, the Labour Party continued predominantly
to use traditional methods of propaganda. Yet although its financial
situation precluded the use of propaganda techniques which were
essentially capital intensive, it was just as anxious to make use of
the new technology of film, loudspeaker, gramophone and radio as was
the Conservative. Despite the (for Labour) considerable cost of £350,
MacDonald, himself the Party's most valuable electioneering asset in
the early 1920s, was provided with a Marconiphone loudspeaker van for
176
a seven day tour in 1924.	 Subsequently, in September 1928, the
Research and Publicity Sub-Committee of the NEC investigated the
possibility of purchasing portable loudspeakers. But although it was
somewhat optimistically agreed to recommend purchase to the local
177
parties, Head Office was itself unable to bear the expenditure.
In 1929 the NEC 's interest was aroused by the use of relay systems by
the Liberal and Conservative Parties for transmitting speeches
simultaneously to several towns. But, with a caution born of the
desire to use the Party's limited financial resources in the most
effective manner, the NEC agreed with Arthur Henderson that reports
on the Liberal relay from the Albert Hall
were not sufficiently satisfactory to warrant a similar relay for
175. LPAR 1939, 69.
176. NEC, Finance Sub-Committee, 24 November 1924.
177. NEC, Research and Publicity Committee, 2 November 1928.
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the Party's demonstration.
By late 1933, however, the use of loudspeakers by the other
parties, particularly at by-elections, could not be left unanswered.
Already that year, for the first time, loudspeakers had been used at
the May Day demonstration in Hyde Park, the speakers almost
symbolically being united as a result to speak from the same
amplified dais, where previously they had spoken simultaneously from
179	 '
a large number of platforms scattered throughout the Park.
	 The
Research and Publicity Committee realized that, although occasionally
180
a van had been hired by a local party for a by-election , more
permanent arrangements were necessary, and accordingly a sub-
committee was established 'to go into the qu
1
estion
81
	of mechanical
apparatus of all kinds for election purposes'.
	 It was recognised
that
The loudspeaker has become an essential
182
 part of modern
electioneering and mass propaganda equipment,
and once again local parties were circularised with details of a
183
suitable portable system.
178. NEC, Minutes, 26 March 1929.
179. NJC, Minutes, 25 April 1933. The value of this did not escape
Party organisers: 'It was very noticeable that the crowds did
not wander as they did at the February demonstration, but were
held by the amplifiers' - NJC, Report on May Day demonstration,
23 May 1933.
180. For example, at Kilmarnock in October to November 1933, and at
Rutland and Stamford in December 1933.
181. NEC, Research and Publicity Committee, 16 November 1933.
182. LPAR 1934, 48.
183. NEC Minutes, 1 March 1934; Research and Publicity Committee 25
June 1934. The Party's very limited experience with such
apparatus was demonstrated on this latter occasion when for the
first time it encountered the problem of fees to the Performing
Rights Society, for playing music over loudspeakers.
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The response was significant. Within a year over 100 of the
portable loudspeaker sets recommended had been bought by Labour
Parties and Co-operative Societies, and 150 by November 1935, in
184
addition to many systems purchased from other firms. 	 The Labour 
Organiser believed that in this respect Labour had been as well
185
equipped as its opponents at the 1935 General Election. 	 Although
it must be assumed once again that equipment was purchased
principally by the more wealthy parties and co-operatives, it was
notable that so many had found the not inconsiderable sum required
for a loudspeaker (c.£30 - 40), yet that only 85 had in the same year
consented to pay 35/- a month for 'Victory for Socialism' leaflets.
The NEC's difficulty in gaining local co-operation was not merely a
question of local finances; traditional local party independence
continued to assert itself in preferences for specific types of
propaganda, above all the spoken word and the public meeting.
Although many party members proved unwilling to deliver party
literature and argued that it was not read, they retained a faith in
the public meeting and hence the loudspeaker. This faith was derived
from the traditional place of speaking in non-conformist and Labour
circles, from the greater appearance of show, size and class
solidarity to be gained from a meeting, from the greater local
independence provided by locally organised meetings than by centrally
produced propaganda and from the proven effectiveness of
Conservative and Liberal loudspeaker use in gaining attention.
By contrast with this development of local loudspeaker use in the
better organised areas, Head Office's attempts to provide equipment
for backward areas met with only gradual success. Although the
purchase of loudspeaker systems for general use was considered in
1934 only one set was acquired, for use specifically in the Party's
186
annual agricultural campaign.	 Only in 1937 did the success of
184. Labour Organiser, July 1935; November 1935. By May 1936 over
250 sets had been purchased from Film Industries Ltd., the
recommended firm - Labour Organiser, May 1936.
185. Ibid., Jan-nary 1936.
186. NBC, Agricultural Campaign Committee, 17 May 1934.
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this apparatus induce the Agricultural Campaign Committee to purchse
a proper loudspeaker van, Which was used at over 500 meetings in the
twenty divisions visited that year. It was declared that
This type of propaganda, used with care, and with due regard to
local circumstances, is the most potent, as well as the most
economical means yet adopted by the Committee to convey Labour's
187
message to the countryside.
The following year three more vans were acquired for the agricultural
campaign, whilst in the South West a 'Bristol and District Propaganda
Association' was formed in order to purchase a loudspeaker van for
use in agricultural, Spanish, and council by-election campaigns in
188
the surrounding constituencies.	 The situation was clearly
improving in the last two years before the war, no doubt largely as a
result of the Party's reviving financial position, although Head
Office still had only five vans at its disposal.
The gramophone was another propaganda weapon thit party organisers
considered. Widespread admiration in the British Labour Party for the
achievements and organisation of the German Social Democratic Party
had been reflected in publicity in 1928 when the Press and Publicity
Department of Head Office requested of the S.D.P. details of its
electioneering methods. It wn-q informed that the 'so-called American
form' of election propaganda was widely used and that 'election soap'
(with slogans set into it), balloons bearing the inscription 'Vote
S.D.P.', and six aeroplanes to scatter leaflets from the air were
used. Also
cinematographs on lorries were very successful, going from place
to place with an S.D. election film. In the same way the speeches
of well known party leaders and the battle song of the workers on
187. LPAR 1937, 33.
188. NCL, Report of activities of TUC, NEC, and PLP, 21 June 1938,
26 July 1938; LPAR 1939, 69.
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gramophone records were broadcast by means of loudspeakers.
Samples of soap, music and speech records and the election film were
sent, and the Research and Publicity Committee agreed iinnediately to
investigate the possibilities of records and films. Initial
enquiries, however, persuaded the committee that the propaganda value
of records would not warrant the financial outlay involved, and the
190
matter was temporarily dropped.
	 Only the late offer by a firm td
produce such records on a commercial basis, at its own expense, made
it possible for the Party to proceed with recordings by MacDonald,
Snowden, Thomas, Henderson and Margaret Bondfield, and in practice
191
less than 9,000 were sold.
	
	 Although W.W. Henderson
2
 reported to
19
MacDonald that the records had been a great success , the Party
showed little further interest in actually investing in a propaganda
medium of such obviously limited use. Only in 1934 was the gramophone
again considered, and although the Research and Publicity Committee
enthusinstically recommended the investment of £500 in records, the
scheme was rejected on the grounds that the Party was unlikely to
193
sell the 10,000 copies necessary to break even.
	 A firm which
agreed to produce records of Labour songs such as 'The Red Flag', the
'Internationale' and 'England! Arise', soon found itself in financial
difficulties through the extreme reluctance of local Labour parties
194
to buy them.	 Although the same firm later also produced records
189. NEC, Letter from S.D.P. contained in Research and Publicity
Committee, 25 June 1928.
190. NEC, Research and Publicity Committee, 2 November 1928. The
cost would have been £500 for twelve recorded speeches.
191. NEC minutes, 26 March 1939; Report on General Election
propaganda, 18 July 1929. The firm was the Columbia Gramophone
Company, who made similar records for the other parties. The
Party took a royalty of 2d. a record, and received £40 in all.
192. MacDonald papers, PRO 30/69/6/33, W.W. Henderson to H.B. Usher,
9 October 1929.
193. NEC, Research and Publicity Committee, 22 November 1934;
Finance and General Purposes Sub-Committee, 18 January 1935.
194. NEC, Research and Publicity Committee, 21 March 1935.
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Movement also attempts were made, at first through individual
initiative and later more formally, to develop a positive educative
role for film. Finally, from the late 1920s onwards there existed in
the documentary movement, headed by John Grierson at the Empire
Marketing Board and the G.P.O. Film Unit, a politically sympathetic
if practically circumscribed group of professional film makers,
anxious, as Grierson explained,
to use the cinema as an instrument of education and propaganda to
assist that pro
5cess of reconstruction Which our modorn society-19
must undergo.
All these various political, educational and cultural elements
were active in film use between the wars, and all at various times
stimulated the official Labour Party's interest in film, particularly
after 1936. Yet the inevitably dominant electoral emphasis of party
propaganda restricted its immediate interest in films of a more
purely educational and cultural nature, particularly given limited
financial resources. Moreover the rather different political
standpoint and aims of many of the people advocating such film use
constrained their acceptability to the Party. In consequence contact
remained comparatively limited between the two, and attention will
here be given to these separate groups only in relation to their
196
influence upon the Party's attitude to film.
	 Not surprisingly
individuals involved in the various independent efforts criticised
the Party for its apparent lack of interest in film, and for its
seemingly outdated attitude to propaganda in general, such as its
continued emphasis on the traditional techniques of speech and
195. Labour, February 1936, 125.
196. For further details of the various left wing film groups see T.
Ryan, 'Films and Political Organisations in. Britain 1929-1939',
in D. Macpherson (ed.). Traditions of Independence, London
1980, 51-69; also B. Hogenkamp, Worker's Newsreels in the 1920s 
and 1930s ('Our History' pamphlet no. 68), London (undated).
For details of the documentary film movement see R. Low,
Documentary and Educational Films of the 1930s, London 1979,
48-170.
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pamphlet. Such criticisms were for all practical purposes justified,
but they neither credited party organisers with sufficient
understanding of political requirements, nor made adequate allowances
for the undoubtedly difficult position of the Party throughout the
period.
Once again, however, as in so much else, many of the local
parties remained laws unto themselves. If the central organisation'
prolonged failure to develop film use was largely due to the lack of
local response, several of the local parties found themselves
identifying more closely with the aims of the various film groups of
the left, and maintained a somewhat closer, though still limited,
relationship with them than did the central party.
The NEC had not needed the S.D.P.'s letter of 1928 to arouse its
interest in film. As early as April 1917 a letter from a party
supporter, recommending 'the adaptation of the cinema to Party
propaganda', had been considered and re
197
ferred to the Organisation
Sub-Committee for further investigation. Only three months later
a letter from a Mr. Underwood
suggested the possibility of carrying on propaganda by means of a
198
travelling daylight cinema and invited inspection.
Although the Organisation Sub-Committee was enthusiastic and attended
a demonstration of this early daylight cinema van, the matter went no
further, presumably because of the inadequacy of the machine, or
because of excessive cost, although no reason was recorded.
In 1919, however, proposals for 'adapting Cinema Films to the
purpose of propaganda' went further then, in conjunction with the
nationalisation of the mines campaign,
197. NEC minutes, 17 April 1917; Organisation Sub-Committee, 24
April 1917.
198. NEC, Organisation and Elections Sub-Committee, 23 July 1917.
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Estimates were submitted for producing a film illustration life
199
and labour conditions in mining areas [sic].
A scheme proposing the formation of a company to produce films which
could be used by local organisations in local halls was eagerly
approved by the Literature, Publicity and Research Sub-Committee.
Although the NEC was more cautious, enthusiasm was sufficient for a
Film Propaganda sub-committee to be formed of all those interested in
the idea, including Arthur Henderson, Sidney Webb, George Bernard
200
Shaw, Rebecca West and Francis Meynell.	 MacDonald also expressed
interest. The committee considered the formation of a 'syndicate'
which would have
the double object of producing films that could be used by the
ordinary trade, but which would be more or less of a propaganda
character; and secondly to produce other films for use in a
portable projector Which could be hired out or sold to local
Labour organisations for propaganda, especially in rural
201
constituencies.
Reports indicated that projectors could be obtained for between £50
and £70, and it was optimistically recommended that interested
parliamentary candidates should agree to take projectors, to
underwrite the film syndicate against financial loss on them and to
organise series of paying shows in order to recoup their own
expenses. Exhibition, therefore, would have to be a cormiercial
proposition.
There was less optimism in a report on the possible use of
existing commercial films suitable for Labour propaganda. Despite a
199. NEC, Literature, Publicity and Research Stb-Committee, 11
November 1919.
200. NEC minutes, 12 November 1919.
201. NEC, Minutes of Film Propaganda Sub-Committee, 18 December
1919.
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thorough investigation it had been found that
the manufacturers of films have not made any films presenting
directly or indirectly the Labour point of view. In one or two
cases, the renting companies sent long synopses of so-called
Labour photoplays, but on investigation, the underlying tendency
of these photoplays proved to be contrary to the aims of the
202
Labour Party.
It was recognised that one of the items on the British Board of Film
Censors' list of prohibitions was "conflict between Labour and
Capital". Although there existed industrial series such as 'How a
railway line is made' and 'Making a modern railway carriage', 'there
203
is no propaganda in these'. 	 The only conclusion possible was
that the film syndicate would have to produce its own films.
Despite this problem the scheme was pushed ahead. It was planned
initially to use comercial films which, whilst not propaganda, were
capable of pointing a moral, such as 'Jo, the Crossing Sweeper', and
'Les MisGrables'. Once the system of profitable distribution had been
established, however, the Party would itself produce fully
propagandist films. Accordingly, in March 1920, a circular was issued
to all local Labour parties expounding the necessity of film
204
propaganda.
	
This deserves to be quoted at some length as
evidence of the Labour leadership's awareness of and interest in
publicity and modern techniques. Beginning with Sidney Webb's
hallmark, a quotation from Heraclitus - 'The eyes are more exact
witnesses than the ears' - it continued:
During the War the Cinematograph became a powerful instrument of
202. Ibid., Reports attached to minutes.
203. Ibid.
204. NEC, Circular on Labour Cinema Propaganda, March 1920. This
circular was written by Herbert Tracey and C. W. Kendall, the
scheme's organiser and original proponent, and was revised by
Sidney Webb.
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propaganda in the hands of the Government. The experience gained
in this attractive and striking method of publicity is now being
used by capitalist interests in various ways to undermine and
check the progress of Labour throughout the country, and there is
little doubt that unless effective measures are taken to
counteract this new form of political warfare it may have serious
consequences at election time.
The scheme was then explained and it was pointed out that
the Trade Unions at Seattle in the United States have definitely
started a scheme similar to our own whereby it is hoped to
convert many thousands to the principles of Labour. In Scotland
the Scottish Miners' Federation has appointed a Committee for the
purpose of manufacturing propaganda films; in fact, there is now
a general movement throughout the country, not only amongst
political . but also religious, educational and industrial
organisations, towards using the cinematograph as an adjunct to
the ordinary and to many less attractive methods of propaganda.
In conclusion it was emphasised that this was
a scheme the possible importance of which to the Labour Movement
can scarcely be exaggerated ... the Cinema is destined to play an
increasing and ever dominating role in propaganda and educational
work generally. Hence no time should be lost in utilising such a
powerful weapon in the cause of Labour.
Yet the scheme went no further, and there is no evidence of any
response from the local parties. Given central enthusiasm it can only
be assumed that local interest and funds, upon which the whole
proposal depended, were insufficient. Here once again was the problem
for any national Labour organisation. Not sufficiently wealthy itself
to undertake expensive or speculative propaganda ventures, it was
dependent upon the support - financial and moral - of the local
parties, themselves often dependent upon local union support, for the
188
success of propaganda schemes. When such support was not forthcoming
there was nothing that the NEC could do about it.
The idea was therefore left in abeyance, and the Party found
little opportunity of returning seriously to it until 1928, although
in late 1926 Egerton Wake (the National Agent) made enquiries about
the new phceo-film device of which the Conservative Party was shortly
205
to make such early use. 	 Between 1928 and 1931, however, the
possibility of film propaganda was again revived, very largely in
reaction to the tremendous expansion of Conservative activity in the
field. Early in 1928 William Mellor, Editor of the Daily Herald,
brought to MacDonald's attention a recent talkie on disarmament by
206
Lord Beatty, and urged that answering films should be made.
Subsequently, at the initiative of the Gaumont Mirror 'film
magazine', MacDonald and J.H. Thomas made their first talking films,
of a non-political character, as part of a Gaumont series on famous
207
personalities..	 Aroused by these new developments and by the
growing fleet of Conservative cinema vans, the Research and Publicity
Sub-Committee investigated the cost of film production and display
208
from cinema vans, but once again found the costs prohibitive.
Not surprisingly, therefore, when the editor of the Bioscope asked
for MacDonald's views on the importance of 'the Cinema from the
Political Standpoint, Its Possible Future as an Electioneering Agent
and its sphere in Electioneering and Campaign Work', and reminded him
of Conservative activities, he was rather curtly told that
Mr. MacDonald thinks that the Cinema can have an enormous
propaganda effect but that he would regret very much if those in
205. NEC, Minutes, 8 October 1926.
206. MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/6/31, W. Mellor to MacDonald, 2
February 1928. MacDonald expressed willingness, but there was
no further action.
207. MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/6/31, Correspondence between
British Acoustic Films Ltd. and MacDonald, July 1928; the
Bioscope, 1 August 1928, reported that MacDonald's talk was on
'flowers and anecdotes, seemingly tame subjects for a politician
of so much oratorical vigour.'
208. NEC, Research and Publicity Committee, 25 September 1928.
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Electoral victory made Labour the first government in the era of
the sound newsreel, and Arthur Henderson, in issuing invitations to
the photographic press agencies to meet the new Cabinet, invited also
the film newsreels, of which one, British Movietone News, had that
213
week begun to produce sound reels. 	 For a brief period Labour
found itself, by comparison with its previous position, reasonably
well catered for in film coverage, particularly as Movietone's early
editorial policy laid some emphasis on the film 'interview' - at that
time simply the provision of screen time to eminent personalities to
state their views. Thus in the last six months of 1929 the Government
wa given five such opportunities to state its position by
214
Movietone.	 Indeed MacDonald soon found the attention of the
cameras excessive and told J.S. Middleton, the Party's Assistant
Secretary, that he
must draw the line between pure advertisement and cheapness, and
215
things that are really good occasions.
The Party also discovered that certain elements in the film industry
were not unsympathetic to its general aims. The Ostrer brothers, for
example, who owned Gaumont British, were Labour Party supporters
until the 1931 crisis, although whether this affected the editorial
policy of their newsreel, Gaumont Sound News (later Gaumont British
216
News), it is at present impossible to assess. 	 They also owned
housing conditions, 43-49. miners' homes, 50. A Duke's home,
51-2. Miner's wife and children, 53. 'Waking the best of it",
54. Message, 55. J.R. MacDonald - Our leader in the Fight for
Right, 56. England! Arise.
213. For details of this newsreel item see note E at end of chapter,
p.216.
214. By comparison Conservatives received one, and that Lady Astor.
Lloyd George and Lord Beaverbrook also spoke once each.
215. MacDonald papers, PRO 30/69/6/34, R. Rosenberg to J.S.
Middleton, 6 May 1931. Paramount had asked for MacDonald to be
present at the maiden flight of a new Imperial Airways airliner
which they intended to film.
216. Gaumont Sound News reels for the period before 1934 are at
present not available, whilst being catalogued by the National
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one of the smaller Sunday newspapers, the Sunday Referee, which was
known for its high-brow and generally left-wing viewpoint. It is
rumoured, although there is no conclusive evidence of this, that in
early 1931, when Gaumont British was in some financial difficulty,
Isodore Ostrer offered the family's controlling shares to the Party.
Even if this offer did take place it could not, of course, have been
accepted, for GB's size, not least its cinema circuit numbering
several hundreds (in the 1930s some 850 cinemas), put it quite beyond
217
the Party's financial capabilities.
Despite this the NEC was anxious to extend its film coverage.
Taking advantage of a certain sympathy on the part of the Paramount
newsreel, it was entering into negotiations regarding General
Election film propaganda (although whether through the newsreel or
private exhibition is not clear), when the 1931 crisis brought its
218
ambitions for film propaganda once again to a halt.
The breaking away of its leader in the National Labour Party, and
its disastrous rout in the 1931 General Election, left the opposition
Labour Party with little inclination or opportunity to undertake
speculative publicity ventures. Not surprisingly it placed a
comparatively low priority on trying to develop a propaganda medium
Which, powerful though it knew film to be, was financially
extravagant and a publicity luxury which repeated efforts had failed
to secure. In the wider field of coverage by the independent media
the Party concentrated its efforts firstly on trying to ensure
adequate broadcasting representation for itself and secondly in an
Film Archive. The items from Gaumont Sound News from 1929 to
1934 kept at Visnews are selected, being only a small portion
of the original output. The Gaumont Sound News issue sheets
prior to 1934 have not survived, and little can be gained from
a study of the Gaumont film ledgers (which record all film
shot) between 1929 and 1931.
217. M. Chanan, Labour Power in the British Film Industry, London
1976, 31.
218. MacDonald papers, PRO 30/69/6/34, J.S. Middleton to MacDonald,
5 May 1931.
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attempt to counter the pro-National Government press, giving full
support to the Daily Herald. Thus a Head Office circular reminded the
local parties that
One of the prime factors in securing electoral success is a wise
use of publicity,
and that wireless would therefore be a significant factor in the next
election. The 'preponderating proportion of political broadcasts
which would probably be given to the National Government made it
essential, however, that the movement should give full support to its
paper, the Daily Herald, for
After the wireless the general newspaper press counts as the most
219
effective method of reaching the multitude.
Between 1932 and 1935, therefore, both the TUC and the Labour Party
took a full part in promoting the Herald's drive to achieve and
maintain a readership of two million.
It was in relation to this readership campaign, and again in
response to the continuing work of the Conservative Films
Association, that in February 1933 the directors of the Herald 
declared that as an incentive to the movement to support the new
drive for circulation, and in order to promote at the same time the
latter's interests in backward areas, they would donate an outdoor
cinema van for the joint benefit of the TUC and the NEC, when the
220
Herald's readership reached two million. 	 The Party and TUC
General Council willingly accepted the proposal, and enquiries were
made about the availability of vans and the cost of' film production.
But in both matters difficulties were encountered. The only second-
hand van available was found to be rotten, whilst the annual running
219. NEC, Circular 'The General Election and the Daily Herald',
February 1935.
220. NEC, Minutes, 22 February 1933.
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costs as estimated by the General Council were alarmingly high: £625
a year for the upkeep of the van and employment of
driver/projectionist, and up to £2,000 p.a. for the production of
suitable (Trade Union) propaganda films, in addition to further
expenses for the hiring of the entertainment, comedy and general
interest films which were considered essential for the success of the
221
project.	 The TUC and NEC were left wondering at their ability to
finance such a scheme, particularly if an ancillary set of portable
equipment for indoor meetings, with the consequent necessary
reduction of film size from 35 mm. to 16 mm., were also purchased. It
was also recognised that the greatest difficulty lay in the actual
production of
films dealing with the Trade Union and Labour Movement which
would be of sufficient interest to attract and retain the
222
attention of an audience.
A group of sympathetic film producers, including Paul Rotha, offered
to establish a film company on behalf of the movement, producing
primarily documentary films for general exhibition. They believed
that
providing that any apparent connection of the company with the
two national bodies was avoided, .... sufficient profit would be
made out of this venture to enable them to produce either free of
charge or at very low costs propaganda films for the
223
movement.
Nevertheless both Party and TUC remained wary of committing
themselves, despite this offer, and although the Herald attained its
target in late 1933 nothing further had been achieved by March
221. TUC General Council Papers, Memorandum by Walter Citrine on
'Cinema Film in Trade Union Propaganda', 25 March 1935.
222. Ibid.
223. Ibid.
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1935.
These proposals had come at one of the Labour Party's worst
moments financially, and when the unions were also undergoing a
temporary fall in membership. Given its previous experiences the
Party perhaps had a right to be cautious. At the same time it must be
said that the estimates made were unduly pessimistic, particularly
given the proposal of Rotha and others, and that as a combined effort
between TUC, party and professional producers, and not dependent upon
local finance to such an extent as previous schemes, this proposal
would have had a better chance of success than most. Botha was
understandably irritated and frustrated when nothing came of it. Of
his criticisms of the movement for excessive caution and an
antiquated attitude to self-projection, the former would appear to be
at least partly justified, particularly given developments over the
225
following five years.
Between 1934 and 1938 Ritchie Calder of the Daily Herald, Rotha,
Donald Taylor and others in the socially conscious and sympathetic
documentary film movement, made repeated efforts to persuade the
Labour Movement to undertake film production of a documentary and
226
propagandist character.	 Further progress, however, was only made
at an extremely tardy pace. In 1935, largely in response to this
pressure, but also in an attempt to revive the Herald scheme, a joint
Film Committee of representatives of the NEC and the TUC General
Council, plus enthusiasts such as Paul Rotha and Ritchie Calder, was
224. T. Stannage, Baldwin Thwarts the Opposition, London 1980, 68,
states that Labour took delivery of this cinema van, and
subsequently purchased another. This was not the case. The
first was never acquired, the second was merely the
Agricultural Campaign Committee's first loudspeaker unit.
225. See Note F at the end of chapter,p.217, for details of Party
leaders' personal interests in film.
226. Ralph Bond was also apparently involved briefly. Earlier John
Grierson had himself made similar proposals to the Party -
F.Thorpe and N.Pronay, British Official Film in the Second 
World War, London 1980,30.
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formed. A definite plan of action was accepted, and agreement made to
guarantee the interest (to the extent of £100 each by the TUC and NEC
for five years) on the £4-5,000 loan 'which it was believed would have
to be raised in order to create a successful and self sustaining
227
venture.	 Once again, however, progress was delayed by the
summer recess, the confusion resulting from the Party's leadership
difficulties and then by the more pressing demands of the
approaching General Election. Only in April 1936 was the scheme
sufficiently advanced for a letter advertising it to be circulated to
local parties. Signed by the Secretaries of the Labour Party and the
TUC, it proposed the establishment of a central organisation to
provide projectors and films for sale and hire to film societies,
which should be established jointly by local Labour parties, trades
councils, co-operative organisations and other related bodies. It
declared that
the film has now become a weapon that can affect the minds of the
multitude in a given direction without the multitude being aware
of what is happening. It can create bias against which neither
reason nor rhetoric can prevail. It can persuade and be
understood by the ignorant as well as by the educated .... it is
imperative that Labour should organise its own film propaganda
228
without delay.
It was hoped that by making such film societies open to other
educational and cultural associations, and to the general public, the
problem of preaching to the converted would be avoided.
Increasingly, between 1935 and 1937, the attention of the Labour
Movement nationally was brought to the necessity of having its own
227. NEC, Research and Publicity Committee, 21 March 1935, 9 May
1935. The details of this 1935 proposal have not survived, but
probably followed in general terms the scheme as circulated to
local parties in 1936, described below. The Daily Herald scheme
was abandoned.
228. TUC Press File, Circular on Labour Cinema Propaganda, April
1936.
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film propaganda. At the party conference in October 1935 Rotha had
given an exhibition of documentary films, and the following year a
propaganda film conference was held in Edinburgh, prior to the party
conference, to explain the Party's proposals. In connection with this
film conference a circular was sent to all local parties explaining
that
Party propaganda services have to be kept efficient and up to
date, and the Party must be ready to adopt modern instruments and
229
to make use of modern methods.
In February 1936 an interview with John Grierson appeared in the
Party magazine Labour, in which he discussed the educative concepts
behind the documentary approach, and declared that
we cannot lecture into life a society so complex as we have it
today, and the lecture method still so common is a Victorian
conception unworthy of our modern instruments, and impotent in
230
the face of modern problems.
Film was the only solution. In a harder hitting article in the
November issue Ritchie Calder cited the recent electoral gains of the
Swedish Socialists, which he directly ascribed to their widespread
use of mobile projectors:
It is a positive - a proof positive - argument for making the
film one of our main propaganda mediums, for turning what
threatens to be one of the most powerful weapons against us into
231
a broadside in our favour.
Not surprisingly he, like Grierson and Rotha, stressed the importance
of the documentary approach being used in addition to more directly
229. NEC, Minutes, 5 September 1936; Circular, September 1936.
230. Labour, February 1936, 125.
231. Labour, November 1936, 35-36.
197
propagandist films. The involvement in Labour's publicity effort of
such film enthusiasts and exponents of the documentary and
educational film inevitably led to a re-emphasis of such an
approach, as did subsequent influences from the Co-operative
Movement. Indeed to some extent this reflected a widely stated desire
in the Party, after the 1935 electoral defeat, to return to education
in the basics of socialism as the principal element of party
propaganda, a desire which had been equally strongly expressed after
1931, but Which perhaps was considered more seriously after the
Party's second consecutive defeat.
Other factors in the mid-1930s also stimulated the Movement's
interest in and determination to use film. The Spanish Civil War was
to be significant in many respects, not least as an issue upon which
the Mbvement could attack the apparent political bias of the cinema
newsreels. There had been notably little official protest previously
from the Labour Party, or even in the pages of the Daily Herald,
although a belief in newsreel bias was widespread. Now, however, the
Party's attention was drawn to the dangers and potential of
propaganda film through the newsreel coverage of the war, which it
increasingly came to see as heavily biased against the republican
232
government.	 This led in turn to the question of general newsreel
coverage for Labour, and in early 1937, at Attlee's request, the
newsreels were pressed for better and fairer treatment for the Party,
only the third recorded occasion on which the Party had contacted the
233
newsreel industry on its own initiative.
232. NCL, Minutes, 22 December 1936.
233. NEC, Publicity, Research and Local Government Committee, 19
January 1937. The first occasion, in February 1933, was merely
to request copies of newsreel film of the Hyde Park
Unemployment demonstration of that month; the second, in March
1934, was a protest, via the Cinematograph Exhibitors'
Association, at a Movietone reel in which the Austrian
Chancellor Dollfuss had referred to recent disorders as a
'Bolshevik Revolution'. Whether or not these were the only
occasions on which the Party made official approaches to the
newsreels, and this seems improbable, individuals certainly
protested at newsreel bias and censorship - see pp. 638-639
below. There were also occasional references in the Daily
Herald, e.g. 2 December 1933.
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Developments in other areas of the Labour Movement and the
political left also encouraged party involvement in film. Although so
far the Party itself had had little success with its schemes for
film, the late 1920s and early 1930s had seen the formation of a
number of left wing film exhibition and production groups. For the
most part they were shoe-string projects and of minimal significance
as mass influences, although at the same time appealing to many of
the cultural left. Their survival was only made possible by the use
of the newly developed 16 mm. film systems, which allowed
comparatively cheap production and projection, and which was to be
the development that made Labour film use possible. Showing
predominantly foreign films, mostly silent, the films that they
themselves produced on 16 nom. film were almost invariably crude,
amateur, silent and, by commercial standards, wholly unappealing,
althongh commercial standards and techniques were not their
234
objective.	 Apart from the ILP based Masses Stage and Film Guild,
formed in 1929, and the independent, intellectual, Socialist Film
Council of Rudolph Messel, which was presided over by George
Lansbury, the majority of these groups were founded and dominated by
individual communists such as Ralph Bond, Henry Dobb, Ivor Montagu
and Charles Mann. They had their origins, as Trevor Ryan has argued
partly in ... the cultural export strategies of the Soviet Union,
and partly in the theoretical responses of the left in Britain to
the emergenc
35
e of film and radio into political and cultural
2
prominence.
234. Workers' cinema was seen as a possible counter to and exposé of
the manipulation intrinsic to the commercial, capitalist
cinema. The value of the moving picture was felt to lie in its
capacity of being seen to tell the truth,. to show reality.
This, the necessity of cheap production and the expectation
that the audience would be itself socially and culturally in
tune with what was represented on the screen, and therefore
able to recognise and accept its truth, led to a concentration
on realist techniques and subjects - the recording of workers'
marches, demonstrations and strikes.
235. T. Ryan, Op. Cit., 52. For contemporary details of the
Socialist Film Council see R. Postgate, in Labour, September
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Groups such as the Federation of Workers' Film Societies, the London
Workers' Film Society, the Film and Photo League, the Progressive Film
Institute and most importantly Kino, were wholly independent and had
no formal connection either with the Communist Party of Great
Britain, or with Moscow. Nevertheless in general terms they worked
within the political guidelines of the CB and Soviet cultural
policy. There was in consequence little formal contact between them
and the Labour Party.
Between 1933 and 1937, however, a major re-emphasis of Soviet
cultural strategy, in order to emphasise Anglo-Soviet and Franco-
Soviet amity in opposition to war and fascism, together with the
growth of liberal, pacifist and popular front consciousness in the
Western democracies, made possible the alignment of these otherwise
disparate elements in a series of campaigns against common
adversaries. The left wing film movements were themselves part of
this development and, as Ryan states,
In this context, the political function of the films changed from
agitation and recruitment for communist campaigns, to fund-
raising for non-communist groups and gathering expressions of
ideological support for more broadly based liberal
236
campaigns.
The films of Kino, both its main Soviet stock and increasingly its
films relating to the Spanish struggle, and those of the Progressive
Film Institute, began to reach a more general thorigh still very
limited audience. In the year 1935-6 Kino films were taken for some
30 shows by trade union branches and trade councils, 30 by co-
operative societies, 20 by ILP branches and 20 by local Labour
1933. For a more critical and realistic assessment of its worth
see P. Botha, Op. Cit., 109-110, in which he states: 'He
[Rudolph Messel] uses a few friends with cultured accents to
speak dialogue for factory workers. It reminds me of what was
once called the fashionable habit of slumming. In other words,
they stink'.
236. T. Ryan, Op. Cit., 63.
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parties, although it is not possible to assess whether these were
several bodies giving just one exhibition each or only a few giving
237
series.	 Neither the NEC nor the TUC General Council, however,
took part in these developments, although even here relations
improved in 1936 when a series of film shows were organised at
Transport House, about once a month, showing largely imported films
hired from Kino. In December 1936 consideration was given to the
purchase of a film from Kino for the Party's prospective film
238
library.
Another section of the Labour Movement to take an increased
interest in film at this time was the Co-operative Movement.
Individuals in the Movement, notably Alderman Joseph Reeves of the
Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society, had been active in showing films
of an educative nature, mainly to children, for many years.Moreover
the Co-operative Wholesale Society had had its own film department
239
since the 1890s, though for purely advertising films. 	 In
237. Kino Annual Report 1936, contained in Kino News No. 2., May
1936. Also in early 1936 Kino approached Kensington Labour
Party with the suggestion that it finance and produce two films
on infant mortality and slums. This was agreed. - Left Review,
April 1936, 415.
238. These shows were advertised in the Daily Worker. See for
example the Thany Worker, 15 April 1936, 8, advertising a
showing of 'The End of St. Petersburg', 'U.S.S.R.' and 'The
Peace Film', on 18 April. The Labour Party's Publicity,
Research and Local Government Committee, 15 December 1936,
considered the purchase of 'Millions like Us', an American film
which could only have come from Kino.
239. The C.W.S. made use of commercial producers such as Publicity
Films Ltd. and G.B. Instructional for the production of many of
these films - Labour Magazine, April 1930, December 1930. Rotha
has written that instead of using its money on films of a
socially and politically enlightening nature, 'The wealthy Co-
operative movement squandered its money on having advertising
pictures made by companies tainted by Conservative views.' - P.
Rotha, Op. Cit., 280. The reason for this was obvious enough'
the C.W.S. was primarily interested in selling its merchandise
and remaining competitive, and as such found the commercial and
popular style of commercial film advertising companies far more
in tune with its requirements than the innovative but crude
work of the early documentarists, which showed little prospect
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September 1936, however, the National Association of Co-operative
Educational Committees, largely at the instigation of Reeves, held a
conference to discuss the use of film educationally in the Co-
operative Movement, and resolved to create a national Co-operative
Film Society to provide its member Education Committees with films.
As Reeves told the conference, educationally the film was of
tremendous importance, whilst,
As a medium for gaining new recruits for the Movement and as a
popular means of arousing interest in the social posslities of
240
human co-operation there is no more effective medium.
Although the C.W.S. refused to involve itself in the project, and
although of the 250 member educative committees asked to donate £10
to the project only 37 initially agreed, the scheme rushed ahead by
comparison with Labour's. Reeves was appointed Secretary of the new
Co-operative Film Committee in March 1937, and the first co-operative
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film circuit had been established by June. 	 As with the left wing
film groups the project was only made possible by the adoption of 16
mm. systems. By late 1937 about twenty co-operative branches
possessed projectors, and the Film Committee was organising road-
shows (hiring out both projectors and films for indoor meetings). In
the first few months of operation over 300 film displays were
242
given.	 Moreover Reeves proceeded to persuade four London co-
operative societies to finance a five year plan of film production,
estimated at £1,000 p.a., although the mainstay of the films
exhibited remained the commercial and GPO film libraries, independent
of ever appealing to a mass audience. But in any case, Rotha's
statement was not strictly true. The Co-operative movement was
to produce or finance a number of documentaries, both on its
own work and on more general political themes.
240. J. Reeves, The Film and Education, London 1936, 3.
241. Co--operative News, Mnrch - July 1937.
242. NEC, Report of the TUC and Labour Party Joint Film Committee,
attached to Publicity, Research and Local Government Committee,
22 July 1937.
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producers, and distribution companies such as Kino. As those planning
the equivalent Labour and TUC organisation admitted:
Quite shortly, While we have been discussing schemes, this
particular movement has actually become effective, and upon
243
precisely the lines recommended by us from time to time.
These two very different elements, of left wing film groups and
the Co-operative Film Committee, both had a significant impact upon
Labour Party film use. Despite the joint circular of April 1936, the
film conference at Edinburgh and the debate on film Which had been
carried on throughout 1936, the NEC and General Council were still
very wary of committing themselves to an expensive central film
organisation. They wanted first to be absolutely convinced that an
effective distribution system would be created by the local bodies.
The response to the circular had evidently not been particularly
encouraging in this respect, for although
ample evidence has been received showing a general interest
throughout the Movement in film propaganda ... At this stage
there seems to be little likelihood of local Labour and Trade
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Union Organisations being able to buy projectors.
The financial investment required was such that the central bodies
were most unwilling to speculate on success. The development of the
Co-operative distribution chain, however, proved the stimulus to
action, for it was at last demonstrated that such a proposal could be
made to work. More importantly a national means of exhibition now
existed, or was being established, through the Co-operative
projectors, for Joseph Reeves, who was equally anxious to develop a
comprehensive Labour film movement, indicated that they would be made
available to local Labour parties and union branches. Consequently in
July 1937 the committee investigating Labour film use recommended
243. Ibid.
244. Ibid.
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that a National Joint Film Committee of the TUC, Labour Party and the
Co-operative Film Committee, be formally constituted in order to
formulate and implement proposals for a national working class film
movement, into which it was evidently assumed the Co-operative
245
organisation would be absorbed.
Matters at first still moved slowly, and by December the new MEC
still had not met as the General Council had failed to appoint
246
representatives.	 From early 1938, however, the pace quickened.
At the first meeting it was resolved to establish a central film
library and office, and a working sub-committee of all those most
interested - Reeves, Herbert Elvin, F.O. Roberts, H.V. Tewson and
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W.W. Henderson - was appointed.
	 Independently the Spain Campaign
Committee, established in 1936 to raise funds for refugee relief,
concluded an agreement with Kino in December 1937 to exhibit its
films of the Spanish Civil War, using the projectors of the Co-
operative societies, as part of the 'Milk for Spain Campaign'. By
February 1938 116 shows of Spanish films had been arranged, whilst
wherever the film 'Spanish Earth', which was distributed both
commercially and in 16 mm., had been taken by an ordinary cinema, the
local Labour party had been asked to assist in publicising it and to
248
take a collection for Spanish relief in or outside the cinema.
In March the sub-committee of the NJ1C reported. It argued that
245. Ibid.
246. NEC, Publicity, Research and Local Government Committee, 14
December 1937.
247. NEC, National Joint Film Committee (NJFC), 28 January 1938.
248. NEC, Spain Campaign Committee, 8 February 1938; LPAR 1939, 33.
It should be mentioned, however, that 'Spanish Earth's'
commercial exhibition was still comparatively limited. These
arrangements were made by Joseph Reeves who, in addition to
being Secretary of the Film Department of the NACEC, and to
acting on behalf of the Spain Committee and Co-operative Union,
was also on the General Council of Kino. By March the number of
shows arranged in the Milk for Spain campaign had risen from
116 to 160 - NEC, NJFC memorandum, 24 March 1928.
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with the development of an efficient sub-standard (16 mm.) sound film
system a Labour Movement film organisation was now practicable. In
urging immediate action it defended past delays:
For years, the Democratic Movements have been considering how to
use the film for advancing their causes, but the large sums of
money needed for film production has [sic] constantly stood in
the way of progress .... in the absence of facilities for showing
films of a special character of interest to audiences we
represent, no good purpose would have been served in spending
large sums of money in producing films which would not have been
acceptable to the commercial cinema proprietors. These facilities
249
are now available and are steadily increasing.
There had previously been a limited number of suitable films; now, in
addition to those the movement might produce, educational and travel
films were available from Gaumont British Instructional and from
dominion offices; socially telling films such as 'Enough to Eat' and
'Children at School' could be obtained from the Commercial Gas
Association; the libraries of the GPO and Empire Marketing Board were
available, as were the political films of Kin°, the Progressive Film
Institute, Unity Films and, shortly, of the four London Co-operative
Societies. The Film Department of the NACEC was showing films to
audiences of up to 800 at a cost of £4-6 a meeting, and had become
virtually self-supporting after six months. The time was clearly
extremely propitious.
This report was referred to the NEC and TUC who agreed, in April,
to finance the establishment of the proposed film service, each
giving £250 a year for two years. Even now only limited finances were
granted, but on the strength of this Joseph Reeves was appointed as
full-time Organiser-Secretary of the new body, which was to be called
the Workers' Film Association. As such it was publicly unveiled in
November 1938.
249. NEC, Memorandum of the sub-committee of the NJFC, 24 March
1938.
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understandably bitter:
in the 1930s the unions and the co-operatives, let alone the
Labour Party, had an antiquated attitude to their public image.
Lack of money was a threadbare alibi that became boring by its
monotony •... Labour had no ear for such an imaginative approach
to public service and public education. Labour did not even have
255
an aesthetic approach, let alone a social one.
Most recently one writer has declared that Rotha was not given the
opportunity to make films for the Labour Movement
largely because the Labour leadership was foolish enough simply
256
to leave the use of the medium to its opponents.
Yet this is a less than fair assessment. The central Party had
been attempting since 1919 to turn film to its purposes, but with
conspicuous lack of success. The Party's wariness betwen 1934 and
1938 can only be fully understood if its previous repeated failures
are known. These were failures not just in film use but in many other
areas of propaganda which it not unreasonably considered, pound for
pound, to be of greater electoral significance. Lack of money might
have been a threadbare and monotonous excuse, but the Party had no
reason to believe it was other than a totally justified one. It could
not afford to speculate with its continuously precarious central
funds. Nor had it received any indication before 1938 that the local
parties, without whose financial support any scheme for film use
would have been impossible, would be able to provide that support.
Even in 1938 the immediate stimulus to action was the creation by the
NACEC of a distributive system which could be usea by Labour. This in
turn had only become possible with the development of an efficient 16
mm. sound film system.
255. P. Botha, Op. Cit., 280-281.
256. B. Hogenkamp, 'Film and the Workers' Movement in Britain, 1929-
1939', Sight and Sound, 45 (1976), 75.
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The argument that Labour lacked an aesthetic and social approach,
however, is a telling one. For although it had long had a moral
commitment to educational propaganda, and although after the defeats
of 1931 and 1935 there was perhaps a return to the concept of long
term social education, culminating in the essentially educative
principles upon which Joseph Reeves finally established the W.F.A.,
the central Party's immediate concern for propaganda had nevertheless
become and remained predominantly short-term and electoral. Its
primary concern was to win votes, and it was only after the W.F.A.
had been established, and with the prospect of a 1939-40 election,
that the NEC agreed to invest heavily in film, and then for purely
short-term propaganda. The P.E.P. enquiry into The Factual Film in
1947 (in which Rotha was closely concerned) concluded sadly that
No political party ha so far made more than a trivial and
superficial use of films. Perhaps this is inevitable because
political parties are more concerned with ephemeral
257
electioneering propaganda; nevertheless it is disappointing.
The Labour Party had always been an avowedly proselytising party.
Its traditional weapons in the execution of this function had been
the spoken word, the voluntary worker and the pamphlet. With only
limited prospects before the 1918 extension of the franchise such
tools had been adequate and effectively utilised, in large measure by
the work of the ILP. With his 1918 reconstruction Arthur Henderson
designed a national party organisation to serve a truly national
party. Yet the new national facade hid a party which in many aspects,
both locally and centrally, was only able gradually to adapt to the
new circumstances. Henderson envisaged a national organisation
capable of national propaganda, co-ordinating the propaganda work of
the local bodies, integrated with the propaganda effort of the Trade
Union Movement and ideally with its own press support. Yet in
257. P.E.P. (Dartington Hall) Enquiry, The Factual Film, London
1947, 161.
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practice few of the Party's propaganda efforts met with the hoped for
or deserved success, and only in the late 1930s was significant
progress being made. A great deal of what was attempted - local
papers, mass leafleteering outside elections, the employment of
professional propagandists, the introduction of modern devices such
as loudspeakers and gramophones and the use of film for propaganda -
simply required too much of the Party financially, both of national
resources and of local. The continuing independence of the local
parties and their suspicion of central guidance was also a constant
factor hindering national propaganda organisation. Faced with these
difficulties party organisers, whilst attempting to develop new means
of reaching the mass electorate, continued to make the fullest use of
its strongest asset, the local party worker, and in continual
campaigning developed a system intended to satisfy local requirements
and regularly to stimulate local propaganda work.
Even here, however, there were mixed results, and only in the
later 1930s did the Party begin to achieve a centrally controlled
spoken propaganda and campaign organisation capable of making any
impact upon the areas where local organisation was weakest. By then
the problems of relying so heavily upon these traditional methods of
publicity were beginning to show. For they depended too much on the
interest of the electorate in politics being sufficient to draw them
to political meetings, and were in shRrp contrast to the techniques
of which the National Government was increasingly making use. In 1931
packed and enthusiastic Labour meetings led the Labour Organiser,
after the election, to conclude:
meetings do not win elections, and only touch the fringe of the
crowd. One draws also the conclusion that oui meetings consisted
258
mainly of our own immediate supporters and enthusiasts.
By 1935 there was increasing comment at the decline in attendances at
political meetings as a result of General Election political
258. Labour Organiser, November 1931.
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broadcasts. Daily Herald columnist Hannen Swaffer was not the only
person who, in accusing Labour of lacking popular appeal and colour,
felt that its methods were out of date:
Labour propagandists have printed admirable pamphlets by the
score. But few read them. Thousands of speeches aremad 2t9e week
after week. But they are made chiefly to Labour followers.
Harold Laski admitted that 'We hear everywhere of listless and half
empty meetings', and Maurice Hackett, the Party's Literature
Circulation Officer, noted the 'falling off in attendance in recent
260
years at public meetings'.	 Others criticised Labour's basic
approach, and Mary Sutherland, the Party's Chief Woman Officer,
believed that it was the poor quality of Labour's spoken propaganda
that turned people from it:
The quality of the platform in recent years has not been up to
the standard of former days ... Good people sometimes turned
their backs on Labour and said they were not politicians because
they had been listening to a lot of jargon from a Labour
propagandist who used words of thirteen letters where words of
261
four would have been much better.
The Labour Organiser similarly quoted the opinion of an
'Investigator':
We are still dominated too much by the soap box outlook ... Study
the average Labour Speech, and you will find that it is rarely
designed to impress the non-politically minded mass .... it is
produced to satisfy opinion within the Party, and get the cheers
262
of supporters who like listening to a fighter.
259. John Bull, 24 October 1936.
260. Tribune, 16 July 1937, 8; Labour Organiser, January 1939.
261. Forward, 3 July 1937.
262. Labour Organiseu August 1937,143.
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The conclusion to be drawn seemed obvious to one writer:
Labour as a whole has a very poor appreciation of the values of
publicity or publicity experts ... political conversion is being
attempted by the Labour Party largely on mid-Victorian lines
The vast appeal which is made by other publicists to the senses
... is a terrible force in society today .... Labour has not
caught the spirit of the times and our publicity has hardly beguft
263
to change to modern needs.
The way forward for Labour propaganda which many critics urged
was very different from the Party's more public professions of
rationalism. As early as 1924 an article had appeared in the Labour 
Organiser on the 'Psychology of political advertising', in which it
was argued that although rational argument was necessary for the
politically conscious,
It is probable that only a minority of electors have the capacity
seriously to discriminate between policies from the point of view
of intelligence, per se, without the admixture and influence of
the primitive emotions .... care should be taken not to neglect
264
appeals to the primitive emotions of the majority.
The Labour Organiser reprinted this article as part of its campaign
to encourage greater publicity effort after 1931. The sentiments it
contained were echoed by the well known Labour agent and candidate,
William Barefoot, in December 1931:
mass psychology must be scientifically studied. Sentiment is not
265
unworthy. Labour's job is to make it a Socialist sentiment.
263. Unsigned article on 'Publicity', Labour Organiser, September
1935.
264. Labour Organiser, June 1924.
265. Labour Organiser, December 1931.
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Another contributor argued that
We too may practise that artistry which pulls the population and
gives them impulses or inclination one way or the other. Herein
266
we shall only imitate modern advertisers.
Thus critics accused the Party of failing to recognise the modern
propaganda requirements for a mass electorate. But neither this, nor
the argument that the Party was too principled to undertake the
popularisation of propaganda needed, were entirely justified. Whether
or not Labour leaders and organisers necessarily understood the
nature of mass publicity, they certainly appreciated the desirability
of co-ordination of mass communication, and differed little from
their Conservative counterparts in this respect. They were convinced
of the power of mass propaganda and certainly not averse to
presenting themselves as attractively as they knew how, and to making
267
use of party 'image'.
	 Of course Labour remained committed to the
ideal of rational political education. Particularly after 1931 the
Party leadership agreed with its wore radical elements that it should
never again accept power other than with a parliamentary majority and
a popular mandate for the implementation of socialism, and that this
could only be accomplished with an electorate fully comprehending of
the socialist argument. One of the lessons which Arthur Henderson
professed to have learnt from the 1931 election was that
If we are to recapture lost support and to gain new support to
266. Unsigned article on 'Publicity', Labour Organiser, September
1935.
267. Herbert Morrison at the L.C.C. was certainly very well aware of
the necessity of 'selling' the London Labour Party, and created
a team of sympathetic professional publicity and public
relations men to devise and implement all propaganda for the
1937 L.C.C. elections. See B. Dononelue and G.W. Jones, Op.
Cit., 207-210. This attitude he brought also to his role as
campaign manager - officially chairman of the Campaign
Committee - of the national Party, in preparation for the 1939
- 1940 General Election. As in so much else Labour hopes,
whether justified or not, were frustrated by the Second World
War which would ultimately prove such a boost to its fortunes.
213
the extent that will be necessary to place Labour in power, or to
enable us to withstand similar combined assaults in the future,
we must ensure that attachment to the
268 
Labour Party is by
conviction rather than by sentiment.
Yet such professions did not prevent the central Party from
continuing to seek ways of presenting Labour's message as popularly
and attractively as it was able, despite considerable difficulties,
and in practice from remaining as committed to rapid electoral
victory as ever. Inevitably, however, it found it difficult to make
the fundamental characteristic of mass communication - that it was
very much a one-way process from the few to the many, which thereby
automatically favoured and emphasised the established and the central
- compatible with the very far from centralised or centrally
controlled organisational constitution of the Labour Party. Above all
its chief hindrance to a successful utilisation of mass propaganda
methods remained neither innate conservatism nor excess of principle,
but simply the problem which it most frequently lamented - lack of
money.
Note A.
Lack of surviving evidence prevents a discussion of Liberal Party
publicity and film use. In 1929 the Liberals made use of almost every
form of mass propaganda, with the exception of the cinema van, which
the Conservative Party used. Lloyd George also utilised press
advertisement extensively. The Liberal Party appears to have been the
first British party to employ as Chief Publicity Officer a man with
previous advertising and public relations experience. William
268. A. Henderson, 'Labour's al-my is unconquered', Labour Magazine,
November 1932, 292.
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Allison, who joined the staff in 1937, was a journalist on the Sunday 
Dispatch, the Daily Sketch, and Pearson's Magazine before joining the
J. Walter Thompson advertising agency, and subsequently Editorial
Services, a public relations firm. - R.D. Casey, 'British Politics -
Some lessons in campaign propaganda', Public Opinion Quarterly, vol.
8 (1944), 81. Hints of Liberal film use are too vague to allow any
conclusions, and may well be false. Lloyd George was anxious to make
use of film and .considered the purchase of a newsreel, but without
result. From these brief indications it is, perhaps, possible to
suggest that Liberals were little different from their opponents in
their attitudes to mass propaganda, and learned the hard way in 1929
that without a national organisation of local parties, in an
efficient condition, large scale propaganda by itself could only
produce limited results.
Note B.
The conviction that Labour propaganda was morally superior to
Conservative, and eminently rational by comparison is well
demonstrated in an article by MacDonald on 'How I won Aberavon', in
The Nation and Athenaeum, Vol. 32, 309-10, 25 November 1922: - 'The
registers of today contain an uncomfortably large number of voters
who are interested in the excitement of elections, but not in
politics, and whose votes depend on a catchword or a whim or a
reputation. The existence of these electors makes stunt issues
possible, and drives candidates more and more to fight upon sheer
propaganda balderdash .... It looks as though this method of
electioneering had [sic] come to stay, and the Party mainly
responsible for this debasement in our political currency is the Tory
Party ... These enormous masses of electors put '
 a terrible strain
upon the candidate who fights by purely educational means. But the
results of my contest in Aberavon leaves me convinced that a high
appeal is a paying one.' Yet see also S.G. Hobson, 'Pilgrim to the 
Left', London 1938, 38, '....the I.L.P. speakers were innocent. They
always spoke of the appeal to the heart: their speeches were a blend
of religion and sentiment - sentiment which generally lapsed into
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sentimentalism'.
Note C.
The case against evolutionary theory was put, for example, by G.D.H.
Cole, who, in urging economic action through guild socialism, used
the same arguments against socialist success through constitutional
political action that the evolutionists themselves recognised. His
time-scale, however, was very different, judging that the
reorganisation of society by a working-class government, through
parliamPntary methods, could not be achieved in less than a century
and arguing: 'The period required to convert, in opposition to the
whole force of money-directed education, propaganda and pressure, a
majority of the people to a habit of sound political thinking is a
sufficient reason against the practicability of social transformation
by this means.' Although a Labour government could be secured quite
soon without such a mass conversion, it could only achieve power if
it had accepted in advance that it would not even attempt any radical
social transformation. - G.D.H. Cole, Guild Socialism Restated,
London 1920, 179. The evolutionist leaders of the Labour Party
therefore found it necessary to assert the success of their policy of
political education and propaganda, but only political victory would
in any degree prove it.
Note D.
Herbert Tracey (1884-1955), although almost entirely self-educated,
had become a Methodist minister 1904-1910, before turning to
journalism. Assistant editor of the Christian Commonwealth 1911-17,
Labour Party Press and Publicity Officer 1917-20, Labour Party
Industrial Correspondent 1922-26, Head of TUC Publicity Department
1926-1950. William Watson Henderson (b.1891), educated to grammar
school level, Editorial Secretary of the Daily Citizen, 1912-14,
Parliamentary Correspondent of Labour Press and Publicity Department
and Lobby Correspondent of the Daily Herald 1919-21, Head of Labour
Press and Publicity Department 1921-1945, M.P. (Enfield) 1923-24,
1929-31. Created first Baron Henderson in 1945.
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Brief descriptions of Tracey and Henderson are provided by W.
Citrine, Men and Work, London 1964, 135. R.D. Casey in 'British
Politics - Some lessons in campaign propaganda', Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 8, (1944), 77-80, argues that Labour Party staff
publicists were almost invariably professionals recruited from
journalism for their expertise. Whilst this was technically the case,
the only two 'journalists' employed in the Press and Publicity
Department until 1945 were Tracey and Henderson, the appointment of
both of whom owed more to party loyalty, religious non-conformism and
Arthur Henderson's patronage than to any previous experience. Like
Ball and Gower at Conservative Central Office, both learnt their
trade predominantly within the service of the Party. Working
journalists and writers were occasionally employed on a voluntary
basis to write specific leaflets and pamphlets, as they were in the
other parties.
Note E.
This film of the first sound reel of a British Cabinet, in the garden
of No. 10, Downing Street, has acquired a certain fame. In it Ramsay
MacDonald introduced his Cabinet colleagues in a relaxed and
impromptu manner to the camera. It was, for only his second screen
appearance, a well pitched and modest performance. But the
informality of the occasion serves to emphasise the almost
revolutionary significance of this film, in which for the first time
ever a mass audience was shown its newly elected government, and was
able to see the Cabinet as a group of ordinary people rather than as
a set of remote personalities. The rulers were being brought to the
people to an extent never before contemplated. An editorial in the
Bioscope took up this point: 'Here was a great. Cabinet of State
dragged out in all its unposed nakedness to a quizzical army of
cameramen and introduced to the microphone one by one, with about as
much formality as one introduces pet chickens in a farmyard. What a
change from the days of the Gladstone Cabinet, when an artist was,
after much discussion grudgingly admitted to the Cabinet Chamber
where Ministers posed the better sides of their faces with the pomp
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and gravity of a set of wax figures in Tussauds! I suppose this
disillusioning informality is really a good thing. They tell me a
bishop never loses his pontifical impressiveness until you have seen
him in his shirt ....' - 19 June 1929. It was admitted, however, that
'Mr. MacDonald is an excellent film speaker' - Review of British
Movietonews, 19 June 1929.
The circumstances of the filming require some clarification. Paul
Wyand, the Movietone cameraman on this occasion, has written that
'One of the first people to appreciate the pack-'em-in value of
"talking" newsreels was the then Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald,
who invited us to make a film in the garden at Downing Street. The
film resulted in queues outside every cinema at which it was shown -
not due to some awakening of the political consciousness, but because
there was a newsreel with the additional marvel of sound'. - P.
Wyand, Useless If Delayed, London 1959, 41. In fact Arthur Henderson
was responsible for the invitation, which subsequently caused a
certain furore when it was discovered that Movietone was an 'American'
firm using German machinery, a state of affairs little conducive to
British pride in early talking newsreels - MacDonald papers, PRO
30/69/1/247, R.G. Leigh to Sir Robert Vansittart, 20 June 1929.
Finally, mention might be made of a somewhat bi7arre reference to
this film in Die Film Wochenschau Im Dienste Der Politik by Hans
Joachim Giese, Dresden 1940, 78, a German propaganda work which uses
this, and similar material, as evidence of British willingness to use
film for propaganda purposes, particularly in the cause of re-
armament.
Note F.
On a personal level Party leaders were not so wholly uninterested in
the possibilities of film at this time as the inactivity between 1933
and 1935 might have suggested. George Lansbury was president of
Rudolph Messel's independent Socialist Film Council, an amateur group
of little significance. Clement Attlee, not known for his interest in
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such matters, briefly toyed with the idea in 1934 of writing and
producing a film for commercial distribution, primarily to earn some
money for himself, but also as possible propaganda: 'The general idea
being the last war wherein two Balkanised despotisms simultaneously
wipe out each other's capitals to the horror of the civilized world.
Extremely realistic scenes of destruction to be filmed. Nftr fomented
by rival armaments groups who own the press of the two countries. Son
of a chief armament monger sees wife and children killed most
unpleasantly. Repentance of the chief armaments monger who gives away
story of the workings of the ring to the D.H. [Daily Herald], just in
time to turn general election. Follows creation of international
world state, abolition of armaments etc. with a postscript some years
afterwards illustrating new world conditions by conversations of
members of world air communications at H.Q. aerodrome in Vienna. Love
interest etc. can be added if necessary. Incidentally there is the
end of Nazism as a Hitlerite dictator intent on war is stopped after
48 hours consideration by threat of international interference
follows collapse of Nazism.' Attlee added: 'It might be quite
valuable propaganda if done sufficiently crudely for the popular
taste.' - Attlee to Tom Attlee, 18 October 1934. Quoted by W. Golant,
'The emergence of C.R. Attlee as leader of the Parliamentary Labour
Party in 1935', Historical Journal, 13 (1970), 328.
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CHAPTER THREE
Broadcasting and Politics: Hopes and Fears.
"An extension of the scope of broadcasting will mean a more
intelligent and enlightened electorate."
J.C.W. Reith - Broadcast Over Britain, 1924
"Radio is a partnership between broadcaster and listener. There is no
virtue and no value in transmitting programmes, however ideal on
paper, to which people do not listen. Listening is a voluntary
occupation and is unlikely to become anything else. It is useless
therefore to lay down standards of what the listener ought to hear
unless they bear some relation to what is likely to interest him and
appeal to him."
Hilda Matheson - in the report of the
International Institute of Intellectual Co-
operation, on The Educational Role of
Broadcasting, 1935.
"We made the mistake of thinking of radio as a new religion, when it
was merely a new channel for the same water."
Lionel Fielden - The Natural Pent, 1960.
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The British Broadcasting Company and Corporation were born into a
political system already very conscious of the potentially
revolutionary implications of a universal franchise, and increasingly
aware of the power of mass opinion and the importance of mass
persunsion. The popular press and the cinema had revealed apparently
untold possibilities for mass media persussion during the First World
War. The political parties were increasingly making use of every
means available to press their case, whilst espousing the educative
ideal. That ideal, and its corollary of an educated and enlightened
democracy, was in its turn being embraced ever more thoroughly with
the development of universal state education, the expansion of public
lending libraries and the work of an ever-growing body of
philanthropic organisations committed to the cause of adult education
and education for citizenship. Developments abroad were already
calling into question the feasibility of a true and working democracy
in mass society. The sides were lining up in a debate which was at
the very heart of inter-war political thinking, that of freedom
versus authority, together with the associated problems of education
and propaganda.
These issues were considered in philosophical terms as well as in
the course of practical decision-taking. The BBC was inevitably
involved in both, and its staff, friends and critics all engaged in a
wide-ranging discussion of such questions. The ideal, recognised as
not yet attained, of an educated and enlightened electorate induced a
major abstract and practical debate as to the dividing line between
'education' and 'propaganda'. Indeed inter-war thinking as to the
BBC's political role, and action taken as a result both within and
outside the Corporation, wereto be dominated by the attempt to draw
such a line.
The protagonists involved in this attempt - broadcasters,
parties, government and individual politicinus - were battling
against the near impossibility, in practical terms , of making such a
distinction. The debate was made even less meaningful by the fact
that all felt themselves obliged to espouse the cause of 'political
221
education' and to abhor 'propaganda'. Yet the objectives and
constraints they set themselves limited the degree of true
objectivity that was possible. The BBC was to be no exception - the
very least of which it can be accused is of holding a brief for
constitutional democracy. Thus the complex problems inherent in the
phrase 'political education' were to provide it with almost insoluble
problems, both in conducting a meaningful debate about the basic
issues involved, and in pursuing practical policies which had the
approval of politicians, broadcasters and commentators alike. If the
most obvious enemy to progress in political education by broadcasting
was to be the conflicting interests of rival politicians, the root of
the problem lay deeper, in the very concept itself. Perhaps for this
reason various attempts to formulate precise regulations to guide the
BBC in its commitment to this ideal were to fail, thereby emphnsising
the sense of one of the first of the many latin tays to be applied to
the Corporation's position - 'solvitur ambulando'.
Yet the inter-war experience of political broadcasting contained
all too few solutions and all too many difficulties. That experience,
as we shall see, was for the BBC one of repeated attempts to overcome
seemingly man-made barriers to the fulfilment of a practicable ideal
- the ideal of using broadcasting to bring closer a rational,
working, representative democracy. For the Labour Party it was one of
continual effort to obtain what it considered just representation on
a medium the constitution and principles of which appeared ideally
designed to put into practice Labour's educative professions, and the
reach of which seemed to offer for the first time a real opportunity
both to implement them and to counter Conservative and Liberal
domination of the older channels of communication. The Conservative
Party, for most of this period also the government of the day,
understandably gave broadcasting a more guarded welcome, yet also
sought to utilise it to maximum effect. These chapters will study the
attitudes and reactions of the two principal parties and of the
1. BBC Archives (hereafter BBC), R4/2/3/12, Crawford Committee,
comments by Lord Blanesburgh and J.C.W. Reith.
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government of the day to this new channel for political
communication, as well as the actual development by the BBC of a
service of controversial political broadcasting. Firstly, however, we
will look at early opinions on broadcasting and politics, and at the
consciously political ideals of John Reith's BBC.
The BBC's high cultural purpose, its dedication to the an of
information, education, and entertainment, is well documented, not
least in Lord Briggs' History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom.
To raise the general level of knowledge, understanding, cultural
appreciation and even religious commitment throughout the nation
were Reith's avowed aims. As he declared in December 1926, when the
British Broadcasting Company was being wound up to make way for the
new Corporation:
We have tried to found a tradition of public service, and to
dedicate the service of broadcasting to humanity in its fullest
sense. We believe that a new national asset has been created ...
the asset referred to is of a moral and not the material order -
that which, down the years, brings the compound in
2
terest of
happier homes, broader culture and truer citizenship.
These three benefits which he offered were not couched in the
vague, nebulous and generalised terms which were all too often used
by the BBC's public supporters - for example in the letters column of
the Radio Times. Reith believed that greater happiness could be the
only possible consequence of freely available and uniformly high
quality entertainment, of a broader culture and of increased
individual knowledge. Culturally one of broadcasting's most valuable
benefits would be not merely the raising of standards but the
introduction to one social class of the culture of another, and the
consequent broadening of the cultural choice of each individual. A
fuller knowledge of social, cultural and political affairs would
likewise lead to a deeper individual understanding of the nature and
workings of society, and hence to truer citizenship.
2.	 Reith, Into The Wind, London 1949, 116.
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Reith's concern for citizenship - the duties and responsibilities
of each person within the state towards the whole - was a reflection
not merely of his moral predilections, but of his conception of the
very nature of broadcasting. For he quickly came to realise that
wireless communication operated on an individual level, rather than
on the mass, as was the case in the cinema. At its best a broadcast
was a personal communication between the broadcaster and each
individual member of his audience, and did not depend in any degree
upon emotional interaction within the audience. The medium was a mass
one in that communication could only be from the few to the many, but
Reith and his colleagues continually emphasised and were constantly
aware that the many were all individuals, listening as individuals or
in only small family groups, in the home. As Asa Briggs has pointed
out, 'There is no reference to 'Vass media" or "mass communications"
in [Reith's book] Broadcast Over Britain or in any of Reith's later
writings: there is rather an emphasis on the "public" or the series
3
of "publics" which together constitute "the great audience.'
The parallels between the relationship of the individual citizen
to the state and of the individual listener to the greater audience
were clear, and they were reinforced by the confident expectation
that for the first time in the development of a mass medium
membership of the audience and of the state could be synonymous,
given the correct structuring of the broadcasting system. Thus the
various largely non-political factors which led to the establishment
of a monopolistic system both assured it of its politically unique
character and guaranteed a political interest in its development.
Viewed from this perspective the idea of public service broadcasting
was more obvious than it might have appeared, and John Reith has,
perhaps, received more credit as its originator• than either the
concept or his part in its perception warranted. Given a mass
franchise in a democracy, with the resultant obligations of
information and education laid both upon the state and upon all
responsible citizens, and given the particular characteristics of a
3. A. Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom,
Vol. 1, The Birth ot Broadcasting, London 1961, 239.
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monopolistic broadcasting system, characteristics which it held in
common only with the state itself, then the public service
broadcasting ideal appeared to many people not as being remarkable,
but as quite natural. Even before the BBC had been created, or Reith
appointed, views were being expressed which may be seen as the first
tentative steps towards the public service concept. In a meeting with
F.J.Brown of the Post Office in March 1922, representatives of
Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical Company, one of the first commercial
firms to carry out experimental broadcasting, stressed the
educational value of wireless and, interestingly, pointed out its
4
potentially 'unifying effect' upon the state. In a statement in the
House of Commons in August 1922 the Postmaster General, F.G.Kellaway,
declared of broadcasting that
Within twelve months - I do not think I am too sanguine - it may
become one of the most valuable sources of communication, within
certain limitations, at our disposal ....For individual
communication it is, I think, impracticable, but for distributing
forms of information of common interest to great numbers of
people, it may indeed prove to be a most valuable resource both
5
for education, and, possibly, for political propaganda.
There was no suggestion here that the
	
PMG would permit the
service to be 'prostituted' and used merely for base entertainment,
as Reith later suggested had been a possibility before the creation
6
of the BBC. Kellaway's vision was already of a high purpose for
broadcasting, and he had previously stated that in his opinion 'the
7
possibilities of this service are almost unlimited'.
Had the principal wireless manufacturers decided to organise
4. Ibid., opposite page 136.
5. H.C. Debates, vol. 157: col. 1954, 4 August 1922.
6. J.C.W. Reith, Op. Cit., 95, 99.
7. H.C. Debates, vol. 153: col. 1602, 4 May 1922.
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themselves into two broadcasting groups, as for a time in July 1922
appeared likely, then the correlation of the broadcasting service to
the state might not have been so apparent, although the interest of
the armed services in wireless telegraphy would have ensured state
involvement. But the unique character of a centrally controlled,
monopolistic and potentially all-pervasive communications channel
guaranteed that from its inception consideration would be given to
the position that broadcasting might occupy in the state system and
the democratic process. The role of broadcasting as a public service,
and as a major factor in direct political education and persuasion,
WRS amongst the earliest points raised in the Commons with regard to
the new medium. In May 1922, in the very first ministerial statement
on broadcasting, the Postmaster General speculated that the
proceedings of the Houses of Parliament might be broadcast, whilst
Sir Henry Norman, the chairman of the Wireless Sub-Committee of the
Imperial Communications Committee, boldly declared that
I think one may say not merely as a matter of opinion but with
the confidence with which one announces a certain fact, that
before much time has elapsed, at times of political crisis the
Prime Minister on the one hand, and the Leader of the Opposition
on the other, will be addressing hundreds of thousands of people
8
in the country simultaneously, by means of wireless telephony.
Amongst the first questions asked in the House were ones concerning
the broadcasting of 'political copy, either generally or in
particular during an election calaign', and the prevention of biased
political news over the wireless.
An appreciation of the singular political implications of the new
medium was not, therefore, confined to those who were responsible for
its development. Although relatively few MPs took a serious interest
in broadcasting in the years before it acquired a truly national
8. Ibid., Col. 1624.
9. H.C. Debates, vol. 156: col. 38, 3 July 1922; vol. 164: col. 238,
15 May 1923.
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audience or a national status and authority, the debate as to its
likely and potential political significance was extensive in the
press, in various parliamentary debates and within broadcasting
circles throughout the inter-war years. The discussion began before
the appearance of John Reith but it was he who produced the first
comprehensive vision for broadcasting, a statement of hope and
purpose, both in his book Broadcast Over Britain and in various
articles and speeches throughout his management of the B. If the
broader public service aspect of this vision received most public
attention this was because, as we shall see below, the BBC was more
easily able to put such a philosophy into practice than it was to
implement Reith's concept of its political destiny. Yet he was
confident of that destiny, despite early obstacles, when he wrote
Broadcast Over Britain in 1924:
There is little doubt that sooner or later many of the chains
which fetter the greater utility of the service will be removed.
It is probable that more debates will be held so that people may
have an opportunity of listening to outstanding exponents of
conflicting opinions on the great questions political and social
which are today understood by a mere fraction of the electorate,
but which are of such vital importance. I have heard it said that
in the old days of limited suffrage two-thirds of the voters were
students of politics, whereas today not five percent have any
real knowledge of the principles on which they cast their vote.
Whether this be so or not, it is admittedly a serious menace to
the country that suffrage be exercised without first-hand and
personal knowledge. An extension of the scope of broadcasting
10
will mean a more intelligent and enlightened electorate.
Thus broadcasting was seen as a solution to the newly extended and
ignorant electorate, whose uninformed and irresponsibly given vote
would be, and already was, a 'serious menace' to the wellbeing of the
country. Wireless debates and speeches would give the elector 'first-
10. J.C.W. Reith, Broadcast Over Britain, London 1924, 112-3.
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hand and personal knowledge' of the political options.
The argument was developed and re-emphasised the following year
in the evidence that Reith submitted to the Crawford Committee, which
was considering the future of broadcasting:
There is nothing exclusive about Broadcasting; it is common to
all sorts and conditions of listeners, and brouebt to them at
their firesides. There is no home, however favoured, to which
broadcasting may not introduce some new and living interest. It
is thus able to bring together all classes of the population,
promoting a conception of service in all lines of human
11
activity.
Broadcasting was, Reith argued, capable of "making the nation as one
man", and he restated the case he had made in Broadcast Over 
Britain . Broadcasting could dispel ignorance and allow the facts of
a case to be set out under 'ideal conditions',
thereby providing the essential basis on which reasoned and
intelligent opinion can be formed. It enables men and women to
... hear the protagonists direct and make up their minds where
formerly they had to accept the dictated and partial versions of
others. A new and mighty weight of public opinion is being
forwed, manifestations of which are not lacking. It may be argued
that there is a danger in this, as if a state of ignorance were
preferable to one of enlightenment. The danger only arises where
awakening interest is not supplemented by satisfactory answers to
legitimate questions. The ignorance and indifference of
12
electorates is proverbial, but both may be overcome.
The full extent of Reith's vision, however, was best revealed in
an article he contributed to The Nineteenth Century and After in
11. BBC,R4/2/2,	 Reith, Memorandum of Information on the Scope
and Conduct of the Broadcasting Service, 1925, 3-4.
12. Ibid., 4.
228
November 1927. Entitled 'Broadcasting, The State, and The People',
this article became the basis for his subsequent writings and
speeches on the political role of broadcasting. So fundamental are
these statements to an understanding of his beliefs and actions that
it is worth looking at them in some detail. His case centred around
the question of how to reconcile the theory of democracy with the
fact of the real world:
No problem seems to exercise political minds to-day more
seriously than that of how to impart to this word [democracy] one
reasonably sure and well-understood meaning applicable to and
13
operating in the world of men and women.
Thus democracy was on trial, and had in many countries already been
found chimerical:
What is looked for is the mode of linking the philosophy of
democracy to the real world that goes on visibly around us ...
some indeed have found it so difficult that they have given up
trying for such a modifying and practical influence in the real
world and have not unnaturally resorted to a counter-theory (as,
14
for instance, dictatorship).
The dilemma for democracy, therefore, was how to turn theory into
practice in the face of encroaching fascist and communist
totalitarianism. The new and unique phe nomenon of broadcasting,
appearing at this very time when democracy was being questioned as a
result both of external and internal development, introduced a new
element into the situation, and Reith posed the question
What significance this new thing may bring to the long search for
the tempering factor that will give democracy (for the first time
under modern conditions) a real chance of operating as a living
13. J.C.W. Reith, 'Broadcasting, The State, and The People', The
Nineteenth Century and After, November 1927, 667.
14. Ibid., 668.
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force throughout the community.
Existing methods of communication between the governors of the nation
and the community itself were both inadequate and developed almost or
quite up to the highest pitch of which they were inherently capable.
Even the parliamentary system divided the nation geographically and
separated the rulers from the ruled by introducing an intermediate
representative, the MP. As for the press, the price of a free and
pluralistic fourth estate was not only that the danger of an
unelected influence upon the electorate was increased, but also that
no particular press organ reached the whole community:
If the parliamentary system of nation-working divides the
elements of the community geographically, the Press system
divides them on the basis of opinions and prejudices. And the
problem is not to find bases of subdivision, but to
16
integrate.
As for public meetings they were merely quasi-theatrical partisan
displays whose effect was merely to produce 'powerful oscillations of
feeling that are by no means permanent', whilst the most common form
of political communication, general gossip and friendly argument, was
17
as often as not 'an argument in the dark, ignotium per ignotius.'
For Reith the conclusions to be drawn from this catalogue of the
failings of British democracy in general and of the existing means of
communication in particular were clear. For communication was the
very nervous system of democracy:
That the nervous system of the modern democracy is imperfect few
could deny. The above brief survey of its elements as they
existed before the coming of broadcasting shows, more or less
convincingly, that they could not in their very nature produce a
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 670.
17. Ibid., 673.
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perfectly harmonious system ... What is lacking is, as hAs been
said before, some integrating element, and it is suggested that,
rightly understood and employed, a national Broadcasting Service
18
will eventually become just that integrator for democracy.
Thus broadcasting created the opportunity to put democracy into
practice in a mass society and to make it a reality. Indeed Reith
recognised a double benefit from the new medium. On one side the
BBC's impartial portrayal of the community would assist the
politicians' understanding of society, for
the broadcast programme must... cover more and more of the field
of social and cultural life, and therefore become a more and more
faithful index to the community's outlook and personality which
19
the statesman is supposed to read.
On the other side wireless would
familiarise the public with the central organisation that
conducts its collective business and regulates its inner and
outer relations.
Reith's vision for the political role of broadcasting clearly
comprehended far more than a national system for communicating
factual information and balanced partisan opinion, revolutionary
though such an innovation might be. His belief that wireless could
help to unite the classes and the nation, its integrating power, was
a central and fateful element of his thinking. Broadcasting would not
18. Ibid., 671. See also Reith's speech at the Cambridge University
Summer School in 1930 (BBC Archives):'The problems today are
therefore not of sub-division but of integration. We are
concerned with the unity of the nervous system of the body
politic. That it is imperfect few will deny. I suggest that
broadcasting is the integrating element, and that rightly
understood and applied a national broadcasting service will
supply the integrator for democracy'.
19. Ibid. 668.
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merely represent the governed to the governors, and communicate the
statements and actions of the latter back to the electorate; it would
also actually bring rulers and ruled closer together in a firm bond
tempered by understanding:
Experience has shown that the art of broadcasting is above all
the art of establishing a quiet and secure linkage between the
speaker or actor and the individuals of the fireside audience.
And it is not the printable scheme of government, but its living
and doing, not the reading of the names of the leading figures in
it, but the conveyance of their personal values "across the
table", that will interlock governors and governed, the holders
20
and the sources of power, in a real ensemble.
Paralleling yet again in its particular characteristics those of
government, broadcasting would thus knit society more securely than
21
ever before.
Through two further unique qualities broadcasting would alter
still more the conditions of political communication. By its
impartiality it would give the electorate for the first time the
opportunity of reaching objective decisions based on balanced
evidence. Reith saw the obligation to be impartial as both a legal
and a moral one, and it was the latter which weighed most heavily:
Unlike other nodes of reaching the citizen directly
[broadcasting] is bound to impartiality, not merely by the terms
in which most states permit it, or will in the future permit it,
to operate, but still more because it cannot abuse the
confidential footing that it haq obtained on every man's
22
hearthrug.
20. Ibid.
21. Reith acknowledged that this particular characteristic of
broadcasting was as applicable to a dictatorship as to a
democracy.
22. Ibid., 673.
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He rather over-confidently argued that because
Impartiality in controversial matters (which does not mean a
fearful avoidance of them) is imposed on or assumed by the
Broadcasting authority. The Service is therefore trusted by all
23
classes and by most shades of opinion.
Finally Reith developed further his argument that the singular
techniques of broadcast presentation would aid the objective
communication and comprehension of political issues and even alter
the very way in which politicians carried out their task of informing
and persuading the electorate. Reith, puritan and puristical, whose
ambition for seven years before joining the BBC had been to become a
politician despite his lack of any strong partisan leanings, had
rapidly become disillusioned by the sordid realities of politics when
he had acted as the olitical secretary to Conservative MP Sir
2
William Bull in 1922. The scheming and manoeuvring of that year
left him with a low opinion of existing political morality. Although
he did not express it in these terms, Reith believed that
broadcasting by its very nature could now raise the moral tone of
political communication, and perhaps thereby of politics per se. He
explained the present widespread opposition to the broadcasting of
politics as the result of a misunderstanding of the fundamental
differences between existing forms of political communication and
broadcasting:
We are accustomed ... to associate controversy with heated
crowds, exaggeration, misrepresentation, and unreasonableness
generally, and we think of broadcast 'politics' as differing only
in degree and not in kind from platform politics. Nothing could
be further from the facts ... It is a medium that, if it is to be
23. J.C.W. Reith, 'Broadcasting and a Better World', Spectator,
22 November 1930, 765-6.
24. A. Boyle, Only The Wind Will Listen - Reith of the BBC, London
1972, 116.
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used successfully must be used soberly. It has a wider and more
continuous audience than either the parliamentary machinery or
any particular part of the Press machinery, yet it holds its
listeners purely as individuals and families and not as vibrating
atoms in a crowd ... [Thus] if the existing technique of
political propaganda and argument is excluded by the conditions,
statesmen will find it necessary to develop another technique in
25
its stead.
Such a technique would owe little to parliamentary or soap-box
oratory, and might, Reith hoped, rely more on the detailed exposition
of facts and figures.
It would not be too great an exaggeration to say that Reith saw
in broadcasting a possible panacaea for the evils both of politics
and of mass franchise democracy - an 'integrator for democracy'.
Provided that this new 'integrating element' was correctly understood
and applied democracy could be a viable alternative to,26
dictatorship. This was the vision, the excessively simplistic
vision, of a man fired by idealism and the conviction that he was,
quite literally, 'predestined' to achieve a great work. His
biographer, Andrew Boyle, describes this 'prophet and practical
mystic of broadcasting' as having the 'romantic vision and
imaginative aspirations of the Celt', a man whose idealism was a
27
'White hot flame'.	 Less kindly, C.P.Snow wrote of Reith's
28
'megalomaniacal or God-drunk vision, or both combined'. For
Reith's idealism, inextricably linked with his complex and tortuous
religious position, dominated him, unmoderated by a bitter contempt
for the capabilities of most of his fellow men. His confident hopes
25. Reith (1927), Op.Cit. , 673.
26.Notoriously autocratic in his personal modus operandi, Reith
actually favoured the somewhat Fabian notion of a 'democratically
born autocracy' - Ibid., 671.
27. Boyle, Op.Cit., 153, 164.
28. Financial Times, 16 November 1972, 14.
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for the political implications of broadcasting were buoyed by a
complete self-assurance with regard to his own abilities.
Broadcasting could be made to lift the nation's levels of culture and
to make democracy an integrated reality because he was in control of
it. It could fulfil its political role only
by preserving its professional independence alike against the
"frown of the threatening tyrant" and the "ardour of the citizens
29
bidding evil".
His task was to maintain that independence. In his upright and
principled hands the danger of such Olympian independence as he
sought being abused by the controllers of broadcasting would be
avoided:
The possibility of the doctor himself turning poisoner can only
be prevented by securing a
0
 high and conscientious type of man or
3
woman for the profession.
He was able to reiterate this point before the Crawford Committee as
part of his argument for independence of action for the BBC.
Questioned by an obviously sympathetic Lord Blanesburgh he urged that
there must be a great deal of responsibility and confidence
vested in the broadcasting authority.
Blanesburgh: You have to trust the man at the wheel?
Reith:	 You have to trust the man at the wheel.
Blanesburgh:And probably with more effective results than if you
were to attempt beforehand, either by express liberty or by
express prohibition, to curtail his liberty of .action?
31
Reith: I do not think there is any other plan feasible.
29. Reith (1927), Op. Cit. , 674.
30. Ibid.
31. BBC,R4/2/3/12 - Verbal Evidence to Crawford Committee,13th
Meeting.
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Reith's naive ambitions, perfectly comprehended and carried
through, would have raised broadcasting and his own personal power
above the level of petty power politics to a position of almost
supernal might and justice. Reith was not unaware of this, and he
welcomed and believed himself capable of undertaking the task
allotted to him by his vision. For he well knew that there was more
to broadcasting than simple communication. At the conclusion to his
lecture at the 1930 Cambridge University Summer School he referred
again to the concept of broadcasting as an 'integrator', and took the
analysis one stage further:
Integration is a process not of gross summation, but of ordering
and valuation. And broadcasting is, and in its nature must be,
not only the collector but the selector of material. And therein
32
lies its supreme responsibility.
Reith might be confident of his own capacity to understand and
apply the new medium to the political system, but his were not the
only abilities or opinions involved. As we shall see, he was soon to
learn by experience that others, both politicians and electorate, did
not share his qualities. Nor, indeed, did those in power feel
sufficiently certain that he himself possessed them to give him
their wholehearted support.
Nevertheless Reith was far from alone in his vision. His
subordinates in the early BBC - individuals of the calibre of C.A.
Lewis, P.P. Eckersley, Hilda Matheson and David Cleghorn Thomson -
did not need his idealism to inspire them. Yet although their widely
differing views as to the manner and practical details of broadcast
development showed them to be considerably pore than Reith's
unquestioning and hand-picked disciples, the ultimate objective was
described in very much the same terms. Thus Cecil Lewis, the Deputy
Director of Programmes, pointed in 1924 to the universal appeal of
broadcasting:
32. BBC - File of Director Generals' speeches and articles.
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From palace to slum people are listening. It is the most
33
democratic form of entertainment ever invented by man.
Like Reith, Lewis believed that this quality would help to unite the
different elements of society:
It would appear that the wholesale distribution of services
covering almost every phase of human ende6ur ... will have the
effect of bringing all classes of society into closer touch with
their neighbours, and so fostering that mutual trust and under-
standing which is essential for the well-being of a great
34
democracy.
Hitherto the majority of the electorate had had their judgements
prepared for them, ninety per cent. of the populace living on the
opinions of the other ten. Here was the opportunity for the man in
the street to hear, absorb and judge for himself; here was his chance
35
to live at first hand. Lewis had a simple confidence both in the
latent ability of the audience and in the power of broadcasting to
raise the morality and practice of politics:
It would appear also that this opportunity to take part in the
life of the nation, to hear great men speak of their country's
affairs, to become a witness of all that is said and done, will
raise the tone and increase the feeling of responsibility among
those that are so placed on trial before their fellow men.
Against this loss of privacy must be balanced the inestimable
advantage of having a true and unbiased record of what has passed
placed in the ears of the public, who will not be slow to
recognise those who have their country's interests truly at
36
heart.
33. C.A. Lewis, Broadcasting From Within, London 1924, 47.
34. Ibid., 174.
35. Ibid., 129.
36. Ibid., 174.
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Not surprisingly, like Reith, he considered it
essential that broadcasting should become a public service, on
whose integrity and impartiality in all controversial matters,
37
the public may rely absolutely.
These sentiments, like Reith's, were utopian and, like Reith,
Lewis took far too much for granted. He expected too much of the
politicians, of the public and of the broadcasters. There was no
hint of irony, nor any recognition of the possibilities of mass media
abuse, in his comment,
when [politicians] appreciate the fact that the microphone, like
the camera, cannot lie, and will always bring to the peoples'
ears what they have said, their sense of fair play will make them
clamour for the public to be their judges, and the microphone
will become just as important an instrument, as much to be
studied and convenienced as the camera and cinematograph are
38
today.
These were arguments Which placed emphasis on the distinguishing
of honesty from corruption. The electorate would recognise those who
did not have 'their country's interests truly at heart', and the good
would be acclaimed. The trap, however, into which such sentiments
might fall was that of equating recognition of honesty with
recognition of truth. The politicians of all parties might be honest
but they could not all be correct in their opposing analyses of
political problems. The danger of Lewis's view was that honesty and
truth might be considered synonymous; once broadcasting had exposed
what was false the choice of policy for the electorate would then be
obvious. Thus there was a potential and unrecognised element within
this analysis which threatened to deny the pluralistic tradition of
British politics. The stress which the BBC founders laid upon
reason' as the essence of successful democracy, and their antipathy
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., 129.
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to party politics, contained this hidden barb; for it was also an
emphasis which the critics of the democratic system used in order to
reject the whole concept of a pluralist society.
Hilda Matheson, Director of Talks from 1927 to 1932, did not
expect so much from broadcasting and, as we shall see below, had an
acute perception of the limitations and dangers inherent in the new
medium. Nevertheless her general attitudes and hopes were familiarly
Reithian. She shared Reith's fear that modern political developments
had found existing political machinery inadequate, and that the
democratic system was under threat. Her antipathy to party politics
39
was a not uncommon feature of BBC senior staff
In most countries the old lines of party demarcation are not
wholly relevant to the problems of today, and this sense of
misfit sends many people to throw in their lot with short cuts of
40
violence or to shrug their shoulders at politics.
The picture of society which she painted was a pessimistic one. She
described the
general sense of fear and distrust, internally between classes,
externally between nations
	
 On the one hand is a dead weight
of half-educated, uneducated, or even illiterate populations,
little trained to think, little able to adapt themselves to
rapidly changing circumstances. They are peculiarly open to
emotional appeals, easily stampeded, easily cowed, and easily
credulous ... On the other hand, the better educated are
themselves oppressed by a sense of impotence, in the face of a
41
growth of knowledge with which it is impossible to keep pace.
39. Reith himself, after his appointment to the BBC, did not vote in
elections. According to Andrew Boyle party politics 'left him
cold' - Boyle, Op. Cit., 222.
40. H. Matheson, Broadcasting, London 1933, 98.
41. H. Matheson, in The Educational Role Of Broadcasting, the report
of The International Institute of International Co-operation,
Paris 1935, 151.
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A growing recognition of the need for new kinds of education, new
forms of social, economic and political life, had led people to
question whether the traditional means of spreading information and
knowledge were adequate for the new conditions.
Matheson argued that broadcasting could alter this situation in
various ways. It could provide, side by side, an objective statement
of the facts of an issue and a subjective argument on the proposed
policies:
People have seldom had the opportunity to see - set side by side-
the objective analysis of a situation and the proposed political
resolutions - the report of the laboratory research men and the
42
remedies of the bedside physicians.
To provide that opportunity would be to 'form the bridge between
national politics and the wider background', thereby demonstrating
the relevance of party politics to real life. Properly utilised,
broadcasting could also counter the baser elements of human nature,
of party propaganda and of the popular press, and thereby raise the
moral tone of politics. It could even, perhaps, turn criteria other
than mere demagoguery into the necessary perquisites for political
leadership and power:
broadcasting can focus attention on the important as distinct
from the trivial elements in politics, which often have greater
headline value. When political leaders come to the microphone it
is usually to discuss a major not a minor issue; those who listen
are brought into direct touch with the business of responsible
government, and they may hear debated the opposing principles
rather than the tricks of parliamentary tactics ... The
microphone ha q
 a curious knack of showing what is real and what
is unreal, what is clear and what is woolly... what is sincere
and what is an appeal to the gallery... it seems not unlikely
42. H. Matheson (1933), Op. Cit. , 98-9.
Institute
The Power
of Intellectual Co-operation, Op.
Behind The Microphone, London 1940,155.
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that the influence of broadcasting will be definitely against the
43
demagogue and in favour of the thoughtful stateman.
Like Reith and Lewis, Matheson saw broadcasting as a unifying
influence and a force for the moderation of partisanship in politics:
Listeners are under no obligation themselves to listen to views
which enrage them; but if they do so, a growth of tolerance
appears to develop Which may be of great value in the practical
44
art of self-government.
Following his resignation as Chief Engineer to the BBC in 1929
Peter Eckersley became one of its most astute critics. Yet it was not
the theories but the practices of the Corporation with which he found
fault. In his opinion it was these latter that had prevented the
achievement of ideals which, as late as 1940, he still believed to be
attainable. For he argued that broadcasting should be
in politics the rostrum for contending political theory, in
sociology a means to show the community to the community, and in
45
art the patron of the artist.
Writing in wartime he saw the present turmoil as a heaven-sent
opportunity to reform and rebuild society. Broadcasting could help
enormously towards 'true reconstruction'. 'Why should not we try to
46
make democracy a reality?', he asked.
Another perceptive critic of the BBC in the later 1930s was David
Cleghorn Thomson, formerly its Northern Regional Director. In his
43. Ibid.
44. International
Cit.,160.
45. P.P. Eckersley,
46. Ibid., 187.
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book Radio is Changing Us Thomson assessed the impact and potential
of broadcasting from a cultural and structural point of view rather
than a purely political. His criticism of BBC policy was sharp and
forceful; yet when he turned his attention to the possibilities of
broadcasting, his beliefs differed hardly at all from those which
Reith had expounded ten years previously:
Radio can... enable us to see ourselves as others see us, and
prevent the world from living in water-tight compartments
separated by class and national barriers of wealth and
distance....It can help to educate good citizens in the best
sense, men and women of rare quality, whose range of human
experience has been generously widened and whose sensitivity of
47
perception has been greatly increased.
Some people felt that the church had abandoned its duty to control
morality in political and business matters, as it had to give a lead
in patronising the arts:
In both these spheres the opportunity of the radio to give a
lead, and to help in the fostering of democratic leaders, is
48
unique.
The idealism of those who created the early BBC was very marked.
The sense of purpose with which they were filled was quite specific
and a conscious, even dominant, influence upon their daily decisions
and actions. They worked for the creation of a state which was
fostered not only culturally and educationally by broadcasting, but
also politically. Broadcasting would become not merely an aid to the
political system, but an integral and essential part of it, its
central nervous system, directing messages from brain to body and
body to brain, linking and binding all parts in a stable and united
whole. It is perhaps not surprising to learn that with such a model in
47. D. Cleghorn Thomson, Radio Is Changing Us, London 1937, 18.
48. Ibid.
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his mind Reith found the actual details of politics as practiced
49
uninteresting, his political aspirations notwithstanding. Despite
his exceptional abilities in organisation, man-management (his
dictatorial reputation being not wholly justified) and diplomacy,
Reith was to find the 'whole horrid technique' of practical politics
50
impervious to and seemingly unaffected by his efforts.
Yet the rise of broadcasting also inspired and reinforced the
idealism of many politicians and others not professionally involved
in radio. Like Reith they looked to it to lift them out of the
depressing realities of an apparently ignorant and unintelligent mass
franchise society. Between July 1922 and March 1926 no fewer than ten
questions were asked in the Commons advocating the broadcasting of
political matter. In the debate which followed the publication of the
report of the Crawford Committee on Broadcasting, a small but
vociferous minority of MPs had their first real opportunity to make
known their views on the new medium. A Liberal MP, Mr. Ellis Davies,
argued that, with audiences at political meetings dwindling, the only
way to compel the attention of the electorate was for politicinns to
broadcast at them. His confidence as to the ease of organisation of
political broadcasting was, for a partisan politician, rather naive:
As to whether time and opportunity could be distributed
impartially, [the Postmaster General] has appointed people of
ability who, like the Judges, can be depended upon to be
impartial. I see no difficulty at all in allowing the
Corporation, through the Government, to decide what proportion of
51
time and what particular speakers may broadcast.
Ian Fraser (Conservative), later to be a governor of the BBC,
stressed that controversy was the breath of life, but rather
49. A. Boyle, Op. Cit., 222.
50. C. Stuart (ed.), The Reith Diaries, London 1975, 213, 29 November
1936.
51. H.C.Debates, vol. 199: col. 1595, 15 November 1926.
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compromised his cse by suggesting that a political broadcasting
policy could be found which would be
a happy mean somewhere between the negative policy that is now
being put forward, and the plea that the Hon. Member for North
52
Battersea (Mr. Saklatvala) should speak.
In a speech primarily on adult education Major Oliver Stanley
(Conservative) argued that highly controversial subjects could be
explained quite impartially by objective speakers, rather than by
opposing disputants, whilst Frederick MacQuisten, also Conservative,
felt that the broadcasting of Parliament would lead to a purge of
incompetent MPs and an improvement in the quality of the people's
53
representatives. Most forceful was Leslie Hore-Belisha who saw in
broadcasting the opportunity to create a direct democracy:
the science of broadcasting makes real democracy possible for the
first time in this country. The representative system is a
makeshift system and is not the system which we intended to have.
It is the system we have because we cannot get real democracy,
for real democracy presupposes all the citizens meeting together
as they did in Athens and hearing speeches. Now for the first
time by means of broadcasting you can get the whole community
associated with your Parli2rent and give it the power to hear
54
speeches.
Not surprisingly the early Radio Times contained many articles on
the broadcasting of politics, and as we shall see Reith used the
journal as a weapon in his attempt to persuade the GPO to permit
controversy on the air. Eminent men were invited to contribute their
thoughts on the new medium, and many did so. In December 1923 the
52. Ibid., col. 1601, 15 November 1926.
53. Ibid., cols. 1609, 1630, 15 November 1926.
54. Ibid., col. 1629, 15 November 1926.
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former Postmaster General, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, commented
approvingly on the fact that the man in the street could now hear the
55
statesmen 'whose words and actions influence his life', 	 whilst
the senior Labour politician J.R. Clynes wrote of broadcasting:
Used rightly for the common advancement and recreation of the
people, who is to set bounds to the positive good which may
accrue from it? Through it a people might hear its national
business discussed and transacted, and who more fitted to hear it
than those millions of ordinary men and women who constitute the
56
nation?
The following year Clynes contributed an article in which he
described the broadening in recent generations of peoples' interests
and outlooks, the decreasing provincialism of society and of nations
and the widening of community interest. Increased education and the
work of the press were largely responsible, but
Broadcasting is another such force, coming with appropriateness
into a gregarious, de-provincialised world, and certain to
accelerate the widening of common interest which is one of the
57
leading characteristics of our time.
Similarly in an article in October 1928 entitled 'The world a
market place again - Broadcasting is restoring the Greek ideal of
Democracy', the writer Gerald Heard stated as facts the rather dubious
contentions that radio had made information available to all and that
everybody was therefore now qualified to play their part in a direct
democracy. He advocated a regular broadcast 'symposium' of anonymous
protagonists discussing affairs of importance rationally, allowing
the listener to reach his own conclusions:
55. Radio Times, 21 December 1923.
56. Ibid., 452.
57. Radio Times, 18 July 1924, 133-4.
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Some such discussion, only restricted by the absolute honesty
with which the speaker advances his argument, and the absolute
toleration ... with which the rest hear him out, is... the only
58
way in which may be met an essential need of Democracy.
Absolute honesty and absolute toleration were unreasonable
expectations, and it is not surprising that, in general, writings on
the subject in the 1930s brought to it a more balanced view than did
those of the previous decade. Yet a more critical approach, as in the
case of Matheson, Eckersley and Cleghorn Thomson, implied no less an
idealistic vision. What all these commentators, apologists and
critics alike were agreed upon was that broadcasting's unique
features should be used not merely for entertainment, not in a purely
trivial way, but that the BBC should apply the incalculable power and
influence which people attributed to it to meeting society's
recognised need for cultural and democratic enlightenment. The
position of wireless was compared with that of the cinema:
Anyone who has considered the almost complete prostitution of the
cinema as an educational force, and its unhappy effect on the
youth of today, cannot fail to appreciate the vital importance of
directing to better ends the almost equally potent force of
59
radio.
Yet, looked at from a different viewpoint, what was being
proposed was the abuse of one of the populace's means of
entertainment. For the potential of broadcasting as a mass political
and educational influence depended primarily upon its power and
popularity as a medium of entertainment. It was evident that its
political and educational value, like that of the cinema, depended
not primarily on its ability to reach the entire electorate, nor on
its absolutely impartial position, but on its power to attract a mass
audience by the simple inducements of music, reviews and popular
58. Radio Times, 26 October 1928, 221-2, and 4 January 1929, 7.
59. A.H. Morse, Radio: Beam and Broadcast, London 1925, 78.
246
personalities. As was to be pointed out on many occasions, that a
broadcast political discussion was capable of being heard by the
electorate gave no assurance that the electorate would listen. The
size of the audience for political programmes would depend very much
on their being placed within the context of an entertainment medium.
Even then the 'off' switch, and not the broadcasters, would remain
the ultimate arbiter of the nation's tastes. The format of a
political programme, its ability to entertain as well as to instruct
and its position in relation to programmes of more obvious
entertainment value, were to be critical factors in the fight for the
listeners' attention. The report of the International Institute of
Intellectual Co-operation on The Educational Role of Broadcasting 
written in 1935, touched faintly and unknowingly upon this, and in
one passage came closer than most advocates of political and
educational programmes to an implicit recognition of the limitations
of broadcasting when considered solely by itself. The word
'education' was, of course, being used here in a general rather than
a particular sense:
Broadcasting, which attracts the public by its recreational
programmes, can happily awaken an interest also in things of the
mind, without scaring listeners by its intellectual ambitions.The
educational role of broadcasting consists essentially in arousing
this latent curiosity in the listener, in encouraging it to pass
from a state of potentiality to definite and practical
60
action.
The important role of broadcasting would be not so much to provide
the information on which a decision could be made (although it would
do this also), as to arouse the listener's curiosity and encourage in
him the desire to make decisions, and to make them from a position of
knowledge. Yet even here the implications were passed over, and the
report's conclusions on politics and broadcasting encapsulated the
essence of the vision already rehearsed by so many advocates:
60. International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, The
Educational Role of Broadcasting, Paris 1935, 17-18.
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Broadcasting furnishes the average citizen with an opportunity of
coming into direct touch with the leaders of public opinion and
of following every stage in the development of the major problems
on which the life of a nation depends. It can thus contribute
very largely to the promotion of the citizen spirit 
	
 all
schools of thought must be granted a hearing; politics in the
true sense should be barred; what is required is a series of
objective statements on the political situation, accompanied by
the reasons which seem to militate in favour of the different
solutions advocated .... Broadcasting will thus contribute to the
enlightenment of public opinion by stressing, outside the public
assembly halls - where all personal judgement is lost in the
61
crowd - the real scope of current problems.
It was one of the ironies of political broadcasting that its
contribution to the political process relied in practice on the
obvious merits of broadcasting as a medium for popular entertainment.
In advocating its use in order to raise the political consciousness
of the ignorant and emotional electorate its supporters were tacitly
accepting the fact that democratic politics and the citizen spirit
needed, and possibly always would need, the assistance of the showman
to make it work. In the debate on the Crawford Committee report in
the Commons Mr. Ellis Davies decried the fact that in one
constituency a short time before there had actually been a Punch and
Judy show in order to attract an audience to a political meeting. Yet
in suggesting that 'The Postmaster General should consider, if we
cannot get our audiences to meet us, whether we should be able by
broadcasting to get at them', he was merely bringing up-to-date and
institutionalising the puppet entertainment as a necessary element of
62
mass franchise democracy.	 For although they might hope that
people would listen to political broadcasting out of a sense of
democratic responsibility, its advocates could not dispute that the
majority of wireless owners - and it was the politically uninterested
61. Ibid., 22.
62. H.C.Debates, vol. 199: col. 1595, 15 November 1926.
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majority which they wished to reach - bought sets either for their
novelty or for their recreational value. It was but a comparatively
short step from accepting the near indispensibility of entertainment
for politics to recognising that if a non-politically motivated
audience was to be gained for a political programme then the
programme itself, and even the politicians and other speakers
involved, would have to take account of the needs of entertainment.
It was a small step, but a crucial one, for to have taken it
would have been to accept much of the mores of the emotionally
grounded partisan politics which so many of the 'political educators'
abhorred. Reith and his colleagues, having justified the case for
broadcast politics in such vehement and confident terms, were forced
because of the nature of their argument to try to prove their thesis
deprived of the principal feature which gave broadcast programmes
their mass appeal - their capacity to entertain. Political programmes
would either have to attract an audience on their own merits as
political programmes or to compromise themselves in attempting to
stimulate interest by means not strictly relevant to or desirable in
the political process. It was this narrow, and it might be argued
non-existent, path between failure through lack of an audience and
failure through the compromising of principles, that Reith, his
colleagues and his heirs had to tread.
Yet as we have seen, hopes and objectives were high and not
confined to broadcasters. The possibilities of broadcasting seemed so
tremendous that even criticisms were confined to the dangers inherent
in the new medium - to what its positive effects might be, bad as
well as good. Criticism which might simply have refuted all these
idealistic expectations was not considered. After all, broadcasting
was too large a development to be introduced into society for there
not to be a significant effect, and this was felt to be as true
politically as it would be culturally. The early criticisms of
broadcasting, from a political standpoint, were therefore concerned
with ways in which certain of its inherent features might endanger
the progress towards the democratic goal which was otherwise the
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anticipated consequence of the new medium. The fears aroused as a
result of these criticisms were extremely strong, and must go a
long way to explaining why the early BBC had so little success in
persuading the government of the day that such an innovation as
broadcast politics should be permitted. Cecil Lewis's views were
particularly graphic and alarming*
Broadcasting is a national detonator. A spark at the microphone,
in the shape of a chance word or phrase, is enougb to set the
whole nation aflame. A speech delivered by a great orator might
produce the most far-reaching results. The power, the force that
is being unleashed is gigantic. Its guardians, like chemists with
some new high explosive, are gradually coming to understand it,
they make experiments and watch the reaction, they weigh it and
sift it, calculating the amount required to blow up the world
.... At any moment a false move, a risky experiment, and it may
all go off, hoisting them with their own petard. That this
terrific medium ... should degenerate into becoming the
mouthpiece of political party propaganda, or of any faction in
the country who have axes to grind, would be to drag a great
force for national education, welfare and amusement into the
63
gutter.
It is perhaps difficult to imagine just how potent a force
broadcasting was then felt to be; yet as with attitudes towards
propaganda and the popular press a sufficiently strong statement and
repetition of belief helped to confirm the fact. Sir Frederick Sykes,
under whose chairmanship sat the Committee on Broadcasting in 1923,
later wrote of his approach to the task in these terms:
If [broadcasting] became partisan, or still more, if it became
even suspected of being an instrument of the Government, half the
influence of the service would be destroyed. In any case it was
63. C.A. Lewis, Op. Cit., 140. Note, however, that this alarming
prospect did not deter Lewis from advocating experimentation and
broadcast politics. Like Reith his confidence in the integrity of
the early broadcasters was complete.
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obvious that broadcasting would affect the very bases of society.
When a single voice can simultaneously address not only a nation
but the whole world, and can induce millions of men to think at
one time a thought dictated by an external will, it is clear that
64
the whole course of history must be transformed.
Peter Eckersley, in 1940, had a rather more subtle and less
sympathetic understanding of the influence of broadcasting than Cecil
Lewis:
Broadcasting is a powerful medium of propaganda. It is oracular
and yet friendly. It is not what is said but the way in which it
is said that influences its listeners. There is no need to say
things directly over the air: the attitude of mind revealed in
day-to-day behaviour is itself powerful propaganda. Political
beliefs need not be imposed: they can be made to grow out of
65
men's minds by suggestion.
Another early staff member of the BBC was Lionel Fielden, a talks
producer under Hilda Matheson. In his memoirs he expanded on
Eckersley's point by talking of the power of the producer. Although
he was writing in 1960, his view, that had he been politically
committed he could have boosted the cause in which he believed'
without direct mention of it, was perhaps one of the fears uppermost
in the minds of those responsible for initially banning the BBC from
dealing with political matters. Fielden argued that although the
talks producer was merely a cypher for the BBC,
his tastes will gradually sway millions. They will not of course
do so in one broadcast programme or even a dozen, but if (and
this is difficult) the thousand odd programmes produced by a man
or woman over, say, two years, could be examined, the drift of
64. Sir Frederick Sykes, From Many Angles, London 1942, 320. It
should, perhaps, be noted that Sykes was writing his memoirs
during the Second World War.
65. P.P. Eckersley, Op. Cit., 154.
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that producer's tastes and belief and influence would become
evident .... Whatever rules you may make, in the last resort
public opinion will be formed by the men who actually produce
66
programmes.
Although politicians might retain a fair measure of control over
programmes which consisted merely of their talking, it was programmes
about politics by commentators which would provide the greatest
opportunity for misuse. Once allow the BBC to consider politics as a
legitimate part of its brief, and all programmes, even those not
obviously political, might assume new aspects.
Fielden was also less sure that the microphone's apparent ability
to expose hypocrisy and insincerity was not rather a tendency to
reveal unfortunate mannerisms and techniques of speech which had
little to do with the sincerity or understanding of the politician
concerned. Broadcasting flattered some politicians but deprived
others, such as Lloyd George, of the stimulus of an audience which
67
they found so necessary for their style of oratory. It was hardly
surprising that politicians whose whole experience was of public
meeting speaking should shy at a new method of verbal communication
which demanded such very different techniques. When Ramsay MacDonald,
in his first General Election broadcast in 1924, chose merely to
relay a speech from one of his public meetings, his reasoning was
rational if unsound. He was simply attempting to carry into
broadcpsting a technique of speaking and an occasion at which he knew
he excelled. It failed, and Stanley Baldwin's quietly spoken studio
talk became the model for future occasions; yet soft-speaking could
be just as much a rhetorical device as theatrical oratory.
Broadcasting seemed to expose the false and hollow in politics, when
in reality it merely demanded that politicians bring into play new
and more subtle ways of demonstrating their integrity and sincerity.
66.L. Fielden, The Natural Bent, London 1960, 1047-5.
67. Ibid., 112.
252
Qualities which at first sight appeared to favour democratic
progress might, therefore, upon closer examination, do nothing of the
kind. What the disciples of broadcasting hailed as its unifying
effect upon society could equally be interpreted as a potentially
dangerous force for increased standqrdisation. As Hilda Matheson
wrote:
Illustrations are not wanting throughout the world of the way in
which broadcasting may be used to secure standardisation of
thought, of opinion, of mass emotion towards a person, or a
political theory. It is an unrivalled means of creating one mood
in a nation at a given moment, a perfect instrument for
68
propaganda against this or that.
And again:
Broadcasting may spread the worst features of our age as
effectively as the best; it ... is a huge agency of
standardisation, the most powerful the world has ever seen.
Standardisation is inseparable,
69
progress.
it would seem, from material
A wholly free forum for the expression of the widest possible
range of individual views was, Matheson felt, necessary if
broadcasting was not to check individual thinking and encourage the
spread of standardised opinion with all its dangers. She recognised
that this was a rather 'heroic' remedy to the problem. But it was
also one that created its own problems. The provision of the listener
with such an abundance of information, such a variety of alternative
opinion, could be self-defeating. As Harman Grisewood has pointed
68. International Institute of Intellectual Co--operation, Op. Cit.,
165. Like Fielden she recognised that excessive overt propaganda
was self-defeating. However, 'When this has been realised by the
ardent propagandist, it is not difficult to diminish direct
appeal or exhortation, and to substitute subtle and indirect
suggestion, which may animate every item from dance bands to
children's hours with the same purpose.- Ibid.
69. H. Matheson, Op.Cit., 17-18.
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out,
for impartiality to be a virtue it must be freely exercised in
70
relation to some particular end.
Yet this would require the judgement of a lively mind, of a listener
prepared to listen impartially to all the diverse and contradictory
evidence put before him, and then to make a decision. The danger
would be that listeners might become so habituated to the
impartiality of the wireless and so confused by the amount of
evidence and opinion from which they had to reach a coherent and
objective decision, that they might find themselves unable to make
such a judgement, and even become indifferent. Writing from his
position as Director of Talks, Grisewood argued that
In the past, few had enough capacity and courage to seek out all
the profusion of discomforts and trials that await the enquiring
mind. But now this cornucopia of discomfort is poured out before
us all. Strong stomachs are required for the vast and varied
intellectual repast provided by the full yield of our proliferous
age ... [The BBC's] responsibility - as things are- is provision.
The	 listener's	 no	 less	 onerous	 responsibility	 is
71
assimilation.
Matheson's solution was the prescription of the perfectionist,
impracticable not only as far as the capability of the audience but
also as far as the capacity of the medium was concerned. For as we
shall see the one, and then two, broadcasting channels of the BBC,
predominantly seen as media for entertainment, were not felt to be
capable of bearing more than a very limited amount of political
programming. The phrase 'Freedom of the Air' was and always would be
a delusion, for at the best of times the policies and activities of
even the major political parties received a degree of attention which
70.H. Grisewood, Broadcasting and Society, London 1949, 47.
71. Ibid., 50-51.
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today would be considered quite inadequate in order to provide the
listener with a reasonable understanding of current affairs. As for
minority groups the question of the coverage they should receive was
a source of continual controversy throne-lout the inter-war years.
Restricted air space, therefore, was to render impossible the
diversity of opinion, the freedom of the air for all views, which
people such as Matheson and Eckersley considered so essential. Their
attitude in this matter was, of course, yet another reflection of
their antipathy towards established party politics, yet, as they
would discover, the combined factors of audience capability and
broadcasting capacity would confirm and ultimately strengthen the
party system. Matheson might complain that 'The unquestioning
acceptance of a case, as put by a party, a government, a newspaper,
is a habit which appeals strongly to ordinary human laziness and
intellectual inertia', and the BBC,in some of its early talks series,
might attempt to give listeners a wide range of evidence and opinion;
but the demands of time and of the audience for ready made solutions
or simple and polarised alternatives would automaticall
2
y reassert the
7
dominant positions of the leading political parties. In trying to
find a solution the International Institute of Intellectual Co-
operation acknowledged this fact:
Broadcasting is often, and sometimes rightly, accused of
developing that intellectual passiveness that has already taken
root among the masses and of inducing the people to accept ready
made opinions as they would Gospel truths. Unless it is used with
forethought, broadcasting may have that effect, especially as it
appeals only to the sense of hearing, and therefore encourages
listeners
73
 to relapse into a state of .purely receptive
activity.
72. International	 Institute	 of	 Intellectual	 Co--operation,
Op.Cit.,160.
73. Ibid., 17.
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The only answer, as Hilda Matheson knew, was one that laid a
tremendous responsibility upon the broadcaster, a responsibility
which she and Reith were ready to accept:
Just because broadcasting may so easily encourage this passive
acceptance of what is heard, a special responsibility lies upon
those who direct it to use to the full its ability to provoke
74
thought and discussion.
Given the correct approach and the 'right handling at the hand of
responsible people', fears as to the dangers of political
broadcasting would, she believed, prove groundless. Unfortunately for
the BBC others did not sh2re her confidence, either as to the correct
approach, or in the responsibility of the people concerned.
One final and related danger was recognised as inherent within
broadcasting, as within all mass media. As a means of communication
it was a one-way track. In response to G.K. Chesterton's opinion that
it was a good thing for the masses to listen to the words of Lord
Curzon, David Cleghorn Thomson suggested that it would have been as
equally valuable for democracy if Curzon had, by means of radio, been
75
able to listen to the voice of the people. 	 Hilda Matheson's
argument that a dialogue could be established by the creation of
listener discussion groups and by contact between broadcaster and
audience, teacher and taught, was hardly realistic for large scale
76
application.
	
In this respect, as in many others, broadcasting
offered, for the time being, no significant departure from the
existing media.
Contradictory evidence and conflicting objectives resulted in a
multitude of opinions, of varying optimism or pessimism, as to the
74. Ibid., 160.
75.D. Cleghorn Thomson, Op.Cit., 18.
76. International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, Op.Cit.,
166-7.
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impact of broadcasting on politics. What was commonly agreed,
however, was that that impact would be considerable once broadcasting
was allowed to extend into the political arena. It is therefore
necessary not only to note the scope of the 'Reithian' vision for
political broadcasting, but also to consider the extent to which the
political community paid heed to the possibilities, powers and
dangers of broadcasting in its early years, together with the degree
to which this affected actual development. The necessary acquittal of
the early BBC from the accusation of excessive caution and lack of
vision with regard to broadcast politics, inevitably leads to
responsibility for slow progress in this field being laid largely
upon the politicians. Reasons are not hard to find; while
broadcasting was still in its infancy interest amongst MPs was
limited to only a few enthusiasts. Despite its potential,
broadcasting could not for many years be considered a truly national
medium. Not until 1926 did wireless licences exceed two million, and
not until 1933 did even half the nation's families have licensed
sets. Ian Fraser, one of the principal exponents of broadcasting in
the Commons, complained in December 1926 that MPs were too concerned
with their many other interests and political duties to be themselves
radio listeners, whilst their attention had not been drawn to
broadcasting either by press coverage or by letters from constituents
criticising the BBC, there being little or nothing to criticise.
77
Consequently they had little knowledge or understanding of it.
Yet this general ignorance of broadcasting amongst MPs,
understandable as it was, should not be over-emphasised. Indeed one
of the areas in which more than just the enthusiasts took an interest
was in the question of broadcasting and politics. It is necessary,
therefore, to turn now to actual broadcasting developments in the
1920s insofar as they related to politics, and to analyse the
reaction of the political community to them.
77. Radio Times, 31 December 1926, 1.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Broadcasting and Politics: Early Arguments, 1922-1926. 
"Tell the BBC and 'the authorities' what they know very well already:
that my speech, like all my speeches, will consist from beginning to
end of violently controversial arguments on questions of public
policy, and that the only undertaking I will give is to use my own
best judgement as to what I ought or ought not to say."
George Bernard Shaw - 15 July 1926.
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The life of the BBC between 1922 and 1928 waq seemingly dominated
by two events, the General Strike of May 1926, and the
transmogrification of company into corporation at the end of the same
year. The impact of the General Strike has been considered in detail
by many writers, its effect upon the BBC by universal consent
tremendous. It provided it with a national audience which for the
first time began to appreciate something of the value of this
revolutionary development in national communication. It has been
argued that it awoke politicians to the potential of broadcasting.
More than anything else, it awoke John Reith to the sad truths of
political reality, to the facts of political pressure and the tenuous
1
nature of BBC independence.	 Boyle has argued that the Strike
'shook the small world of John Reith to its foundations' and that
His destiny had cheated him: the earlier grandiose design of a
model broadcasting service, independent in fact as well as name,
2
had been severely tested and found wanting.
The reasonableness of this conclusion will be considered later.
Yet significant as the General Strike was it should not be
allowed to blot out surrounding developments. It must be seen in the
context of a steadily growing sale of wireless sets and licences, an
increasing political interest in broadcasting and constant pressure
by Reith to extend the bounds of broadcast programmes. Not least it
must be seen as just one, admittedly prominent, incident in the
process of defining the BBC's position vis-a-vis the state. In the
development of controversial broadcasting, and of broadcast political
communication, the General Strike must likewise be set in the context
of preceding events.
Given the fears of political abuse of broadcasting that were
already forming, it is perhaps surprising to note that in the British
1. A. Boyle, Only The Wind Will Listen - Reith of the BBC, London
1972, 207.
2. Ibid., 215.
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Broadcasting Company's first Licence of 18 January 1923, no
injunction was laid down prohibiting the broadcasting of matter of a
controversial political nature. Indeed nowhere in the Licence is
there any mention of 'Controversial Broadcasting'. The prospectus of
the new Company told potential shareholders that the broadcast
service would provide
news, information, concerts, lectures, educational matter,.
speeches, weather reports, theatrical entertainment and any other
matter which for the time being may be permitted or be within the
3
scope of the said Licence.
Already, a few days before the formal creation of the Company in
October 1922, Colonel Simpson, the Deputy Managing Director of
Marconi, had argued that a summary of the Prime Minister's speech at
the Manchester Reform Club should be broadcast. It was, however,
significant that he considered it necessary to ask the permission of
4
the GPO before going ahead with such a broadcast.
Clearly from the very beginning of the broadcasting service there
was an implicit understanding that controversial matter should be
referred to the Post Office for approval. But that there was no
actual formulated ban on such broadcasting was made clear by the
GPO's solicitor, R.W. Woods, during the hearings of the Sykes
Committee on Broadcasting in 1923. Asked by Lord Burnham whether the
Licence would allow the Postmaster General to interfere with any
broadcast by prohibiting,for example,political or religious speeches,
Woods argued that the BBC was subject to no controls other than the
ordinary common law, which applied equally to newspapers:
I do not think there is anything to prevent the Broadcasting
3. A. Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom,
V01.1, London 1961, 127.
4. BBC Archives (hereafter BBC), PPBG, F.A. Simpson to W. Noble,13
October 1922.
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Company from broadcasting political speeches or religious matter
if they choose to also [sic]. LORD BURNHAM: Take a concrete
example: last night I think Lord Birkenhead was broadcasting in
the London area.	 Would it have been possible for the Post
Master General to have stopped his speech being broadcasted?
WOODS: No I do not think so. LORD BURNHAM: No matter how much
5
he might have objected to it? WOODS: I do not think so.
Such were the de lure rights of the BBC with regard to political
affairs and other controversial broadcasting. The Postmaster
General, it was agreed, might intervene if he believed the standard
of programmes to be of an unreasonably low level, and might also
concern himself in relations between the BBC and press with regard to
broadcast news. But in concentrating on standards of broadcasting
and on protecting the press against competition from the new medium,
the GPO had quite missed the far more delicate issue of controversy.
The consequence was a curious situation which came to an end in 1927
with the formation of the Corporation. The BBC had greater de iure 
right to broadcast controversial matter than it was ever again to
enjoy.	 As F.J. Brown of the Post Office put it, the BBC had the
legal freedom to be 'as partisan as it pleases about political or
6
economic or other questions'.	 Yet in practice it knew that its
every action was being watched and that, as Brown added, if it did
behave in a partisan manner 'I am quite sure that the Licence would
7
never be renewed'.	 From the very earliest months of the BBC it
was made quite apparent to it that licence renewal was dependent upon
'good behaviour', and that 'good behaviour' was determined according
to the criteria of the government of the day. Hence the practice
throughout this period of automatically referring any doubtful matter
to the Postmaster General, and hence de facto powers of censorship
for the PMG which in effect he lost in 1928, when the ban on
controversial broadcasting was lifted.
5. BBC, R4/6/2/1, Sykes Committee, second meeting.
6. Quoted by A. Briggs (1961), Op.Cit., 169.
7. Ibid.
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The nature of the Postmaster General's power of censorship was
again well brought out in the hearings of the Sykes Committee.
Indeed the latter was remarkably acute in its perception of many of
the fundamental problems that would be faced in the future,
particularly considering how little experience of broadcasting it
had to go on. It is therefore worth looking at its discussions in
some detail. In them the issue was raised of a broadcast a few days
previously relating to the current London building strike. This
broadcast, which Reith claimed to be an impartial appeal for
arbitration, was objected to by a Labour Whip, C.G. Ammon, who asked
the Postmaster General what he was doing to ensure that any broadcast
political matter or industrial news was given in an unbiassed
8
manner.	 The reply was significant and hardly accorded with
R.W.Woods' view:
I think it is undesirable that the Broadcasting service should be
used for the dissemination of speeches on controversial matters
and I have had the attention of the British Broadcasting Company
9
called to the incident'.
Reitht paraphrase of the intention behind the Postmaster General's
statement, when questioning Woods, was more significant:
... it seems to be admitted that there is no actual censorship
laid down in the Agreement. Could the Solicitor, perhaps, then
tell us why the Postmaster General said in the House the other
day that he had communicated with the Broadcasting Company to the
effect that they should not transmit, I think he said,
10
controversial matter?
Woods correctly denied that the Postmaster General had expressed
8. BBC, R4/6/2/1, Sykes Committee, second meeting.
9. Ibid.; H.C.Debates, vol.163: col .300, W. Joynson-Hicks, 24 April
1923.
10.BBC, R4/6/2/1, Sykes Committee, second meeting.
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himself in that form, and it was left to Sir Charles Trevelyan, the
Labour representative on the committee, and to Reith, to clarify how
both the BBC and the PMG interpreted the legal and the actual
situation:
TREVELYAN: the point at the present moment is the legal one, that
there is not legal censorship. That is only a censorship on
understanding that the Postmaster General thinks it is unwise to
publish this. The Broadcasting Company says, "Certainly we are
very anxious to work with you and do what you think right."....
LORD BURNHAM: not censorship, an influence 	  REITH: the
Broadcasting Company would, I think, be inclined to interpret
11
influence as instruction: they wish to be very careful.
The uneasy situation of the BBC was emphasised by Sir Henry Norman
who pointed out to Woods that clearly the Company did not have
complete freedom under the common law in the way that the press did:
the Postmaster General would not think of writing to "The Times"
and saying I am sorry you 
12
printed this speech of Mt. Ammon's,
please do not do it again?. .
There were two issues at stake here - the ability of the
Postmaster General to censor controversial programmes, and the right
of the BBC to broadcast them. Yet one remark by Reith during this
discussion seemed to make the whole question a theoretical one. For
he emphasised that
The Broadcasting Company have never, I think, broadcasted
anything controversial, and, of course, they are taking very
great care not to. Whether they are prevented from doing it or
13
not, they obviously would not do it.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13.Ibid.
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At first sight this appears a strange comment for Reith to make, not
least because it was not quite true. The explanation for such an
ambiguous statement lies in a fuller understanding in the primary
concerns of the Sykes Committee and of its individual members. It
must after all be asked to whom it mattered whether or not political
controversy was broadcast? The issues under consideration were
actually rather different - whether a broadcasting company could be
partisan, and whether a partisan company might challenge the press in
adopting its most fundamental characteristic, editorial freedom.
Without that freedom, and severely restricted in its broadcasting of
news as a result of press influence, it was felt that the BBC would
have less chance of threatening the established media.
	
	 The
14
protection of the press was Lord Burnham's first consideration.
Trevelyan, as a Labour politician, was primarily concerned to ensure
that the BBC, a monopolistic commercial combine, could not add itself
to the ranks of the already overwhelming Tory and Liberal media.
Each was certainly anxious to define the rights and freedoms of the
Company, and neither could have been satisfied to hear Woods'
statement of the BBC's legal freedom. It was in order to reassure
the committee that the Company had no desire to be partisan that
Reith made his remark, not that it had no desire to broadcast
controversy.
Reith, as a member of the Committee, was in a good position to
make his views known. Sir William Noble and Mr. A.M. Mckinstry,
comercial directors of the Company, were not in such a position, and
their outlook was fundamentally different from Reith's.
Broadcasting to them was essentially an adjunct to wireless set
production, a means to a profitable end, and their primary concern
was to avoid any controversy, either with the press or the public,
that might endanger the profitability of the venture. In questioning
14. Burnham was chairman of the Newspaper Proprietors' Association.
Other members of the Sykes Committee were: Sir Frederick Sykes,
J.J. Astor (proprietor of The Times, and Conservative MP), Sir
Henry Norman MP (a radio amateur), Sir Charles Trevelyan MP, F.J.
Brown and Sir Henry Bunbury (both of the Post Office), Field
Marshal Sir William Robertson, W.H. Eccles, and John Reith.
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them the Committee investigated the root questions of editorial
control, the inevitability of selection of material and the nature
of controversy. Again it was Trevelyan who was most acute, in a
question which appeared very much as an attack on the commercially
all-important monopoly:
by your exclusive possession of broadcasting you are in a
different position from newspapers, where there is a whole
variety of newspapers of various opinion, .... and the public,
therefore, have a certain variety of choice. In the case of
broadcasting, as long as you have the exclusive possession of the
Broadcasting Stations, you can control the whole of what is
issued. You realise that you are in a different position and the
public, therefore, can be a little more anxious as re
15
gards the
exercise of your rights than for that of the newspapers?
Noble, anxious to assure press interests that the BBC would not and
could not emulate the editorial freedom of a newspaper, insisted that
this was ensured by the Company's agreement to broadcast only news
supplied by the four news agencies. Trevelyan, not surprisingly, was
more concerned with the public's view of the BBC's editorial
position, and MdKinstry hastened to reassure him with a statement
which had rather more positive intent behind it than Reith's earlier:
The Broadcasting Company wish to keep away from controversial
matter and has endeavoured to do so: we do not wish to have the
Broadcagting Stations used for propaganda which will excite one
16
section of the population and be very distasteful to another.
He felt that any form of controversy would antagonise some interest
group, most importantly the press:
15.BBC, R4/6/2/2, Sykes Committee, third meeting.
16. Ibid.
264
we think, therefore, that it is better for the Broadcasting
Company to keep away from controversial matter. Political matter
17
is very controversial.
Trevelyan was not satisfied. Both he and the Chairman, Sir
Frederick Sykes, saw that it was neither so easy nor so wholly
desirable to avoid controversy. Moreover it was made clear both that
the BBC had already broadcast at least one avowedly controversial
programme, and that people's views as to what was controversial
differed. Trevelyan asked the directors whether they could conceive
of a situation where the public would welcome not partial propaganda
but balanced statements from both sides on great public questions:
'I am not at all sure that everybody would be in favour of absolutely
18
excluding controversial questions.'	 Yet at the same time he
indicated two basic problems - firstly that the public might be
unwilling to trust such statements if issued from a commercial
company rather than from a public body, and secondly that, as in a
recent apparently militaristic broadcast by an army General, what was
seen as uncontroversial by some might be considered extremely so by
others. Sir William Noble's replies were pertinent and prophetic:
if you are going to make every man of importance in the country
who wishes to speak, and has something to say, put down in
writing just what he will say, and censor it before he says it,
you will kill all interest in that kind of broadcasting 	
Furthermore I submit this, that even the most fair-minded
statement made by the most fair-minded man will be objected to by
19
some one in the enormous audience.
Trevelyan agreed and posed the dilemma that was to Terrain for as long
as the company existed, and beyond:
17. Ibid.
18.Ibid.
19. Ibid.
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I am only trying to face up to the difficulty, because I agree
with you that if you are going to exclude everything which
everybody thinks is doubtful, you are going to make yourselves
very dull and I am wondering what kind of satisfactory public
control there might be over broadcasting without interfering with
20
what you are doing under it.
At the next meeting of the Committee, at which Noble and
Mdkinstry were again questioned, the precise editorial position of
the BBC and the nature of controversy were again examined, this time
by Sir Henry Norman. He was told that the General Manager, with the
authorisation of the Board, was responsible for deciding in the end
whether a certain topic was controversial or not. But, he argued,
that there were such decisions made indicated clearly
that there is a censorship exercised on behalf of the British
Broadcasting Company as to what is, and what is not,
controversial as regards the public ? 	 In other words the
Broadcasting Company is not simply - I use the word in no
derogatory sense - a mnchine like a printing press or, to put it
more poetically, it is not merely "a trumpet set at Shakespear's
lips to blow", but it is in some sense a
1
 body possessing
2
editorial responsibility? NOPTR: That is so.
The discussion was confused on many occasions by Noble and
Mdkinstry's failure to appreciate that the committee was not just
concerned with news items and the agreement with the press; but at
the same time this meeting did bring out yet one or two further
inconsistencies in the BBC's position. For example, Norman referred
again to the building strike broadcast. This had been given by the
editor of The Builders' Journal , a magazine subsidised by the
22
Ministry of Health. 	 Norman suggested that, irrespective of
20. Ibid.
21. BBC, R4/6/2/3, Sykes Committee, fourth meeting.
22.The editor, B.S. Townroe, happened also to be a former
Conservative candidate. His talk concluded: 'If broadcasting is
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whether or not it was controversial, any such statement by a man
occupying a position of public responsibility on any question must be
considered to be news. The implication was that by broadcasting such
a studio talk the BBC was itself creating news, and therefore
infringing the press agreement by not taking all its news from the
agencies. This point was also made by a later witness, Sir Roderick
Jones, the chairman of Reuter:
if the Broadcasting Company become news providers as well as news
carriers, it is bad 	
 I agree, an occasional gech here
and there is not a matter to worry about. But no more!
Finally, Lord Burnham picked up Norman's points about news,
controversy and editorial responsibility. Was it not in fact
'practically impossible', he asked Noble, to broadcast news without
getting into controversy? Noble concurred. That being the case,
Burnham argued, some ultimate responsibility for the censorship of
such broadcast controversy would have to be established in
parliament.	 The BBC was itself, as had been shown, supposedly
editorially responsible. Yet in practice it acted under the
authority of the Post Office. The Postmaster General's only real
sanction, however, lay in his powers to withdraw the broadcasting
licence, and this would be far too severe a penalty to impose for the
inevitable minor day to day breaches:
I am driven back to the position that the British Broadcasting
24
Company is not a mere conduit, but is itself responsible?
not merely a pastime but can also convey a wireless
message, surely it is only commonsense tonight to suggest that
both sides should agree to arbitration ... so that the nation may
be protected from the threatened tragedy.' - BBC, R34/881/1.
Reith told the Committee that the broadcast was only permitted
after the script had been submitted in advance and various
deletions made.
23. BBC, R4/6/2/5, Sykes Committee, tenth meeting.
24. BBC, R4/6/2/3, Sykes Committee, fourth meeting.
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His conclusion was that news (in the broad sense) could therefore be
uncensored. Noble qualified this:
uncensored, if you like but certainly censored and censored
strictly by the Company.
Much of the discussion of these issues during the hearings was
confused and reflected the confused situation that existed.
Theoretically quite free to broadcast controversy, yet in practice
admitting the authority of the Postmaster General, the BBC denied
intent to be controversial yet admitted the inevitability of being
so. By the strict letter of the agreement with the press it could
not initiate news, and therefore could not broadcast newsworthy
talks: but in practice it was recognised that this would have been
an unreasonable restriction on its freedom. Yet despite confusion the
Sykes Committee was remarkably prescient in its discussion of the
various problems the BBC would have to face on the slippery path of
controversial broadcasting. Asa Briggs has pointed out how a draft of
the only surviving working paper of the committee asked all the right
questions on the issue of the monopoly. It also asked very pertinent
questions on the broadcasting of news (and newsworthy items):
(24) Is it possible to distinguish between controversial and
uncontroversial news? (25) If not, is it sufficient to leave the
discretion as to the issue of news to the licencee? Will the
taste and choice of the listening-in public be the best safeguard
26
for fairness and veracity?
The evidence submitted to Sykes with direct regard to the
broadcasting of politics ranged from the sublime to the ridiculous.
Two submissions nicely reflected hopes and fears as to the potential
of broadcasting in this respect, and its likely impact on the
democratic system. Particularly optimistic were the views of the
25. Ibid.
26. BBC, R4/6/4, Sykes committee, unsigned draft paper.
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National Association of Radio Manufacturers:
The Broadcasting service holds great possibilities of bringing
those responsible for Government in closer touch with the
populace and nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of
this condition being brought about. Parliamentary debates should
be broadcasted so that the people can be better informed and
given the opportunity of taking greater interest in governing
matters. New governing regulations and Acts of Parliament could
be broadcasted in concise form, so that all would be easily
27
acquainted with these matters.
By contrast Lord Riddell of the Newspaper Proprietors' Association
feared for the future of the smaller newspapers, and, by extension,
for the unity of the whole democratic mechanism:
nothing could be more deplorable than to injure the smaller
newspapers throughout the country which are essentially part of
the body politic 	 They are the organs of public opinion:
they are the organs of criticism, they are carried on very often
at very moderate profit and if you are to kill them off by
robbing them of the greater part of their most valuable sale, the
28
result is going to be very serious.
In a somewhat lighter vein he also opposed the broadcasting of
parliament, with this decidedly risible argument:
Is it a good thing to deflect the whole population from their
private duties to listening in? It might have a most prejudicial
effect. If the debates from the House of Commons, for example,
were being broadcasted, people would be seduced from their
ordinary labours to listen to these delectable things. It is a
27. BBC, R4/6/5, Sykes Committee, precis of written evidence.
28. BBC, R4/6/2/4, Sykes committee, eighth meeting.
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29
most serious aspect.
The report of the Sykes Committee, presented in August 1923,
recognised the defects and inconsistencies in the existing situation.
It considered it right that there should be an agreement with the
press regarding news broadcasting, but thought that the existing
restrictions should be gradually relaxed. It denied that the Post
Office exercised any form of positive censorship, but agreed that the
Postmaster General had intimated his opposition to broadcast
controversy and that the Company had rightly been cautious. It
appreciated that while the Postmaster General remained the final
arbiter of what should or should not be broadcast, his position was a
politically difficult one. A recommendation was therefore made to
set up a Broadcasting Board, free from any suspicion of political
bi2s, to advise him on such matters. Despite difficulties, however,
the Committee clearly favoured an extension of controversial
broadcasting and acknowledged the impossibility of avoiding it:
We do not consider that it is desirable to maintain any system of
censorship. Nor do we think it necessary to exclude everything
which is controversial: indeed, there are few subjects on which
controversy may not arise.	 It would obviously
interest of broadcasting if it were necessary
30
everything which might have a political bearing.
reduce the
to exclude
The report tentatively suggested that broadcasting might hold social
and political possibilities 'as great as any technical attainment of
31
our generation'.
The BBC had indeed been highly circumspect before Sykes, but it
had not been as wholly passive as Mckinstry's evidence suggested.
The building dispute broadcast had been considered controversial by
29. Ibid.
30.Cad. 1951 (1923), The Broadcasting Committee Report, 32.
31. Ibid, 6.
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Labour, perhaps an interesting comment not so much on the objectors
as on the background and outlook of the BBC officials who passed it
as entirely unexceptionable. This was the earliest proof to Reith of
what was to become a standard, if singularly unhelpful, BBC defence
that partisanship was in the eye of the beholder. It could equally
well have been concluded, from a different viewpoint, that
impartiality was in the eye of the producer, the BBC.
If the building dispute broadcast was the earliest to be
unintentionally controversial, the earliest recorded political
affairs broadcast was, rather startlingly, a debate on communism,
between Sir Ernest Bean and a communist, J.T.W. Newbold, which took
32
place in February 1923. 	 Cecil Lewis later described this as an
early outside broadcast of a communist meeting from the Kingsway Hall
33
which ended with the singing of The Red Flag. 	 From the start the
BBC made positive decisions, as of course it had to, as to what might
be broadcast without reference to the GPO and what might be
controversial. The effects of this division of programmes and system
of referral were curiously contradictory. Referral, more often than
not, resulted in complications, objections and cancellation. Yet
because the BBC demonstrated in its referral a proper caution and
sense of responsibility, it was possible for programmes deemed non-
controversial to delve into potentially controversial political
topics, such as communism and also foreign affairs. The distinction
between political affairs broadcasts per se and political affairs
broadcasts that proved themselves to be controversial is a useful one
here. In recognising that the Postmaster General was primarily anxious
to exclude the latter the BBC, though cautious, took the opportunity
tentatively to experiment in the former. In January 1924 Vernon
Bartlett, later to be a regular and controversial broadcaster, gave a
talk on the potentially contentious subject of the work of the League
32. Daily News, 23 February 1923,7b
33.C.A. Lewis, Never Look Back, London 1974, 68. In fact it was
organised by the Industrial League and Council, on the motion
'that Communism would be a danger to the good of the people'. The
Red Flag was, however, sung by communist supporters.
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of Nations.	 This was to be the first of many broadcasts on
foreign affairs given throughout the life of the Company by eminent
and political figures.Thus a monthly broadcast survey of the
international situation was begun by the British Institute of
International Affairs in October 1924, J.R. Clynes broadcast on
'World Peace' and Lord Robert Cecil talked on 'The Price of Peace'.
35
Vernon Bartlett's regular weekly series, 'The Way of the World',
was to start as an objective explanation of foreign affairs in
January 1928, over a month before the ban on controversial
broadcasting, by then official, was lifted. On the domestic front a
broadcast debate from Newcastle in June 1924 tackled the motion 'That
independent working class education on industrial questions is
36
essential for the workers'. It must be said, however, that in few
of these tentative experiments were live issues discussed. There was
an emphasis on the theory rather than the practice of politics, on
the ideology of communism or the role of the League of Nations.
Reith explained his attitude to controversy in the Radio Times in
October 1923. Quoting Victor Hugo that 'there were two privileges of
the English - freedom of speech and conscience, and the prudence
never to practise either', he suggested that there was a moral in
this applicable to broadcasting,
with certain latitude in the interpretation, of course .... I do
not infer [sic] that we contemplate blasting forth into
controversial fulminations or anything of that sort, but just
that there is a power of wisdom in the old Latin tag - Festina 
37
lente.
34. V. Bartlett, I Know What I Liked, London 1975, 65.
35. Radio Times, 29 August 1924.
36. Radio Times, 25 June 1924. Compare this, incidentally, with
Reith's comment in Broadcast Over Britain, London 1924, 153: 'It
has been said that the industries of the country suffer from the
ignorance which prevails concerning them. If that be so then
there are means at hand whereby the ignorance may be dispelled.'
37. Radio Times, 26 October 1923.
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In the same issue Reith appealed for public support against the
refusal to allow the broadcasting of either the King's speech or the
Cenotaph ceremony:
Nothing will sooner break down the present hesitancy on the part
of those responsible for these functions than an emphatic and
40
overwhelming expression of public sentiment in the matter.
In early 1924 he returned to the attack, using the ploy of
publicly revealing continuing negotiations in order to influence
public opinion for the future. He admitted it was a platitude to say
that by the time that edition of the Radio Times appeared the King's
speech either would or would not have been broadcast: 'But there is
41
occasionally a great deal behind even a platitude'.
	 In August an
article by S. Graham supported parliamentary broadcasting by
emphasising how much calmer and fairer an opinion the listener would
gain of politicians by listening at home rather than by attending
42
political meetings. A more novel argument was put forward by W.W.
Burnham of the National Association of Wireless Manufacturers in a
letter to Ramsay MacDonald, then Prime Minister. He felt sure that
such parliamentary coverage, by attracting considerable interest in
broadcasting, would raise the sale of radio sets, boost the wireless
43
industry and so reduce unemployment.
	 Later in the year Reith
made a personal, direct approach to the PM, by now Baldwin, to have
the King's speech broadcast, arguing that
the value of the broadcasting service is, I think, generally
appreciated, and we believe that it is capable of exercising a
44
considerable and beneficial national service.
40. Radio Times, 23 November 1923.
41.Radio Times, 18 January 1924.
42. Radio Times, 22 August 1924.
43. Baldwin papers, Ba1.65/f2, W.W. Burnham to J.R. MacDonald, 4
April 1924.
44. Baldwin papers, Ba1.65/f7, Reith to Baldwin, 24 November 1924.
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The appeal brought a friendly response from Baldwin, and Reith
visited him at Downing Street to press his case, but without
45
result.
Repeated failure did not deter Reith, and in 1926 he turned his
attention to the Chancellor's Budget Speech. Once again the Radio
Times was used in the agitation, editorialising that
all those who are striving to keep this lusty young giant
Broadcasting as a sort of perpetual Peter Pan who may never grow
up, declare in a dismal chorus that to broadcast the Budget
Speech would "open the floodgates and obliterate the landmarks,"
and inevitably lead to red ruin and the breaking up of laws. But
the antediluvians cannot, of course, have it their own way for
46
ever.
Calling upon the public to appeal to their MPs and the press, it also
persuaded such eminent men as Keynes, T.P. O'Connor,the Father of the
House, and the Shadow Chancellor, Philip Snowden,to express their
views. Keynes declared that it would be
an immense loss to the cause of political education in this
country if, in these days of declining public interest in
political meetings, and of declining publicity for reports of
political speeches, broadcasting is to take no part whatever in
47
spreading political information and political argument.
O'Connor found it difficult to understand why anyone should possibly
object to parliamentary broadcasting, Whilst more guardedly (and
perceptively) Snowden agreed that Budget and other occasional
45. C. Stuart (ed.), The Reith Diaries, London 1975, 91, 3 December
1924. For arguments against parliamentary broadcasting see Daily
Mai1,26 March 1925.
46. Radio Times, 19 February 1926.
47. Radio Times, 26 February 1926.
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speeches might be broadcast, but opposed the general broadcasting of
parliament,
at least until the proceedings of Parliament are more calculated
to inspire admiration and respect 	 I want the public who
never visit the galleries of the House of Commons, to retain
48
their reverence for the Mother of Parliaments.
The Radio Times claimed that an 'extraordinary amount of interest'
had been aroused on this question, and printed letters praising the
BBC for 'making possible another step in the advancement of the
49
democratic spirit'.
Using the articles by Snowden and Keynes for support Reith
appealed to the GPO for permission to broadcast the budget speech,
and received a blank refusal. Moreover, when the BBC arranged for the
Labour MP, William Graham, to broadcast a talk on 'Budgets', F.W.
Phillips of the Post Office requested an advance copy of the script
50
for approval, lest it be controversial.
Reith had an inordinate respect for and love of the traditional
and formal set-piece event, which boosted his already strong desire
to have the opening of parliament and the budget speech broadcast.
Not himself in favour of complete parliamentary broadcasting, he felt
that the coverage of important debates would bring the public into
contact with politicians and the active working of government.
Perhaps this was a naive assumption, but it was one that was not
unreasonable at a time when parliament remained the hub of the
51
Empire. Nor was it to fade and die with him. In any cae the
broadcasting of parliamentary debates would have been one of the few
48. Radio Times, 12 March 1926; 5 March 1926.
49. Radio Times, 19 March 1926.
50.B3C, PPBB, Reith to GPO, 3 March 1926; Phillips to Reith, 9 March
1926; Phillips to Reith, 27 March 1926.
51. J. Margach, The Anatomy of Power, London 1981, 55-64.
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means whereby the BBC could have undertaken political affairs
broadcasting without laying itself open to accusations of
editorialisation or partisanship.
Reith's repeated attempts to persuade the Government on this
matter were indicative of his hope that its concern was to prevent
controversial rather than political affairs broadcasts.
Unfortunately, extreme caution made the two virtually synonymous as
far as the Government was concerned, at least for the mocent.This
being the case Reith was almost as unsuccessful in his more general
requests to be allowed a degree of political affairs broadcasting. In
November 1923 he argued that so long as, in any debate, opposing
views were stated with equal emphasis and lucidity, then the BBC
could not be accused of bias:
A debate on such a subject as Tariff Reform might also be of
considerable interest, and would perhaps be permissible if the
52
exponents of each side were of similar calibre and quality.
The Sykes Committee had recommended that a broadcasting board be
set up by the Postmaster General to assist in the formulation of
policy. Reith was dubious as to the value of such a body and quickly
became disillusioned by its deliberations. Nevertheless he argued his
case strongly when, in April 1924, the PMG asked it to consider the
desirability of changing GPO policy in refusing permission for
53
controversial political broadcasts.
	 In reply to the view that
existing policy was reasonable and had worked well, he argued that
52. Radio Times, 30 November 1923.
53. GPO Archive (hereafter GP)), Post 33-M15956/1924 Broadcasting
Board Papers, file 13, paper no. 3, 2 April 1924. The composition
of the Board was as follows: Sir Frederick Sykes (Chairman), F. J.
Brown (GPO), Reith, Guy Burney, Sir Francis Ogilvie, W. Payne,
Lord Riddell, A.A. Cambell Swinton, Fred Bramley (TUC),and F.W.
Phillips (Secretary). Dr. Marion Phillips, the Labour
representative, was only appointed in November 1924, by which
time the Board hod ceased to meet.
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all subjects are in some degree controversial and that any
exclusion of controversial matters tends to reduce the interest
54
and value of broadcasting.
But despite such arguments the Board's final recommendation to the
Postmaster General went only a small way to giving Reith what he
wanted. Although lengthy it is worth quoting:
So far as political speeches are concerned, if the present rule
were abandoned, the difficulties of deciding on what occasions
and in favour of what speakers permission should be given would
be so serious and the power that would be vested in those
responsible for these decisions would be so great that the Board
do not see their way to recommend any alteration in the general
policy at present adopted, although any exceptional case might be
specially considered .... Apart from political speeches, the
Board recognises that most subjects are, in some degree,
controversial, and whilst recognising that it is difficult to
differentiate, they feel that the maintenance of too strict a
policy would reduce the interest and value of broadcasting. In
deciding, therefore, what is controversial and what is not, the
tendency should, it is considered, be in the direction of
55
gradually giving greater freedom rather than less.
Reith found far more to dislike in the first part of this
recommendation than to like in the second.
What it is important to note here is the differentiation between
the broadcasting of political speeches and of other ordinary
programmes which might, of course, have included political affairs
programmes that did not contain speeches. This is not to suggest that
such programmes of political commentary or description were
54.GPO, Post 33 - M15956/1924, file 14, 14 May 1924.
55. GPO, Post 33 - M15956/1924, file 12, F.W. Phillips to FUG, June
1924.
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contemplated even by Reith. The point is that no one at this stage,
including the BBC's General Manager, imagined that political affairs
programmes which did not consist of the politician talking would ever
be more than a minor part of political affairs broadcasting. Their
prime concern - as with the broadcasting of parlisment - was with
direct political statements, direct communication from elected to
elector. Given the respect with which government, parliament and
political leaders were then held, given the BBC's desire to
strengthen and become a new integral and integrating part of the
democratic machine, yet without challenging the supremacy of
parliament or becoming a mere extension of the press, and given the
way in which the press jealously guarded against the BBC's rivalling
it in every respect, this was not so very surprising. Reith wanted
the BBC to be something fundamentally different, participating in and
perfecting the democratic process rather than emulating the press in
its partisanship or in its role as the people's watchdog. He wanted
the BBC to become the nervous system of the body politic rather than
the antibodies which guarded against its abuse. It is interesting to
note that as a straight purveyor of speeches the press did not
initially consider the BBC to be a rival. At the Sykes Committee
hearings the three press representatives, when asked for their
attitude to the outside broadcasting of speeches, either admitted
that they had not considered the matter or stated that there could be
56
no objection.
Reith was extremely anxious that the Company should retain de
iure freedom, that it should be formally bound as little as possible.
He was concerned, perhaps to excess, with the view that the BBC
should never be seen publicly to have been in any way controlled by
the government of the day. It may be argued that.this led him to the
dangerous doctrine of preferring informal pressure to formal
sanctions, but given his paramount concern to have the BBC seen as
politically aloof and independent, this was an understandable, if not
56. BBC R4/6.2.4, eighth meeting; R4/6/2/5, tenth meeting. See also
A. Briggs (1961), Op.Cit., 263, for press agreement regarding
broadcast speeches, in September 1924.
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wholly excusable, attitude. The effect of this concern was to be most
evident, of course, during the General Strike, and was to be
manifested again in various incidents in the 1930s, but it first
tentatively appeared in 1924. Thus in a letter to F.W. Phillips,
Secretary of the Broadcasting Board, commenting on the minutes of the
third meeting, he wrote:
On the question of broadcasting speeches and controversial
matters, you say at the beginning that the Post Office had
requested us to avoid these speeches. This may be a small point,
but I do not remember anything like this having been done; we
57
avoided them of our own volition from the start.
The previous month, in response to a question in Parliament, he had
written to Phillips:
Mr. Hudson's question states that "the
and the Post Office excludes political
such clause in any agreement we have
althou • h we have always refrained from
contract between the BBC
propaganda." there is no
with the Post Office -
58
doing so, as you know.
Despite the latter assurance Reith continued to struggle for
greater de facto freedom, and between 1924 and 1927 the Postmaster
General was constantly reminded that both Sykes and the Broadcasting
59
Board had recommended just this.	 In November 1923 the BBC
proposed without success that the three party leaders should make
60
broadcast speeches before the General Election. 	 In August 1924
Reith boldly suggested a broadcast debate on a current political
topic, between party leaders and under the chairmanship of the
Speaker of the House of Commons. But the Labour Pdstmaster General,
57. BBC, BBM, Reith to Phillips, 20 May 1924.
58. BBC, PPBG, Reith to Phillips, 11 April 1924.
59. See, for example, c.7 letters from Reith to GPO during this
period, in BBC, CB 1923-1928.
60. BBC, PPEGEB, Reith to GPO, 15 November 1923.
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whilst agreeing that such a debate might be innocuous, felt it would
lead to a demand for others which would be less so. Showing a
fundamental misunderstanding of the BBC's position he stated that
many of the public would resent doctrines repugnant to them being
broadcast by any agency controlled by the government in power, even
if the other side were given. Listeners might well resort to
oscillation:
the potentialities of broadcasting for propoganda [sic] purposes
are so considerable that the Postmaster General considers that it
would be necessary for him to consult the Cabinet or his
61
colleagues before agreeing to a proposal of this kind.
Reith took this hint of a possible Cabinet discussion seriously and,
having waited for one month to allow for such consultation applied
again:
I feel very strongly that the utility of broadcasting as a medium
of enlightenment is prejudiced owing to the ban upon such
matters. People have to take the views which are given them
either in the Press or from the Party with which they are
connected and practically never have an opportunity of hearing
all sides of a question from the lips of the exponents of them,
and they will not take trouble to read what is written. I submit
that broadcasting in this way might be a national service of
62
great value.
Here was a clear statement of ideals from Reith. Six days later the
announcement of the General Election put paid to the idea of any such
debate, but opened the way for his one and only positive success
during this period, agreement that the three party leaders should
61. BBC, PPBG, W.E. Weston to Reith, 19 August 1923. Oscillation was
a means by which early radio receiving sets could be used to
interfere with the reception of other nearby sets.
62. BBC, PPM, Reith to F.J. Brown, 3 October 1924.
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each broadcast once before the poll. During the campaign the BBC
agreed not to broadcast any other matter of a political nature, and
when it appeared that Lord Linlithgow's speech to the National Union
of Farmers might be broadcast, F.J. Brown of the Post Office wrote to
64
remind Reith of this agreement.
Following the election Reith returned to the attack. He was
concerned, of course, not just to gain greater freedom for the BBC
but also firmly to establish it as a recognised and integral part of
the system. If the idea of 'the establishment' has since assumed
undesirable connotations, it certainly had few for Reith in the 1920s
before the name had been invented. Reith himself wanted to be part of
the established order, and he wanted the BBC to be part of it,
65
yet above it also.	 For these reasons he was anxious to involve
senior politicians and other leading figures in broadcasting. The
rear guqrd action of the press actually assisted him in this by
making broadcasting early on an issue in which senior politicians
might reasonably take an interest. Reith's previous contacts with the
Unionists were also of value. He encouraged the broadcasting of talks
and of speeches from outside occasions by men such as J.R. Clynes,
the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, and the Prime Minister, Stanley
Baldwin, whose speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet was broadcast
66
without complaint in early November 1923. 	 In 1924 outside
speeches by the Labour Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, Lord
Parmoor, the President of the League of Nations, Earl Balfour, Tom
Shaw (Minister of Labour), J.H. Thomas, Austen Chamberlain, Lloyd
George and Churchill were all broadcast, even though few if any
contained political matter. In addition the King was given a wireless
63.BBC, PPBG, Brown to Reith, 6 October 1924
October 1924; BBC, PPBGEB, Reith to Brown,
Stuart, Op. Cit., 90, 11-12 October 1924.
64.BBC, PPBG, Brown to Reith, 21 October 1924.
; Reith to Brown ,7
7 October 1924; C.
Linlithgow did not
speak.
65.See pp. 310-312 below.
66. Radio Times, 26 october 1923, 22 February 1924.
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set and the Archbishop of Canterbury shown the potential of
broadcasting. Whenever possible Reith cultivated politicians. Meeting
by chance Joynson-Hicks, the outgoing Conservative Minister of Health
and former PMG,late in December 1923, he 'Expatiated to "Jix" on the
67
advantages of unified control for broadcasting.
	 From his first
meeting with Baldwin, prior to the 1924 General Election, he
developed a personal friendship with the Conservative leader and used
it to urge the cause of broadcasting. Reith later recorded that at
another meeting with Baldwin about the possibility of broadcasting
the King's speech, in early December 1924, Baldwin asked many
questions about broadcasting:
he seemed to be genuinely interested; I delighted at the
opportunity of telling him about the BBC, its policy and
68
intentions.
Another good friendship was to arise out of Reith's first meeting
with Ramsay MacDonald in March 1925. So well, indeed, did they get on
that a week after their first meeting Reith took his mother to have
69
tea with the Labour leader at the House of Commons. Later that
month John and Muriel Reith dined alone at No. 10 with the Prime
Minister and Mrs. Baldwin, and Reith 'did some useful work for
70
Broadcasting'.	 By the end of 1925 it was clear that Baldwin had
considerable regard for Reith.
Reith was personally gratified by this close contact with senior
67.C. Stuart, Op Cit., 132, 30 December 1923.
68. J.C.W. Reith, Into The Wind, London 1949, 97.
69.C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 91, 5-13 March 1925.
70. Ibid., 91, 27 March 1925. Baldwin and Reith swopped anecdotes
about the nature of power. The previous week, when Baldwin was in
a hurry, he had been driven down the wrong side of Piccadilly.
This, he suggested was power. Reith said that from his study he
could give two orders - I SB' and 'All transmitters' - and could
then talk to millions. This, he felt, was also power. The
distinction Reith did not make was that Baldwin could and did
legitimately use his power. Reith could never have used his.
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politicians. Well aware of the need for good public relations, he
also knew that the highest level of PR was personal friendship. In
December 1924 he appointed W.E. Gladstone Murray as BBC Director of
Publicity to replace W.C. Smith, who went as publicity officer to the
Liberal Party. Briggs describes Murray as being on close terms with
the press, a number of MPs and with 'key people' in government and
71
administration.	 In March Reith himself made the first of many
appearances at Westminster to meet and talk to a group of MPs about
broadcasting.
Such public relations exercises, of course, were increasingly
concerned with Reith's desire to push the public service concept and
the change from commercial company to public corporation. But as the
notion of political affairs broadcasting formed an important part of
that public service ideal Reith continually pressed for greater
broadcast freedom. Throughout 1925, however, he was hindered by the
success of his own labours. The rapid growth of broadcasting made it
clear that further government consideration would have to be given to
the general question of the BBC's future. The likely appointment of a
new broadcasting committee provided the GPO with a good excuse for
not venturing out into the dangerous waters of controversial
broadcasting. A request in March to broadcast an Oxford Union debate
on the King's speech was rejected and when, in May, Reith suggested
again a broadcast debate, specifically on unemployment, he was told
that the whole question would be considered by the forthcoming
broadcasting committee, and should therefore be held in abeyance for
72
the time being. Despite a statement by Baldwin in the House that
a Select Committee would be established to consider the broadcasting
of parliament, this too was postponed pending the major broadcasting
committee, which it was then decided would not consider this
71.A. Briggs (1961), Op. Cit., 296.
72. BBC, PPBG, Reith to GPO, 27 March 1925; Reith to GPO, 16 May
1925; GPO to Reith, 28 May 1925.
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particular question.	 Reith made the Crawford Committee on
Broadcasting the excuse for appealing yet again in September 1925,
arguing that, because the Committee's recommendations would not be
implemented until January 1927, a new policy was needed immediately:
we urgently require to develop new lines, and to keep Rening up
fresh fields ... The Service is being badly prejudiced.
The fear that broadcasting might be losing impetus and running out of
75
initiative was to reappear in 1928. 	 Between October 1925 and
March 1926, however, while the Crawford Committee was sitting, no
progress was to be possible, although Reith did attempt to have the
76
King's speech broadcast. 	 It was also during this period that
Winston Churchill made his first impact upon the BBC, by making
political references in a supposedly non-political outside broadcast
speech. Reith's determinstion not to be cowed by the resultant
protests was clear from his defence of the decision not to fade
77
Churchill out in mid-speech.
Why was there apparently such considerable government resistance
73. H.C.Debates,vol.182: co1.428, I. Fraser, 25 March 1925; vol.182:
co1.1339, Lt. Cdr. Kenworthy, 1 April 1925; vol.182:co1.1814,Lt.
Cdr. Kenworthy, 6 April 1925; Baldwin papers, Ba1.651f.15 -16,
G.E.P. Murray to Sir R. Waterhouse, 30 October 1925; Waterhouse
to Murray, 19 November 1925.
74. BBC, CB, Reith to GPO, 15 October 1925.
75. See pp. 321-323 below. Already in 1924 the BBC Control Board had
complained in similar vein that 'restrictions are depriving us of
the assistance in our programmes of many eminent men, men who
have achieved a national position by the strong line they have
taken in various movements.' - quoted by A. Briggs (1961),
Op.Cit., 269.
76.BBC, PPBG, Reith to Sir Evelyn Murray, 15 October 1925.
77. BBC, PPBG, Hon. V. Phillips to BBC, 26-27 October 1925; A. Briggs
(1961), Op. Cit., 270, quotes Reith in a letter to
Gainford: l there is always a great public demand to hear public
men, and Churchill is perhaps a better draw than any other
Minister or ex-Minister ... I think that our staff were well-
advised in not switching off Churchill in the middle of his
speech.
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to the development of political affairs or other controversial
broadcasting? Taken in context the tendency is not very surprising.
The years between 1922 and 1926 were uneasy ones politically, full of
change and seeming instability, with the appearance of the first
Labour Government and its rapid demise. This was not an obvious
moment for any government to give its consent to a controversial and
unprecedented experiment. Other matters, far more pressing than the
infant BBC, dominated the political stage for both the newly led and
deeply split Conservative and the minority Labour governments. If the
strong Conservative Government of 1925 could have conceded greater
freedom, there was no urgent reason for it to do so, particularly
with the clear need for a broadcasting committee, the likelihood of
fundamental changes in the structure of broadcasting and the firm
prospect of at least a five year term in which to consider and
implement any recommendations.
It must also be remembered that between 1922 and 1926 the BBC was
still a private company. Although it was not really feared that its
Directors would abuse their monopolistic position if broadcast
politics were permitted, there was simply no precedent for a
commercial company to pursue the high-minded, selfless and, above
all, impartial policy envisaged by Reith. The BBC was not yet a
national institution. Not until it became one could such ideals truly
appear plausible and legitimate. Besides it was still very much an
infant finding its way, with an audience of still less than two
million licence holders. Although it was rapidly growing, it was not
yet the medium which no politician could afford to ignore. Despite
Reith's efforts only a minority of MPs had yet shown an interest in
broadcasting, and many noticed it only to deplore its likely
influence. When in March 1926 Baldwin was informed that the important
1922 Committee of all Conservative back-benchers was 'unanimously'
opposed to the broadcasting of parliament, this was one vote .which he
78
above all Conservative leaders could not afford to disregard.
78. Baldwin papers, Ba1.65/f20, G. Rentoul, MP, to Baldwin, 15 March
1926.
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Cecil Lewis put his finger on a significant factor when he ascribed
political reserve over broadcast politics to
prejudice - the difficulty that every new invention has to face,
79
particularly in a conservative country like ours.
It had taken Reith himself some time to grasp the revolutionary
nature of broadcasting. Many of that pre-broadcasting generation of
80
politicians, such as Asquith, it just passed by.
Politicians had not only their own innate conservatism to
consider, but also the very pragmatic, even mercenary, conservatism
of the press. If it was still politically safe to ignore
broadcasting, the press was an interest group whose feelings had very
definitely to be soothed. From the very beginning of the broadcasting
service governments showed themselves most sensitive to the views of
the press, such that when, in 1929, the BBC first published The
Listener , the PM personally involved himself in calming ruffled
feelings. Controversy, almost by definition, suggested potential
rivalry with the press, and it was therefore only cautiously to be
considered.
Government policy is not infrequently linked to party interests.
This was particularly true of the Conservative Party's attitude to
broadcasting throughout the 1920s, and was well brought out by a
letter from the Conservative Postmaster General, W. Mitchell-Thomson,
to Baldwin early in 1925. In yet another attempt to extend the
boundaries of political affairs broadcasting Reith had suggested the
possibility of ministers broadcasting from the studio about the work
of their departments:
It would serve a useful rational purpose to have the work of
79.C.A. Lewis, Broadcasting From Within, London 1924, 129.
80.J.C.W. Reith, (1949), Op Cit., 130.
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public departments better known and appreciated.
Mitchell-Thomson's advice to Baldwin revealed his awareness that
party interests would not be best served by extending political
affairs broadcasts:
My own view is that it would be extremely important to keep this
new and potent medium of broadcasting outside the political arena
as far as possible ... It seems probable that even if addresses
by Ministers were at the outset confined to non political topics,
they would in time tend to trespass on the political field. We
should then be asked to approve rejoinders being broadcasted by
the opponents, and the precedent would no doubt be exploited to
82
the full by future Governments.
The Conservative Party recognised for the most part that such a
medium, if used for political affairs broadcasting, would probably
redound to the advantage of the opposition, because it would provide
Labour with the mass communications outlet that it currently lacked.
Even if quite impartially controlled it would contribute
proportionately more to Labour's means of access to the electorate
than to the Conservatives'. The opposition of the 1922 Committee to
parliamentary broadcasting has already been mentioned. Between 1922
and 1925 only four parliamentary questions were asked by Conservative
MPs about politics and broadcasting, two of which were concerned with
the danger of broadcast propaganda, and two favouring greater
3
freedom.	 It had been a Conservative government that refused
Reith's first application in 1923 to broadcast three election
81. Baldwin Papers, Ea1.65/f9, Quoted in letter from W. Mitchell-
Thomson to Baldwin, 19 January 1925.
82. Ibid.
83.H.C.Debates, vol.164:co1.2003, Sir Walter de Frece, 5 June 1923;
vol 182:co1.1339, Sir Walter de Frece, 1 April 1925;
vo1.187:co1.1144, H. Willinms, 4 August 1925; the fourth was Ian
Fraser's request on 25 March 1925 to have parliamentary debates
broadcast.As a blind MP Fraser took a great personal interest in
broadcasting, served on the Crawford Committee, and later became
a BBC Governor.
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speeches.
This is not to suggest that the Party was completely hostile. In
October 1923 its Principal Agent, Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, had
expressed to Reith his hope that Baldwin's forthcoming speech at
84
Plymouth might be broadcast. 	 Baldwin himself, apart from his
general friendliness, showed an unusual interest in broadcasting
techniques, took Reith's advice in 1924 to broadcast from a studio
rather than merely to relay a public speech, and visited the BBC's
studios the day before he broadcast in order to learn exactly what
was involved. Before he broadcast he dined at the Savoy with Reith
and then, according to the latter,
gave an excellent twenty minutes talk, which will, I expect win
85
the election for him.
But despite these few small signs of individual interest the
Party could hardly be said to have taken any positive note of the
86
existence of broadcasting. 	 The Labour Party's interest was
greater, though equally variable. The parliamentary question on the
building dispute broadcast in April 1923 had been raised by a Labour
Whip, C.G. Ammon, and the following month Reith admitted that the
87
Labour Party were showing 'considerable hostility' to the BBC.
His public relations work with Ammon and Herbert Morrison, however,
88
made them 'very friendly'. Morrison, typically, was very quick to
take an interest in broadcasting and submitted, and may well have
written, evidence to the Sykes Committee on behalf of the London
Labour Party. Briggs has pointed out that this was the only evidence
84.C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 90, 20 October 1923. It was snot.
85. Ibid., 90, 15-17 October 1924.
86.Chamberlain, for example, when Minister of Health, refused
Reith's offer to broadcast a speech on housing policy, to be
given at a- non-political dinner - BBC, PPBG, Reith to GPO, 27
January 1925; F.W. Phillips to Reith 31 January 1925.
87.C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 89, 31 May 1923.
88. Ibid., 89-90, 21 June 1923.
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to press for the end of the private company and the full public
ownership of broadcasting, but it is also interesting to note the
reasons given for this proposal:
Already accusations have been made that announcements and
subjects of a party political or anti-Labour character have been
radiated and, however true or untrue these allegations are, it is
nevertheless obvious that in view of the subtle and obscure
character of modern commercial publicity, the extension of that
psychological treatment of political and industrial questions in
connection with broadcasting work involves great dangers to
democracy. .... Without hesitation our submission is that such a
monopoly, in view of its character and importance, should be in
public hands and that there should be public accountability
either for inefficiency or for political or class misuse of the89
great publicity powers of modern wireless.
Revealing to the full the new post-war awareness and fear of
propaganda and mass psychology, the first remarkable thing about this
memorandum was that it was written at all, and so early in the life
of broadcasting. The second interesting point is that it stuck at the
heart of the problem for broadcasting - not simply the control of
overt political propaganda, but the 'subtle and obscure', the
'psychological' influences that broadcasting could not avoid bringing
to bear upon the existing political system and class structure.
Others in the Party also showed an interest. It may be of some
slight significance that of the small number of parliamentary
questions on politics and broadcasting between 1922 and 1925 eight
were by Labour MPs,most complaining about or seeking to gu
0
ard against
9
BBC bias, and half urging political affairs broadcasting. J.R.
89. BBC, R4/6/3, memorandum of evidence submitted by the Executive
Committee of the London Labour Party to the Sykes Committee.
90. H.C.Debates, vol.156: co1.38, 3 July 1922; vol.163:co1.300-301,
24 April 1923; vol.164:co1.238, 15 May 1923; vol.168: co1.585-
586,16 November 1923; vol.172:co1.259, 8 April 1924, vol.172:
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Clynes also demonstrated interest
k
 by broadcasting and writing
articles for the Radio Times. In contrast,however,Ramsay
MacDonald showed a bad lack of awareness of the new medium, admitting
in December 1923 that he was much too occupied to give more than
passing attention to radio and maintaining what Briggs describes as
92
a Garbo pose.	 Although the Conservative Postmaster General,
Worthington- Evans, had written to MacDonald in late 1923 suggesting
that a Labour MP be appointed to the Broadcasting Board in order to
represent Labour interests, it was only in November 1924, long after
the Board had ceased to meet and effectively to exist, that Dr.
93
Marion Phillips was appointed. However, it must also be said that
it was MacDonald who, in the heat of an election and with the urgent
need for publicity before him, was the first Prime Minister to
approve General Election broadcasts, in 1924. His own, relayed direct
from a public meeting in Glasgow, Reith described as 'quite hopeless:
94
it will do him considerable harm'.
On the whole neither of the two major political parties (nor the
Liberals) had yet taken any great interest in broadcasting. The
reasons were largely the same as those which led to Government
inaction, with, on the Conservative side, an added party interest in
maintaining the existing political communications system relatively
unaltered, or at least in not encouraging the development of media it
co1.1169, 15 April 1924; vol.175:co1.2632, 11 July 1924;
vol.185:co1.508, 17 June 1925. Thus of 15 such questions 8 were
by 6 Labour MPs, 4 by 3 Conservative and 3 by I Liberal,
J.M.Kenworthy, who in November 1926 transferred his allegiance to
the Labour Party.
91. See p.244 above.
92.Radio Times, 21 December 1923; A. Briggs (1961), Op. Cit, 271.
93.GPO, Post 33-M15956/1924 Broadcasting Board, file 11.
94.C. Stuwrt, Op. Cit., 90, 15 October 1924. Reith had warned
that' it was a mistake to append an invisible audience of millions
to a visible audience of two or three thousand'. - J.C.W. Reith
(1949), Cp. Cit., 96.
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could not influence or control. Reith later wrote of the BBC that
it had naturally in its first year made no great impact on public
life and affairs .... It was regarded as a medium for
entertainment in a narrow sense .... The Savoy Hill conception of
the part that broadcasting could play in national and
95
international affairs was far ahead of public opinion.
With little obvious progress as far as political affairs broadcasting
was concerned the Radio Times was left to make a decidedly hollow
defence of the British system against American accusations of
excessive caution. News had been received that an Australian
political party was buying a radio station, and that American
socialists were buying air-time:
the caution of which we are accused has at least the merit of
preserving the British listener from an orgy of special pleading
such as is envisaged in the recent reports received from the
United States....while avoiding all partisan bias we are still
able to provide a forum for the expression of authoritative
96
opinion on questions which command public attention.
But perhaps a more realistic view, which pointed one of the major
hindrances to the development of current affairs broadcasting and
hinted at the frustration felt by the BBC management, was provided by
Cecil Lewis:
The limitations of our News Service have often been discussed.
The effect upon the service is far reaching, for it tends to give
the impression (particularly to the staff) that topicality is
banned - or at least, not encouraged. So-called Topical Talks,
95. J.C.W. Reith, (1949), OD. Cit., 95.
96. Radio Times, 16 October 1925.
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started with the idea of being a little more up-to-date, were the
outcome of this: but, for various reasons, they have not been too
97
successful.
The evidence which Reith presented to the Crawford Committee on
Broadcasting,in 1925, rehearsed all the arguments that he had been
using with the Postmaster General and others for the previous three
years. His general statements of vision have already been
98
discussed. His particular arguments reflected his frustration and
sense of enchainment:
While appreciating the immense potentialities in this opportunity
for helping towards the aim of a more informed and enlightened
democracy, the BBC have been cramped and restricted in pressing
towards its fulfilment. Only when they have been freed from the
chains which now impede or nullify progress in this sphere can
one of the chief functions be realised 	  the present rigorous
censorship without regard to the eminence of the talker is
hampering the due development of one of the most important sides
of the work and deterring prominent men from making as much use
of the Service as they might.
He suggested that by regularly arranging debates on political and
other controversial topics, and by giving leaders of opinion the
opportunities to place their case before the public, a great service
would be rendered. He assured the committee that
little danger would be incurred so long as the necessary
safeguards for impartiality were provided and discrimination 
97.C.A. Lewis, 'Building better Programmes', Radio Times, 8 January
1926.
98.See p.227 above.
99. BBC, R4/2.2, J. Reith, Memorandum of Information on the Scope and
Conduct of the Broadcasting Service, 4.
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exercised in the choice of subjects.
The freedom that Reith sought was supreme. In response to
questioning by Lord Blanesburgh, at his first appearance before the
Committee, he argued that it should be left to the Executive of the
BBC, 'a man who is above Party politics', to decide to a very large
extent what should or should not be broadcast. Upon Blanesburgh's
likening his to a judge, however, Lord Crawford intervened with a
sharp comment that the Committee would never recommend that the Chief
Executive should have the independence (or pension) of the judiciary.
101
Reith's view that the BBC could become the universal and
universally accepted means of impartial communication on political
matters was indicated by his vision of the future of news gathering
and of the press.He suggested that when the broadcasters were
eventually allowed to broadcast events as they happened the
transmission of news would become virtually spontaneous. Newspapers
would then tend to become primarily organs of opinion and comment10
and more useful thereby to the public than they were at present.
The implications of this idea were considerable, for if interpreted
logically it suggested a division, by media, of fact and opinion. The
BBC would provide the former in the shape of up to the minute news
and statements by experts and politicians, the latter interpreting
these facts and political statements in line with their view-points.
The public would hear the unbiased facts and judge the newspaper's
interpretation accordingly. In this way broadcasting and the press
would become complementary, though with broadcasting filling the more
fundamental and central role. This was a vision for the far future,
as unacceptable to the press of 1925 as it would be to today's
broadcasters. A very different model was provided by Hamilton Fyfe,
100. Ibid., 4.Reith's handwritten emphasis.Beside the underlined
passage Reith wrote: 'Necessary for confidence in intelligence and
integrity of those responsible t .Belief in the BBC's integrity was
all-important. This was perhaps indicative, despite his desire
for controversy, of Reith's own essentially circumscribed and
establishment outlook.
101.BBC, R4/2/3/1. second meeting. See also p.234 above.
102.BBC, R4/2/2. Supplementary Memorandum of Evidence, by Reith.
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the Editor of the Daily Herald, in his evidence. Whilst deploring the
slide of the press into scandal, gossip and public entertainment, he
felt that wireless would now relieve newspapers of the need to
appease the baser instincts by itself supplying such material. The
press would revert to its proper role as a serious medium of news and
103
intelligent opinion.
Considering the serious issues involved, the Crawford Committee
paid remarkably little attention to the question of controversial
broadcasting. The overall future of the BBC, its transformation from
Company to Corporation, was naturally of foremost importance. The
Committee's conclusions on controversy were perhaps predictable,
therefore, and endorsed the cautious line of 'solvitur ambulando':
We are unable to lay down a precise line of policy or to assess
the degree to which argument can be safely transmitted 
	
But,speaking generally, we believe that if the material be of
high quality, not too lengthy or insistent, and distributed with
scrupulous fairness, licensees will desire a moderate amount of
controversy .... in this and in other problems the Commissioners
[BBC Governors] will do well at the outset to act with firm and
104
consistent circumspection.
Reith and Reith's biographer, Boyle, have painted W. Mitchell-
Thomson as a PMG whose hostility to the BBC was second only to the
PMG of the 1930s, Sir Kingsley Wood. In the case of both the picture
is too strong. Mitchell-Thomson certainly proved a tight-fisted
controller of the BBC's purse, but his recommendations on broadcast
controversy to Baldwin and the Cabinet, following the Crawford
report, could hardly have been bettered by Reith. Indeed it may be
wondered whether he really needed Crawford's very mild
recommendations to stimulate him to act on this matter. It is clear
that the proposed constitutional changes were as significant in the
103.BBC, R4/2/4/3. Written evidence of Hamilton Fyfe.
104. Cmd.2599, Report of thc) Broadcasting Committee 1925., paragraph
15.
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determination of the future of broadcast controversy as any specific
counsel by the Committee. Immediately following the presentation of
the report in March 1926 Mitchell-Thomson told the Cabinet of its
recommendations. He admitted that until that time the Government had
effectively barred controversy. However:
The exercise of any form of censorship is an extremely difficult
and invidious task, and I think there is much to be said for
relieving the Government of this responsibility. But attacks will
be made upon the impartiality or discretion of the [Corporation];
the broadcasting of a partisan speech, whether on a political or
industrial controversy, will certainly provoke criticism from
some section of the public
05
and the Postmaster General will be
1
pressed to exercise a veto.
The only way to avoid placing the PMG in the impossible position of
having to determine what should or should not be censored, assuming
controversial broadcasting was permitted, would be for him to decline
responsibility for any aspect of the Corporation's programme policy:
I should be glad to know if the Cabinet agree with me that - (a)
controversy should not be entirely barred: (b) that it should be
within the control of the [Corporation], and (c) that the
Postmaster General should decline to accept responsibility for or
106
to review the [Corporation's] decisions or arrangements.
Boyle's implication that Mitchell-Thomson was responsible for the
105. Baldwin Papers, Ea1.64/f196-203, Report by PMG on Crawford
Report,March 1926.
106. Ibid.It should be noted that in his desire not to involve the PMG
in BBC policy-making Mitchell-Thomson was following closely the
view of Sir Evelyn Murray, the Secretary of the Post Office, in
his evidence to Crawford: 'the Corporation should enjoy a large
measure of independence and should not be subject either in its
general policy or its choice of programmes to the detailed
control and supervision of the Postmaster General, from which
would follow the corollary that the Postmaster General would not
be expected to accept responsibility or to defend the proceedings
of the Corporation in Parliament.' - Quoted by A. Briggs (1961),
Op.Cit.,328.
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continued ban on controversial broadcasting is therefore mistaken.
107
Nor can the role of the BBC in the General Strike be seen as an
influence for greater freedom upon the Postmaster General. His
recommendations were first stated before the Strike, and were
recapitulated in similar terms afterwards. In July 1926 Mitchell-
Thomson wrote to Baldwin asking for a decision on this question which
had clearly not been dealt with by Cabinet in March. It is worth
quoting this memorandum at length, because it makes clear the
Postmaster General's attitude, the considerable extent to which he
felt the new Corporation could be trusted, and the importance of the
commercial nature of the old BBC in hindering greater broadcast
freedom:
I am convinced that if the Postmaster General or any other
Minister is required to exercise any kind of censorship, he can
only do it on the rigid line of vetoing all controversy as is
done at present. He would be placed in an intolerable position if
he were required to determine upon his own judgement which
controversial broadcasts were to be admitted and which were to be
barred. If, on the other hand, the determination is left to the
Corporation, it is evident that the practical difficulties of
giving equal opportunities to both sides of a controversial
question will be considerable 
	
 At the same time 	
 It
seems a drastic curtailment of the potentialities, educative and
otherwise, of broadcasting, if all matters of controversy, which
necessarily cover nearly all the important questions of the day,
are rigorously barred, and it will tend to accentuate the
complaints, which are growing, that the non-musical portions of
the programmes are too colourless and insipid: So long as the
broadcasting service was controlled by the wireless manufacturers
the ban upon the controversial matter was justifiable and
necessary. But the establishment of a new Corporation of a quasi-
public c1-i2racter and independent of commercial interests affords
an opportunity of giving the programmes a wider scope .... There
107. A. Boyle, Op.Cit., 208.
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will be no doubt occasions on which the action of the Corporation
in admitting or rejecting particular speeches will arouse
criticism, but I think that the new body may be trusted to
proceed with discretion, to 
108
feel their way gradually and to keep
in step with public opinion.
He proposed a clause in the new BBC Licence giving the PMG the power
to prohibit the broadcasting of particular or general matter, and
specified editorials as an example of what he had in mind. Clearly
this was not intended as a censorship clause.
The Postmaster General was therefore favourably inclined to the
idea of controversial broadcasts and to trusting the BBC to act
sensibly. Two weeks previously he had announced in the House that the
major recommendations of the Crawford Committee were being
109
accepted.	 Yet the outcome was to be very different from that
hoped for by Reith. The issue did not go before Cabinet until 27
October, and when it did the Cabinet agreed
that the Postmaster General should not include in the Licence to
the new Broadcasting Corporation, for the present, any provision
authorising them to permit the broadcasting of matters of
controversy: but that the Corporation should be left to do its
best to improve the existing broadcast programmes without such
110
powers.
It was,however,agreed that after an experimental period of six months
111
the FUG might report on progress to the Cabinet. 	 On 15 November,
during the Commons debate on broadcasting, Mitchell-Thomson therefore
announced the decision not only to prohibit editoriaiisation, under
108.Baldwin papers, Ba1.65/f33-35, Mitchell-Thomson to Baldwin, 26
July 1926.
109. H.C.Debates, vol. 198:co1.448, 14 July 1926.
110.Cab.23/54(26);Cab.24,C.P.355(26).
111.He did not until early 1928,when the BBC approached him yet
again.
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the Licence clause mentioned above, but also broadcasts on political,
religious or industrial controversy. Clearly he had met opposition to
his proposals of March and July in Cabinet, and it may be wondered to
what extent this ministerial wariness was due to the awakening of
senior politicians to the power and influence of broadcasting as a
result of the General Strike in May. The precise nature of Cabinet
opposition does not, unfortunately, appear to have been recorded, but
Mitchell-Thomson's explanation of the decision suggests both
government interest and circumspection:
our view is that this subject as yet has received quite imperfect
consideration at the hands of the public in general 
	
 we are
maintaining the existing restrictions because we do not want to
start introducing political controversy into this new service
without very careful consideration and the fullest discussion in
112
the House and in public.
The Assistant Postrnster General, Viscount Wolmer, equally emphasised
that the Government's mind was not closed on this subject but that
they had decided that, in the early days of the new and in itself
innovatory Corporation a further and probable source of controversy
11J
should be excluded.
	
The response to this decision in the House
was predominantly hostile, but the Government's caution was not
wholly unjustifiable, given the other controversial changes that were
114
being made to the whole character of the B.
The imposition of a ban on controversial broadcasting, under
clause 4 of the Licence, was to have constitutional effects lasting
well beyond its removal, and resulted in a permanent point of
difference between the constitutions of the BBC and the commercial
broadcasting authority, the ITA (later the IBA). In recommending that
the BBC be given greater broadcast freedom Mitchell-Thomson had
112. H.C.Debates, vol.199:cols.1581-82, 15 November 1926.
113.Ibid.col. 1641.
114.Ibid., cols. 1583-1638. See also pp 242-243 above.
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suggested the inclusion, in the Licence, of a clause expressly
binding the BBC 
to115act impartially in the presentation of
controversial issues. This clause was omitted when it was
decided to ban controversy under clause 4, and could not be
reinserted when the ban was lifted in 1928. Subsequently no
government considered it necessary to confirm in writing what had
been established in practice. But when the new and untried
Independent Television Authority was created it was considered
desirable to include just such a condition in the Television Act, in
contrast to the BBC, which by then had very definitely
116
become the
known and trusted quantity which it had not been in 1926.
It has been possible to chart the course of controversial and
political affairs broadcasting up to the demise of the Company with
hardly a reference to the General Strike, and indeed, except as an
example to all concerned of the delicate relationship between
government and BBC, and as a lasting sore to the Labour Party, the
Strike was not of the primary importance to our story that it might
appear. The event was just so extraordinary, the role of the BBC in
it so wholly divorced from either previous or subsequent experience,
that it has attracted such an interest as to lift it quite out of
context. This is not to deny its importance in the early life of
broadcasting. It demonstrated both the BBC's potential as a purveyor
of news and its limitations as an impartial and entirely apolitical
organisation. It illustrated Reith's determination never to be
officially controlled by government, or by express order to be
directed to do something he did not wish: but at the same time it
revealed the compromises to which this concern for appearances could
lead. Last but not least it showed the unashamed support of Reith and
the BBC for the principles of moderation over extremism and
discussion over confrontation, and,ultimately, their backing for the
state over what, in Reith's opinion, endangered it.
115.Baldwin papers, Ba1.65/f33-35, Mitchell-Thomson to Baldwin,26
July 1926.
116.The Television Bil1,1953-54 (127), vol.iii, 487, clause 3(1).
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It is not necessary here to detail the events of the Strike as
they effected the BBC, nor to analyse the BBC's position in any great
detail1 
7
Briggs, Symons and others have already covered the ground
1
well.	 Between the 3rd and the 12th May the BBC was the only
major national communications system working. During this period it
broadcast regular news bulletins on the situation, taking both
government and TUC statements as well as agency news. It broadcast
statements and appeals by the Prime Minister and developed its own
form of editorial, appealing for calm during the crisis. The news was
mostly truthful, but was selected, and the general tenor was one of
support for government, for moderation and conciliation. The BBC
truly worked as a unifying and integrating element within the nation,
and Reith saw it as 'an organisation within the constitution'.
Churchill, placed by Baldwin in charge of the Government's propaganda
sheet, The British Gazette, strongly urged commandeering the BBC.
Baldwin, however, confident of Reith's trustworthiness and impressed
by his arguments that the BBC could be a more powerful conciliator if
it remained semi-independent, managed to prevent the extremists in
Cabinet from carrying the day.
Reith saw the BBC as a unifier, an upholder of the democratic
system and defender of the constitution, whilst like many others he
regarded the Strike as a direct attempt to impose the will of the
trade unions over that of the Government in a wholly undemocratic
manner. Again like so many others he was perhaps unduly impressed by
the Astbury ruling in the High Court that the General Strike was
illegal. There could be no question of the BBC being impartial as
between democracy and undemocratic force, or between legality and
illegality. Impartiality depends on one's position, and Reith's was
almost completely with the Government as representing the national
interest on this issue. He accepted that the Government could either
commandeer the BBC or legally require it to broadcast anything it
specified; but in any case, as he wrote in a famous justification
117. A. Briggs(1961), Op. Cit., 360-384; J. Symons, The General 
Strike, London1957, 177-182; M. Tracey, The Production of 
Political Television,London 1977, 142-156.
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after the Strike was over:
since the BBC was a national institution, and since the
Government in this crisis were acting for the people, apart from
any Emergency powers or clause in our Licence the BBC was for the
118
Government in the crisis too.
He felt that the BBC had a clear duty to assist in maintaining
essential services, and appeals were therefore broadcast for
volunteer strikebreakers. The BBC also had a duty to encourage the
preservation of law and order, and a memorandum written during the
Strike stated that
we should make a particular point of emphasising statements
119
calculated to diminish the spirit of violence and hostility.
Reith's sympathies and his general approach to the Strike have
been well summed up by Symons and Tracey. Symons points out that
Reith might have sympathised with the miners' claims'
but although, like many other liberals, he might have supported
the miners against the coal owners, he was certainly not prepared
120
to support the strikers against the government.
Most recently Tracey interprets Reith's statements during and after
the Strike thus:
What Reith was doing was defining the BBC as an "organisation
within the Constitution" and thereby effectively defining
impartiality - for specific institutional and ideological reasons
118.Reith to Senior Staff, 15 May 1926. Quoted by A.Briggs (1961),Op.
Cit., 365.
119.BBC, NA, memo probably by Reith although signed by Lord Gainford,
6 May 1926.
120.J. Symons, Op. Cit., 178.
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- 
in such a way as to make it synonymous not with a particular
121
party line but with a particular political and moral order.
When the BBC concluded its announcement of the end of the Strike
with Blake's 'Jerusalem' and a message from the King, this typified
the BBC's position:
To turn to such established features of an established order was
a metaphorical sigh that the crisis had passed and that the
political and moral order with which the BBC had identified
122
throughout remained intact.
Yet was this stance either surprising or reprehensible? It was
one which the BBC has pursued ever since, particularly with regard to
the situation in Northern Ireland. The BBC was indeed a national
institution: if it was to have any political raisons-d'etre these
would have to be to tell the truth and to act in the national
interest. Yet these two aims could quite clearly conflict, and where
the truth was a matter of opinion and where the issue involved was
one of the national interest, it was for the BBC to make the
unenviable decision of where precisely truth and national interest
lay, and whether they were compatible. An interesting example of the
nature of such decisions had occurred less than two months before the
Strike. It reveals that Reith and his colleagues did not need the
events of May to appreciate and determine the position of the BBC
vis-a-vis the national interest. In its meeting of 11 March 1926 the
BBC Board of Directors had discussed news:
It was pointed out that certain of the news broadcast contained
an announcement which was inimical to the interests of British
trade and the Managing Director undertook to ask Reuters [who
provided the BBC with news] as a general rule to exclude
121.M. Tracey, Op. Cit., 151.
122. Ibid., 155.
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123
announcements of contracts placed abroad.
This incident should not be over-emphasised. It was during the life
of the Company when all the Directors were business men; nor is it
known whether this undertaking was carried out, or for how long.
Nevertheless its significance cannot be denied - Reith was agreeing
to a selection of news not on the grounds of newsworthiness but of
the national interest. If one equates truth with a journalistic
definition of newsworthiness based on public interest in an issue,
then it must be accepted that Reith was party here if not to a
fabrication of the truth then at least to a minor falsification of
it.
The same was to be true of events during the General Strike.
Reith sidestepped the issue, arguing that
as the government are sure that they are right, both on the facts
of the dispute and on the constitutional issues, any steps Which
we may take to communicate the truth dispassionately should be to
124
the advantage of the Government.
The BBC throughout was certainly careful to distinguish between news
agency, government and TUC originated news, yet its fundamental
attitude to the Strike was far closer to what the Government would
have considered the truth than to what the strikers would have done.
The BBC's view of the true state of affairs was, and would always be,
coloured by its view of the national interest, even during the Suez
crisis when it was seen to act contrary to the government line. It
was inevitable and quite legitimate that it should be so: for where
truth was open to interpretation the national intei .est was the only
yardstick for its own interpretation of truth which the BBC could
use. Not to have done so would have been to set itself up as opposed
123. Gainford Papers, BBC Board Minute Book, 11 March 1926.
124. BBC, NA, memo probably by Reith although signed by Lord
Gainford, 6 May 1926.
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to the national interest and in consequence hostile to the people it
was created to serve.
The only charge, therefore, to which the BBC was possibly open
was one of too closely equating national interest with the government
line. Yet here, quite apart from his natural tendencies, Reith was
placed in a position where he could really do nothing else, given the
constitutional relationship of BBC and Government. Reith agonised
over the consequences of this relationship, and was greatly hurt that
the Government did not completely trust the BBC to act in the
national interest. Yet his primary concern was to avoid being
commandeered, to prevent the BBC from being seen as under government
control. He considered it 'cardinally important ... to maintain the
BBC tradition and preserve its prestige', and felt that it would have
been
a calamity if public confidence in the BBC had been dissipated
125
through actions, negative or positive, during the Emergency.
This was the first major evidence of Reith's determination that the
BBC should be seen not to be constitutionally bound to the
Government. As already shown, however, this determination did not
originate in the Strike: it was a natural consequence of Reith's
ambitions for the service, and later incidences of the BBC's
readiness to submit to unofficial pressure rather than be directly
ordered, cannot be traced back to the events of May 1926.
Two further issues need briefly to be considered: the reaction of
the Labour and Conservative parties to BBC actions during the Strike
and the BBC's development of 'editorials'. Conservitive reaction was
divided. Hard-liners such as Churchill deplored what they saw both as
a wasted opportunity to put out government propaganda, and as an
anti-government stance in the BBC's broadcasting of TUC communiques
and other non-official news. Whether or not this damaged the BBC's
125. Reith to Senior Staff, 15 May 1926. Quoted by A. Briggs
(1961), Op. Cit., 365.
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chances of gaining Cabinet approval for controversial broadcasting in
the new Licence it is impossible to say. By contrast Baldwin and
J.C.C. Davidson had nothing but praise for the BBC, whilst the
Executive Committee of the National Union sent a verbal message of
126
thanks to Reith for the BBC's work during the Strike.
By contrast the Labour Party was united in its objection to BBC
policy, though the outcome of these protests was in some respects to
the BBC's benefit. From 5 May onwards Reith had received constant
requests by the Party to permit one of its number to broadcast.
William Graham, Charles Trevelyan and Hugh Dalton all visited Reith
and MacDonald wrote and phoned to him. Reith personally considered
the idea a good one and believed that it could do only good, but he
felt constrained to seek Davidson and Baldwin's opinions and they
proved too strongly opposed to the idea for Reith to go against them.
They argued strongly that such a broadcast would only reinforce
Churchill's demands to have the BBC commandeered. Reith explained to
Graham and MacDonald that the BBC was not a free agent and, following
the end of the Strike, wrote to express his hope that they did not
blame either himself or the BBC for its actions. But he had to admit
to his di127ary that the BBC was 'properly in bad with the Labour
Party'. Graham considered the BBC's broadcasts hopelessly one
sided, and MacDonald, after calling the BBC biased, concluded:
We have become so accustomed to unfair play in publicity that we
are beginning to take it as an ordinary experience, but I regret
that this new form of publicity seems to have already yielded to
128
tendentious propaganda.
As the events of May receded, however, Graham, MacDonald and other
126. NUCUA, Executive Comittee meeting, 8 June 1926. Was it
perhaps, verbal because they recognised that it would be
impolitic to have such an expression of thanks generally known?
127. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 97, 18 May 1926.
128. MacDonald to Reith, 17 May 1926. Quoted by Boyle, Op.Cit.,
205.See also article by Ellen Wilkinson, Radio Times, 28 May
1926.
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Labour leaders became more friendly towards the BBC. They came to
appreciate the BBC's difficulties, and the outcome was an altogether
closer and more intimate association between Reith and MacDonald, and
a greater interest by the Labour Party leadership in broadcasting.
Reith visited MacDonald at his London home and MacDonald spent the
129
evening at Reith's.
	 Amongst Labour's rank and file, however,
memories of the BBC's role continued, and were to contribute to
renewed animosity after 1931.
The 'editorials' stemmed directly from Reith's never ceasing
desire to extend BBC freedom to deal with controversial issues, which
continued unabated throughout 1926 quite irrespective of the Crawford
Committee or the General Strike. In late April B.E. Ndcolls, the
London Station Director, had proposed to Reith that outside speakers,
including Labour leaders, might be permitted to give brief talks on
the need for calm. In the event these talks started quite non-
controversially as internally written appeals. After the end of the
General Strike, however, but while the miners were still out, they
became more controversial. This was the result of close liaison
between BBC Director of Pnblicity Gladstone Murray and J.C.C.
Davidson,and was not wholly approved by Reith, for he recognised that
the conciliatory line taken would be objected to by Cabinet hard-
liners. Murray saw the editorials as a chance to develop BBC
influence and freedom gradually, but although Reith agreed he felt
130
that the development should be even slower.	 When in late May the
editorials over-reached themselves and Mitchell-Thomson demanded to
vet every script before transmission, Reith ended the experiment.
For a brief while he hoped that the effective ban on controversy
would not be reimposed, now that the BBC had proVed itself, but the
131
Post Office quickly clamped down again. 	 On 28 May Reith wrote to
the GPO suggesting that representatives of the employers and workers
129. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 98, 3 October 1926; 22 December 1926.
130. Ibid., 138, 25 May 1926.
131. Ibid.,139, 26 May 1926.
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of the Federated Associations of Boot and Shoe Manufacturers of Great
Britain might broadcast on how industrial peace had been maintained
in their industry for thirty years by putting all di132sputes to
arbitration. This proposal was immediately rejected. In July
Reith appealed again to be allowed to develop controversial
broadcasting, hoping thereby to influence Mitchell-Thomson's
recommendations to Cabinet regarding Crawford. The Postmaster
General had not needed to be influenced, but Reith still did not
133
achieve his aim.	 When in August the Industrial Peace Union
applied to have one of their public meetings broadcast, the BBC
referred the matter to the GPO merely for confirmation of the
decision already taken that such a broadcast would not be
134
possible.	 In November, however, the Post Office had to reject
yet another appeal, this time to be allowed to broadcast speeches
from the 
135
Hull Station by candidates in the forthcoming Hull By-
Election.
From the controversial broadcasting point of view, 1926 was a
momentous year more for the results of Crawford than for the effects
of the General Strike. The outcome of both for the immediate future
of controversy was disappointing but understandable. Boyle saw the
Strike as a climacteric for the visions of John Reith:
the General Strike cost Reith his innocence. Henceforth he became
less unworldly. His eyes moved towards the establishment, on the
sound principle that what a man could not defeat he must
136
join.
132. BBC, R34/881/1, Reith to Sir Evelyn Murray, 28 May 1926; F.W.
Phillips to Reith, 1 June 1926.
133. Reith to Mitchell-Thomson, 6 July 1926. Mentioned by A.
Briggs(1961), Op.Cit., 359.
134. BBC, R34/881/1, Carpendale to Reith, 16 September 1926.
135. BBC, PPBGEB, correspondence regarding Hull by-election, 1-3
Noveinber 1926.
136. A. Boyle, Op.Cit., 203.
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Evidence both of Reith's ambitions for broadcasting's democratic
role, and of his continued pressure for broadcast controversy, do not
bear out the first proposition. Nor is it possible to see the
situation of the BBC during the Strike more as a future influence
upon than a symptom of its delicate relationship with government and
of its position in the state. Of course memories of the Strike would
for long influence the views and decisions of those who were
involved, but fundamentally the outlook of the BBC in such a unique
situation was predetermined, and Reith never disputed that he would
have acted in an almost identical manner whether or not government
pressure had been applied. Reith's eyes did not turn to the
establishment - they were already there, quite deliberately seeking
to place the BBC (and himself) within and as a perfecting agency for
the established form of the democratic state. Membership of the
establishment did not necessarily imply uncritical approval of it,
and Reith, who could never have been uncritical for long, found
almost everything to criticise.
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Between 1923 and 1938, when he left the BBC, Reith was constantly
involved in the round of party and national politics. Scme reference
has already been made to his character and outlook, but so central
was he to the development of political broadcasting that it is
necessary to fill out briefly the picture so far given.
Biography, diary and innumerable pen-portraits by former
colleagues, all agree that Reith was a highly complex man. He gave
the impression of being an extreme autocrat and could be most
objectionably arrogant and snobbish. His diary reveals at times the
most unattractive vanity and sense of his own superiority. It
contains such comments as:
What a curse it is to have outstanding comprehensive ability and
intelligence, combined with a desire to use them to maximum
purpose,
and,
I am much burdened with a sense of my own ability, and this is
1
not conceit.
Yet at the same time his self-hatred could be almost unbearable. Not
only did he consider that he was condemned to eternal damnation, but
he also believed himself a complete failure in life:
I have been such a ghastq mediocrity compared to what I wanted
to be and could have been.
A BBC governor of the 1930s, Mary Agnes Hamilton, „later wrote a most
perceptive and essentially sympathetic description of Reith, in which
she described him as
1. C. Stuart, Op.Cit., 142, 21 January 1927; 147, 14 January 1929.
2. Ibid., 123, 24 November 1935.
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a most baffling mixture of the large and the small .... In John
Reith's case, a shy and intensely self-conscious creature is
condemned by the fact of being over six foot six in height ....
to inescapable prominence. .... Someone once remarked on the
absurdity of saying that, on a difficult occasion, one feels
small: what one actually feels is unduly large. John Reith's
efforts, at times, to behave as though he were not there are
3
pathetic.
The product of a strict Calvinist and Scottish manse upbringing,
Reith had at one and the same time a deep respect and reverence for
tradition and traditional institutions, yet a profound disregard for
many of his fellow men who in themselves represented just those
traditions and institutions. He had a disproportionate respect for
academia and suffered a decided sense of inferiority for not being
himself university trained. Yet it was a sense of inferiority in
formal education and background, never in intelligence. Although he
rapidly established himself and was honoured with all the
accoutrements of the establishment - a knighthood, membership of the
Athenaeum and the recognition of the eminent - he was too self
conscious, too introspective, too sensitive and too well aware by
turns of his inferiority and superiority, to be ever wholly at ease.
He was proud to be a man who had reached the top on merit alone, yet
feared that this fact might in some way diminish him and his power.
The trappings of power meant a great deal to him and ritual, ceremony
and uniform were his delights.
Reith felt a great affinity with and liking for the two major
political leaders of the age, Ramsay MacDonald and Stanley Baldwin.
MacDonald also was a Scot, while Baldwin shared Reith's celtic
spirit. All three in their own way were idealists and romantics. All
three spoke in general, visionary terms. MacDonald, the illegitimate
and wholly self-educated son of a Scottish crofter, was even more of
a self-made man than Reith and, like Reith, sought the comfort of
3.	 M.A. Hamilton, Remembering My Good Friends, London 1944, 284.
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establishment recognition without ever really finding it. Like Reith
he had never been to university. Baldwin, despite his wealth, was
equally such a departure from the normal political mould - quiet,
comfortable, retiring, apparently simple and straightforward - that
again he gave the appearance of not being wholly of the system. In
politics he appeared a self-made man, having reached the top
apparently without trying to do so, yet holding on once there with a
tenacity which excited the admiration even of his enemies. Reith
admired both leaders for their eminence and their vision, if not for
their minds and actions. Between 1923 and 1937 the BBC was to know no
other Prime Minister than these two, and Reith's regard for them was
to be of extreme significance. Even when he did not respect the
individual leader he had a respect for the office of Prime Minister
which was undoubtedly to influence his response to government
pressure. Reith saw himself as a public servant (though not a civil
servant) and so bound to serve in whatever way was required. This was
at no time more apparent than in 1938 when he left the BBC, at the
specific request of the PM, Neville Chamberlain, to go to a job he
unreservedly disliked, as chairman of Imperial Airways.
4
Reith's idealistic vision has already been discussed. His
political understanding, beliefs and ambitions were a vital element
of this vision. In view of the innumerable occasions when he was
described as autocratic and dictatorial, with the implication that
this was the form of rule he favoured, the first question to be asked
is whether he was a democrat. Like most rational people of the period
he had strong and sincere qualms about the practicability of
democracy and the sense of the electorate. He queried whether the
electoral process secured the best possible rulers, 'aristocrats of
character and intelligence'. Moreover his knowledge of his own
abilities and belief in his own divine predestination to achieve
great works, led him to the notion of a 'democratically born
5
autocracy', with himself as the autocrat.
4. See pp.226-235 above.
5. J.C.W.Reith (1949) ,Op.
 Cit.,170; see p.233 above, note 26.
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Yet his autocratic dreams remained democratically based and did
not prevent him from working to improve and perfect, if possible, the
democratic system. Certainly he had autocratic ambitions for himself;
as Mary Agnes Hamilton put it:
he is one of those .... who never grow out of the illusion
Carlyle denounced so passionately: the illusion that the universe
is made for them. Not perhaps to make them happy, but to give
them scope. John Reith's powers are great, but no one hnS the
6
scope that he thinks he should have.
Reith knew he could run everything better than everyone else, but
this led to a daydream of himself not as a dictator but as a
successful if autocratic democratic leader. For mental superiority
in such circumstances would be democratically recognised. In the
corridors of power he hinted at semi-autocratic posts abroad:'Hankey
told me yesterday that Sir John Reith .... fancies himself as
Ambassador in Washington, or as Viceroy in India', wrote Thomas Jones
7
in his diary. But Reith's own comments make it evident that his
fantasies were of still higher things. In his autobiography he
mentioned MacDonald's comment, after the 1929 election, that he was
having difficulty in making up his Cabinet to everyone's
satisfaction: "maybe you'll find out for yourself someday what it's
8
like".
	 The previous year Lord Riddell of the Newspaper
Proprietors' Association had told Reith that 'he thought I would be
9
Prime Minister one day'. Reith's naive belief in his own ability
to set the world to rights was compounded by a comment of Lloyd
George's in 1931:
He said that he could cure unemployment in the country in a year
6. M.A. Hamilton, Op. Cit., 285.
7. T. Jones, A Diary With Letters, London 1954, 176, 8 March 1929.
8. J.C.W. Reith (1949), Op. Cit., 120.
9. Ibid., 129.
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if I was seconded with him .... I could not help feeling upset as
10
a result, feeling that I had lost so much time up to date.
Earlier Baldwin had tried to disabuse Reith of his simplistic view of
politics, but Reith also remembered the latter part of his comment:
"No matter how much imagination or vision or energy the Prime
Minister may have, it's like being stuck in a glue pot. Perhaps
11
you'll find that someday".
These ambitions were largely fantasies. Reith wrote his diary
very much as a way of letting off steam, without caring much about
the truth or sense of what he said, whilst his autobiography was
essentially an exercise in self-advertisement. Nevertheless they do
indicate his innermost illusions, his egotism and the dreams he
entertained. For dreams they were. Reith was too much of an
individualist to be a successful minister, particularly in the
subordinate posts he was given by Churchill during the early stages
of the war. He was also too independent and too rebellious ever to
have been a loyal party man. Above all he was simply too much of a
dreamer ever really to grasp hold of and cope with mundane political
realities, unlike Baldwin and MacDonald who were always politicians
first and foremost.
Reith's diary demonstrates his superficial approach to politics.
Initially drawn to the Liberals he then came to feel that the Labour
Party might best represent his own viewpoint. Consequently he applied
to J.R. Clynes in 1920 with a view to becoming a Labour MP. Yet
Clynes' coolness offended and discouraged him, and by 1922 he had
given up the idea. With the political crisis of October 1922 Reith
immediately contacted Conservative and Unionist Central Office. Yet
when Sir William Bull asked him a few days later to be his personal
assistant he transferred his support from the new Conservative
10. C. Stuart, Op.Cit., 109, 15 October 1931.
11. J.C.W. Reith (1949) Op. Cit., 129.
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government to the coalition Conservative group headed by Austen
Chamberlain. Later in the year he told Chamberlain that he had always
been a Liberal, but that he approved his line.
Once he joined the BBC, Reith's personal political ambitions were
put in abeyance, but he continued to express his opinions in his
diary. The superficiality of his approach is revealed by a comment
before the 1924 election and following MacDonald's broadcast, which
Reith considered a technical failure:
I hope the Unionist party have a really decisive majority as
otherwise things are so unsatisfactory. I have been having some
sympathy with the Labour lot, but not now, having been much put
12
off by MacDonald's speech.
Between 1926 and 1929, however, Reith developed his friendship with
Ramsay MacDonald and, having helped both the latter and Baldwin in
the preparation of their broadcasts, was favourably disposed towards
the new Labour government. Yet the deteriorating political situation
and the inability of the Government to handle it quickly
disillusioned him, and the crisis of 1931 found him solidly behind
the MacDonald/Baldwin coalition. As ever this support did not last
and, in the absence of what he considered any reasonable opposition
party, he was reduced to a general condemnation of all politics and
politicians. This and his simplistic view of what politics involved
was indicated when he wrote:
I reflect sometimes on politics. The whole horrid technique
should be abolished. Government of a country is a matter of
proper policy and proper administration,, in other words
13
efficiency.
It might be argued that Reith saw one of the BBC's principal
12. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 90, 28 October 1924.
13. Ibid., 213, 29 November 1936. See also 211, 6 June 1936; 213,
15 December 1936.
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duties as being to distinguish between what was rational and what was
irrational - certainly between what was objective and subjective. The
irrational elements of argument from both left and right were to be
resisted and, through the encouragement of rational statement, shown
for what they were. Reason and objectivity seemed attainable and, as
already stated, it was perhaps too easy to equate these with the
perception of truth and right action. Like Cecil Lewis Reith saw
politics too much in black and white terms. In this respect there was
a fundamental flaw in his avowed support for the British democratic
tradition, for the pluralistic approach, although it is doubtful
whether he recognised it as such, despite his autocratic temperament
and concern for efficiency. Yet in spite of Reith's much quoted diary
entries, fantasising about the possibility of himself becoming a
dictator, he did not reject the pluralist form of democracy, but
rather gave its various elements a different balance. His vision was
possibly of an idealised pluralistic system, in which the electoral
decision received a greater emphasis than was in practice granted
and in which inter-election pressure politics were played down in
deference to the concept of national unity. Such relative emplinses
will certainly be observed when we look at BBC policy during the
years that Reith was its Director General.
Politically speaking Reith's stance, whilst non-party, was in
practice somewhat right of centre. For although he was primarily
concerned to promote reason over irrationality, his definition of
what was 'reasonable' or rational was necessarily linked to his
respect for certain forms of established authority. Reith's position
was inevitably a determinant upon that of the BBC. The result was a
greater regard for the 'reasonable' mainstream centre of the two
major parties and a dislike for the more radical elements of both.
This redounded to Labour's disadvantage in 1931 and created
innumerable difficulties with regard to the whole question of
broadcasting minority viewpoints. It also led not unreasonably, and
despite Reith's frequent disapproval of government policies and
actions, to a considerable regard for the wishes of the government of
the day. For the Government, in addition to having the ultimate
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authority over broadcasting, had also been democratically elected,
was in itself the representative of the state and had the practical
day to day job of governing. The BBC has always been accused of being
unduly influenced by the fact that the government had the authority
and power to put pressure on the broadcasters: such an argument fails
to take account of the absolutely legitimate BBC view that the
government of the day, of whichever party, was worthy of respect
simply because it was the embodiment of the state and the director of
its fortunes. Reith was always conscious of this fact and it was
certainly to influence his actions.
At the end of 1926 the old Company was brought to a close and the
new Corporation created. On 11 January the Secretary of the Post
Office informed the BBC of the Postmaster General's requirement,
under clause 4 (3) of the Licence, that it should not broadcast
'speeches or lectures containing statements on topics of political,
14
religious, or industrial controversy'. Reactions to the ban when
it was first announced had been mixed. The Times had called it
logical and 'calculated to prevent trouble', whereas the Daily 
Chronicle regretted that no attempt would be made through
broadcasting to stimulate the interest of the citizen in
15
politics. The press was more vehement in its condemnation of the
Licence clause which made the ban possible:
This vast machine of broadcasting, growing so rapidly to enormous
dimensions, and so capable of beneficent or malevolent
manipulation, may be converted by the Government of the day under
the terms of the Charter at any moment to. purely propaganda
16
purposes.
14. BBC, PPBG, Secretary of GPO to BBC Board, 11 January 1927.
15. The Times, 16 November 1926; Daily Chronicle, 16 November 1926.
16. Daily News, 13 November 1926. The item continued: 'is there
much doubt that a harrassed or discredited Government would be
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Another point about the new Corporation, picked up by some
papers, was that its Governors were none of them broadcasting
experts. The Glasgow News wondered whether between them they owned a
17
crystal set.	 However, the most pertinent (and extreme) comment
came from the Ccumunist Sunday Worker whose verdict was that
the board consists of capitalists, landowners, tories and empire
touts - with the sugar of a "Latour" representative well
18
calculated to make the Workers vomit.
The kernel of truth in this accusation was undeniable and was only
confirmed by the fact that, although the Governors were not appointed
to represent specific interests, Ethel Snowden was certainly seen as
19
the Labour representative and was appointed accordingly. 	 For
Labour to be marked out for particular representation was not to show
it special regard: it was rather a recognition that Latour supporters
were only a small minority within that class of people from which
such governors were usually chosen. This awareness had already been
demonstrated when in 1924 a Labour representative had been appointed
to the PMG's Broadcasting Board, although none had been appointed to
represent Conservative or Liberal interests. Neither was in need of
20
specific representation.
sorely tempted on slight provocation to use its powers and to
turn its broadcasting apparatus into a thinly disguised
variation, through an infinitely more effective medium, of the
"British Gazette". See also Liverpool Echo, 12 November 1926.
17. Glasgow News, 13 November 1926.
18. Sunday Worker, 31 October 1926. Quoted by A. Briggs, Governing
the BBC, London 1979, 168.
19. J.C.W. Reith (1949), Op. Cit.,114:'The PMG had to find a
representative of Labour and a woman; he said he had done well
to find them in one person'.
20. Asa Briggs (1979), Op.Cit., 31, has pointed out that, between
1927 and 1979, of the politically active governors of the BBC,
19 were Conservative or Unionist, 8 Labour, 7 Liberal, 1
Liberal and Conservative, 1 National Labour, 1 National Liberal
and one former Liberal M.P. who became a Latour peer.
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For the first time the BBC's position with regard to
controversial and political affairs broadcasting was clearly defined.
Moreover the PMG assured the House that
it is my desire to interfere as little as possible with the
Corporation's responsibility in deciding whether a talk should or
should not be excluded on the ground that it is of a political or
21
controversial character.
The Post Office did, however, indicate that the ban might be queried
when the BBC had gained practical experience of its new situation. In
a memorandum to his senior staff in January 1927 Reith carefully
stated the position as he saw it. He thought that the BBC had now
both greater autonomy and greater responsibility. Because the ban was
quite specific, it was no longer necessary to obtain the GPO's
permission for every outside broadcast speech. But, being specific,
Reith did not have any qualms about cautiously advising the abuse of
both its letter and its spirit. The PMG had banned any form of
broadcast statement on any issue that was considered controversial;
Reith interpreted this as a ban on controversial statements on any
such issue. He stated that the prohibition need not apply to
statements of fact even on such red-hot topics (in religious
controversy) as prayer-book revision. Statements of fact on
political matters, such as the situation in India and China, were
also permissible, although these were also controversial.
In abusing the spirit of the ban Reith knew that he could trust
the GPO to turn a blind eye:
There have been many occasions on which, when .1 referred a matter
to the Post Office by telephone, they have said they would rather
not be consulted, which means that if we did refer it officially
they would probably have to turn it down, but that if we managed
to get away with it all right they would not take the initiative
21. H.C.Debates, vol. 203: col. 2004, 16 March 1927.
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22
in raising objections.
He also recognised that it was the GPO which had to apply the ban,
and therefore recommended that in cases of doubt about a political
talk it should not be the Post Office which was asked to advise, but
the government department whose area it was. Of course it was very
necessary that all remotely political talks should be acceptable to
the relevant government department. Reith's advice was therefore a
mixture of boldness and caution, and almost all factual talks given
on political subjects steered well clear of domestic controversy. It
was to be generally easier and safer, for most of the BBC's pre-war
existence, to broadcast on Imperial and foreign affairs than on
domestic, although even on the former it was to be very far from
simple, as we shall see.
The first non-controversial talk on an obviously controversial
domestic topic was an eye-witness account and summary of the budget
23
given by The Times' former editor, Wickham Steed, in April 1927.
Straight talks of this kind, however, avoiding all controversy, were
clearly only of limited interest, and the Talks Director, Hilda
Matheson, was soon trying to deal in a more interesting manner with
more contentious issues. Thus she enquired of Reith in early March:
would there, do you think, be any objection to a friendly
discussion on the possibilities of industrial peace and co-
partnership, between, for instance, Citrine, the secretary of the
TUC and some friendly Capitalist or employer? I am sure it could
24
be handled without giving offence.
Reith, however, recognising that this was scarcely a borderline case,
referred the question to Sir Evelyn Murray of the Post Office, with
22. BBC, CB, Reith to R. Eckersley, Stobart and Matheson, 30
January 1927.
23. BBC, PPBB, correspondence, February - March 1927.
24. BBC, TDD, Matheson to Reith, 8 March 1927.
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the inevitable result.
Despite tentative efforts to circumvent the prohibition on
broadcast controversy, 1927 was a frustrating year for the BBC's
senior staff, and Reith summed up the general feeling in his report
to the Board in July:
Today ... the BBC is silent on many vital problems of immediate
and urgent interest to the country. Many subjects also have had
to be handled inconclusively and in an almost platitudinous way,
stopping short where real interest begins. On some subjects when
a talk is proposed there is hardly anything worth saying by the
time it has been censored. Our senior staff feel strongly that
the present state of affairs is unfortunate .... in that the BBC
is prevented from exercising as useful and beneficial influence
as it might do. On most vital problems today the majority of
people are either left in ignorance or else 
25
have to take the
dictated version prescribed by their newspaper.
Attempts to find politically non-controversial topics for debate
became steadily less successful, and one debate at least was
26
cancelled for not being sufficiently emasculated. The problem of
finding speakers willing to debate on such irrelevancies as 'that
prophecy is a dangerous thing', or 'that the present generation is
too superficial', soon became insuperable. In February 1928 Matheson
informed Roger Eckersley, the Director of Programmes, that although
two dates had been reserved for broadcast debates,
I have tried with absolutely no success to secure speakers for
these dates, or indeed for any other dates, on our present
restricted lines. The truth is that we have about exhausted the
25. BBC, BGP, Director General's report for Board, 4 July 1927.
26. The Times, 25 January 1928, 10e: 'owing to a difference of
opinion arising from the application of the official ban on the
broadcasting of controversy, the speakers in a debate to have
taken place on January 30th decided to withdraw'.
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supply of non-controversial subjects on which it was possible to
get up any kind of debate, and, still more serious, we have
about exhausted the supply of people of any standing who are
willing to talk on our present terms ... I have only come to this
27
conclusion with great regret.
.Reith was conscious that there was continued support outside the
BBC for controversial and political affairs broadcasting. Ian Fraser
continued in press and parliament to advocate the broadcasting of
parliament and the budget, whilst in The Times Philip Guedalla voiced
his belief that 'controversy should be broadcast with a single
28
unofficial safeguard - fair play'. Above all Reith had found an
ally in the Chancellor, Winston Churchill, who requested in 1927 that
his budget speech be broadcast. Reith would have been happy to
oblige. Later in the year Reith met Churchill
9
 again, and Churchill
2
expressed himself passionately on the subject.
Encouraged by this support Reith drafted a letter to the
Postmaster General in September 1927, although for reasons that are
not clear it was not until the following January that this letter,
very slightly amended, was sent. In it Reith emphasised that a review
was necessary after a year of experience, and repeated the arguments
used in his report to the Board. He cited developments in broadcast
controversy abroad, particularly in Germany, where he claimed it was
27. BBC, TDD, Matheson to R.Eckersley, 21 February 1928. Eckersley
was Assistant Controller (Programmes).
28. Daily Despatch, 31 March 1927, and H.C.Debates, vol. 202:
co1.1574, 22 February 1927; vol. 213:co1.872, 15 February 1928.
Contrast, however, the comment of the Northern Daily Mail, 22
February 1927, on parliamentary broadcasting: 'In these days a
country is fortunate that has no politics, or, in other words,
which has a political machine which functions so smoothly and
efficiently that no one need worry much about it. What this
country needs at the mcaent is fewer, not more speeches'; The
Times, 21 January 1928, lie.
29. J.C.W. Reith (1949), Op.Cit., 128; C. Stuart, Op.Cit., 99,14
June 1927.
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actively encouraged, and stated that experience showed the
broadcaster himself to be the most effective self-censor. The letter
argued that
the Corporation has been aware that it is not only falling behind
enlightened practice in other countries, but that it is also
attracting a growing volume of substantial criticism from its
listeners.
However, it stressed the BBC's appreciation of its responsibility and
of the need for caution if controversy were permitted:
it is obvious that both the choice and the treatment of subject
would necessitate most careful consideration. There could be no
expression of views contrary to the interests of the State, or on
subjects likely to offend religious or moral susceptibilities.
Subjects would require to be presented in such a way as to ensure
adequate safeguards for impartiality and equality of
30
opportunity.
As further support for his argument Reith enclosed a copy of the
conclusions of Sir Henry Hadow's committee on broadcasting and adult
education.
Mitchell-Thomson was unimpressed by Reith's foreign examples, but
accepted that criticism at home was growing. His recommendation to
Cabinet v,ra therefore for a removal of the ban in stages, allowing
pre-arranged debates, but maintaining the ban on single speeches and
lectures on controversial topics;
This would enable public feeling to be tested in the matter and
would go some way towards satisfying the demands which are made.
At the same time this course would not be open to the most
formidable objection which is levied at the general admission of
30. Cab.24,C.P. 36 (28), Reith to PMG, 16 January 1928.
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controversial speeches, namely, that if a policy obnoxious to
certain sections of listeners be broadcast, the broadcasting of a
31
reply some days or weeks later does not repair the damage.
Hearing that the matter was being discussed, sympathetic MPs
32
began asking parliamentary questions and lobbying for support.
Within Cabinet, however, the BBC's friends were of the very highest
and in little need of backbench pressure. Reith already knew that
Baldwin trusted and had a great regard for him and his work. In
addition Churchill's ardent desire to propagandise made him a
passionate advocate of broadcast controversy, and of single speeches
in addition to debates:
Controversy is the soul of British life and I really do not see
why politicians should not be allowed to express their
controversial views through the agency of the broadcasting
apparatus. Of course they are no longer allowed to do so through
the Press.
Thus at the annual Civil Service dinner in early February, which was
itself broadcast, he argued that
this great and wonderful new invention ... will enable the
leading political figures to impart exactly that guidance to the
vast mass of intelligent listeners which they ought to receive
33
and which I confidently believe they wish to receive.
His somewhat radical proposal was for an hour each night to be given
over to broadcast political and party controversy, time being
allocated according to party strength in the Commons.
31. Cab.24,C.P. 36 (28), Memorandum by W.Mitchell-Thomson.
32. H.C.Debates, vol. 213:co1.872, 15 February 1928; vol.213:
co1.1051-2, 16 February 1928.
33. The Times, 11 February 1928, 12 b.
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It may briefly be wondered what had happened to questions of
party advantage, since broadcast controversy would be likely to
assist the Labour Party in increasing its means of communication
proportionately more than the Conservative. Politicians in the
constant heat of the fight do not always see the true situation.
Particularly when in government a party is placed on the defensive
and the barbs of the Opposition appear sharper and more numerous than
the weapons of defence. Churchill in particular always suffered from
a conviction of his opponents' propagandistic advantages, but he was
not the only one. Ian Fraser had written to Baldwin early in 1927
stressing the party advantage of broadcasting occasional
parliamentary debates:
6) From the Conservative Party point of view, I believe
broadcasting gives us an advantage over our opponents. Without
doubt Labour Party speeches and propaganda reach a wider audience
than is touched by Conservative efforts, and there must therefore
be thousands who, in a fair broadcast, would hear all sides of
the question who at present hear only the Socialist argument. 7)
much credit will accrue to the Government which permits this new
34
and interesting experiment to be made.
His support for the broadcasting of the budget debate also had a
party political aspect, namely that, as Chancellor, Churchill's
powerful oratory and presentation was 'an important psychological
consideration'. Above all, only by this means would the Government be
certain to have its case presented truthfully to a wide audience:
broadcasting as a medium of transmission from the speaker to the
listener is bound to be truthful, whereas the newspapers, which
are the only medium available at present, distort and colour
35
their presentation of the case.
34. Baldwin papers, Ba1.65/f38-43, Fraser to Baldwin, 3 February
1927.
35. Ibid.
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The Government was indeed receiving a rough ride from the press
between 1927 and 1928, and the feeling that its traditional source of
support and communication was deserting it may have led to greater
readiness to consider the idea of political affairs broadcasting. But
in any case other arguments in favour of the experiment would have
overridden all but major party objections. For the BBC did have a
strong case - it had proved itself to be trustworthy and responsible,
whilst Reith had won the support and respect of senior politicians of
all parties. By contrast the ban on controversy had been generally
seen as emasculating the service and reducing its potential, and the
ever growing number of listeners was demanding a change. Not least of
the Government's considerations was the fact that Reith had steadily
eroded away the very real influence of press interests on
broadcasting freedom and policy. Newspapers could still protest at
the prospect of broadcast controversy, but their power to prevent it
was greatly diminished.
On 5 March 1928 the ban was withdrawn and a statement made by the
Prime Minister to that effect in the Commons. The secretary of the
Post Office informed the BBC:
After full consideration, His Majesty's Government are of the
opinion that the time has come when an experiment ought to be
made in the direction of greater latitude ... His Majesty's
Government rely upon the Governors to use the discretionary power
now entrusted to them strictly in the spirit of the Report of
Lord Crawford's Committee. The responsibility for its exercise
will devolve solely upon the Governors and it is not the
intention of the Postmaster General to fetter them in this
36
matter.
Press reaction was mixed. The Morning Post was horrified, The
Times and Telegraph were reserved, whilst the Manchester Guardian 
36. Prem.1/127, Sir Evelyn Murray to BBC, 5 March 1928;
H.C.Debates, vol.214: co1.812, 5 March 1928.
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fully approved.
37
 The BBC's press statement, however, was suitably
calm and cautious. Controversy would be introduced gradually and
experimentally with no fundamental change in programme policy:
Controversy, political and economic, will be admitted on clearly
defined occasions with adequate safeguards for impartiality and
equality of treatment, the subject being dealt with in such a way
that the main opposing views can be presented clearly contrasted
and linked as closely as possible. Debates and discussions will
be the normal procedure and the removal of the restriction is not
to be interpreted to mean the immediate introduction of
38
indiscriminate controversy in Talks and Outside Broadcasts.
Within the BBC the lifting of the ban provoked a fierce
discussion of its implications, and this revealed divided opinions
about the speed and extent of developments. Reith himself was clearly
determined to move with caution - he more than anyone else was aware
of the opposing forces watching for unbalanced partisan statements or
other errors of judgement. His caution was shared by Roger Eckersley,
who thought that 'the need for circumspection and a quiet start is
39
obvious'.	 Both, however, were aware that an excess of caution
would be unfortunate. They believed that extremes should be avoided.
Nevertheless,
It will be impossible, if we are to be outspoken, for us not to
irritate on occasions: we must certainly be prepared for
criticism, more, probably, than we have ever had before, but it
will be the natural outcome of a policy which must be provocative
40
to be successful.
37. The Morning Post, The Times, Telegraph, Manchester Guardian, 6
March 1928.
38. The Times, 2 April 1928, 25a.
39. BBC, CB, R. Eckersley to Reith, 8 March 1928.
40. Ibid.
328
One of the primary sources of speeches, since the creation of the
BBC, had been outside broadcasts taken from dinners or other
occasions. In the past the body organising the function had
approached the BBC which, having extracted a signed agreement from
the speaker not to be controversial, had broadcast almost any such
speech if the speaker was sufficiently eminent. Eckersley recognised
that in future the BBC would have to be more selective, so that
particular interests were not over-represented in this way. It would
even be possible, he pointed out, for a controversial outside
broadcast speech to be answered within a few days with a studio talk
by an opponent of the views stated. Although the written agreement to
abstain from controversy would no longer be required, he felt that it
would be necessary to devise some safeguarding formula, and he
suggested the rather dangerous one
that there could be no expression of views contrary to the
interests of the State, or on subjects likely to offend religious
41
or moral susceptibilities.
As for debates Eckersley suggested a slow start, and put forward
as possible subjects 'The return to the gold standard and its effect
on national prosperity' (Churchill versus J.M. Keynes), 'Is the
minimum wage desirable or practicable?' (James Maxton versus a young
Conservative), and 'Is the Surtax fair or workable?'. However, the
most interesting section of his analysis of controversial and
political affairs broadcasting was a paragraph on talks which he did
not consider controversial at all:
freedom to handle controversy does not lessen the necessity for
continuing to present non-controversial and non-partisan
statements on current affairs. ....People have come to regard
with respect fair minded descriptive or explanatory talks by the
leading experts, which are altogether different from anything
42
they get in the ordinary daily newspaper.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
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He gave as example a talk the previous Monday on the Eygptian crisis,
and clearly had in mind programmes such as Vernon Bartlett's regular
talks on foreign affairs, which had been started in January. Thus one
of the strands of broadcasting that eventually produced modern
current affairs programmes, the explanatory exposition of the facts
of a situation as one man saw it, passed through this discussion of
'controversial' broadcasting without even being considered
controversial. Such talks were to be the mainstays of political
affairs broadcasting, at least as far as foreign affairs were
concerned, throughout the inter-war period. Yet Eckersley failed to
consider them more closely not because he was unappreciative of their
political affairs importance. Quite the contrary - such talks were
the direct result of Reith's decision in 1927 to misinterpret the
letter of the ban. Yet at their best they were considered one of the
highest forms of political affairs broadcasting - as neutral as one
man's exposition could make them, short yet cogent, attractive and
interesting to a wide body of listeners, yet dealing with matters
that were undeniably politically controversial, if only rarely of
relevance to domestic party politics.
Roger Eckersley represented the more cautious school of thought
within the BBC. At the opposite extreme was his brother Peter, the
Chief Engineer. If Roger came close to believing that nothing should
be broadcast which might endanger the state, Peter, by his passionate
defence of the rights of minority pressure groups, came equally close
to putting the status quo on trial:
Whatever we may believe, it is important to realise that the
minorities of to-day are the majority of tomorrow and that
without minorities progress in industrial, social and religious
affairs would never take place. In this connection I was
horrified to hear it said that we would never have a Communist
speaking. I think this is a most insidious doctrine, first
because Communism is a very large force in the world with many
serious people, secondly because if believers in the present
regime are so sure of its worth and consequence, they should have
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no fear.
His view of the BBC was of a balanced Hyde Park of the air:
Our policy should be that we are the lessors of a debating hall,
we are public spirited enough to allow into this debating hall
any people - so long as the subject chosen does not offend
against ordinary decency - and we do not mind how positive a
statement is upon the one hand, as long as an opportunity is
given for a statement upon the other hand, as vigorous and as
44
negative.
He argued that in any future General Strike both sides should be
allowed to broadcast equally, whilst he rejected the idea that the
Corporation should be editorially biased in favour of even such a
desirable concept as industrial peace.
This last view was directly contradictory to that of Gladstone
Murray, the Assistant Controller (Information), who saw the
democratic missionary role of the BBC in more positive terms. His
comments are worth quoting at length, both for their frankness and
for the way in which they did indeed accurately reflect the BBC's
position and outlook in early 1928. Warning against the danger of
'playing safe', he saw the BBC as impartially providing a forum for
discussion. Its attitude in providing this forum, however, could not
be entirely detached from reality:
We are bound to have a policy. We cannot afford to be a variation
of a gramophone sound box .... for example, the outstanding need
of the day at present is for concerted progressive co-operative
industrial effort. All the best minds of employers and of labour
are now engaged in preparing the way. We should take advantage of
43. BBC, CB, P. Eckersley to R. Eckersley, W. Gladstone Murray, H.
Matheson (Control Board), 6 March 1928.
44. Ibid.
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our new freedom to help develop a favourable atmosphere for this
movement and quite consciously to ally ourselves with the side of
progressive co-operative endeavour and against the side of
destruction. On broad principles our policy might be interpreted
as combining the liberalism of Mr. Baldwin with the innate
conservative caution of Mr. MacDonald. This means a little more
than the forum, it means a control just a "little to the left";
which after all, is faithful reflection of collective
45
aspiration.
Murray saw the BBC, therefore, as aiming at a 'faithful
reflection of collective aspiration', a very different concept from
that formulated some thirty years later of the BBC as a mirror on
society as it was. 'Collective aspiration', to the middle class,
educated intelligentsia that comprised the BBC's production staff of
the late 1920s, meant industrial and political harmony at home and
international peace. The latter in particular was a cause that the
BBC was to champion, with its frequent reports from the League of
Nations, close contacts with the League of Nations Union, its first
motto ('Nation shall speak peace unto Nation'), various experimental
broadcasts and talks by foreigners appallingly didactic and
moralistic stories in Radio Times. From the very beginning the
Corporation showed itself to have an editorial line, and one that was
not as uncontroversial as it supposed.
Hilda Matheson's reaction to the lifting of the ban was entirely
practical. She recognised new possibilities for debates, discussions
and outside broadcasts, but expressed concern at the dangers of
concentrating on those formats which stressed adversary disputation:
If we limit our talks which deal with matters of controversy to
debates and discussions we shall rule out a lot of people who
45. BBC, CB, W.E. Gladstone Murray to Control Board members, 6
March 1928.
46. See Radio Times 1928 Christmas Issue, for its story, 'A Story
of the future - "Nation Shall speak peace unto Nation".
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find the debate form artificial or restraining, and many others
who cannot be squeezed into being merely the opposite of some
47
other view.
She hoped that it would be possible to invite distinguished people
who had a distinctly individualistic viewpoint, such as Bernard Shaw,
to broadcast without the necessity for a directly opposing reply.
The vitally important question of the development of political
affairs broadcasting technique will be discussed later. A brief word,
however, on talks, debates, discussions and symposia is necessary
here, firstly to avoid terminological ambiguity, and secondly to
explain why such stress was laid on these forms of broadcasting. The
BBC used each of these terms sometimes generally, sometimes in fairly
well defined senses. However, when used specifically, each term meant
something different. A talk was a single statement without reply
either immediately or the following week. A debate was, as in a
debating chamber, argument between two or more individuals speaking
alternately within one programme. 'Discussion' was used vaguely and
often referred to single programme debates, but also meant a series
(perhaps weekly) of talks on one subject, with a different speaker
for each programme putting a different point of view. Finally
'symposium' was also a vaguely used term, and could be applied to
discussions;more particularly it referred to the type of series Hilda
Matheson had proposed, where eminent people gave general statements
of their outlook, without necessarily taking an argumentative or
mutually contradictory stance. It could also be used for series on a
particular subject which contained a mixture of factual talks by
experts and partisan statements of opinion by politicians.
To minds accustomed to modern current affairs, documentary and
magazine formats of political affairs programming, such techniques as
formal debates and protracted discussion series appear exceedingly
crude and clumsy. Yet this was not nearly so apparent in 1928. The
47. BBC, CB, H. Matheson to R. Eckersley and W. Gladstone Murray.
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BBC had two existing models of political affairs communication upon
which it might pattern itself - the press and the public meeting in
all its forms. To most of those who composed the senior staff of the
Corporation the larger part of the press was anathema. There was a
general BBC antipathy towards the journalistic outlook, which was
associated, not surprisingly, with bias, editorialisation, hmAte and
sensationalism. Even the quality press, which aspired to straight
news reporting and distinct and separate editorialisat ion, provided
the BBC with no alternative pattern for political affairs
broadcasting. Far more obvious a model for broadcasting than the
written tradition of political communication was the spoken. Indeed,
before broadcasting, all notions of 'talks' were bound up with public
meetings, debating societies, lectures and public and parliamentary
speeches. Politicians and other leading figures whom the BBC invited
to broadcast certainly did not see it as a journalistic exercise, but
simply as an extension of their public speaking commitments. For if
the public meeting in all its forms was in decline by the 1920s, it
was still a highly important means of communication, with a long and
impressive tradition behind it, and it was so regarded by all
politicians and others who had lived most of their lives without the
wireless. This included those who had created and were responsible
for developing the BBC. They saw broadcasting as a replacement, an
infinitely superior replacement, for the public meeting, and one
which eliminated the manipulative opportunities offered to speakers
at public meetings by mob psychology. As already mentioned, the early
BBC made great use of outside broadcast speeches from functions, and
this practical example of the link between broadcasting and the
spoken tradition was a further influence upon Matheson and her
colleagues. It was therefore to this tradition rather than to the
48
journalistic that the BBC initially looked.
For these and other reasons the Corporation did not immediately
48. See pp.487-508 below for a fuller analysis of political affairs
technique development.
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start broadcasting on current political affairs once the ban had been
lifted. Indeed it was as cautious as anyone could have wished. Vernon
Bartlett's broadcasts and other talks on world affairs continued,
but little else appeared to be done. Nevertheless, behind the scenes
much was happening. From the beginning there was recognised a
division between programmes which the BBC was prepared to arrange on
its own initiative and under its own complete control, and those for
which consultation with the major parties proved necessary. It was
inevitably the latter which were to provide most of the problems.When
discussing either type it is necessary to remember that the other was
going on, or being negotiated, at the same time, and where the
parties complained about programmes of the first type an absolute
division became impossible. Despite this it is probably most sensible
to discuss separately those political affairs programmes in which
party involvement was high, and those in which it was incidental; for
there can be no doubt that one of the biggest factors in the
development of political affairs broadcasting was to be the interest
of the parties, and this tends to obscure other and more subtle
influences and developments. Programmes in which party involvement
was incidental or the result of complaints will be considered first.
Reith's first idea was an obvious one, to see whether permission
49
would now be given for broadcasting the budget speech. He was not
to be successful in this. Indeed the whole question of parliamentary
broadcasting was one to which there was considerable resistance from
MPs of all parties, and both Baldwin and MacDonald took note of their
50
objections. Churchill strongly favoured the budget broadcast idea
and, on being told that this was not possible, proposed that he
should broadcast a factual explanation of the proposals on the night
following the budget. He assured Reith that it would be wholly
51
uncontroversial. Reith fully supported the proposal and did not
49. Baldwin papers, Ba1.65/f46, Reith to W. Mitchell-Thomson, 14
March 1928.
50. H.C.Debates, vol. 192:co1.866, 22 March 1926; vol.214:co1.1136-
7, 7 March 1928; vol.215:co1.2447, 27 March 1929.
51. BBC, PPBB, Reith to Clarendon, 13 April 1928.
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Proposals were put in hand in April for a number of slightly more
political and controversial debates than had before been possible,
and in May the first of these took place with Sir Ernest Benn and ILP
leader James Maxton debating on 'Riches and Poverty, are they
necessary?'. This was hardly topical controversy, and the Controversy
Committee's desire to avoid currently hot topics was shown by their
decision not to arrange an industrial debate between the Co-operative
Movement and the National Traders Defence League. It was felt that as
these two bodies were at daggers-drawn, a debate between them would
56
stir up feeling rather than contribute to any useful conclusion.
This was a policy which implied that broadcasts should not be given
if they might be antagonistic, a potentially dangerous view if
caution were carried too far. Once again; however, it must be
remembered that, traditionally, debates consisted of formal and
rather general motions to be talked to, and that there was no
precedent for topical debates on up-to-the-minute news. Certain
subjects, it was considered, lent themselves to generalised and
detached debate, whilst more immediately topical issues would only be
debated in an emotional and unhelpful manner. The BBC's desire for
objectivity and calm analysis perhaps led it to look with disfavour
upon the debating of issues of the moaent. Lacking a dominating and
powerful news service with an emphasis upon immediacy, the early BBC
laid far greater stress upon the importance of the political issue
than of the political event. Given such a viewpoint, hot topicality
was far less paramount than it was to become. In any case, with the
subject for debate being chosen and announced weeks in advance, up-
to-the-minute topicality was simply not possible. The topics that
were chosen were politically controversial and even topical, but with
a greater stress than was later to be the case, perhaps, upon
political fundamentals.
Having said that, the early subjects for debate, following the
first, tended to be political but not really party issues - 'Road
versus Rail' (Col. Moore Brabazon, MP, and J.H.Thouas, MP), 'Scottish
56. BBC, CC, minutes, 12 July 1928.
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Nationalism',
	 'The Channel Tunnel'	 and 'Is Disarmament
57
practicable?'. A series of programmes aimed at new women voters
included debates on 'Does protective legislation protect women wage-
earners?', 'Should wages be supplemented by family allowances?' and
'Can women influence le 	
8
gislation more effectively by joining party or
5
non-party organisations?'. The second of these, between Eleanor
Rathbone and D.H. MacGregor, touched on party politics in that Labour
was currently considering the idea. In general, however, these early
debates avoided specifically party issues because it was known that
the parties would object, because it was hoped that specifically
party political debates or discussions would soon be arranged and
perhaps also because the BBC mentality was anxious to step outside
the confines of mere party debate and to demonstrate that political
controversy could be non-party.
Despite this, Matheson and her colleagues showed themselves most
anxious to experiment, to propose more partisan debates and to
attempt greater topicality. There was certainly no lack of ideas in
the Talks Department of the late 1920s. One proposed debate agreed by
the Controversy Committee was on housing problems, between the
Minister of Health, Neville Chamberlain, and a Labour leader. This
57. Brabazon was Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of
Transport, Thomas the railwaymen's leader. The Radio Times 
assured its readers that, 'This discussion of one of the great
problems of the day cannot fail to be thoroughly interesting,
as lively as it is well informed and "controversial" in the
best sense of that comprehensive word'. - Radio Times, 24 July
1928. Following the debate Truth commented: 'Listeners might
well have expected - perhaps hoped - that the talk would have
developed into a heated wrangle and ended in sounds of a
personal combat, followed by the announcement that the police
had taken charge of the combatants. So far from that the debate
proved to be a first rate comic turn. The combatants addressed
one another as dear James" and "My dear Brab", used no
rhetoric more violent than genial banter, and gave listeners
the impression that they must be sitting at a table with drinks
and smokes, and chaffing one another across it.' - Truth, 1
August 1928.
58. The speakers for the last were Dame Caroline Bridgeman and the
Countess of Galway.
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Siepmann, favoured scripted broadcasts, that did not prevent them
experimenting with unscripted debates of a more currently topical
nature. Unfortunately, because these were experimental they were not
extensively publicised, and so little is known about them. Following
an early experiment in unscripted debate in 1927, the first of these
programmes to be mentioned, after the ban on political controversy
62
was lifted, was in September 1928.
	 Reith asked Roger Eckersley
about 'the [J.H.] Thomas-Blumenfeld' fifteen minute debate, clearly
on current political issues, in which he considered that Thomas had
63
hogged the microphone. 	 Eckersley admitted that both this and a
previous unscripted debate had been rather one-sided, but felt that
to be too cautious, and to prepare such debates too much, would kill
their interest:
I believe in the spontaneity of it and therefore like to think
that these sort of programme items should not be given too much
publicity or too much preparation - in
64
fact should not be treated
necessarily as controversial occasions.
Matheson's comments equally showed her general approach and that
these debates were an attempt to handle current issues:
I think .... there is a definite place for short discussions of a
quarter of an hour if they are either a conversation on current
events or an argument on a single small issue ... It really comes
down to this: that it is at present impossible to lay down any
hard and fast rules about these discussions. Different subjects
and different people seem to require different handling, but we
really are miring an effort and spending a lot of time in trying
65
all sorts of ways. I fully realise the importance'of it.
62. BBC, TDD, Matheson to Reith, 1 February 1927.
63. BBC, TDD, Reith to R. Eckersley, c. 17-18 September 1928.
64. BBC, TDD, R. Eckersley to Matheson, 19 September 1928.
65. BBC, TDD, Matheson to R. Eckersley, 20 September 1928.
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In response to a letter complaining of J.H. Thomas's statements in
this debate, that Labour was sure to win the next election, it was
emphnsised that for topical discussions to carry conviction they
should be impromptu:
Although these discussions are only in an experimental stage,
there is already evidence that they are recognised as imparting a
66
new element of vitality and interest to programmes.
Matheson was also anxious to develop talks of the factual and
explanatory type, talks which were politically significant because
they had 'the general cultural function of raising the level of
67
information and intelligence'. To this end 'popular' talks series
were arranged on finance in the modern world, rates, the machinery of
government, the daily work of an MP and an LCC member and, as already
mentioned, talks for new women voters. A series on 'Tendencies in
Industry' was broadcast, with speakers ranging from Lord Melchett
(Chairman of ICI) to Walter Citrine (talking on the attitude of
organised labour), and from Walter Elliot, MP, to Sir Herbert Samuel.
These talks, in addition to those on foreign affairs by Vernon
Bartlett and others, were all given in 1928. Matheson claimed that
such talks were possibly the most important type of political affairs
68
broadcasting done by the BBC.	 Impressed by Vernon Bartlett's
weekly taiks on 'The Way of the World', the Controversy Committee
boldly discussed the possibility of a similar series of talks on home
affairs, and in early 1929 Matheson announced that Gerald Barry would
indeed talk each week on politics, personalities, social events and
69
other domestic news.
There was evidently much experimentation and a determination to
66. Printed in Patriot, 11 October 1928.
67. BBC, PPBGEB, Matheson to R. Eckersley, 20 December 1928.
68. Ibid.
69. BBC, CC, minutes, 8 August 1928, 8 February 1929.
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develop new forms of political affairs and other controversial
broadcasting in the first year after the removal of the ban. Caution
was, however, very evident and certainly limited possible progress.
Not surprisingly proposals by the Communist Party and the Imperial
70
Fascist League, that each be allowed to broadcast, were rejected.
Similarly a suggested talk on the International Co-operative Movement
was turned down on the grounds that the movement was now definitely
71
political.
	
It was also clear that many of the programmes
broadcast did not really live up to the hopes for them. A letter in
the Radio Times in July called for completely impromptu talks now
72
that the ban was removed: 'more speaking and less reading'.
Another writer admitted that the controversial debates had 'not
73
proved really exciting'. 	 Although some topics for the impromptu
debates broadcast did arouse emotions, others did not deserve to be
considered controversial. After a particularly anodyne example Lionel
Fielden wrote that
it proves conclusively that we cannot stage unrehearsed debates
unless the subject is violently controversial and each speaker so
74
partisan that a hot discussion along one line is assured.
Hilda Matheson pointed out that one reason why there had been
relatively few good political debates or discussions was that senior
politicians had been too busy to undertake them. She might have added
that many ministers were willing to broadcast statements on newly
passed legislation, but saw little value in providing the opportunity
75
for themselves and their policies to be publicly criticised.
Gerald Barry's weekly talks on home affairs, initially intended to
70. BBC, CC, minutes, 11 October 1928, 29 November 1928.
71. BBC, CC, minutes, 13 December 1928.
72. Radio Times, 13 July 1928.
73. D. Edge, in Radio Times, 28 December 1928.
74. BBC, TDD, Fielden to R. Eckersley, c. 24 July 1929.
75. BBC, PPBGEB, Matheson to R. Eckersley, 20 December 1928.
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parallel Bartlett's on foreign, only occasionally touched on
political matters . and rarely in anything more than the most
superficial manner.
Political affairs broadcasting, therefore, made a slow and
cautious start, but one which to those involved in early
experimentation did not appear so. Both they and politicians had a
firm belief in broadcasting's potentially explosive power and
influence, and accordingly treated it with respect. This attitude was
summed up in the comment of the writer Gordon Oakes:
when one realises that the broadcasting machine has become an
enormous power for good and evil, one cannot but recall
Nietzsdhe's Superman and wonder whether the species
76 
has not
arrived in the shape of the Programme Department staff.
The BBC was conscious not only of the power of broadcasting but
also of that of watchful politicians. It had to recognise party and
government interest in its wholly independent programmes, in
political but theoretically non-party ministerial broadcasts and
other speeches,. and in the most difficult area of all, party
political broadcasting. The Corporation was still in a proving period
and had to act with care. As late as April 1929 Ramsay MacDonald
could publicly state that when Labour was returned to power it would
have to 'recast the control of the BBC ... the plan adopted has been
77
dictated by the Government'.
	 Inevitably it waR mdnisterial
broadcasts that caused most trouble with the Labour opposition.
Protests at Churchill's budget broadcast in 1928 have already been
mentioned and, in view of this and the closeness of the General
Election, it was decided in 1929 only to broadcact. an eye-witness
account of the budget speech and a news summary of its proposals. In
November 1928 H.S. Lindsay, secretary to the Parliamentary Labour
Party, wrote to protest at a projected broadcast speech by Walter
76. Radio Times, 28 December 1928.
77. Forward, 13 April 1928.
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Elliot on the Western Highlands and Islands Transport Services
78
Bill. Reith described this speech as a ministerial explanation of
the results of the Select Committee enquiry into the problem, on the
basis of which the bill had been drafted: it was therefore impartial
79
and non-party.	 Such a pettifogging approach to a politically
controversial bill was treated as such by Lindsay. If Elliot was
talking on the report as a minister and not as a party politician,
what, he asked, would be the BBC's reaction to the proposal that
MacDonald should speak as Leader of His Majesty's Opposition, and not
as a member of the Labour Party, on the Official Opposition's
80
approach to the West Highland transport problem? Reith denied the
talk was partisan and emphasised that had Labour been in power the
same attitude would have been taken. Nevertheless Lindsay's point,
that a statement on a controversial issue currently passing through
parliament could not be considered ministerial, was reasonable. Hilda
Matheson admitted that ministerial broadcasts, even on Acts already
passed, were not impartial:
of course all such talks are to some extent tendencious, however
rigorously censored. The mere fact of explaining the Act in
81
question is an attempt to get a little credit.
When, at the end of the year, Neville Chamberlain proposed a
ministerial broadcast on the details of his De-rating Bill, the
Controversy Committee agreed that this was a controversial issue that
82
could only be dealt with by a debate.
The Committee's discussion of ministerial broadcasts, in early
1929, was therefore an interesting mixture of common sense and
78. BBC, PPBMB, H.S. Lindsay to Reith, 15 November 1928.
79. BBC, PPBMB, Reith to Lindsay, 16 November 1928.
80. BBC, PPBMB, Lindsay to Reith, 20 November 1928.
81. BBC, PPBGEB, Matheson to R. Eckersley, 20 December 1928.
82. BBC, CC, minutes, 20 December 1928.
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political pragmatism, both prompting caution. The Minister of
Agriculture had asked to talk on egg marketing:
this raised a point regarding the desirability, particularly at
the present moment with an election in sight, of ministers
personally sponsoring subjects, which, though they had actually
become law, had only recently passed out of the realms of acute
controversy. The very fact of a minister dealing in person with
such matters would again raise the controversial issue and would
set a precedent which might be still more regretted under a
83
future government which might be without a powerful press.
It was agreed that such talks should always be given by a civil
servant and that ministers should only broadcast in discussions or if
the subject was wholly non-party. Yet although the function of
ministerial broadcasts was gradually to be taken over by the news
bulletin, they remined a regular feature of broadcast political
affairs throughout the period under consideration, and incited
constant criticism from both sides as to BBC bias.
If the Labour Party was only beginning to be aware of the
significance of ministerial and non-party political broadcasting, the
Conservatives were very much alive to it. Most of their protests
reflected a party mentality rather than a partisan BBC. Nevertheless
such protests made it quite clear to the Corporation that even
balanced and fair political affairs broadcasting could be
misinterpreted and so endanger its hard won progress. Even before the
controversy ban was lifted J.C.C.Davidson, now Party Chairman, was
complaining to Reith about a series on 'Has farming a future?'. He
felt that the speaker,J.W. Robertson-Scott, had a decided leaning
towards the policy of land nationalisation and state control of
agriculture. Whether or not he was a professed socialist he was
advocating socialist policies and ignoring government actions. Such
talks
83. BBC, CC, minutes, 1 February 1929.
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do not appear to present a really thoughtful contribution to the
very difficult agricultural problems of the day, and anything
which tends to confuse the public as to the real difficulties
would be an additional embatrassment to the Government in their
very serious task of helping agriculture to pass through its
84
present critical stage.
Reith denied that the talks were biased, but admitted that the BBC
would occasionally make mistakes:
I am sure criticism is bound to come periodically as we normally
have fairly well informed men dealing with the various subjects,
and the more eminent they are the more likely it is that they
will express some opinion or another which is not held by
85
everyone.
A query about bias in the news bulletins was also summarily dismissed
86 •
by Reith.
By early 1929, however, the conviction was growing within
Conservative Central Office that the BBC had a left wing bias. A
broadcast conversation between former Labour minister Arthur Ponsonby
and his daughter, on 'The new enfranchisement of the young', aroused
the attention of Joseph Ball. He told Davidson that it
contained dangerous socialistic propaganda - dangerous because
insidious and difficult to detect. Miss Matheson, the Director of
Talks who was formerly in MI5, has the reputation of being of
Socialistic tendencies, and I have definite evidence that she is
in communication with the League of Nations Union on the subject
of counter propaganda to a rather good boys' book on the Navy. I
84. BBC, PPBAPB, Davidson to Reith, 13 March 1928.
85. BBC, PPBAPB, Reith to Davidson, 11 February 1928; also 15 Mnrch
1928, 24 March 1928.
86. BBC, PPBAPB, Reith to Davidson, 21 February 1928.
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suggest that it is no good writing to Reith, but that we should
87
get him beaten over the head by the Postmaster General.
The 'close association' of the BBC and the League of Nations Union
was a source of some disquiet to the Party. The LNU was supposedly
non-party, but had frequently, according to Pembroke Wicks,
Davidson's personal adviser, shown definite pro-Liberal tendencies.
Wicks took up Ball's point about the BBC/LNU connection, pointing out
that both Vernon Bartlett and Gladstone Murray were members of the
Publicity Committee of the LNU. He also explained that Hilda Matheson
had written to the LNU drawing attention to propaganda in favour of a
88
bigger navy in the boys' book 'The Wonder Book of the Navy'.
Where possible Ball was anxious to prevent potentially adverse
broadcasts being given, and he was quick to notice that in a BBC
press release in April a series of talks on 'Trade Tendencies in the
Industrial North' included one by Professor Henry Clay on the 'Humor! 
89
effects of trade depression.' This talk was due to be given on 21
May, during the General Election campaign. Having determined that
Clay was a Liberal, Davidson complained to Reith that 'I do not see
how any talk on such a subject can avoid being largely, if not
90
entirely political'. Reith assured him that it would not, but his
close contact with Davidson led him to compromise the BBC's
independence in this matter:
[Clay's] talk will be sent in here a week or more before it is
due to be given, and I will see it myself, and if you like I will
91
send it privately to you.
87. Conservative Central Office papers (CCO), CC04/1/23, Ball to
Davidson, 6 February 1929.
88. CCO, CC04/1/23, Pembroke Wicks to Davidson, 21 February 1929.
89. CCO, CC04/1/23, Ball to R. Topping, 15 April 1929.
90. CCO, CC04/1/23, Davidson to Reith, 24 April 1929.
91. CCO, CC04/1/23, Reith to Davidson, 25 April 1929.
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Davidson did like, and both he and Joseph Ball read the script and
agreed it should not be broadcast. As with the Ponsonby broadcast
they could not find positive objections,
but it is open to the general criticism that it does not mention
any of the bright features in the situation as it exists today.
It gives an account which, I think, is unduly depressing, and
there is little doubt that if it were written by a supporter of
the present Government a fairer and more favourable exposition of
92
the subject could be given.
Vigilance and pressure had their reward. Clay's talk and another, on
the problem of the Tyneside, were postponed until after the election,
and Clay was asked to revise his script. Reith explained that the
revision was because it was unduly depressing and written in a bad
93 •
broadcasting style.
In 1928 Churchill's budget broadcast bad aroused Labour protests;.
in 1929 Wickham Steed's eye-witness account of the budget led to
complaints from incensed Conservatives. Sir Patrick Gower asked to
see the script, and Reith, admitting that it had not been vetted in
advance, sent it to him with the assurance that
an entirely different impression is gauged from reading it than
from hearing it, his references to bribery and so on being
obviously in inverted commas as spoken and the tone sardonic. I
believe Mr. Wickham Steed is a great admirer of the
94
Chancellor.
Gower and Ball, however, were unimpressed and considered the talk so
outrageous' as to justify a formal letter from the Prime Minister to
the BBC's chairman, Lord Clarendon. The complaint, which was at the
92. COD, CC04/1/23, Davidson to Reith, 13 May 1929.
93. COD, CC04/1/23, Reith to Davidson, 14 May 1929.
94. CCO, CC04/1/23, Reith to Gower, 17 April 1929.
talk's facetiousness, was said to be non-party but was drafted by
Gower:
it seems difficult to believe that such a flagrant
misrepresentation of the scene, circumstances and speech in the
House of Commons .... should have been possible ... The annual
presentation of the National Balance Sheet is one of the most
serious occasions in the House of Commons, and I cannot but
regret that the first account of it over the wireless should have
been couched in a spirit of levity amounting almost to ridicule.
The last thing I am sure that you would want is. that a wrong
impression of the proceedings of Parliament should be conveyed to
the general public, and while I fully appreciate the difficult
task with which the British, Broadcasting Corporation is
confronted, I hope sincerely that steps will be taken to check
95
such statements in the future before they are delivered.
Davidson's own opinion was that the talk was 'quite incredibly biased
and vicious' from a party point of view, and hostile to the
96
Government. Reith and Clarendon could only accept such a prime
ministerial protest, particularly since it was clear that there were
reasonable grounds for complaint. Reith admitted that the tone of the
talk had been unsuitable, and Clarendon told Baldwin that the BBC
recognised the talk to be
our responsibility and we are very sorry. It is interesting that
97
complaints were also received from the other side!
The protest which raised the most interesting questions about the
political influences of broadcasting, and which showed the
Conservatives to be well aware that such influence could be subtle,
95. COO, CC04/1/23, Baldwin to Clarendon, undated draft letter.
96. CCO, CC04/1/23, Davidson to Baldwin, 18 April 1929.
97. BBC, PPBB, Reith to J.D.B. Fergusson(Treasury), 28 April 1929;
Clarendon to Baldwin, 2 May 1929.
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concerned a series in the Autumn of 1929. This was 'Points of View',
the first of Hilda Matheson's symposia, in which G. Lowes Dickinson,
Dean Inge, George Bernard Shaw, H.G. Wells, J.B.S. Haldane and Sir
Oliver Lodge each stated their philosophies of life. This series
cannot technically be considered as coming under the heading of
'political affairs', but the political implications of the discussion
that surrounded these programmes make it desirable to consider them.
Following the first in the series, by Lowes Dickinson, it was
reported to Joseph Ball as having been 'an exposition of the rankest
B8
and most poisonous socialism'.
	 Ball pointed out that whereas
Dickinson, Shaw and Wells were Socialists none of the others in the
series were Conservative propagandists. He therefore suggested a
letter to The Times, as previous complaints to Reith and Clarendon
had, in his opinion, brought no result. Rank and file Conservative
complaints at this first talk were such that Davidson wrote to Reith
to ask for a transcript. In Reith's absence his deputy, Admiral
Carpendale,. replied to assure Davidson that this was not a party
political series in any sense, 'though politics, in the broad sense,
are likely to be mentioned' as part of the speakers' statements of
99
their philosophy. Davidson's retort was an obvious one:
In this series of six talks .... it is clear that the balance is
very heavily weighted on the side of Socialism. I do not contend
for one =cent that the BBC is not within its rights in asking
eminent men of science and letters to contribute talks on general
subjects, but the point I wish to emphasise is that if politics,
even in the broad sense, are to be permitted to fall within the
scope of these discussions, then arrangements ought to be made to
secure fair and equal representation, not only of the Socialist
100
and Liberal, but also of the Conservative point of view.
He also took the opportunity to complain of the number of ministerial
98. CCO, C004/1/23, memo by J. Ball, 1 October 1929.
99. BBC, PPBAPB, Carpendale to Davidson, 3 October 1929.
100. CCO, CC04/1/23, Davidson to Clarendon, 9 October 1929.
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series lies in the degree to which it could bring new ideas, and
105
not old ones, to the ears of the public.
This was the kernel of Conservative complaints: such a broadcasting
policy, by its very nature, introduced new thoughts to people, and
new thoughts encouraged change.
Politicians generally were becoming more alive to the potential
of broadcasting. Although he had no hand in the removal of the
controversy ban MacDonald had fully supported it, having himself felt
106
the ban's restrictions.
	 Early in the following year he received
intimations of the Baird low definition television system. Robert
Williams, the General Manager of the Daily Herald,told him that
already Conservative and Liberal leaders had seen the new device, and
he strongly urged MacDonald to go and see it:
these influences over the ether, vocal and visual, are destined to
make enormous headway, and you owe it to yourself, as leader of
the Party, to see what can be done. If television can amplify the
work of the Daily Herald, and other Party organs, together with
the magnificent work you and your colleagues do on the platform,
107
we shall still keep the world safe for democracy.
105. The Listener, 13 November 1929, 640. See also Note A at end of
chapter, p.374.
106. MacDonald's speech at the Burns centenary dinner was broadcast
on 5 January 1928. Asked to pledge himself not to be
controversial he replied, via his secretary, 'that so far as he
is concerned he has no intention of dealing with, controversial
matters but that if the Postmaster General, in whose judgement
he has no confidence whatever, thinks that he is violating his
pledge, Mr. MacDonald wishes to make it perfectly clear that he
himself retains the right to define what controversy is'. - R.
Rosenberg to Sir R. Blair, 19 January 1928. As MacDonald
himself told Blair: 'I am very anxious not to be quoted by the
Postmaster General as one who has surrendered to his
conditions'. - MacDonald to Blair, 23 January 1928. Both in
MacDonald papers PRO 30/69/6/31.
107. MacDonald papers, PRO 30/69/6/32, R.Williams to MacDonald, 17
January 1929.
352
The following month Herbert Tracey, writing in Labour Magazine, saw
broadcasting as the solution to the press combines and monopolies:
from the point of view of public policy, the ban on the
broadcasting of controversial discussions is sheer folly. With
proper arrangements to ensure fair play and absolute impartiality
as between the BBC and the parties in matters of current
controversy, the 
108
dangerous consequences of newspaper monopoly can
be counteracted.
On the Conservative side Ian Fraser was still pressing for a greater
degree of political affairs broadcasting, and stressed the party
advantage:
if you are alone, as you are when listening, you are in the right
position to be appealed to by reason, for you are not subject to
the emotional effect of being in an excited and largely partisan
crowd. The tory case is more reasonable than emotional; the case
put by Lloyd George and Ramsay MacDonald is the reverse;
consequently our case stands a better chance through the
microphone than does that of either of the two parties .... I am
sure Mr. Baldwin cannot realise the extraordinary effect of his
voice and the intimate and personal touch which he creates with
the ordinary listener in his own home. He has the knack, which
few have learned, of talking to a million individuals personally,
109
rather than to an imaginary audience of a million.
J.C.C. Davidson and others who were concerned with par	 y strategy
agreed with Fraser as to the power and importance of broadcasting,
but their conclusions were to be rather different.
The area of political affairs broadcasting which absorbed most
L8. Labour Magazine, vol.VII, no. 10, February 1929, 445-447.
L9. Baldwin papers, Ba1.65/f54-5, Fraser to L.C.S. Amery, 19
November 1928. Amery forwarded this letter to Baldwin with the
comment that it contained i a great deal of good sense'.
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attention, and which caused most difficulties for Reith, was
undoubtedly that of broadcasts by representatives of the political
parties themselves. Here the different approach of the three parties
became apparent. The Labour Party quickly showed its anxiety to
broadcast. Eight days after the ban's removal Arthur Henderson wrote
to Reith with a request that MacDonald's forthcoming speech at the
110
Yingsway Hall be broadcast. 	 Reith very properly replied that as
the BBC had a duty to be impartial such broadcasts would only be
possible if the other two parties were given similar opportunities.
It was too late to broadcast MacDonald's speech, but he promised to
111
contact the other parties in order to arrange such talks.
Optimistically it was proposed that they should begin in May, all
party broadcasts in a series being given within one month of each
other. Davidson's response to this proposal, however, immediately
necessitated delay:
I would venture to suggest that before any isolated engagements
are undertaken it would be to the benefit of all concerned if the
British Broadcasting Corporation could draw up rules of general
application which would enable the various political parties to
know the scope of the privileges to 
112
which they will be entitled,
and to make their plans accordingly.
Roger Eckersley therefore set out proposals for one half hour
broadcast every fortnight while parliament was sitting, each party
having one opportunity every six weeks. By this scheme the Liberal
Party received an equal opportunity to each of the other parties,
whilst the government of the day obtained no overall advantage.
But before the idea could be put to the parties Winston
Churchill, who had already played an important role0aving the ban
removed, made a significant and fatal intercession. Having called
.10. BBC. PPBPPB, Henderson to Reith, 13 March 1928.
L11. BBC, PPBPPB, Reith to Henderson, 15 March 1928.
L12. BBC, PPBPPB, Davidson to R. Eckersley, 29 March 1928.
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Reith to No.11, Downing Street to discuss the budget broadcast, he
made another point regarding party political broadcasts. Reith was
impressed:
[Churchill] feels most strongly that it would be unfair to run
our political speeches in series of three as this means only one
chance in three for the Government of the day. He is most
emphatic that the Government of the day ought to have a one in
two chance .... he thinks it would be very unfair that the people
who at the moment are carrying the burden of affairs, should only
have a one in three chance. I must say that I quite agree with
him.... whatever is agreed now would apply irrespective of the
11
Government in power.
Thus the government of the day, in addition to ministerial broadcasts
and inevitably greater news coverage, would also receive greater
opportunity for political self-justification. The arguments for and
against this procedure were finely balanced. La favour of it was 6-be
view that both opposition parties would inevitably be attaaking the
Government more than each other. Against it was the fact that, in the
thin dividing line between government and party, defence of policy
was a party task, and such broadcasts would be party ones. One party
would therefore have greater opportunity than either of the others.
Reith's agreement with Churchill reflected his identification with
'government' and led him for once to ignore party sensitivities. It
was, of course, quite coincidental that the government of the day was
Conservative, but it was unfortunate, for it added to Labour's
growing belief in BBC bias.
On 19 April Reith submitted his proposals to the three parties.
As an introduction to party political controversy he offered three
equal broadcasts in succeeding weeks on the understanding that these
would be used for a general statement of party policy. During the
period of a General Election similarly, exactly equal opportunities
113. BBC, PPBPPB, Reith to Clarendon, 13 April 1928.
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would be offered. As a routine arrangement throughout the year,
however, he proposed fortnightly broadcasting in the ratio of one
government spokesman to each opposition one. In addition a budget
statement and the Prime Minister's annual speech at the Lord Mayor's
Banquet would be broadcast, whilst 'other explanations of government
intention' might be transmitted without being regarded as
114
controversial	 occasions	 involving	 opposition	 replies.
Potentially the most dubious proposal in this letter was the last,
but it was quickly forgotten in the succeeding argument about speaker
ratios. The Conservative Party was delighted with the immediate
advantage offered to them. Patrick Gower called it 'a very good
arrangement', and Davidson told Baldwin that the proposals were
'obviously completel
115
y satisfactory from the point of view of the
Conservative party'.	 He wrote to Reith that they
meet with my entire approval, and I am very grateful to you for
the kindly consideration which you have given to my previous
116
letter.
The Labour Party, although understandably less happy about the
proposals, were sufficiently keen on the idea of political
broadcasting to agree in principle to them, asking only for an all-
117
party conference to discuss details. 	 The Liberals, however,
objected strongly not only to the ratio but also to the budget
broadcast being considered uncontroversial. They also raised the
question of who would decide which explanations of government
intention might be broadcast without opposition reply. Hilda
Matheson's reaction to this was caustic:
114. BBC, PPBPPB, Reith to Henderson, Davidson, Sir Herbert Samuel,
19 April 1928.
115. CCO, CC04/1/22, Gower to Davidson, 25 April 1928; Cab.24,C.P.
158(28), Davidson to Baldwin, 12 May 1928.
16. COO, CC04/1/22, Davidson to Reith (drafted by Gower), I May
1928.
.17. BBC, PPBPPB, Henderson to Reith, 4 May 1928.
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How like the Liberals to make a big fuss because they are a small
118
party. I hope we shall stick to our own proposals.
J.C.C. Davidson was determined that the BBC should have no
option, and asked Baldwin for a Cabinet ruling on the subject before
the all-party conference. Armed with a Cabinet instruction to 'stand
firm in support of the original proposals', he was able at this
meeting on 21 May to stimy completely any compromise proposals by the
119
Liberal Party and the BBC.	 The Labour ParLy, however, was now
beginning to have doubts about its original acceptance, and,
following a National Executive Meeting on 23 May, H.S.Lindsay
informed Reith that it now saw the matter in a different light.
Previously Arthur Henderson and Labour Chief Whip Tom Kennedy, who
had agreed to the proposals, had done so in a belief that such
broadcasts would consist of criticism of the Government. It was now
felt that such critical talks would bring broadcasting into
disrepute, and that speeches should rather be constructive and
expository only. This being so Labour completely changed its position
and, going beyond the compromise now put forward by the Liberals,
120
proposed absolute equality for each national party.	 Reith,
however, did not believe it possible to confine speeches solely to
constructive matter, or to base any arrangement on the substance of
the broadcasts, because in practice it would be impossible to
exercise any real control over content. He therefore resisted the
121
proposal.
118. BBC, PPBPPB, H.F. Oldham (for Samuel) to Reith, 3 May 1928;
note by Matheson on memo by R. Eckersley to her, c. 7 May 1928.
119. Cab.23/29(28); BBC, PPBPPB, Minutes of All Party Conference on
Political Broadcasting, 21 May 1928. Samuel proposed a rota of
7:5:5, the BBC one of 3:2:2.
120. BBC, PPBPPB, H.S. Lindsay to Reith, 24 May 1928. This proposal,
of course, although advocating constructive talks only,
restricted them to the three major parties, and omitted the
Communist Party, even though it had a member in Parliament.
121. COO, CC04/1/22, Gower to Davidson, 25 May 1928.
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In any case the Conservatives knew themselves to be in a strong
position and were little inclined to give way, for they realised that
political broadcasting was not of critical importance to their party.
Sir Patrick Gower's arguments, which Davidson presented to Baldwin
and Cabinet, are worth quoting in their entirety:
(1) The proposals originally submitted represented the unbiased
views of the British Broadcasting Corporation, which is' an
independent body. They meet with the acceptance of the two
parties forming an overwhelming proportion of the House of
Commons, and the fact that objections are raised by an
insignificant body numbering some forty members is not sufficient
justification for upsetting an arrangement which has been
accepted by a vast majority. In this argument I am ignoring the
fact that the Labour Party was subsequently induced to support an
arrangement which was more advantageous to them because it is the
uninfluenced decisions of the various parties which alight to be
weighed in the balance.
(2) On the merits of the proposal it must be recognised that the
Government of the' day is in a special position as compared with
the other two parties. They bear the responsibility of
government. Their function is action, whereas the function of the
Opposition parties is criticism. It is obviously right and proper
that the Government of the day, which owing to its position is
especially a butt for criticism, should have equal opportunities
with the other two parties for answering such criticism, more
especially as any misrepresentations of Government action or
Government Policy may have a harmful effect from the national
point of view.
(3) If we maintain our previous attitude it would be extremely
difficult for the British Broadcasting Corporation to go back
upon their original proposals.
(4) If the British Broadcasting Corporation do attempt to go
back upon them, and there was a failure to reach any agreement,
the fact would not be detrimental to the Conservative Party. A
very large section of the Press of this country is Conservative,
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proposals, there were also very strong party ones; and that it was
Davidson, the Party Chairman and not a Cabinet member, who conveyed
the 'hint' to Reith, suggests that on this occasion the Cabinet was
acting as much as the head of the Party as the head of the state.
Later the threat to use clause 4 became increasingly tied to the
government objection to programmes that they would not be in the
national interest. Such an excuse could not really be used on this
occasion.
Faced with such a clear Cabinet statement of intent only three
months after the removal of the ban, Reith could only accept
discretion to be better than valour. For once it was Lord Clarendon
who tentatively continued to press for a compromise. He pointed out
that the BBC Board, which contained Labour and Liberal
representatives, would not be at all happy at the news of the
Cabinet's hint, and he tried to argue party advantage in permitting
political broadcasting:
As a party man I am really rather apprehensive about the future
if the ban on political controversy is once more re-imposed, for
if we fail to reach agreement now, in my view Labour will when it
comes into office remove it again, and so secure a good deal of
kudos, and furthermore the Conservative Party will, if no leader
comes to the microphone, lose a very valuable medium before the
General Election for explaining its principles and policy to a
126
vast audience.
Such appeals were to no avail, and on 28 June Reith informed the
parties that the BBC had reluctantly decided party political speeches
127
could not be broadcast, no agreement having been possible.
During the remainder of the year the BBC worked cautiously to
establish its other forms of controversial and political affairs
126. CCO, C004/1/22, Clarendon to PIG, 8 June 1928.
127. BBC, PPBPPB, Reith to three parties, 28 June 1928.
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broadcasting, thereby making it more difficult in the future for any
government to reimpose the ban. It did not broach again the subject
of party political broadcasting. As the date of the General Election
approached, however, both the BBC and the Labour and Liberal parties
grew increasingly anxious that broadcasting should play its part.
Shortly before Christmas 1928 Sir Herbert Samuel approached the BBC
once again to arrange party broadcasts, both before and during the
128
election.	 The BBC's reply emphasised that it did not consider it
worth taking the initiative until it was clear that the parties would
129
agree on a procedure.	 Two days previously, however, Hilda
Matheson had reportelto Roger Eckersley on plans for covering the
General Election. Interestingly, in view of later events, there was
no suggestion in her memorandum that the BBC should abstain from
political coverage during the campaign. Indeed quite the reverse was
so, for she suggested an extra five minutes on the news so that
political speeches could be fully covered. She also proposed that if
the parties came to no agreement then the BBC should itself arrange
ad hoc debates on the principal issues', with the best speakers it
130
could get.	 The same day Eckersley and Gladstone Murray visited
J.C.C. Davidson and Joseph Ball to discuss the whole question.
Davidson pleaded that in opposing political broadcasting his only
concern was the good of the Corporation:
he adhered to the view that on the larger ground of the public
interest in the maintenance of a good broadcasting tradition,
131
this innovation would not be a good thing.
Ball signified his 'complete indifference' to Samuel's complaints,
whilst Gladstone Murray said he thought that Samuel. was so anxious
132
that he 'would take anything that he could get'.
128. BBC, PPBGEB, Samuel to Reith, 20 December 1928.
129. BBC, PPBGEB, Carpendale to Samuel, 22 December 1928.
130. BBC, PPBGEB, Matheson to R. Eckersley, 20 December 1928.
131. BBC, PPBPPB, Gladstone Murray to Carpendale, 21 December 1928.
132. CCO, CC04/1/22, memorandum by J. Ball, 20 December 1928.
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The double standards of Davidson's concern for the BBC became
apparent, however, over his interest in a proposed debate on Neville
Chamberlain's De-rating Bill. This arose out of a request by
Chamberlain to the BBC that he broadcast an impartial explanation of
the Bill. Conservative anxiety to explain and justify this unpopular
piece of legislation, which was far too close to an election for
comfort, made both Chamberlain and Davidson amenable to the BBC's
proposals for a three parly debate on one night. This would consist
of three twenty minute talks followed by a ten minute reply by the
government spokesman, the psychologically important final word
133
therefore remaining with the Government. 	 Thus the first party
political debate to be broadcast, on 22 January 1929, between Sir
Kingsley Wood, Arthur Greenwood and Ramsay Muir, was very much by
government permission as a result of their desire to explain an
unpopular measure. In its letters to the Liberal and Labour parties
the BBC did not mention that the original proposal for the suject had
been Conservative, and Samuel complained that the topic chosen was
134
automatically to the Government's advantage.	 The debate itself
received an inevitably mixed reaction. The Morning Post declared that
listeners wanted entertainment, not politics, and most papers found
135
it tedious.	 By contrast it elicited from the Manchester 
Guardian an optimistic declaration of faith in' democracy now that
136
such means of democratic education were available.
	
Predictably
The Listener had nothing but praise:
it represents a new epoch in the development of political
education. ....One was_ principally impressed by the calmness,
logicality and reasonableness of manner of the speakers, so
different from those appeals to prejudice and passion which are
usual on platforms. Perhaps this marks the first step towards a
133. Unfortunately the BBC file on this debate has not survived.
134. BBC, PPBGEB, Samuel to Carpendale, 7 January 1929.
135. See Radio Times, 22 February 1929 for other press comments.
136. Manchester Guardian, 25 January 1929 - editorial, 'Mechanised
Politics'.
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agreement was only until the election
144
and that it could not be
considered a precedent for the future. Reith's formal proposals
were for two series of broadcast speeches on the 2:1 ratio before the
dissolution of parliament, and two sets of three speeches during the
campaign, one of these sets to be specifically by women MPs for women
voters.
Yet agreement had anything but been reached. The Liberals
protested strongly about the proposed length of the broadcasts, the
order of speaking and that one election series of speeches would be
by and for women. The Conservatives felt that enough had been
conceded in agreeing to any broadcasts at all, and objected that
there should be four opposition election broadcasts to their two.
MacDonald objected to the order of speeches and to the BBC's
decision, in response to Conservative protests, to omit the women's
series. He told Reith that he was being drawn to the belief that the
BBC 
was145
adjusting the arrangement in order deliberately to handicap
Labour. The BBC's decision to cancel one of the election series
had been taken in the belief that it would make general agreement
easier, but it was also an unfortunate fact that it coincided with
Conservative wishes, and MacDonald picked this up:
the whole thing has a most unpleasant savour in my nostrils. It
may all have been perfectly innocent, but I really must say that
an innocent creature has never been cursed with a more sinister
146
countenance.
144. BBC, PPBGEB, Samuel to Reith, 22 March 1929, and H.S. Lindsay
to Reith, 26 March 1929; Labour Party papers, NEC minutes, 26
March 1929.
145. BBC, PPBGEB, Samuel to Reith, 27 March 1929; MacDonald to
Reith, 2 April 1929; and Davidson to Reith, 28 March 1929.
146. MacDonald papers, PRO 30/69/5/40, MacDonald to Reith, 8 April
1929. It is an interesting comment on their relationship that
despite his anger MacDonald signed this letter 'With kindest
regards'. It was while this argument was continuing that
MacDonald made his comment about the need to recast the control
of the BBC - see p.342 above.
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A new wireless set had just been installed at Chequers, and Baldwin
listened to it frequently over the weekend 
bef158
ore his broadcast. He
also rehearsed beforehand with Thomas Jones. He was quick to
recognise that impression rather than content was what mattered in
broadcasting, just as on the platform. This led him to take the
unique step of speaking for less than his alloted time of half an
hour. Whereas MacDonald had to be told that 'Half an hour on end is
about the limit of really effective listening time for the average
hearer by wireless', and actually spoke for thirty-eight minutes,
Baldwin informed Reith that he might speak for only fifteen minutes
159
in his final broadcast, and in the event spoke for twenty-three.
Reith helped both MacDonald and Baldwin with their broadcasts, but
his assistance to Baldwin was significant, for he wrote the final two
memorable and thoroughly Baldwinesque paragraphs, concluding:
The personal note does not come easily to me, but as I am
speaking to you, my fellow countrymen and women, mostly in the
quietness of your own homes, in every corner of the land, may I
put it to you 
160
this way:- you trusted me before: I ask you to
trust me again.
158. Thomas Jones, A Whitehall Diary, vol.II, London 1969, 180,182.
159. MacDonald papers, PRO 30/69/5/40, Reith to MacDonald, 30 April
1929; CCO, CC04/1/22, Davidson to Reith, 28 May 1929; BBC
Programme Records, 28-29 May 1929.
160. Baldwin papers, Ba1.199/f214-216, undated draft broadcast (as
given). Following the broadcast Baldwin had many letters of
congratulation. A 'flapper' told him that if only other
politicians would realise that they were speaking to 21 year
olds, 'and deliver their speeches in the same strain as
yourself, then the children (because that is all we are) would
have a better opportunity of choosing a party for themselves
instead of following Father's footsteps'. Another listener
contrasted Baldwin and MacDonald's broadcasts: 'The one so
clear and kind the other so vaporous and critical the contrast
impressed me more than I can say'. Having expressed his
admiration for Baldwin another listener commented that 'Every
word uttered was sincere, and, if I ray be pardoned for saying
so, without any recriminations...' - Ba1.38/f5-6,12,62, 29-30
May 1929.
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Another myth to have developed since 1945 is that before the war
the BBC's desire for impartiality, and its inherent caution, led it
completely to refrain from broadcasting any potentially political
items during the election, party broadcasts excepted, and not even to
report the progress of the campaign as it developed. This was simply
not so in 1929, and indeed the BBC showed remarkable boldness in its
determination to use standard news values rather than the need for
absolute balance as its criteria for coverage. Reith ruled that
election speeches should be treated as other news and judged on their
news value. He felt that although the BBC should avoid showing undue
partiality to any one party that did 61not mean it had to be over
1
anxious to give equal space to each.
	 Regional station directors
were assured, regarding local news, that
there is no reason through fear or accusations of partiality, to
omit political news, such as the adoption of candidates, accounts
or announcements of political meetings and speeches and other
matters of a similar kind. These subjects have a considerable
news value at th1e6yresent time, which will increase until the
General Election.
Towards the end of the campaign News Editor E.C. Henty analysed the
BBC's news reportage for Reith. Between 9 April and 22 May
(parliament having been dissolved on 10 May) 17 Conservative, 15
Labour and 15 Liberal speeches had been reported. In terms of news
lines broadcast before the dissolution this meant respectively 145,
55 and 146, the extremely low Labour figure being a consequence of
the late start of its campaign. Since the dissolution the figures had
been Conservative 131, Labour 149, Liberal 80,. giving totals
respectively of 276, 204 and 226 lines of coverage. Henty explained
that although it had been possible to balance the number of speeches
broadcast, the length of the speeches had been more difficult, and he
161. BBC, NBPB, memo by E.C. Henty, 10 April 1929.
162. BBC, NBPB, E.C.Henty (for Director of Talks) to Station
Directors, 17 April 1929.
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165
achievements or programme without appearing to be partisan.
No Labour politician appeared in such non-party broadcasts after the
dissolution, although Ernest Bevin of the T&GWU and TUC General
Council (but not an MP) broadcast on 'Accidents in Industry' on 8
May.
With the removal of the ban on political controversy and with the
1929 General Election the BBC entered properly into the business of
political communication. The fundamentals of development in the 1930s
could already be seen - a BBC se -eking to experiment and expand
this aspect of its national role, but with a deep sense of
responsibility, a respect for government and the 'national interest',
and a knowledge of the Government's real power over it; on the
political side an anxious, eager and frustrated Labour (and Liberal)
ParLy already suspicious of BBC motives, particularly in its lower
levels where personal acquaintance with Reith could not reassure it
as to the Corporation's soundness; and on the Conservative side an
astute and aware leadership, playing a tactical game and, until May
1929, holding most of the advantages. Yet once again there was in the
ranks a growing suspicion of BBC bias, which was to surface between
1929 and 1931. Throughout the BBC, the three parties and the press,
however, there was one common belief, and that was that broadcasting
could provide a political propaganda and education channel of
unrivalled power, and that it could and would fundamentally change
the political process. For good or ill broadcasting had indeed
entered into politics.
165. Chamberlain papers, NC18/1/654, Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 18
May 1929.
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Note A 
The continual association of broadcasting policy with the
attainment of the democratic ideal is well illustrated by this
Listener editorial of 13 November 1929, which continued:
To-day we are in some danger of losing our own democracy because
the vastness and complexity of our civilisation offers so few
possibilities of personal contact between those who think and
rule and those who act and obey. By bringing those leaders of
thought to the microphone and inducing them to bare their inner
philosophy before us all, broadcasting is restoring the somewhat
frayed faith of the man in the street in his leaders ... We feel
sure that in due course the series will come to be looked back
upon as a landmark in the growth of the contribution of
broadcasting to the education of democracy.
